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In the aftermath of a Russian influence operations against the U.S. presidential election of 2016 there was a change in governmental behavior. Since it was not known whether learning processes had caused these behavioral changes, the study aimed to examine the lessons learnedas well as their implementation. By using process tracing as a method, this essay established a causal link between the situation at hand and crisis induced learning by the U.S. Government.The characteristics of lessons were then examined more closely, and explained using the theory of crisis induced learning. It was concluded that the crisis induced lessons were mostly singleloop, as the crisis to a limited extent highlighted flaws in societal premises. They were mainlyaimed at improving crisis response, because focusing on the antagonistic reasons behind the crisis was less fruitful. They were predominantly inter-crisis, because uncertainty, timepressure and stress made intra-crisis learning difficult. Finally, most lessons were distilled (not implemented), due to a shift in the government’s priorities. In the end, not all behavioral changes could be linked to governmental lessons learned, which calls for further research.

In my thesis, I will answer question of what is sharp power, how China use sharp power and then on 4 cases illustrate that China has different strategies of influence operations. In Japan, respectively Okinawa, China is focusing on their common history and trying to lure Okinawans away from Japan. In South Korea, China exploit Korean economic dependence during the THAAD dispute to their advantage. In Taiwan, thanks to common cultural ties China wants to change everybody mind about Taiwanese "status-quo". In New Zealand, China utilize overseas Chinese community to spread Chinese propaganda. In the end, I will compare each country situation and find out where China's sharp power was effective and where it wasn't.

Försvarsvilja är ett centralt begrepp i det svenska Totalförsvaret. Begreppet beskriver en individuell och kollektiv benägenhet att tycka eller handla i ett försvarsrelaterat syfte. Psykologiskt försvar skyddar försvarsviljan från främmande påverkanskampanjer som försöker urholka den. Denna uppsats syftar till att skapa ett seriöst spel för att lära ut element av försvarsvilja och drar slutsatsen att ett sådant spel är möjligt men utmaningar kvarstår i avdömningen av resultat av påverkansoperationer i seriösa spel och när det gäller att inkludera psykologiskt försvar i spelet.  Aktuell forskning om försvarsvilja och psykologiskt försvar är begränsad till den svenska kontexten och har inte prövats i krigföring. Denna uppsats föreslår att kognitiv krigföring är ett relevant proxy-begrepp för moderna försök att urholka försvarsviljan och föreslår att valpåverkan är en relevant proxy-kontext för ett seriöst inflytandespel som syftar till att lära ut kärnbegrepp inom påverkansoperationer som syftar till att urholka försvarsviljan. En integrerad systemmodell för valpåverkan är sammansatt av befintlig vetenskaplig forskning och dess kärnelement är uppdelade i inlärningsblock. Slutligen utvecklas ett seriöst inflytandespel och metoder för effektiv avdömning i inflytandespel utforskas. / Will-to-defend (försvarsvilja) is central to the Swedish concept of ’total defence’ (totalförsvar). It represents an individual and collective inclination to think or act in support of the defence of the nation. Psychological defence (psykologiskt försvar) shields will-to-defend from foreign influence campaigns that attempt to degrade it. This thesis sets out to create a serious game to teach elements of will-to-defend and concludes that such a game is possible but serious challenges remain with regards to the inclusion of psychological defence and in adjudicating the outcomes of influence operations in serious games.  Current research into will-to-defend and psychological defence are limited to the Swedish context and have not been tested in warfare. This thesis proposes that cognitive warfare is a relevant proxy concept for modern-day attempts to degrade will-to-defend and proposes that elections interference is a relevant proxy context for a serious influence game that aims to teach core concepts involved in attempts to degrade will-to-defend. A systems integrated model for elections interference is composed from existing scholarly research and its core elements are decomposed into essential learning blocks. Finally, a serious influence game is developed and venues for effective in-game adjudication are explored.

This study explores the foundations of US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine in order to better understand the main historical influences on that policy and doctrine and how those influences have informed the current US approach to counterinsurgency. The results of this study indicate the US experience in counterinsurgency during the Greek Civil War and the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines had a significant influence on the development of US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine following World War II through the Kennedy presidency. In addition, despite a major diversion from the lessons of Greece and the Philippines during the Vietnam War, the lessons were re-institutionalized in US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine following the war and continue to have significant influence today, though in a highly sanitized and, therefore, misleading form. As a result, a major disconnect has developed between the “rhetoric and reality” of US counterinsurgency policy. This disconnect has resulted from the fact that many references that provide a more complete and accurate picture of the actual policies and actions taken to successfully defeat the insurgencies have remained out of the reach of non-government researchers and the general public. Accordingly, many subsequent studies of counterinsurgency overlook, or only provide a cursory treatment of, aspects that may have had a critical impact on the success of past US counterinsurgency operations. One such aspect is the role of US direct intervention in the internal affairs of a supported country. Another is the role of covert action operations in support of counterinsurgency operations. As a result, the counterinsurgency policies and doctrines that have been developed over the years are largely based on false assumptions, a flawed understanding of the facts, and a misunderstanding of the contexts concerning the cases because of misleading, or at least seriously incomplete, portrayals of the counterinsurgency operations.