The purpose of this dissertation is to make sense of two sets of reactions. On the one hand, Americans can barely lift a finger to help threatened and endangered species while on the other, they routinely come to the aid of human victims of disaster. I argue that in contrast to cases of human tragedy, for the biodiversity crisis conservationists are faced not only with the familiar yet arduous task of motivating the American public to care for living other-than-humans, but they are also saddled with having to overcome the motivation problem of future ethics. The motivation problem consists in eliminating or bridging a motivational gap that lies between knowledge of the effects of our actions on future generations and action taken based upon such knowledge. The gap exists because motives that typically move people to action are either ineffective or unavailable. What is more, the gap influences not only our ability to care for future humans, but it affects our ability to care for future other-than-humans as well. Biodiversity loss is in fact a subset of the problem of future generations, an identification hitherto little appreciated. I argue that conservationists can overcome the motivational gap not by appealing directly to the value of species or biodiversity, both of which are temporally distant, abstract and general moral patients, but indirectly, by focusing on the concrete and particular lives of extant and near future moral patients. By applying techniques that have been developed to overcome the motivation problem as it pertains to distant future human generations, conservationists have additional resources to draw upon in their efforts to motivate American citizens to preserve biodiversity. This dissertation’s contribution to the fields of environmental philosophy and conservation biology is both theoretical and practical. It is theoretically significant to elucidate the nature of moral failure for biodiversity conservation. In terms of broader impacts, identifying the basis of moral failure for biodiversity conservation allows me to assess educational campaigns and environmental policy, and to suggest solutions for bridging the motivational gap.

Modern states are committed to the implicit assumption that one generation has the normative power to bind later generations through laws and contracts. My dissertation explores this assumption through two case studies: constitutions and sovereign debt contracts. I show that in both cases the assumption of transgenerational binding shapes the legal practices and doctrines of modern states. It informs, for instance, the ratification of eternity clauses, the interpretation of constitutions, and the doctrines of sovereign immunity and odious debt. But although these practices of transgenerational binding are prevalent in modern states, they stand in tension, I argue, with the liberal moral commitments of these states. Liberals are committed to moral individualism, according to which only individual human beings (and some nonhuman animals) are moral persons. Moral individualism, I show, is incompatible with the assumption of transgenerational binding and its accompanying practices and doctrines. By contrast, moral statism, according to which states themselves are moral persons, can easily justify those transgenerational practice. But moral statist justifications are illiberal because they assign states intrinsic moral status above and beyond individual human beings. I argue that liberals must engage in revisionism whichever theory of political obligation they pick - whether it is a theory of agreement, restitution, justice, reciprocity, or instrumentalism. If liberals assume moral individualism and combine it with any of these theories, they will be forced either to declare some transgenerational practices and doctrines illegitimate or to revise the justification and scope of transgenerational binding in light of instrumentalism. If liberals choose moral statism, they will be able to justify the transgenerational doctrines and practices of constitutions and sovereign debt contracts - but only at the cost of illiberalism. The dissertation's analysis thus shows that liberals face a trilemma between illegitimacy, instrumentalism, and illiberalism.

Why do we care for future generations? This work argues that the reason we care for future generations lies in our psychogenetic nature. When we think of future generations, we feel that we have to do something for them. If we all have a common feeling profile, it is plausible to assume that this common feeling profile includes &ldquo / caring for future generations&rdquo / , because all of us do care for at least our own future generations. This psychogenetic disposition enables us to explain why sometimes we act as if we do not care for future generations as well. I believe that instead of telling people what their obligations are, it would be more realistic to reach their feelings deep inside: once people are aware of their true feelings, the situation can change.

In this essay, I will examine the theory of territorial rights developed by Anna Stilz. The overarching project of hers is to defend a system of territorially sovereign states, the defense of which is grounded in the natural rights of individuals to personal autonomy and self-preservation. She begins her theoretic project by arguing for the plausibility of the preinstitutional occupancy right, intended to grant individuals usage-rights over the earth, existing irrespective of social or moral conventions, formally defined as follows: “Occupancy Rights. A person has a preinstitutional right to occupy a particular area if (1) access to spaces in that area is fundamental to his located life plans and (2) his connection to the territory was established without any wrongdoing on his part, involving (at a minimum) no expulsion or wrongful interference with prior occupants or infringement of others’ claims to an equitable distribution of geographical space.” The condition of equitable distribution expresses a concern for proportionality.  It seems as if Stilz believes that no territorial holding will be legitimate unless it is of an appropriate scale, with regard to the holdings of others. This condition is referred to by Stilz as the fair-use proviso. The fair-use proviso concerns the occupancy claims made by individuals. Stilz also introduces conditions for a legitimate global distribution of territory, named as the full proviso. Stilz’ defines the full proviso as follows: (conditions for a legitimate global distribution of territory): “The full proviso hold that a just distribution of the earth’s spaces must (i) satisfy everyone’s basic territorial interests and (ii) grant groups with shared practice-based interests the right to use geographical space in ways that reflect these interests, so long as the groups are of sufficient size, and so far as this is institutionally feasible.” For an individual occupancy claim to be legitimate is simply that it is consistent with the conditions for a legitimate global distribution of territory, i.e. the full proviso. The full proviso and the fair-use proviso are thus inseparable parts of a whole. In what follows, if not specified otherwise, I will alternate in referring to the fair-use proviso as the fair-use proviso or simply the proviso. The full proviso will always be italicized when discussed.  The purpose of this essay is to investigate whether the fair-use proviso is satisfying in the face of some criticism. In completing this task, I will draw on an objection put forth by Lea Ypi. The objection as formulated by her is not in direct response to Stilz, however I believe we might draw on her work to formulate a powerful objection from scarcity to Stilz’ fair-use proviso. The question at stake in this essay is thus if the objection of scarcity is successful against Stilz’ fair-use proviso.

This paper is concerned with the examination of Caspar Hare's (2007) de dicto approach to the non-identity problem and specifically the non-identity case of The Inconsiderate Mother. On the de dicto approach an act can be wrong if it makes things de dicto worse for a role, even if that act does not make things worse for any actual person that fills that role. In this paper I provide a brief overview and reconstruction of Hare's argument. I argue that objections to Hare's arguments due to David Wasserman (2008) do not give us reason to dismiss the de dicto approach. Lastly I consider an objection to the effect that Hare's solution to the non-identity problem is ad hoc. I conclude that the de dicto approach faces some challenges but that we cannot readily dismiss it.

<p>Recent discussions on global climate change have brought to our attention the largely disruptive influence of human activity on the planet and its inhabitants. Moral philosophers have added to the discourse their concerns about the unprecedented environmental problem of global climate change which threatens, and increasingly so, human welfare and the stability of the planet. The circumstances should be of concern to all, including philosophers who beyond their own endeavours will be affected by climate change. There are good reasons to think that the circumstances surrounding global climate change are morally repugnant and that serious action is required to avert global catastrophe and widespread suffering.</p> <p>Our discussion will draw attention to the ethical dimensions of climate change given present knowledge about the state of the global environment and human welfare across the planet, now and into foreseeable future. My aims in this paper are twofold. First, I will provide a survey of various arguments that fit under the umbrella of climate change ethics as a way to gauge their suitability to address the wider issues that should be of concern to us. Second, by seeking to refute these arguments on a number of theoretical grounds, I will make the case that the climate change problem is best understood through a welfarist lens. Climate change is fundamentally a problem of distributive justice for present and future generations and, as such, it is of great urgency to protect human welfare over the long run.</p> <p>The main argument begins in the first chapter with an overview of climate change against the backdrop of existing realities. We will take a look at the economics and science of climate change to gain a better understanding of issue, namely its origins and implications for the planet across space and time. In subsequent chapters, we defer to a variety of principles of global and intergenerational justice which are thought to offer moral guidance for the successful resolution of the climate change problem. Having concluded in the third chapter that we must focus on considerations of distributive justice, indeed those that are ultimately but not only utilitarian, the final chapter explores the appropriateness of various mechanisms and systems which would constitute a fair global climate regime.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

This thesis explores how architectural design can shape future generations by creating kindergarten environments that foster a profound connection with nature, promote self-directed learning, and instill social responsibility. The study draws on historical perspectives, examining the origins of kindergartens inspired by Friedrich Froebel, which emphasized nature and community-oriented spaces. It contrasts these with contemporary approaches shaped by evolving pedagogies and societal needs, highlighting the demand for adaptable, multifunctional learning spaces. The proposed design introduces a new architectural vision, integrating sustainable elements to create "a building that teaches." Inspired by the natural geometry, the design emphasizes flexibility and adaptability to support children's holistic development. This approach seeks to nurture environmentally conscious individuals by fostering a mindset of harmonious coexistence with nature. Through architectural strategies, the project addresses the developmental needs of children while unlocking their potential to contribute positively to global challenges. By reimagining kindergarten architecture, this study underscores the role of design in shaping a sustainable and socially responsible future, aiming to inspire generations to live as integral, caring members of Earth's ecosystem. / Master of Architecture / This project examines how the design of kindergartens can influence future generations by creating spaces that encourage a strong bond with nature, foster independent learning, and promote a sense of social responsibility. It looks at the origins of kindergartens, inspired by educational pioneer Friedrich Froebel, who emphasized natural settings and community-focused learning. These ideas are compared to modern approaches that address evolving educational needs and emphasize flexible, multifunctional spaces. The proposed design introduces a forward-thinking approach to kindergarten architecture. By incorporating natural elements and sustainable materials, the design creates "a building that teaches," encouraging children to learn through interaction with their environment. Inspired by natural geometry (geometry from nature), the design is meant to be adaptable and grow with the needs of its users, supporting children's overall development while nurturing environmental awareness. This vision goes beyond creating a building—it aims to help children develop into thoughtful, eco-conscious individuals who live in harmony with nature. By rethinking how kindergartens are built, this project highlights how architecture can play a key role in preparing future generations to face global challenges responsibly.

In this dissertation, I investigate the implications of libertarian morality in relation to the problem of climate change. This problem is explicated in the first chapter, where preliminary clarifications are also made. In the second chapter, I briefly explain the characteristics of libertarianism relevant to the subsequent study, including the central non-aggression principle. In chapter three, I examine whether our individual emissions of greenhouse gases, which together give rise to climate change, meet this principle. I do this based on the assumption that we are the legitimate owners of the resources we use in those activities. In the fourth chapter, I question this assumption and scrutinize libertarianism’s restrictions on appropriations of climate-relevant resources, which leads me to distinguish between some different versions of the libertarian view. Toward the end of the chapter, I also examine libertarianism’s answer to the political question regarding how emission rights should be distributed. The fifth chapter investigates libertarianism’s verdicts for mere risks of infringement, as stemming from people’s emissions and acts of appropriations. In chapter six, I investigate the libertarian right to self-defense against both the effects of climate change and other people’s climate-relevant activities. In chapter seven, I discuss two intergenerational issues related to climate change: what libertarianism says concerning future generations and how libertarianism might deal with the problem of historical emissions. The eighth chapter explores the implications of libertarianism regarding collective moral wrongdoing in connection to climate change. In chapter nine, I take a look at the libertarian room for governmental responses for tackling climate change. The tenth and final chapter is a summary. The overall conclusion of the dissertation is that libertarianism recommends that we reduce our emissions and decrease our extraction of natural resources such as forests and fossil fuels. Furthermore, governments are permitted to undertake some quite substantial actions in order to fight the causes of climate change. I end with some bottom-up reflections on what these conclusions might say about the plausibility of libertarianism. I claim that although libertarianism after all manages to explain some of our moral intuitions regarding climate change, it is questionable whether libertarianism’s explanation is better than those offered by alternative moral theories.

This dissertation has three aims: 1. To evaluate several ethical theories about responsibility towards future generations. 2. To construct a theory about responsibility towards future generations. 3. To carry out an ethical evaluation of different nuclear waste management methods. Five theories are evaluated with the help of evaluative criteria, primarily: A theory must provide future generations with some independent moral status. A theory should acknowledge moral pluralism. A theory should provide some normative claims about real-world problems. Derek Parfit’s theory provides future generations with full moral status. But it is incompatible with moral pluralism, and does not provide reasonable normative claims about real-world problems. Brian Barry’s theory provides such claims and a useful idea about risk management, but it does not provide an argument why future generations ought to exist. Avner de-Shalit’s theory explains why they ought to exist; however, his theory can not easily explain why we ought to care for other people than those in our own community. Emmanuel Agius’ theory gives an ontological explanation for mankind’s unity, but reduces conflicts of interests to a common good. Finally, Hans Jonas’ theory shifts the focus from the situation of future generations to the preconditions of human life generally. However, his theory presupposes a specific ontology, which might be unable to motivate people to act. The concluding chapters describe a narrative theory of responsibility. It claims that we should comprehend ourselves as parts of the common story of mankind and that we ought to provide future generations with equal opportunities. This implies that we should avoid transferring risks and focus on reducing the long-term risks associated with the nuclear waste.

The aim of the thesis is to systematically present, analyse and critically reflect Hans Jonas's (1903-1993) conception of moral responsibility with respect to his axiological ontology, anthropology, speculative theology and conception of modern technology with account of the most important topically relevant German secondary sources, including the latest ones. The first chapter maps the relevant Czech and Slovak secondary sources, whereby it evaluates to what extent Jonas's ethics of responsibility represented a general or applied approach, whether it was only an ethics of survival and whether in this context Jonas's thinking can be labelled anthropocentric. The second chapter offers insight primarily into Jonas's ethical thought in the chronological context of his life. The third chapter analyses Jonas's axiological ontology, anthropology, speculative theology and conception of modern technology. Against this philosophical and speculative-theological background the fourth chapter critically examines Jonas's conception of moral responsibility proper. The fifth chapter critically reflects on both the philosophical and speculative-theological background of Jonas's conceptions of responsibility and the conception itself. An excursus into applied ethics, which concludes the fifth chapter and the work as a whole, finally solves a topical ethical challenge in the sphere of assisted reproduction having to do with the categorical imperative of Jonas's responsibility for future generations. The main results of critical analysis and reflection: Jonas's ethics of responsibility is a supplementary applied conception, an ethics of survival, whose normative axiom commands the preservation (perpetuation) of the human capacity to responsibility. Jonas's thought is monistically anthropocentric. That follows from Jonas's integral monism, in which the difference between god and world, spirit and matter, reality and possibility is levelled out. These monistic confusions are more or less also projected into the ethical points of departure of Jonas's conception of responsibility, especially his specific axiological onto(theo)logy, in which the difference between ontology and axiology is levelled out. The main characteristic of Jonas's proper conception of responsibility consists in confusion (identification) of the object of responsibility with the instance of responsibility - from which at the level of theory of responsibility Jonas's specific two-place relationship of responsibility (subject - object=instance) follows. Although Jonas within his ethics of responsibility, in order to justify responsibility for future generations, broadened his specific two-place relationship to a three-place one, the author of this thesis finds none of the versions of Jonas's three-place relationship plausible - though the author agrees that an at least three-place conception of responsibility is necessary (instance - subject - object). However, for a more differentiated analysis of responsibility a five-place conception is suitable (normative standard - instance - subject - action - object affected by the action), with respect to the possibility of solving some of the problems of Jonas's responsibility for future generations a six-place conception (last instance - normative standard - instance - subject - action - object affected by the action).