Ever since the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula there has been an intense scientific debate about how the Russian way of war should be defined and explained. Some argue that the way Russia is acting is something new and maybe could be defined for example as hybrid warfare. Others are not so convinced and argue that it is something old that the Russians have been doing before. After the annexation, a new concept emerged called full-spectrum conflict whose purpose was to define the Russian way of war in Ukraine.  The purpose of the thesis is to investigate Russia’s actions during the Georgian conflict 2008, to see if it is possible to trace the use of full-spectrum conflict there. This is to create a clearer picture of whether the Russian way of war is of innovative nature or if the actions in Ukraine were already used during the previous conflict. The method used in this investigation is a qualitative text analysis to either reject or support the theory. The results of the survey show that the Russian way of conducting warfare is presumably evolution of prior ways to conduct warfare and is nothing new. However, more research must be conducted to enhance this statement since a single survey cannot capture everything and needs to be strengthened for the result to be more representative.

With a changing state of security in Europe, defined by instability and unpredictability, the use of hybrid threats presents itself as an international security challenge. Characterized by the antagonistic use of both conventional and unconventional means, the hybrid threat actor coordinates these means in an attempt achieve specific goals, often under a guise of ambiguity. The complexity of hybrid threats deepens as advancing technology and globalisation enables the hybrid threat actor to use tools not only bound by geographical constraints, but tools that makes use the cyber domain and the constant flow of information. Tools ranging from military, political, economic, civil, and informational tools can, in various combinations, take advantage of specific vulnerabilities in the target state. Identifying and countering such a wide range of multifaceted tools provides a difficult task for most states.                                            This study aims to investigate the Swedish hybrid threat scenario by focusing on the authorities concerned with national defence and security and their identification of potential hybrid threats that faces Sweden. For countering such hybrid threats the study investigates the highly topical Swedish defence act 2021-2025. Its focus being on investigating potential goals, strategies and abilities for building resilience and countermeasures regarding hybrid threats. The study finds that Sweden is subject to the use of hybrid threats by antagonistic state actors, mainly Russia and China. Tools being used against Sweden include for example espionage, strategic acquisition of businesses and real estate, disinformation, and cyberattacks. For countering these threats, the study fails to find a specific set of goals for hybrid threat defence. Instead, the study finds a broad effort to strengthen national defence and security including among others the rebuilding of the Total Defence, founding of a national cybersecurity centrum, instituting an agency for psychological defence as well as lifting the perspective of hybrid threat among relevant national agencies.