With the discontinuation of Interbank Offered Rates(IBOR), traders found some al-ternative reference rates to replace IBOR. Backward-looking rates are widely accepted new benchmark interest rates. In this thesis, we introduce and subsequently proceed to explore backward-looking rate model and continue doing some re-valuation of interest rate instruments under the backward-looking rates framework.

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All firms should aim to reduce their risks and avoid bankruptcy. One way they try to lessen their chance of bankruptcy, or entering into a financially distressed state, is by using risk management techniques. Part of risk management is using derivatives, which many firms rely on today to reduce their exposure to certain types of risk and avoid a cash flow crunch. I test the notion that hedging reduces the probability of bankruptcy. Hedging reduces risks such as interest rate and currency risk, and these types of risk can send a firm into financial distress. Financial distress can result in bankruptcy, so hedging should then ultimately reduce the risk of bankruptcy.

by Kwan Wai Kwong. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 89-92). / ABSTRACT --- p.1 / Chapter 1. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.2 / Chapter 2. --- LITERATURE REVIEW --- p.5 / Chapter 2.1 --- Traditional and Working's hedging theory --- p.5 / Chapter 2.2 --- Portfolio theory and hedging --- p.5 / Chapter 2.3 --- Selection of proper statistical estimation model --- p.7 / Chapter 2.4 --- StaTIonarIty of optimal hedge ratio --- p.8 / Chapter 2.5 --- time-varying hedging models --- p.9 / Chapter 3. --- MARKETS AND INSTRUMENTS --- p.13 / Chapter 3.1 --- Exchange Fund Bills --- p.13 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- Rationale --- p.13 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- Status and deployment of funds --- p.14 / Chapter 3.1.3 --- Form of Bills --- p.14 / Chapter 3.1.4 --- Pricing of the Bills --- p.15 / Chapter 3.1.5 --- Development of the secondary market --- p.15 / Chapter 3.1.6 --- Investors --- p.17 / Chapter 3.1.7 --- Reasons for the success of the Bills programme --- p.17 / Chapter 3.2 --- eurodollar futures contract --- p.18 / Chapter 3.3 --- Treasury bill futures contract --- p.19 / Chapter 3.4 --- Comparison between eurodollar and treasury bills futures --- p.20 / Chapter 4. --- RESEARCH METHODOLOGY --- p.22 / Chapter 4.1 --- DATA --- p.22 / Chapter 4.2 --- DEFINITION of hedging effectiveness and comparison criterion --- p.23 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Definition of hedging effectiveness --- p.23 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Comparison of ex-ante hedging performance --- p.24 / Chapter 4.3 --- Model description --- p.25 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Conventional hedging model --- p.25 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Error correction model (ECM) --- p.28 / Chapter 4.3.2.1 --- Unit root test --- p.29 / Chapter 4.3.2.2 --- Test of cointegration --- p.30 / Chapter 4.3.2.3 --- Construction of the error correction model (ECM) --- p.31 / Chapter 4.3.3 --- Time-varying hedging model --- p.32 / Chapter 4.3.3.1 --- Time-varying conditional hedging theory --- p.32 / Chapter 4.3.3.2 --- Test for the ARCH effect --- p.34 / Chapter 4.3.3.3 --- Bivariate ARCH(q) error correction model --- p.35 / Chapter 4.4 --- out-of-sample forecast --- p.37 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- Rolling samples against expanding sample --- p.37 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- Out-of-sample forecast without transaction cost --- p.37 / Chapter 4.4.3 --- Out-of-sample forecast with transaction cost --- p.39 / Chapter 5. --- DATA SUMMARY --- p.42 / Chapter 5.1 --- Preliminary analysis --- p.42 / Chapter 5.2 --- Unit root analysis --- p.43 / Chapter 5.3 --- Co-integration analysis --- p.44 / Chapter 6. --- EMPIRICAL RESULTS --- p.45 / Chapter 6.1 --- Model estimation --- p.45 / Chapter 6.2 --- Ex-ante hedging effectiveness with no transaction cost --- p.47 / Chapter 6.3 --- Ex-ante hedging effectiveness with transaction cost --- p.49 / Chapter 6.4 --- Summary and discussion on empirical findings --- p.50 / Chapter 6.4.1 --- Hedging superiority between the two futures contracts --- p.50 / Chapter 6.4.2 --- Magnitude of hedging performance --- p.51 / Chapter 6.4.3 --- Hedge ratio estimates --- p.56 / Chapter 6.4.4 --- Hedging effectiveness across investment horizon --- p.57 / Chapter 6.4.5 --- Model superiority --- p.57 / Chapter 7. --- CONCLUSION --- p.59 / APPENDIX --- p.84 / Chapter I) --- derivation of optimal hedge ratio under static hedging strategies --- p.84 / Chapter II) --- Derivation of optimal hedge ratios under dynamic hedging strategies --- p.85 / Chapter III) --- Causality test on the lead lag relationship between HKEFB and the two futures contracts --- p.87 / REFERENCES --- p.89

This thesis concerns with speculative carry trade strategy. Carry trade is based on breach of Uncovered Interest Parity. The theoretical part is focused on traditional fundamental analysis. This thesis deals with the identification of carry trade existence and capture their expressions in the financial markets, verification profitability and attractiveness of carry trade operations, analysis of conditions for carry trade on financial markets before and after global financial crisis 2008. Important part of the work was also description of the consequences of carry trade transactions and their effects on the exchange rate and financial situation

Previous research suggests that a policy interest rate cut below the reversal interest rate reverses the intended effect of monetary policy and becomes contractionary for lending. This paper is an empirical investigation into whether the reversal interest rate was breached in the Swedish negative interest rate environment between February 2015 and July 2016. We find that banks with a greater reliance on deposit funding were adversely affected by the negative interest rate environment, relative to other banks. This is because deposit rates are constrained by a zero lower bound, since banks are reluctant to introduce negative deposit rates for fear of deposit withdrawals. We show with a difference-in-differences approach that the most affected banks reduced loans to households and raised 5 year mortgage lending rates, as compared to the less affected banks, in the negative interest rate environment. These banks also experienced a drop in profitability, suggesting that the zero lower bound on deposits caused the lending spread of banks to be squeezed. However, we do not find evidence that the reversal rate has been breached. / Tidigare forskning menar att en sänkning av styrräntan under brytpunktsräntan gör att penningpolitiken får motsatt effekt och blir åtstramande för utlåning. Denna rapport är en empirisk studie av huruvida brytpunktsräntan passerades i det negativa ränteläget mellan februari 2015 och juli 2016 i Sverige. Våra resultat pekar på att banker vars finansiering till större del bestod av inlåning påverkades negativt av den negativa styrräntan, relativt till andra banker. Detta beror på att inlåningsräntor är begränsade av en lägre nedre gräns på noll procent. Banker är ovilliga att introducera negativa inlåningsräntor för att undvika att kunder tar ut sina insättningar och håller kontanter istället. Vi visar med en "difference-in-differences"-analys att de mest påverkade bankerna minskade lån till hushåll och höjde bolåneräntor med 5-åriga löptider, relativt till mindre påverkade banker, som konsekvens av den negativa styrräntan. Dessa banker upplevde även en minskning av lönsamhet, vilket indikerar att noll som en nedre gräns på inlåningsräntor bidrog till att bankernas räntemarginaler minskade. Vi hittar dock inga bevis på att brytpunktsräntan har passerats.

Den svenska fastighetsbranschen är genom bankernas höga exponering av stor vikt för Sveriges finansiella stabilitet. Sedan inflationen tagit fart under 2021, följde Riksbanken utvecklingen genom att från mitten av 2022 intensivt höja styrräntan till 4%. En identifierad sårbarhet har ansetts vara de ofta högt belånade fastighetsbolagen, vars finansieringskostnader stigit från tidigare periods noll- och minusränta.  En utbredd metod för ränteriskhantering är användandet av derivatinstrument, där bolagens storlek tidigare antytts ha stor påverkan. Syftet med studien är därför att undersöka hur de svenska medelstora fastighetsbolagen använt räntederivat för hantering av ränterisken under den senaste tidens ränteförändringar. Studien bygger på 11 intervjuer med Mid Cap noterade fastighetsbolag, som genom semistrukturerade intervjuer fått besvara frågor kring bolagens reaktion på ränteförändringen, incitamenten bakom derivatanvändning och strategiförändringar.  Resultatet visar att branschen inte väntat sig ränteförändringar av denna magnitud. Flera bolag beskriver sig ha förändrat sina finanspolicys och utökat sin räntesäkringsnivå avsevärt, men flera skillnader finns mellan bolagen. Incitamenten beskrivs primärt vara lånekovenanter såväl som intresset av att stabilisera kassaflödet. Det finns en stor variation i val av derivatinstrument, men klart står att derivat är betydligt mer flexibla än fasträntelån. Framöver beskrivs räntechocken som något bolag kommer att ha i beaktning vid utformandet av nya strategier för derivatanvändningen samt uppsättandet av finanspolicy. / The Swedish real estate sector is crucial to the financial stability of Sweden due to the banks' significant exposure. Following the rise in inflation in 2021, the Riksbank closely monitored the situation and, starting from mid-2022, aggressively raised the policy rate to 4%. A notable vulnerability identified is the highly leveraged nature of many real estate companies, whose financing costs have increased from the previous period of zero and negative interest rates. A common approach to managing interest rate risk is the use of derivative instruments, where company size has previously been indicated as a deciding factor. This study aims to investigate how medium-sized Swedish real estate companies have utilized interest rate derivatives to manage interest rate risk amid recent rate fluctuations. The study is based on 11 interviews with Mid Cap listed real estate companies, conducted through semi-structured interviews to explore their responses to interest rate changes, motivations for using derivatives, and strategic adjustments. The findings reveal that the industry did not anticipate interest rate changes of this magnitude. Several companies reported having revised their financial policies and significantly increased their level of interest rate hedging, although there are notable differences between companies. The primary motivations for using derivatives are described as loan covenants and the desire to stabilize cash flow. There is considerable variation in the choice of derivative instruments, but it is evident that derivatives offer significantly more flexibility than fixed-rate loans. Looking ahead, companies will take the recent interest rate shock into account when formulating new strategies for derivative use and establishing financial policies.

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