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因應紅色供應鏈崛起之水平併購策略 以本土電源線製造公司為例黃郁穎, Huang, Yu Ying Unknown Date (has links)
「紅色供應鏈」的崛起已讓與之相關的產業人士聞之色變,近期電視新聞媒體、報章雜誌、學者專家、產業公會及相關業者都在討論「紅色供應鏈」。許多人在討論此議題時,往日的自信神態不復存在,更多的是憂心忡忡、蹙眉唏噓,言談之中「紅色供應鏈」似乎就如紅魔鬼一般可怕,隨時會將台灣廠商吞噬殆盡,一時之間風聲鶴唳,山雨欲來。
「紅色供應鏈」的崛起,其當然存在強大競爭力,其不僅對中國大陸市場俱有重大影響力,對全球其他巿場的影響亦是至關重要,近期更是對以中、小企業型態各自經營發展的台灣廠商產生重大影響。這些經過多年發展的優秀台灣廠商們,會不敵只經短短數年發展的「紅色供應鏈」而束手無策嗎?本研究想協助找出因應「紅色供應鏈」崛起的策略性方法,以供先進們參考。
經由研究發現,其實台灣廠商多年來,各自在不同領域發展,早已發展出不同的核心競爭力,因此得以在其面對的市場中生存並發展,透過水平併購策略,將台商們各自單一但具互補性的核心競爭力相加後,所產生的綜效是強大的,將讓結合後的台灣廠商競爭能力大幅度提升,甚至讓併購前個別廠商的劣勢幾乎完全消失,不只足以對抗「紅色供應鏈」,更是足以進軍甚至稱霸全球市場。
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Equilibrium and strategies of horizontal mergers inasymmetric differentiated oligopolyLU, Juan 21 August 2013 (has links)
Building an asymmetric differentiated goods quantity competition model, the present paper explores how substitutability of products, one of the factors affecting the unilateral effect, determines horizontal mergers and acquisitions equilibrium and strategies. It seems intuitively obvious that the merger between firms with goods that are sufficiently close substitutes can be more profitable. However, this thesis's counter-intuitive results show that, for some parameter values, a merger is more profitable for the merging firm when the target firm produces a distant substitutes (i.e., when it is not the closest competitor to the acquiring firm in the market).The theoretical analysis shows that to merge with firm with low substitute parameter is more profitable provided that target firms are close enough and the both of them are distant enough from merging firms. The results in Cournot model and Bertrand have some similarities, for example, they both harm to consumer surplus and the optimal strategy harms most. For the difference, for example, in Coumot model, whenever it is profitable to merge with a distant competitor, it is the optimal strategy, while in Bertrand model, it depends. The paper also extends the classical "horizontal merger paradox" to a setting of asymmetric differentiated oligopoly.
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Do Horizontal Mergers Affect Rivals’ Investments?Li, Dongxu January 2020 (has links)
No description available.
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Merger incentives of cost asymmetric firms under production differentiationLi, Xia January 1900 (has links)
Master of Arts / Department of Economics / Yang-Ming Chang / This report examines merger incentives of cost asymmetric firms under product differentiation and their welfare implications. Considering a simple contract under which merger profit is distributed according to the proportions of differential marginal costs between duopolistic firms, we show in a stylized model that for almost all parameter ranges (in terms of market competition intensity and marginal cost differential), a low-cost firm may have no incentive to merge with a high-cost firm whereas the high-cost firm always finds merger to be profitable. Only when marginal cost differential is sufficiently low and the degree of product similarity is sufficiently high will both the low-cost firm and the high-cost firm share the common interest in merger. On the other hand, the merger equilibrium is not welfare-improving, regardless of whether the firms initially compete in quantities or prices. Viewed from the perspective of production efficiency, mergers with differentiated products thus create a fundamental conflict between the maximization of consumer and social welfare and the maximization of firm profits. We also examine the scenario that merger takes place when merger profit exceeds the sum of firm profits under duopoly, without considering how merger profit is distributed between the firms. We discuss the conditions under which mergers may or may not be welfare-improving.
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企業購併策略之研究-以賽局理論分析胡漢之 Unknown Date (has links)
本文透過特定之賽局設計,欲觀察廠商在相互整合之現象與原因。內文中之賽局有以下玩家:上游有一獨佔之中間財供應商,而下游有兩種不同類型共三家之最終財生產廠商,而其中一間下游廠商之技術優於其他兩家,其生產最終財之邊際成本較低。賽局之設計為一動態賽局,上游先決定是否進行垂直整合,下游將會觀察到上游垂直整合之意願,並將水平整合視為對上游釋放之友善信號,接著上游廠商將對水平整合之廠商,進一步進行垂直整合;若下游未因上游之意願而進行水平整合,則上游廠商將隨機選擇一間下游廠商進行垂直整合。
廠商於互動時,我們加入不確定性並加以計算並分析;首先是廠商間整合時存在不確定性,由於下游廠商之技術水準為一不透明資訊,換言之,無論是上游觀察下游,或者下游廠商間,皆不了解對方之技術水準,僅知技術水準佳與較差的下游廠商之比例與數量,因此在廠商整合時將面臨整合綜效與技術衰退之風險性;另外,在模型中,加入一整合失敗之懲罰額,當技術較差之兩間下游廠商相互水平整合時,將面臨整合失敗之風險。
經試算後發現,根據這樣的模型設定,若下游未水平整合,或者水平整合之雙方生產技術相異,將會排擠技術較差之下游廠商進行生產;此外,我們亦發現,若進一步分析均衡結果,我們發現,不同技術類型之下游廠商,水平整合之成功(失敗)率,以及兩間技術較差之下游廠商整合後之懲罰金額,皆將影響下游廠商水平整合之意願,若下游廠商不願意進行水平整合,上游廠商經衡量後,將不對下游釋放垂直整合之意願信號,此時廠商間之結構將維持原狀。
本文欲透過加入不確定性,試圖找出與前人研究之異同處;而透過本文之模型設定,我們發現了與前人相似之結論,亦即存在上下游之廠商結構中,將有可能出現廠商間完全分離(沒有任何水平或垂直整合發生)之現象。 / This thesis tries to find out the interaction between firms, especially when these firms face the decision of merging. We also try to figure out the reason why these firms try to merge than stay separation. Here we design a game with some specific conditions for firms to observe the process they merge and the outcomes.
In this dynamic game, we design 2 layers, 3 kinds, total 4 firms to be the players of the game. Upstream firm has to make decision whether to merge the downstream firms. Then downstream firms try to merge horizontally after they receive the signal that they knows that upstream firm’s willingness to vertical merge. Here we have to kinds of downstream firms, the one who has better technology has lower marginal cost, in this thesis we assume the marginal cost to be zero. The game have 3 downstream firms totally, so the other 2 downstream firms have the same technology and have the marginal cost above zero. While the downstream firms merge horizontally, they face the uncertainty of the marginal cost changes and the rise of fixed cost, recognized as the failure of integrations. Then the upstream stick to its promise to vertical merge, it will tend to merge the downstream firm which had horizontal merge previously.
The result is far beyond the expectation we had before we run this model. The inferior downstream firms will not join the game, even they won’t produce any when the superior downstream firms is vertically merge by upstream firm, no matter the downstream firms merge each other. More, the probability of success in horizontal merge will affect upstream firm to make the decision of vertical merge. The game has only two equilibriums in the end, one is all firms stay separately, and the other outcome is one inferior downstream firm will rule out from the game, and other firms will be merge to one firm and become the monopoly firm in the entire market.
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