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We think less than we think. My thesis moves from this suspicion to show that standard accounts of intentional action can't explain the whole of agency. Causalist accounts such as Davidson's and Bratman's, according to which an action can be intentional only if it is caused by a particular mental state of the agent, don't work for every kind of action. So-called automatic actions, effortless performances over which the agent doesn't deliberate, and to which she doesn't need to pay attention, constitute exceptions to the causalist framework, or so I argue in this thesis. Not all actions are the result of a mental struggle, painful hesitation, or the weighting of evidence. Through practice, many performances become second nature. Think of familiar cases such as one's morning routines and habits: turning on the radio, brushing your teeth. Think of the highly skilled performances involved in sport and music: Jarrett's improvised piano playing, the footballer's touch. Think of agents' spontaneous reactions to their environment: ducking a blow, smiling. Psychological research has long acknowledged the distinctiveness and importance of automatic actions, while philosophy has so far explained them together with the rest of agency. Intuition tells us that automatic actions are intentional actions of ours all the same (I have run a survey which shows that this intuition is widely shared): not only our own autonomous deeds for which we are held responsible, but also necessary components in the execution and satisfaction of our general plans and goals. But do standard causal accounts deliver on the intentionality of automatic actions? I think not. Because, in automatic cases, standard appeals to intentions, beliefs, desires, and psychological states in general ring hollow. We just act: we don't think, either consciously or unconsciously. On the reductive side, Davidson's view can't but appeal to, at best, unconscious psychological states, the presence and causal role of which is, I argue, inferred from the needs of a theory, rather than from evidence in the world. On the non-reductive side, Bratman agrees, with his refutation of the Simple View, that we can't just attach an intention to every action that we want to explain. But Bratman’s own Single Phenomenon View, appealing to the mysterious notion of 'motivational potential', merely acknowledges the need for refinement without actually providing one. So I propose my own account of intentional action, the 'guidance view', according to which automatic actions are intentional: differently from Davidson and Bratman, who only offer necessary conditions in order to avoid the problem of causal deviance, I offer a full-blown account: E's phi-ing is intentional if and only If phi-ing is under E's guidance. This account resembles one developed by Frankfurt, with the crucial difference that Frankfurt – taking 'acting with an intention' and 'acting intentionally' to be synonymous – thinks that guidance is sufficient only for some movement being an action, but not for some movement being an intentional action. I argue that, on the other hand, Frankfurt's concept of guidance can be developed so that it is sufficient for intentional action too. In Chapter One I present and defend my definition of ‘automatic action’. In Chapter Two I show that such understanding of automatic actions finds confirmation in empirical psychology. In Chapter Three I show that Davidson's reductive account of intentional action does not work for automatic actions. In Chapter Four I show that the two most influential non-reductive accounts of intentional action, the Simple View and Bratman's Single Phenomenon View, don't work either. And in Chapter Five I put forward and defend my positive thesis, the 'guidance view'. Also, in the Appendix I present the findings of my survey on the intentionality of automatic actions.

The International Township of Auroville was inaugurated as an international experiment in Human Unity on the southeast coast of India in 1968. My research on Auroville constitutes a case study of collective decision-making. Coding extracts from the weekly internal newsletters of the Township 1975 to 2000 in the qualitative software program, NVivo, I reconstruct features of decision-making in the township which I argue form implicit agreements on principles of organization. Illocutionary action, the effort to reach mutual understanding, underscores each of these principles. Illocutionary action is the building block of Jurgen Habermas Theory of Communicative Action and his Discourse Ethics. Because of the correspondence between decision-making in Auroville and the formulations of Jurgen Habermas, I apply key dimensions of Habermas theory to developments in the township in order to identify the practical consequences of adherence to the primacy Habermas pays to illocutionary action. In this way, I submit his theory to practical test. Contrary to the theoretical expectations of Habermas, decision-making characteristic of lifeworld continues to play a role in steering the systems developed to facilitate the expansion of the Auroville Township.

The International Township of Auroville was inaugurated as an international experiment in Human Unity on the southeast coast of India in 1968. My research on Auroville constitutes a case study of collective decision-making. Coding extracts from the weekly internal newsletters of the Township 1975 to 2000 in the qualitative software program, NVivo, I reconstruct features of decision-making in the township which I argue form implicit agreements on principles of organization. Illocutionary action, the effort to reach mutual understanding, underscores each of these principles. Illocutionary action is the building block of Jurgen Habermas Theory of Communicative Action and his Discourse Ethics. Because of the correspondence between decision-making in Auroville and the formulations of Jurgen Habermas, I apply key dimensions of Habermas theory to developments in the township in order to identify the practical consequences of adherence to the primacy Habermas pays to illocutionary action. In this way, I submit his theory to practical test. Contrary to the theoretical expectations of Habermas, decision-making characteristic of lifeworld continues to play a role in steering the systems developed to facilitate the expansion of the Auroville Township.

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This thesis examines the role of concepts of jurisprudence, utopian theory and intentional community in three novels that are based on actual attempts to construct utopian intentional communities. Chapter one focuses on Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Blithedale Romance, applying Ronald Dworkin’s interpretive theory in order to evaluate the Blithedale commune’s attempt to construct its own legal community. Questions of “why does it fail?” are pervasive in this thesis, but in this chapter, I pull apart the various roles of individual members in order to decipher both the role of the individual and the community in self-created legal systems. Chapter two adds to the consideration of constructive interpretivism by looking at the role of associative obligations in T.C Boyle’s Drop City. In particular, I analyze how associative obligations change when the commune relocates to Alaska, considering the effects of space in shifting associative obligations. The final chapter considers the meaning of legal death in Richard Brautigan’s In Watermelon Sugar. I explain the implications of a commune based on negative intent in order to determine whether this community can still maintain integrity to its cause. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

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Magister Educationis - MEd / In South Africa it is widely known that most learners struggle with mathematics. The results for mathematics are poor. The department of basic education offers a number of intervention programmes to assist learners in mathematics but the problem still persists. Algebra is the most basic and important topic in mathematics as it becomes an element in almost all the other topics in mathematics curriculum. Algebraic fractions in particular are a challenge for most leaners. Research shows that learners commit a number of errors when they work with algebraic fractions. The study investigated the implementation of an intentional teaching model into grade 9 mathematics learners’ ways of working with rational algebraic fractions. An intentional teaching model is a teaching strategy which emphasizes teaching intentions or teaching objectives are brought to the fore during a lesson, the model emphasizes the use of spiral revision and assessment for learning. Ways of working in this study refers to the way in which learners deal with algebraic fractions when they simplify them including the errors they commit from the misconceptions they have about aspects of working with fractions. The study was conducted in a group of grade 9 mathematics learners at Gugulethu High school, which is located in Guguletu, a township in the Western Cape Province of South Africa. The study is premised on a qualitative research paradigm which focuses on studying situations in their natural settings and applying an interpretive perspective. Data was collected by means of observation and video recording of lessons while learners were engaged in working with algebraic fractions. Learners’ written work was analysed as part of the data collection. The results of the study show that leaners commit a number of errors when they manipulate algebraic fractions. Among other errors are: (i) Cancellation errors which had the highest frequency of occurrence (ii) Defractionalisation (iii) No recognition of the common factor and (iv)Exponential laws error. It was found that the learners’ ways of working with algebraic fractions are mostly characterised by their misunderstanding of exponential laws and difficulty in working with fractions needing the use of factorisation to simplify and find the lowest or highest common denominator during addition or subtraction. The results of the study also reveal that learners struggle to articulate extensively or in detail what they are actually doing as they simplify rational algebraic fraction.