Originally published as author's dissertation--Munich, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [245]-252).

Inaug.-diss.--Erlangen. / Cover title. Vita.

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[…] Por mucho tiempo se pensó que en Hume no había tal cosa como un interés propiamente epistemológico, es decir se pensó que no había interés alguno por describir condiciones normativas que justificaran nuestro conocimiento, sino más bien una descripción psicológica y por ende subjetiva del modo en que tienen lugar nuestros estado de “certeza” subjetiva. Por otra parte, hay una de las tres condiciones mencionadas que pocas veces es tratada en el marco del problema de la justificación, a saber, la verdad de la creencia. La verdad de la creencia, sin embargo, como se verá, no necesariamente ha de ser considerada como la verdad objetiva más allá del marco de las creencias del sujeto. Es decir, no es necesario, según creo, adquirir compromisos ontológicos en el marco de una teoría realista para sostenes una teoría de la justificación epistémica propiamente normativa. Para llegar a este punto en la filosofía de Hume, sin embargo, se analizará en el primer capítulo el origen y principales influencias del proyecto humeano de la ciencia del hombre. En la sección I, intentaré mostrar cómo la filosofía de Hume se comprende de manera más cabal en contraste con la filosofía a la que se opone, a saber, la metafísica racionalista. Leeremos, tal como Hume sugiere en su correspondencia, su Tratado de la Naturaleza Humana, en contraste con la filosofía cartesiana. En ella hallaremos una de las teorías de la justificación más conocidas y debatidas en la espistemología, a saber, el fundacionalismo clásico. En este mismo contexto haré notar la búsqueda de Hume de una renovada concepción de conocimiento capaz de subsanar los vicios de la vieja escuela. En las secciones II y III intentaré mostrar los principales recursos de Hume para levantar una nueva metafísica, que no es sino su así llamada ciencia de la naturaleza humana. En esta nueva ciencia la adopción del método experimental de razonar juega un rol central. Luego de ello, esbozaré en la misma sección la recepción y la interpretación de las doctrinas humeanas acerca del conocimiento humano en la epistemología contemporánea. Con ello se habrá delineado la visión estándar del autor del Treatise. Esta visión, sin embargo, no agota el pensamiento de nuestro autor, y debe ser considerada tan solo como la parte negativa de su filosofía. En el segundo capítulo, intentaré mostrar que la visión estándar de Hume, puede ser matizada por nuevas interpretaciones del proyecto de Hume, como una doctrina metafísica propositiva y no como un mero diagnosticador de los problemas del conocimiento. En ella, sostendré que es posible encontrar una teoría de la justificación fundada en una nueva comprensión de la naturaleza humana y fundamentalmente de la racionalidad.

Tesis para optar al grado de Magíster en Filosofía / El objetivo general de esta tesis es elucidar una vía de entrada hacia las relaciones entre la filosofía de Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) y la escuela fenomenológica. Se trata de una relación crítica. Nos acercamos a ella a través de la lectura y la evaluación de los análisis que tanto Husserl como Deleuze hicieron del pensamiento del filósofo empirista escocés David Hume. Husserl era un lector asiduo de Hume, cuyo peculiar empirismo representaba una amenaza interior para la fenomenología. De otra parte, Deleuze elaborará un pensamiento que se ha dado en llamar "empirismo trascendental". Por tanto, nos ha parecido que la conflictividad existente entre ambos pensadores debía de pasar por el examen del empirismo. El empirismo, sin embargo, tal como nos ha parecido leerlo en Deleuze, no es exactamente una "doctrina". Es más: la evaluación del empirismo, de esto que no es una doctrina, nos echará luces ahora, a la inversa, sobre cuál puede ser el sentido de un conflicto filosófico. De modo que los exámenes que llevamos a cabo cumplen un doble propósito: mapear el diferendo entre Deleuze y la fenomenología en clave de crítica, y esclarecer un motivo posible para el peculiar trascendentalismo deleuziano.

論文(碩士)--香港中文大學,1978. / Manuscript. / Includes bibliographical references: (leaves 185-188). / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue. / 前言 --- p.1-5 / Chapter 第一章 --- 畧論道德問題思考的幾種進路 --- p.6-28 / Chapter 第二章 --- 休謨的道德哲學 --- p.29-86 / Chapter 第三章 --- 休謨道德理論之困難 --- p.87-127 / Chapter 第四章 --- 休謨理論進路之限制 --- p.127-148 / Chapter 第五章 --- 先秦儒家(孔孟)對道德的形上意義之啟示 --- p.149-179 / Chapter 第六章 --- 總結 --- p.180-184 / 參考書目

In this dissertation, I argue for a set of interpretations regarding the relationship between moral obligation and reasons for acting in the theories of Hobbes, Hutcheson, and Hume. Several commentators have noted affinities between these naturalist moral theories and contemporary ethical internalism. I argue that attempts to locate internalist theses in these figures are not entirely successful in any clear way. I follow Stephen Darwall's suggestion that addressing the question “why be moral?” is one of the fundamental problems of modern moral philosophy. Since, as some have argued, there is a tension between accepting internalism and providing an adequate response to the “why be moral” question, I argue that each figure maintains a distinctive response to this question given the sort of internalism, if any, he would accept. In the introduction, I provide the key distinctions that arise from contemporary discussions of ethical internalism, and I motivate my project of looking for insight into the relationship between internalism and amoralism in the British Moralists. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the moral theory Hobbes who, I argue, would accept a version of constitutive existence internalism because he holds that there is a necessary connection between one's being contractually obligated and one's being in certain rationally motivating states. I then present the fool's objection as an objection to the assumption of a relevant similarity between divine obligation and contractual obligation. I argue that, irrespective of this dissimilarity, the fool has some rational motive to keep his covenants in virtue of the fact that making covenants changes one's decision situation in such a way that it becomes reasonable to treat covenants as if they imposed categorical constraints on behavior. I claim that Hobbes's response to the fool is, at least in part, that the fool fails to understand what moral obligation consists in. In the remainder of the dissertation I turn my attention to two classical sentimentalist moral theories. I examine the theories of Hutcheson and Hume because it is not clear what resources moral sentimentalism has available to it in order to address questions about the reasonableness of moral action. In chapters 3 and 4, I develop an interpretation of Hutcheson who, because he distinguishes between exciting and justifying reasons, is able to say there is some non-derivative sense in which moral actions are reasonable. I argue that he develops a theory whereby moral obligation is to be understood in terms of the non-motivating states of approval of moral spectators, and I do not think, contrary to Darwall, that there is anything puzzling about his doing so. I argue that Hutcheson does not accept a version of motive internalism, but that he shares much in common with internalist views: he claims that there is a very strong, if contingent, connection between our states of approval and our motivational states. I offer an explanation of how Hutcheson could respond to the amoalist, which holds that we ought to be moral because, in part, we all already have the motives for and the interests in doing the sorts of things of which moral spectators approve. In chapters 5 and 6, I turn my attention to Hume who, because he makes no distinction between motivating and justifying reasons, does not seem to have anything to say about the non-derivative reasonableness of moral action. I argue that a textually grounded interpretation of Hume's theory of the passions provides us with more reason to favor an (appraiser motive) internalist reading over an externalist reading of his moral theory. Much of my argument depends on an interpretation of Hume's claim that it is possible for agents to be moved to act from a sense of duty alone. When we ask what Hume can say to the question “why be moral,” some of the options that Hutcheson pursues are initially open to him. However, I argue that Hume thinks philosophical theorizing must give way to the operations of psychological mechanisms that are causally responsible for inspiring agents to act morally by giving rise in them to particular kinds of affections. I conclude with some general remarks about the problems surrounding Darwall's interpretation of Hume's theory of justice, and use this discussion to lend further support to the claim that the actual theories of Hobbes, Hutcheson, and Hume do not neatly fit into the taxonomies that Darwall seems to think they do.

In his 1757 essay “Of Tragedy”, Hume reflected on a curious puzzle about emotions. Sometimes people seek out emotions or experiences that are typically negative and associated with displeasure or pain. People often desire to watch horror films that will make them scared or listen to music that will make them sad. Some people even engage in the pursuit of negative emotions on a regular basis such as in the case of thrill-seeking. In this paper my goal is to update Hume’s puzzle with empirical evidence from the affective sciences and argue for two conclusions. First I will argue that Hume’s puzzle still runs deep. Though some recent scientific and philosophical accounts of emotions have tried to solve it, they have thus far failed. Second I attempt to construct a psychological account that solves the puzzle. Instead of focusing on how emotions are generated as previous theories have done, I argue that what is important is how emotions are regulated.

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