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Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

Resumé Presented thesis is dedicated to specific problems of van Gogh's art. In the first chapters I investigate Heidegger's philosophy of art and his philosophical interpretation of van Gogh's painting Old shoes. Second chapter is dedicated to the critical reaction of distinguished art-historian Meyer Schapiro. Schapiro wrote two short texts, where he attacked Heidegger's way of interpretation of the painting. But Schapiro did not take into account Heidegger's philosophical arguments and completely misunderstood Heidegger's essay. Third chapter is dedicated to the "conclusion" of the conflict of interpretations. In late seventies French philosopher Jacques Derrida published an article (Restitutions), which deals with previous contributions. Derrida seriously attempted to investigate philosophical principals of Heidegger and Schapiro and he suggested, that both authors have the same tendency to appropriate the shoes to some person, in Heidegger's case to peasant woman in that of Schapiro to van Gogh. Derrida tried to leave the "theory of appropriation" by saying that the shoes belong to the painting. I also added two appendices dedicated to specific problems of van Gogh's painting. In first appendix I investigated the role of synthesis of painting and drawing in van Gogh. In second appendix I trace the...

Linguistic mood is a grammatical term as well as a morphological category of the verb. Due to its often philosophical implications it is challenging to find a definition or a common understanding of the notion; it has been proven historically and linguistically difficult to analyze. In this essay I aim to cast new light upon and interpret the concept of mood in extended, philosophical manners. The argument of the essay is that the traditional approach to the notion is done in ways that omit fundamental aspects of it, as well as puts it into a framework that tries to explain it in ways through which it cannot fully be explained. Thus the thesis is that there is more to the notion than what meets the eye. The idea is to find this through the work of phenomenologists. Alongside a linguistic use, the word mood [Modus/mode] is also being used in philosophy, most notably within a phenomenological discourse. Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty all use the word. By going through a close-reading of the concept, I argue for the proximity between the linguistic and the phenomenological adaption of mood and show how they are ontologically related; the objective is to suggest that there is more common ground between them than the mere (English) name. By concentrating on this term I want to further examine in what way a phenomenological understanding of language can challenge an overly narrow, one-dimensional understanding, which I see as a fault shared by the linguists.

Thesis advisor: John Sallis / This dissertation is an attempt to describe parallels and convergences between the work of Martin Heidegger and that of the poet and philosopher of the Jena Romantic period Friedrich von Hardenberg, known also as Novalis. The fact that little attention has been given to the consideration of their relationship is undoubtedly owing to the fact that there is no sustained address to the work of the Jena Romantics in Heidegger's writing. However, the question of their relation merits reflection because of the insistence with which, albeit in a marginal way, Heidegger returns again and again in his work to fragments of Novalis. These fragments often seem to operate in Heidegger's lectures as something like stepping-stones, or guide-posts that mark a particular turn in the direction of the argument. Following one such quotation, Heidegger remarks that he "does not want to provoke and argument over the authority of this witness." However, it is indeed as "witness," and also in a certain sense as "authority" that Novalis is more often than not introduced. The question, then, is: what kind of authority? And to what is this authority called upon to bear witness? This question is rendered more substantial by the fact that these curious and marginal appearances of the Jena Romantic poet and philosopher take place in Heidegger's work over a period of forty years, from 1916 to 1959. More intriguing still, though, is that - when viewed together - these appearances attest to a strong ambivalence on Heidegger's part. On the one hand, a fragment of Novalis might be presented as an extraordinary "flash of insight" that presages unforeseen directions in philosophical thinking. On the other hand, these insights are also sometimes subject to summary judgment, dismissed by virtue of a broad and rather sweeping association with Hegel. Thus, it might be said that a kind of mystery hovers around this presence, a sense of both attraction and resistance. Following one such moment, indeed, and after having quoted Novalis' Monologue in its entirety, Heidegger writes: "Much remains dark and confusing in this monologue of λόγος, especially as he thinks in another direction and speaks in another language than the one attempted in these lectures." Still more than marking points of convergence, then, this project is dedicated to an attempt to shed light on this "dark and confusing" difference. To that end, the first part of the essay will engage Novalis' own extraordinary philosophical project; a project that involves an endeavor not merely to ponder the relations between philosophy and poetry, but to effect a complete elision of their distinction, and to offer to them thereby the thought of an entirely new meeting-ground. The essay will trace out the philosophical origins of this endeavor, and try to show how the thinking engendered in those origins flourishes to produce a unique conception of the relations between the natural world and the language we use to describe it. The second part of the essay will, by contrast, engage Heidegger, in an attempt to mark a terrain in which aspects of his work can be seen to come into close proximity with the thought of the Jena Romantics, often in quite unexpected and unpredictable ways. These considerations will operate along two axes. On the one hand, an address is made to question of pain in Heidegger's work, in order to show the continuity, but also to describe the philosophical orientation and historical genesis of this thematic. Secondly, the very distinctive manner of writing and thinking that belongs to Heidegger's work of the late 1930's is addressed in light of this thematic. It will be shown that it is in these texts, and most especially in the Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), that Heidegger's processes of writing offer the most striking parallels to modes of thinking that unfold in the orbit of Jena Romanticism. Finally, though, what is hazarded in this essay is not by any means a "Romantic" reading of Heidegger, and still less a "Heideggerean" reading of Novalis, but rather an endeavor to show how, and to what extent, the thinking of both Heidegger and Novalis converge in taking their orientation, in very different ways, from the historical appropriation of a decisive moment in Greek thought, namely one particular thought that belongs to the fragments of Heraclitus. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

by Chan Chi Wai. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1988. / Bibliography: leaves 117-120.

黃頌文. / "2010年2月". / "2010 nian 2 yue". / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 106-111). / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / Huang Songwen. / 全文摘要 --- p.i / Abstract --- p.ii / 目錄 --- p.iii / 導言：對「死亡」的重思 --- p.1 / Chapter 第一章： --- 死亡一存在論的詮釋方法 --- p.5 / Chapter 1.1 --- 死亡的描述在《存在與時間》的位置 --- p.6 / Chapter 1.2 --- 存在論的本源層面 --- p.15 / Chapter 第二章： --- 死亡作爲現象基點 --- p.23 / Chapter 2.1 --- 死亡與「在死之中」 --- p.23 / Chapter 2.2 --- 「在死之中」與「存在於世」的關連 --- p.31 / Chapter 第三章： --- 死亡與「在家」 --- p.42 / Chapter 3.1 --- 本源的基點 --- p.42 / Chapter 3.2 --- 存活的「無」與死亡的「可能性」 iii --- p.51 / Chapter 第四章： --- 探究死亡的意義 --- p.59 / Chapter 4.1 --- 自我的覺醒 --- p.60 / Chapter 4.2 --- 倫理關注的痕跡 --- p.69 / Chapter 4.3 --- 詮釋層面的序列 --- p.78 / 總論：對「存活本源」的領悟 --- p.88 / 《存在與時間》引文(原文/譯文：)對照 --- p.92 / 參考書目 --- p.106

Chan, Li Choi Raymond. / Thesis submitted in: November 2007. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 130-135). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Introduction --- p.2 / Chapter Chapter 1: --- The Problematic of Ground --- p.9 / Chapter 1.1 --- The Problem of Ground in Traditional Philosophy --- p.11 / Chapter 1.1.1 --- Metaphysical Ground: Aristotle and First Cause --- p.13 / Chapter 1.1.2 --- Epistemological Ground: Descartes and Archimedean Point of Knowledge --- p.22 / Chapter 1.1.3 --- Theological Ground: Leibniz and God as the Sufficient Reason --- p.26 / Chapter 1.2 --- The Problem of Ground in Early Heidegger --- p.27 / Chapter 1.2.1 --- The Question of Being and the Problem of Ground --- p.28 / Chapter 1.2.2 --- The Task of Fundamental Ontology --- p.35 / Chapter 1.2.3 --- The Problem of Ground as the Problem of Transcendence --- p.39 / Chapter Chapter 2: --- Dasein and World --- p.43 / Chapter 2.1 --- The Concept of Dasein --- p.45 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Existence and In-each-case-mineness --- p.46 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Care --- p.51 / Chapter 2.1.3 --- Understanding-of-Being --- p.55 / Chapter 2.2 --- The Concept of World --- p.57 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Analysis of Tools --- p.59 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- World as Reference Whole --- p.61 / Chapter 2.3 --- Being-in-the-world and Dasein as Disclosedness --- p.64 / Chapter Chapter 3: --- "Transcendence, Truth and Ground" --- p.70 / Chapter 3.1 --- Intentionality and Transcendence --- p.74 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- The Concept of Intentionality in Husserl --- p.75 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- Transcendence and Immanence in a Phenomenological Sense --- p.80 / Chapter 3.1.3 --- Ontic and Originary Transcendence --- p.82 / Chapter 3.2 --- Transcendence of Dasein --- p.90 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- The Problem of Transcendence: Transcendence of World and Transcendence of Dasein --- p.90 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Transcendence as Projection World --- p.94 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- World-entry --- p.100 / Chapter 3.3 --- Transcendence and Truth --- p.103 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- Ontic and Ontological Truth --- p.104 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- Transcendence as the Ground of Truth --- p.108 / Chapter 3.4 --- Transcendence and Ground --- p.111 / Chapter 3.4.1 --- Transcendence as Primordial Grounding --- p.112 / Chapter 3.4.2 --- Freedom and Abyss of Ground --- p.116 / Conclusion --- p.121 / Glossary --- p.126