Thesis (MPA.) --University of Limpopo, 2017 / This study was undertaken to evaluate the effectiveness of the oversight role of the Portfolio Committee on Education, in determining their influence on accountability functions by the Department of Education. The overall aim is to provide an understanding into inherent challenges in the oversight role of the Portfolio Committee on Education in the Limpopo Legislature. The study further aimed to collect data on the role played by the Members of the Education Portfolio Committee on how they exercise their oversight role in ensuring that the Department of Basic Education delivers quality service to the public. As such, the study was conducted from a qualitative perspective; using interviews and documentation analysis. The results of this study indicate that although Members of the Limpopo Legislature, particularly Members of the Portfolio Committee on Education, are capacitated to conduct oversight over the Department of Basic Education, there are still gaps and challenges as far as the oversight role of Parliament is concerned. The study further reveals that the Portfolio Committee’s ineffectiveness when performing its oversight may be attributed to the Department’s lack of co-operation, submission of poor quality reports, non-compliance with rules and regulations, Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) (and other policies), deviation from the budget, unwillingness to implement the Committee’s recommendations and failure to submit required documentation to Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) and the Auditor General’s (AG) Office. / Limpopo Legislature

“For too long the world has stood by in the face of atrocities. The Responsibility to Protect is a commitment to act.” After the 2005 World Summit, the international community endorsed a new international norm, the Responsibility to Protect. This new international norm stipulates that the primary responsibility to protect the population of a country lies with the state itself. When a state is either unable or unwilling to protect peoples, the responsibility shifts to the international community. The obligation must be exercised preventively and the tools of action include diplomatic, legal and other peaceful measures; coercive measures such as sanctions; and, as a last resort, military force. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2011. / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/ / nf2012 / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

In order to complement existing empirical research on democratic consolidation in Kenya and the role of the judiciary in particular, this mini-­‐dissertation analyses the relationship between judicial appointment processes and judicial independence in Kenya. The escalation of corruption, centralisation and abuse of power by the executive, the lack of government accountability and post-­‐election conflict of 2007 is linked to the dominance of the executive and corresponding subservience of the judiciary. Historically, judicial appointments have been the ambit of the President. The powers given to the President to appoint and remove judges have resulted in judicial appointments premised on allegiance to the executive rather than on upholding justice and the Bill of Rights. To rectify this deficiency, the 2010 Constitution has introduced a merit based system of judicial appointments that meets international standards on judicial independence. The new process requires the President to limit his appointments to the recommendations of a Judicial Service Commission whose responsibility it is to shortlist candidates through a transparent public process. An analysis of the selection of Kenya’s sitting Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice demonstrates that the reformed judicial appointment process has delegitimised the executive’s dominance over the judiciary and by so doing has placed Kenya on the road restoring judicial independence. / Dissertation (MPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / gm2014 / Centre for Human Rights / unrestricted

The number of Ombudsman offices in U.S. federal agencies rose dramatically in the 1990s. This study investigates why, despite the efforts of policymakers to force staff reductions across the federal government, Ombudsman offices continued to be established to the point that almost every agency has an Ombudsman. This study uses neo-institutionalist theory to pinpoint indicators that explain what has triggered the proliferation of external facing Ombudsmen in the federal government. The results of this historical retrospective investigation, which uses a mixed methods approach, indicate that the offices were created to ensure procedural justice and as a response to both: stakeholder pressures (since the population became more vocal and active, demanding access to the government, transparency, and accountability) and congressional mandates (such as the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act (ADRA) of 1990 and 1996 the Alternative Dispute Resolution Acts from 1998). This is consistent with neo-institutionalist expectations that organizations change as the result of pressures from forces in the environment combined with the drive for survival. As change accelerates, isomorphism occurs as organizations and agencies adopt strategies that have worked for other similar organizations in their environment. / Ph. D.

Thesis (MPA. (Public Administration)) -- University of Limpopo, 2018 / The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 requires the Legislature in Local, Provincial and National Governments to hold the Executive accountable and continue to do oversight on the work of government. The Legislature in executing its work, sometimes make use of the Auditor General’s reports, Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) reports and all other reports submitted by constitutional institutions, the Executive and other agents of the State. The study investigates whether the Legislature understands its mandate as legislated and whether the legislation is efficient and effective in ensuring accountability and conducting oversight of the work of the Executive. The research methodology used in this study is the qualitative approach. The respondents were clear that the Legislature understand its business as legislated, and further that there is a challenge at implementation of these important functions of the Legislature. There is varying implementation due to resources, capacity constraints and lack of commitment. The study recommends that the training of Members of the Legislature and staff, allocation of adequate resources and proper planning. The commitment of the Members of the Executive to the process and implementation of consequence management for poor performance and key interventions to ensure efficient and effective oversight of public finances in the province

This is a qualitative research study undertaken to explore the extent to which Evidence based and Results based management approaches are being applied in SA in the area of public policy, with the aim of improving policy performance feedback. The orientation of this study was influenced by the problem statement which is stated in Chapter 1 as the general absence of reliable and appropriate performance information that is required to evaluate policy performance and gauge the impact of government‘s policy decisions. Reviewed literature, in Chapter 2, shows that generation and utilisation of reliable performance information, to a large extent, depend on the effectiveness of an evaluation system that is outcomes-based and embedded in a functional evidence-based system. Thus chapter 2 attempts to explain processes (mechanisms and practices) that lead to the availability and utilisation of reliable and credible performance information. Chapter 2 assists the researcher to answer the secondary research question of this study; which is, does embedding a monitoring and evaluation system in an evidence-based system contribute to an outcomes-based and accountable government? This study, though critical of the emerging policy evaluation framework in SA, acknowledges efforts made in the policy arena since 1994 (which is discussed in chapters 3). Thus, in identifying challenges, this study seeks to take a prospective approach that would outline the issues which government must grapple with in order to successfully institutionalise an outcomes based policy evaluation system. In this study institutionalisation of an outcomes-based policy evaluation system refers to the creation of a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system which produces monitoring information and evaluation findings which are judged valuable by key stakeholders, and are used in the pursuit of evidence-based decision making (Mackay 2006:5). Based upon the findings of this study, the researcher concludes that the government has adopted a technocratic approach to monitoring and evaluation, paying little attention to the broader institutional and systemic issues. At the core of the matter is an under-emphasis of the political influence on the effectiveness of the evaluation systems. This study further argues that even the recent public reforms, driven through the newly established Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Ministry, continue to advocate for this technocratic approach with little or no consideration of the political environment within which evaluations are supposed to be executed. Therefore the researcher recommends that in order to institutionalise the Outcomes-Based policy evaluation system, interventions should be made at different levels; that is, political and administrative levels. Political interventions would entail reforming the current electoral system, and strengthening the role and capacity of parliamentary organs. On the other hand, administrative interventions would entail accelerating differentiated evaluation support programmes, strengthening financial accountability and budget allocation mechanisms. This study found that, despite government‘s much publicised intentions of implementing an outcomes-based approach through the GWM&ES, most government departments are far from implementing outcomes-based policy evaluation systems. Evaluation culture is weak and, if done, evaluations only occasionally inform strategic directions of the departments. This in turn discourages departments from conducting evaluations. The extent to which departments have applied the GWM&ES is the subject of this research. Chapters 3 and 4 address this matter and thus assist the researcher to answer the main research question of this study; which is, what strides have been made by SA towards an outcomes-based policy evaluation framework – ―Where are we and what are the gaps? / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2011.

In this research study an investigation was launched into the monitoring and evaluation system that the government introduced to monitor and evaluate the performance information produced by the Provincial Government Departments on the implementation of their annual performance plans. The Government Departments obtain budget approval from the Legislature and submit their three-year performance plans with their budgets. The government realized that service delivery was not improving against the back drop of annually increasing the budgets. The monitoring and evaluation system was introduced to assist the Government Departments with the implementation of their annual performance plans. Monitoring and evaluation serves as a control measure and deviations can be detected from the planned outputs of the Government Departments. Corrective measures must be instituted that will have the effect that the Government Departments meet the targets set in the indicators as approved in the annual performance plans. A literature review was conducted on monitoring and evaluation regarding the ideal manner in which it should be performed. The South African Government introduced a number of discussion documents from the Presidency and National Treasury on monitoring and evaluation. Several authors raised their views on the matter and it was captured in the research study. The methodology followed was based on the Systems Theory and a questionnaire was prepared and circulated amongst Political Office Bearers and Chief Officials in the Provincial Government Departments in the Eastern Cape on the issues that was researched. Interviews were conducted with selected participants to gain clarity on specific issues related to the questionnaire. The official annual report issued by the Auditor General to the Provincial Legislature served as official document in the research study. The data collected from the questionnaire, interviews and official documentation was analyzed and graphs were drawn and deductions were made from the results. Findings and recommendations were made from the data collected and a summary was compiled of the issues raised in the research study.

Since the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, which identified the three spheres of government as distinctive, interrelated and interdependent, the local government sphere has been perceived in many parts of the country to be failing to fulfil its mandate of delivering essential basic services to local communities. The mandate of the South African local sphere of government has been to provide a developmental and accountable local government and to ensure provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner. As a key developmental agent, local government is obliged by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 to develop a culture of municipal governance that encourage and create conditions for the local community to participate in the affairs of the municipality. In this regard, ward committees have been introduced to municipalities as community structures to play a critical role in linking and informing the municipalities about the needs, aspirations and challenges of their communities. In adherence to national legislation, such as the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 (Act117 of 1998) and the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 2000 (Act 32 of 2000), the City of Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality established advisory structures in the form of ward committees throughout its area of jurisdiction to advise the municipal council on any matter within the council’s competence. As a representative structure of the community the ward committee is expected to serve as a link between the council and the community and for this purpose articulates community needs and aspirations to better the living standards of the community. Despite the stated objectives of ward committees, the Du Noon area has been identified by City of Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality IDP: 2012-2017 as the ward with backlogs in infrastructure and service delivery. This study evaluates the extent at which the Du Noon ward committee (Ward 104) is enhancing service delivery in its area of jurisdiction. A sequential use of mixed methods was preferred, since quantitative and qualitative research methods were found to be complementary rather than opposed approaches. Using both obtrusive and unobtrusive collection procedures, the methods employed proofed practically useful. To this end, the study sought to examine extent at which the Du Noon ward committee is enhancing service delivery in its area of jurisdiction. The study further attempted to suggest practical techniques of bringing a resolve to the challenges faced by the ward committee in as far as providing effective and efficient service delivery to the community without fail.

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009. / The study investigated what the degree of political accountability is in water projects as practiced by project implementers. The evaluation was also aimed at determining the impact of political accountability on project sustainability. In order to evaluate the question, field research was conducted. Field research was of a quantitative nature, using a questionnaire. This involved (a) selecting two systems (project implementers, a municipality and a non-governmental organisation) where the systems’ political accountability within water projects could be compared, and (b) interviewing community respondents from a set questionnaire in four villages. The main findings are that (i) the level of political accountability in water projects depends on the system implementing a water project, (ii) three elements of political accountability (responsibility, information, and inclusion) differ significantly between the two systems, and (iii) political accountability has a significant impact on project sustainability. It is recommended that project implementers take into consideration the identified three elements of political accountability in order to improve project sustainability.

The Big 4 global networks (Deloitte, Ernst & Young [E&Y], KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers [PwC]) market themselves as providers of worldwide seamless services and consistent audit quality through their members. Under the current environment in which these auditors operate, there are three types of global network members: inspected non-U.S. affiliates (inspected affiliates, hereafter), non-inspected non-U.S. affiliates (non-inspected affiliates, hereafter), and inspected U.S. offices (U.S. offices, hereafter). The recent suspension of the China-based Big 4 affiliates from auditing U.S.-listed companies calls into question whether these global networks can deliver the same level of audit quality across all their members and whether those located in jurisdictions denying access to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB or Board, hereafter) to conduct inspections may benefit from such inspections. This study examines the effect of being an affiliate and the effect of PCAOB inspections on perceived audit quality. I use earnings response coefficients (ERCs) as a proxy for perceived audit quality. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2015. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection