Texte remanié de: Th. Ph. D. / Bibliogr. p. 273-277.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2008. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

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This dissertation extends contemporary views about uncertainty. It does so through a reading of the role of uncertainty in the political thought of two modern philosophers, Baruch Spinoza and David Hume. Despite uncertainty's notable and multi-disciplinary appeal in the academic literature, the frame in which most scholars think about social and political uncertainty is one-sided. On the whole, contemporary scholars consider uncertainty as a problem in need of a remedy. In the social sciences uncertainty is transformed into risk in order to empirically calculate risk probabilities. The hope is that risks (uncertainties) can be controlled, reduced, and in all, mitigated. In this dissertation, I argue for a conceptual rethinking of uncertainty that expands its scope and reach to include a socially and politically beneficent understanding, a constructive form of uncertainty. In particular, I explore the ways social groups experience conditions of uncertainty in different contexts through an examination of what I term future-oriented and epistemic uncertainty in Hume and Spinoza's political thought. Spinoza's arguments for liberal democracy, and Hume's arguments favoring commercial society, are highlighted as instances of constructive uncertainty. The dissertation concludes by applying a general understanding of constructive uncertainty to the ideology of the American Dream in order to illustrate suggestively how a constructive conception of uncertainty might prove useful when critically engaging contemporary matters. / Ph. D.

Partindo das teorias políticas predominantes no século XVIII, o contratualismo e a obediência passiva, personificadas pelos dois principais partidos políticos da Inglaterra àquela época (Whig e Tory), a presente dissertação pretende mostrar como Hume discorda de ambas. Porém, o objetivo central é, sem dúvida, sua refutação ao contratualismo. Para tanto, o texto traz duas linhas de argumentos aptos a tanto: a primeira delas, referente ao conceito de artifício em Hume, significativamente diferente do artifício criado pelos contratualistas, oposição esta a que a tradição de comentaristas da filosofia política humeana de maneira geral não faz referência, especificamente quando se trata da refutação ao contratualismo; a segunda linha de argumentação refere-se à refutação mais direta feita por Hume, a que se pode chamar \"oficial\", em que estão presentes as discussões a respeito do papel do consentimento, da existência de estado de natureza e do pacto expresso ou tácito, da obrigação decorrente das promessas, da origem do governo e da obediência. / Starting from the most popular political theories in the 17th century, contractualism and that of passive obedience, represented by the two main political parties in England at that time (Whig and Tory), this paper intends to show how Hume disagrees with both. However, his main objective is, without a doubt, refuse contractualism. To achieve its end, the text brings two sets of arguments: the first one concerns the concept of artifice in Hume\'s theory, which is very different from the artifice created by the contractarians. This opposition is not in general mencioned by the tradition of commentators, especially when the subject is the refutation of contractualism. The second set of arguments concerns the more direct refutation made by Hume, which we can term the \"official\" one. Here we can include the discussions about the role of consent, the existence of the state of nature and the explicit or tacit contract, the obligation derived from promises, the origin of government and allegiance.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Cambridge, 1991.