This dissertation attempts to determine to what extent sections 88 and 90 of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 comply with the constitutional right to just administrative action, read with the provisions of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. As international trade increases, it is increasingly important that the provisions of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 which regulate the industry are regarded as constitutional as potential trade between South Africa and other countries may be lost if the said provisions are not seen as promoting administrative justice. As wide and far-reaching powers are conveyed upon an administrator acting in accordance with the provisions of sections 88 and 90 of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964, it is important that the said provisions are regarded as constitutional. As not only goods, but also vessels, vehicles and other property used in connection with the suspected goods may be seized in terms of the aforementioned sections, the danger of potential large-scale pecuniary losses to the trader immediately becomes evident. As the current provisions do not allow an affected party to state his or her case before the action in terms of sections 88 and 90 is taken by an administrator, nor require the administrator to provide reasons for his or her action, the legality of the said provisions are tested against the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, as effected by the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. The remedies available to an affected party of an action in terms of the relevant sections of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 are discussed in depth, together with the issue of the determination of the procedural fairness of such action. Certain practical guidelines in the exercising of powers in terms of the aforementioned sections are also given, providing an administrator with a minimum framework of responsibilities and guidelines in order to ensure that the legality of his or her action cannot be brought into dispute. As is evident from the content of this paper, the constitutionality of any action in terms of the relevant sections of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 will almost always depend on the circumstances of the individual case. It is therefore of the utmost importance that an administrator applies his or her mind in a reasonably acceptable manner in order to ensure compliance with the administrative justice provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The dissertation consists of a literary study, focusing on the latest developments regarding the promotion of justice in the international trade industry in South Africa, taking into account statutory provisions, case law, text books, journal articles as well as internet sources. / Thesis (LL.M. (Import and Export Law))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2010.

Economic globalization, the liberalization of markets, and the opening of once closed societies have all heralded the remarkable emergence of the current system of investment treaty arbitration. The current system, however, has attracted significant criticism and calls for reform. This thesis reviews the historical employment of arbitration in international society and the circumstances that lead to the emergence of the current system of investor-state dispute settlement. Following this, two recent proposals for reform of the current system are outlined: the creation of an international court of investment and the implementation of appellate mechanisms for investment treaty arbitration. The thesis concludes by offering an assessment of these proposals and argues for the rejection of the proposal to replace the current system with an international investment court, but offers a cautious endorsement of appellate mechanisms. / Graduate

The ubiquitous nature of e-commerce demands an innovative conceptualization of consumer behaviour that responds to various cultural preferences. Culture has been identified as an underlying determinant of consumer behaviour, and this extends to ecommerce. This research investigates this phenomenon for the Egyptian consumer. This research designed a plausible, integrated framework for investigating the target phenomenon, especially for un-explored cultures. To help to identify salient components of the phenomenon, a three-study exploratory phase, that included: interviews, a survey, and card sorting sessions, was undertaken. The exploratory results highlighted the roles of trust, uncertainty avoidance, Internet store familiarity, and reputation as the main salient factors affecting the perception of the targeted group toward e-commerce. The research hypotheses were then developed based on the exploratory results. Finally, a model testing phase to empirically assess the research hypotheses through a laboratory experiential survey with 370 Egyptian Internet users was undertaken. The experiential survey results support the significant role of the Internet store’s perceived familiarity and reputation as the main antecedents of online trust. The relationship between trust and its two antecedents are found to be culturally sensitive; the high uncertainty avoidance of the consumer is found to be associated with a stronger effect of the store’s reputation on trust, and a stronger effect of store’s familiarity on trust. The research also highlights the significant effect of trust on the attitude towards and the willingness to buy from an e-commerce site. This research, by providing an understanding of the cultural drivers of e-commerce, contributes to building a theory of consumer’s cultural trust within an Internet store context. The research reports on the development of an integrated cultural trust model that highlights recommendations for expanding the adoption of e-commerce. The systematic research framework, introduced by this research, can be a robust starting point for further related work in this area.

The present thesis deals with the international legal consequences of the Biosafety Protocol. If this Protocol answers the problem of GMOs, by enforcing the application of the precautionary principle to the international trade of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), it does not solve the conflict between the interests of trade and those of the environment. On the contrary, the Biosafety Protocol conflicts with the rules of the GATT and the national norms inspired by it would risk being contested before the dispute-settlement institutions of the World Trade Organisation. The Protocol therefore constitutes a new element in the conflict, pre-existing and unsolved, which sets the implicit supremacy of the GATT against the international environmental norms. It confirms the necessity to find a solution enabling the equal authority and mutual respect of the international environmental and trade rules. / All information is correct as at 14 November 2000.

Bill C-55 proposes amendments to the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act tailored on the procedural framework contemplated by the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. This thesis demonstrates that implementation of these amendments will bring Canadian insolvency law into closer---but by no means complete---alignment with the doctrine of modified universalism reflected in the Model Law. To this end, the thesis undertakes an analysis of the different theoretical approaches to cross-border insolvency, shows the importance of instrument choice in determining the level of global harmonization attained, and reviews recent projects of harmonization. This is followed by a close comparative analysis of the extent of compliance of the provisions of Bill C-55 with the Model Law, an analysis that demonstrates the shortcomings of model laws and, somewhat paradoxically, their important role and function in eventually bringing about global legal harmonization.

In the last decade, parties to arbitration agreements have attempted to broaden the scope of judicial review of arbitral awards by contract, beyond the boundaries established in international and domestic arbitration statutes. This thesis analyzes this contractual expansion of judicial review from an international perspective. To this end, the standard of judicial review under the most important international instruments pertaining to commercial arbitration is examined: the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. The study then addresses the question as to whether provisions for heightened judicial review of arbitral awards would be enforceable under the legislation of three major players in commercial arbitration: England, France and the United States. An analysis of the legitimacy of agreements that provide for expanded judicial review under the New York Convention and UNCITRAL Model Law follows. The thesis concludes with an assessment of the impact the mentioned clauses would represent for the institution of arbitration and its advantages.

The availability of firm level data in international trade started a very quickly developing theoretical literature that focused on the micro evidence and understanding its implications for aggregate productivity and welfare. The new models were dealing with individual firm characteristics determining entry and exit from foreign markets and the different ways in which firms chose to enter. Two of the main features of this literature are that firms have heterogeneous productivities and need to pay a fixed costs in order to enter both their home and foreign markets. As a result, some do not find it optimal to export and it is those with higher productivity that do. This thesis is comprised of three theoretical papers (chapters) in which the models are with firms with heterogeneous productivities and there is steady state economic growth. The purpose in all three papers has been to generate results that are already established empirical facts but that have not been incorporated in the theoretical trade and growth literature. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, 2011

In recent years, the use of the mode of regional trade liberalisation has proliferated, while the multilateral talks through the WTO have proceeded slowly, resulting in a debate on the role of bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation. This thesis aims to provide new insights to this debate by studying the welfare effects of different types of trade agreements and the equilibrium outcome(s) of trade negotiation. We apply the three-country and three-good “competing-exporters model" developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) as our basic trade framework. By comparing the equilibrium welfare of each country under different structures of trading blocs, we clarify the welfare impacts of each trade agreement. Then we model the process of trade negotiation as a trade negotiation game, in which each country endogenously decides whether to negotiate through multilateral or bilateral trade liberalisation. By solving the equilibrium of the game, the stable structure of trading blocs and the path(s) to reach it can be found. We start with a framework in which all countries are welfare maximising. We find that at the early stage of trade negotiation, a free trade agreement (FTA) is Pareto welfare improving, despite the fact that member countries benefit more than any non-member. Although being the hub is the best position, a spoke is in a worse position than being outside a single FTA. Thus, a “hub-and-spoke" structure cannot be achieved and the unique equilibrium outcome of trade negotiation is given by multilateral free trade (MFT) through a multilateral trade agreement (MTA). The welfare-maximising analysis is followed by the examination of cases in which each government is politically motivated. The political structure we use is similar to Ornelas (2005), which follows the basic framework developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995), emphasising the interaction between lobby groups representing the special interest of one industry and the government in their home country. We first consider a circumstance where the political pressures are only from the import- competing sector. It is then generalised to a case in which all sectors are allowed to lobby the local government. Furthermore, the analysis is extended into an asymmetric world that includes two big countries and one small country. Our results show that political economy forces usually reduce the likelihood of forming trade agreements and that when the political concerns are sufficiently large, all trade agreements can be prevented by political pressures. Also, our findings suggest that the option of bilateral FTAs does not cause an initially infeasible MFT to become feasible, while a previously feasible MFT is likely to be blocked by the option of FTAs. Thus, our thesis provides some evidence to support the argument that the formation of FTAs can be a “stumbling block" for global trade liberalisation. / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2009

In recent years, the use of the mode of regional trade liberalisation has proliferated, while the multilateral talks through the WTO have proceeded slowly, resulting in a debate on the role of bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation. This thesis aims to provide new insights to this debate by studying the welfare effects of different types of trade agreements and the equilibrium outcome(s) of trade negotiation. We apply the three-country and three-good “competing-exporters model" developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) as our basic trade framework. By comparing the equilibrium welfare of each country under different structures of trading blocs, we clarify the welfare impacts of each trade agreement. Then we model the process of trade negotiation as a trade negotiation game, in which each country endogenously decides whether to negotiate through multilateral or bilateral trade liberalisation. By solving the equilibrium of the game, the stable structure of trading blocs and the path(s) to reach it can be found. We start with a framework in which all countries are welfare maximising. We find that at the early stage of trade negotiation, a free trade agreement (FTA) is Pareto welfare improving, despite the fact that member countries benefit more than any non-member. Although being the hub is the best position, a spoke is in a worse position than being outside a single FTA. Thus, a “hub-and-spoke" structure cannot be achieved and the unique equilibrium outcome of trade negotiation is given by multilateral free trade (MFT) through a multilateral trade agreement (MTA). The welfare-maximising analysis is followed by the examination of cases in which each government is politically motivated. The political structure we use is similar to Ornelas (2005), which follows the basic framework developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995), emphasising the interaction between lobby groups representing the special interest of one industry and the government in their home country. We first consider a circumstance where the political pressures are only from the import- competing sector. It is then generalised to a case in which all sectors are allowed to lobby the local government. Furthermore, the analysis is extended into an asymmetric world that includes two big countries and one small country. Our results show that political economy forces usually reduce the likelihood of forming trade agreements and that when the political concerns are sufficiently large, all trade agreements can be prevented by political pressures. Also, our findings suggest that the option of bilateral FTAs does not cause an initially infeasible MFT to become feasible, while a previously feasible MFT is likely to be blocked by the option of FTAs. Thus, our thesis provides some evidence to support the argument that the formation of FTAs can be a “stumbling block" for global trade liberalisation. / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2009

In recent years, the use of the mode of regional trade liberalisation has proliferated, while the multilateral talks through the WTO have proceeded slowly, resulting in a debate on the role of bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation. This thesis aims to provide new insights to this debate by studying the welfare effects of different types of trade agreements and the equilibrium outcome(s) of trade negotiation. We apply the three-country and three-good “competing-exporters model" developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) as our basic trade framework. By comparing the equilibrium welfare of each country under different structures of trading blocs, we clarify the welfare impacts of each trade agreement. Then we model the process of trade negotiation as a trade negotiation game, in which each country endogenously decides whether to negotiate through multilateral or bilateral trade liberalisation. By solving the equilibrium of the game, the stable structure of trading blocs and the path(s) to reach it can be found. We start with a framework in which all countries are welfare maximising. We find that at the early stage of trade negotiation, a free trade agreement (FTA) is Pareto welfare improving, despite the fact that member countries benefit more than any non-member. Although being the hub is the best position, a spoke is in a worse position than being outside a single FTA. Thus, a “hub-and-spoke" structure cannot be achieved and the unique equilibrium outcome of trade negotiation is given by multilateral free trade (MFT) through a multilateral trade agreement (MTA). The welfare-maximising analysis is followed by the examination of cases in which each government is politically motivated. The political structure we use is similar to Ornelas (2005), which follows the basic framework developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995), emphasising the interaction between lobby groups representing the special interest of one industry and the government in their home country. We first consider a circumstance where the political pressures are only from the import- competing sector. It is then generalised to a case in which all sectors are allowed to lobby the local government. Furthermore, the analysis is extended into an asymmetric world that includes two big countries and one small country. Our results show that political economy forces usually reduce the likelihood of forming trade agreements and that when the political concerns are sufficiently large, all trade agreements can be prevented by political pressures. Also, our findings suggest that the option of bilateral FTAs does not cause an initially infeasible MFT to become feasible, while a previously feasible MFT is likely to be blocked by the option of FTAs. Thus, our thesis provides some evidence to support the argument that the formation of FTAs can be a “stumbling block" for global trade liberalisation. / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2009