This dissertation addresses organized crime in post-Soviet Eurasia (Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan) exploring the nexus between politics, business and crime. Based on extensive field research in the three countries the dissertation examines organized crime groups in the region and describes their inter-relationships with political and business elites, then discusses the impact of the three countries’ Coloured Revolutions on crime and corruption. The impacts of the revolutions on organized crime are situated in several variables, among them political opposition to incumbent regimes; the strength of civil society and the role of organized crime groups during the revolutionary processes; personal morals of the leaders and their views on cooperation with organized crime; and the presence and nature of the “pact” between outgoing and incoming elites. The dissertation also takes into account larger explanatory variables, such as geography, natural resources, industry, and regional wars and documents their role in shaping organized crime. In accounting for the diverging patterns of the three countries in terms of post-revolutionary effects on crime and corruption, the role of the West, defined as a “push” factor for democratization, and the experience of earlier statehood are also considered. The interaction between elites and criminals is regarded as a crucial part of state formation, and is characterized by shifting dominance between the actors of the underworld and upperworld. The thesis identifies points of cooperation and conflict between licit and illicit actors, and provides insight into the collusive nature of criminal networks in the post-Soviet context, arguing that the distinction between licit and illicit is frequently blurred and the representatives of the upperworld are sometimes key participants in organized criminal activity.

The cases of the Kurds in Iraq and the Abkhaz in Georgia were chosen to illustrate how ethnic entrepreneurs play a crucial role in the ethnic mobilisation process. The study argues that in both cases a combination of variables was at work. These cases seem unlikely comparisons at first. The primary challenge appeared to be dealing with cases that involve different contexts and identities. However, in both cases entrepreneurs exploited an appropriate domestic environment to start the process and they perceived the opportunities provided by external intervention and the state’s policy towards their groups as incentives. Choosing the intermediate variables depends on the understanding that each one provides part of the explanation. Political opportunity structure directs the attention to the cost-benefit analyses of ethnic entrepreneurs and their perceptions of the available opportunity. Ethnic identity politicisation illustrates the role of ethnic entrepreneurs in choosing and activating identities. Finally, resource mobilisation is essential in conflict as any conflict requires resources that are consumed throughout its various stages. These resources are also used by ethnic entrepreneurs to reward their followers and guarantee loyalty, or sometimes to provide material incentives to reassure those unconvinced of the movement's potential success against the central authorities.

This dissertation analyzes the adoption of neoliberal economic policies in the wake of two shocks, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Color Revolutions. I look at whether policy choices in the aftermath of massive political change significantly constrain future economic policy. Two arguments have attempted to explain post-Soviet economic reform, one arguing that initial elections largely determined economic reform, and another arguing that even the results of initial elections were conditioned by a state's neighbors and diffusion. In the first chapter I test these arguments, using regression analysis to update and reanalyze determinants of economic reform in post-Soviet Eurasia. My results indicate that initial elections may have been influential in the short term, but their influence is indirect. Instead, the Soviet collapse created an opening for the establishment of patronage dynamics, and it is these dynamics that largely determine the timing of economic reform. I then use three cases to illustrate why early evaluations of post-Soviet economic reforms need revision. Analysis of Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan after each shock demonstrates that elites and political institutions are important determinants of reforms, and there is significant variation in neoliberal policy adoption that previous arguments do not explain. I find that economic policy mirrors political cycles of patronalism in these countries and the effects of shocks on policy are not straightforward. When economic reform does occur, it is often an instrument used to advance other political goals.

This dissertation provides an in-depth study of police transformation in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It draws upon interviews with police, NGO workers, politicians and international practitioners, and employs a comparative-historical approach. Contra to democratic policing approaches, advocating the diffusion of police power and implementation of police reform concurrently with wider democratisation, reform was relatively successful in Georgia after the 2003 Rose Revolution because of state-building. The new government monopolised executive power, fired many police, recruited new personnel, raised police salaries and clamped down on organised crime and corruption. Success also depended on the elite's political will and their appeal to Georgian nationalism. Prioritisation of state-building over democratisation limited the reform's success, however. The new police are politicised and have served elites' private interests. Reform has failed in Kyrgyzstan because of a lack of state-building. Regional, clan and other identities are stronger than Kyrgyz nationalism. This has hindered the formation of an elite with capacity to implement reform. The state has limited control over the police, who remain corrupt and involved in organised crime. State-building has not precipitated police reform in Russia because of the absence of political will. The ruling cohort lacks a vision of reform and relies on corruption to balance the interests of political factions. The contrasting patterns of police reform have a number of implications for democratic police reform in transitioning countries: First, reform depends on political will. Second, institutionalising the police before democratising them may be a more effective means of acquiring the capacity to implement reform. Third, such an approach is likely to require some sort of common bond such as nationalism to legitimate it. Fourth, ignoring democratisation after institutionalisation is risky as reformers can misuse their power for private interests.