The emerging technologies of prenatal human genetic enhancement give to third parties the unprecedented power to design newborn genetic traits such as eye and skin color, intelligence, and emotional profile. The literature has not provided any answers to the question as to why these genetic enhancement technologies are prohibited by the European Biomedicine Convention. This thesis will demonstrate, by way of legal theory, that the prohibition on prenatal genetic enhancement is thoroughly justified on grounds that it violates the human right to dignity, as expressed in Kantian philosophy. In light of Kant’s Philosophy, genetic interventions for designing identity-related characteristics treat human beings instrumentally, to satisfy the desires of others, as mere means and not as ends in themselves. This thesis offers a deeper understanding of the law and policy regarding the prohibition on human genetic enhancement in order to safeguard future generations in the wake of a brave new world.

Recent Inter-American Court of Human Rights jurisprudence has resulted in major amendments to Mexican military justice law that were previously thought to be impossible, considering the historical role of the armed forces and Mexico's civil-military pact. Yet, with a recent Supreme Court decision, Mexican law has been modified to bring it into compliance with the Inter-American Court's decisions. However, their efficacy has been undermined by aspects of the decisions which were not made on a principled basis.

The emerging technologies of prenatal human genetic enhancement give to third parties the unprecedented power to design newborn genetic traits such as eye and skin color, intelligence, and emotional profile. The literature has not provided any answers to the question as to why these genetic enhancement technologies are prohibited by the European Biomedicine Convention. This thesis will demonstrate, by way of legal theory, that the prohibition on prenatal genetic enhancement is thoroughly justified on grounds that it violates the human right to dignity, as expressed in Kantian philosophy. In light of Kant’s Philosophy, genetic interventions for designing identity-related characteristics treat human beings instrumentally, to satisfy the desires of others, as mere means and not as ends in themselves. This thesis offers a deeper understanding of the law and policy regarding the prohibition on human genetic enhancement in order to safeguard future generations in the wake of a brave new world.

The United States has justified targeted operations against suspected terrorists as a legitimate tool in the war against terrorism. In response to international criticism that a November 2002 targeted killing operation in Yemen violated human rights standards, the US asserted that the right to life was suspended during war. While this assertion is prima facie incorrect, many legal experts, scholars and authors agree in principle that a military response to international terrorism -- along with the concomitant dilution of the right to life -- is not only appropriate, but also complies with international law. However, the modern jus ad bellum limit the circumstances in which a state may lawfully resort to armed force. A fulsome understanding of international humanitarian law and the characteristics of groups such as Al Qaeda reveals that international law does not permit states to employ their military forces to responde to the international crime of international terrorism.

The incidents of human rights violations have increasingly captured the international attention. I think that part of the reasons for human rights violations is because of the foundational theories of the current international law. In this thesis project, I argue that basic human rights should be the moral foundation of the international law. I achieved my goal in several steps. In the first section, I introduced the thesis project; I also outline my objectives. In the second section, I briefly define human rights, basic human rights, and provided the scope of basic human rights. In the third section, I provided my argument that basic human rights should be the moral foundations of the international law; provide criterion of state legitimacy; I critiqued the United Nations in the context of my arguments. Finally, I concluded by formulating the international basic human rights law.

This thesis interrogates the continued statelessness of more than 12 million stateless people around the world, in the face of Article 15 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which provides that everyone has a right to a nationality. Its principal argument is that the continued unresolved presence of stateless groups around the world exposes international law’s inadequate protection of the ‘right to a nationality’. It advocates the adoption of a robust approach to protect and enforce this right to nationality of stateless people. Article 15 of the UDHR has been complemented by a host of international and regional instruments relating to the right to nationality. In developing its argument, the thesis reviews the relevant instruments, as well as local and international judicial decisions relating to the right. The review is juxtaposed with local legislation and state practices on the issue of citizenship, for the purpose of determining the status of the right, and whether the right forms part of customary international law. This thesis also examines the emergence of nationality as a human right under international law and the interplay between states sovereignty and the right to nationality, for the purpose of showing the lacuna in international law that allows continued statelessness. It examines the relationship between the possession of nationality and the enjoyment of other human rights vis-à-vis the sufferings that arise from statelessness, as well as the extent to which denationalization is a step toward genocide, for the purpose of showing that protection of the right qualifies as erga omnes obligation. It also argues that suffering of stateless people must be taken seriously, as a step toward taking the right to nationality of stateless people seriously. While the thesis does not necessarily provide the final solution to all the problems arising out of statelessness, it is anticipated that it will make a worthy contribution to addressing the legal questions on statelessness and, more importantly, provide a sound basis for further discussions on the status, importance and the need to protect and enforce the right to nationality of stateless people.

No abstract available. / Thesis (LL.M.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2006.

This research focuses on the desirability and feasibility of allowing individuals to access the International Court of Justice when their rights under international human rights treaties have been violated. International law now recognizes individuals as its subjects and that from such recognition flows a right of access to international courts. Using the Inter-American and European Courts of Human Rights as models, it is examined whether the right of individual access supersedes the will of states, the arguments for and against a global human rights court and how the ICJ’s statute and rules could be changed to allow individuals a) to participate in the court’s proceedings and b) gain direct access to the court as parties. Individuals could have both locus standi before the ICJ if the Court modifies its procedural rules and jus standi, which requires not only procedural changes, but the modification of the U.N. Charter.

This dissertation is an evaluation of the concept of a minimum core content to the constitutional right to health, with particular reference to HIV-positive persons in South Africa. The analysis involves an assessment of what the minimum core entails; whether such a formulation is necessary in the South African health context; the application of the concept in national and international law; as well as enforcement and implementation in the South African context. An appraisal of the South African social reality reveals the extent of the suffering of HIV-positive individuals and the difficulties experienced in accessing health care, especially for the vulnerable and disempowered. The problem is exacerbated by a critical inadequacy in national jurisprudence which fails to generate certainty in respect of the minimum, basic entitlements of affected people. Such a shortcoming maligns transformative constitutionalism, which requires the judiciary to develop a construction of human rights that accords with the canons of the Constitution. It is argued that one such course of action is the adoption of the minimum core, which prescribes a basic level of human rights that is guaranteed to all people – and which may withstand legislative challenge on the basis of resource constraints or progressive realisation. Reference to international law, in terms of Section 39(1) of the Constitution, assists us to overcome the shortcoming in domestic legislation in this regard. Of particular relevance is covenantal guidance offered by the ICESCR, and its guidelines of interpretation, which include the CESCR General Comments and the WHO recommendations. It is postulated that a minimum obligation to HIV-positive individuals under the right to health encompasses the duty of treatment and prevention and control in respect of the epidemic, on a non-discriminatory basis. Enforcement and implementation of such core obligations must be strictly and timeously effected. Of crucial importance in such a process is a competent judiciary that is able to resist an undue deference to the legislature. A review of court judgments, however, reveals an inadequate judicial approach to the implementation of socioeconomic rights and an appeal is made to the Constitutional Court to re-commit itself to an interpretation of the Bill of Rights that accords with Constitutional values, such as uBuntu. / Thesis (LL.M.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2014.

The incidents of human rights violations have increasingly captured the international attention. I think that part of the reasons for human rights violations is because of the foundational theories of the current international law. In this thesis project, I argue that basic human rights should be the moral foundation of the international law. I achieved my goal in several steps. In the first section, I introduced the thesis project; I also outline my objectives. In the second section, I briefly define human rights, basic human rights, and provided the scope of basic human rights. In the third section, I provided my argument that basic human rights should be the moral foundations of the international law; provide criterion of state legitimacy; I critiqued the United Nations in the context of my arguments. Finally, I concluded by formulating the international basic human rights law.