For decades our military has been designed and funded as a conventionally superior force on the battlefield employing the most devastating and advanced weapon systems the world has ever seen (World, War I, II, Operation Desert Storm, and Phase I of Operation Iraqi Freedom). However, in low intensity conflicts (LICs) or irregular warfare (IW) campaigns, U.S. forces are faced with an irregular enemy, one that does not choose to fight our forces directly but rather through unconventional or indirect methods. For over 60 years, the Department of Defense has had an appalling record of protecting its air bases and personnel while deployed around the world in support of low intensity conflicts. However, the way the military defends and protects these air bases still revolves around a Cold War threat, a conventional threat. The strategy of global power projection and forward presence are the cornerstone to U.S. defense. To enhance combat capabilities in the Air Force and to defeat irregular warfare (IW) forces in any environment, the answer lies within the concept of Integrated Swarming Operations (ISO); the complete integration of a highly trained security force, skilled in the employment of successful counterinsurgency tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), with today's most sophisticated Command, Control, Communications, Computer and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) platforms into a battlefield swarm. In doing so, ISO allows security forces to achieve their three critical air base defense Mission Essential Tasks (METs) of 1) tactical ISR, 2) intercepting the threat, and 3) application of force as well as the Air Force's Integrated Base Defense (IBD) Objectives of "See First, Understand First, and Act First." / US Air Force (USAF) author.

Under the leadership of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), the military is undergoing transformation to more effectively counter the asymmetric threat of non-state terrorists and extremists in the "long war." After five years, however, one component of national security strategy is visibly unfulfilled: military pursuit of terrorists and extremists outside of Afghanistan and Iraq. The lack of offensive military efforts outside of areas designated as combat zones creates the impression that the long war has stalled. Overt offensive military operations targeting non-state actors may advance the counterterrorism mission and serve as a deterrent. This thesis identifies and analyzes four major constraints on the conduct of such operations: legal concerns about the use of force, use of the CIA for covert paramilitary activities, limits on USSOCOM and Special Operations Forces, and civilian and military leaders' aversion to risk. It describes the historical, bureaucratic and cultural causes of the constraints, concluding with recommendations to allow the US government and the US military to pursue non-state terrorists and extremists with overt offensive military operations.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009. / Thesis Advisor: Sepp, Kalev. Second Reader: Greenshields, Brian. "December 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on February 1, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Civil Affairs, Irregular Warfare, counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, stability operations, special operations, future threat environment. Includes bibliographical references (p. 85-89). Also available in print.

This thesis attempts to convince Air Force leadership to shift its approach to expeditionary airpower in counterinsurgency (COIN) from one that emphasizes advanced technology for striking targets to one which focuses on airmen to influence indigenous populations. Judging history, airpower will certainly play a supporting role in any effort to quell insurgency through reconnaissance, airlift, and close air support. Thus, wherever the American military deploys for COIN, the Air Force will not only operate, but will also deploy substantial numbers of expeditionary airmen. This forward presence of American airmen at expeditionary airbases enables the Air Force to participate in pacification where it most counts on the ground, in the surrounding community, and among the indigenous population. To contribute more fully, airmen must comprehend the nature of insurgency to reveal the unique challenges it poses for airpower. To meet these challenges, airmen must develop an appropriate strategic framework for waging COIN so as to correctly shape the expeditionary Air Force by exploiting its own human capital to solve human problems. By bolstering its aviation advisors and security forces, and creating its own cadre of civil affairs airmen, the Air Force can most significantly improve its effectiveness in COIN.

The U.S. military has an increasing requirement to prepare for and conduct urban operations (UO). This UO requirement spreads across the spectrum of conflict, from high intensity combat to peacekeeping and humanitarian missions (Stability and Support Operations--SASO), often simultaneously. Regardless of which portion(s) of the warfare spectrum U.S. forces are involved in, urban engagements are inevitable and present major challenges. Superior standoff weapons ranges and combined arms tactics are quickly negated in the confined terrain of a complex and usually unfamiliar urban environment. Often considerably more challenging is the ability to differentiate the enemy from noncombatants--endangering our Soldiers and their mission. Conventional forces, armed only with traditional weapons, normally have two options: the threat of a violent response (passive) or the use of deadly force (active). These two extremes have virtually no middle ground. The reluctance of military and/or peacekeeping forces to employ deadly force on unconfirmed enemy targets creates a vulnerability. This vulnerability may be mitigated by equipping a small combat unit (SCU) with a viable alternative to deadly force-- non-lethal weapons (NLWs). Using an imperfect friend or foe identification modeling framework within an agent-based simulation (ABS), an NLW is essentially used to interrogate (determine the intent of the person in order to identify friend or foe) rather than attempt to incapacitate a target. To determine the impacts of employing NLWs in an urban combat environment (with civilians on the battlefield), three factors were varied across 15 design points: the ability of U.S. military forces to positively identify a target, the range of the selected NLW, and the distribution/number of NLWs in an SCU. By replicating each design point and analyzing the resulting output data, the following insights were determined: the use of NLWs does not degrade U.S. survivability; NLWs are essential to neutralizing suicide attacks; and NLWs decrease civilian casualties.

Doctor of Philosophy (Economics) / This dissertation asks how foreign assistance to one or both sides in a civil war affects the dynamics of the conflict. This overarching question is subsequently divided into two further questions: 1) how does foreign intervention affect the capabilities of the recipient, and 2) how does this affect the nature of the warfare. The puzzle for the first is that the impact of foreign intervention on combat effectiveness frequently varies significantly between recipients. This variation is explained by recipients’ different abilities to convert the inputs of foreign intervention into the outputs of fighting capability. The nature of the warfare in civil war will change in line with the balance of military capabilities between the belligerents. The balance of capabilities will be responsible for the form of warfare at a particular place and time whether it be conventional, irregular or guerrilla/counter-guerrilla. The argument is then illustrated with two extensive case studies, of civil wars in Angola and Afghanistan, where temporal and spatial variation in the type of warfare is shown to correlate with the type, degree, and direction of foreign intervention.

<p>Förändringar i den svenska säkerhetspolitiken under 2000-talet har gjort att Försvarsmakten i större utsträckning bidrar med trupp till internationella fredsfrämjande insatser världen över. Dessa har endast varit i konfliktområden med så kallade irreguljära aktörer. Förändringarna har gått fort och det finns delar av Försvarsmakten som inte hunnit med i omställningen. Reglementen och doktriner är ett av dessa områden. Arbetet med doktrinerna har precis börjats men det finns idag inget arbete som påvisar hur relevanta doktrinerna är för den verksamhet som Försvarsmakten bedriver i internationella insatser idag.</p><p>Syftet med uppsatsen är att börja fylla detta kunskapshål och undersöka i vilken grad Försvarsmaktens militärstrategiska doktrin är tillämpbar för irreguljära konflikter och besvara frågeställningen: Är <em>Militärstrategisk doktrin</em> relevant som vägledning för att lösa Försvarsmaktens uppgifter i irreguljära konflikter?</p><p>I uppsatsen beskrivs irreguljära konflikters bakgrund och karaktär samt aspekter som anses viktiga för att insatser skall lyckas med att skapa fred i konflikterna. Utifrån teorin formas operationella indikatorer vilka används i en kvalitativ textanalys för att undersöka den militärstrategiska doktrinen. Resultatet visar att Försvarsmaktens Militärstrategiska doktrin inte är relevant som vägledning i irreguljära konflikter. Den innehåller inte tillräckligt mycket information som anses vara viktig för att insatser skall lyckas. Doktrinen fyller inte längre sitt syfte utan behöver revideras.</p> / <p>Changes in the Swedish security policy during the 21^st century have made the armed forces extending their international peacekeeping efforts worldwide. These missions have only been in conflicts with so-called Irregular armed forces since year 2000. The changes have been rapid and there are areas within the Armed Forces who haven’t kept up with them. Regulations and doctrines is one of those areas. The work with revising these doctrines has just begun but there is currently no efforts being made to demonstrate the relevance of the doctrines for the work the Armed Forces is undertaking in international operations.</p><p>The purpose of the paper is to start the process of amending this lack of knowledge and to examine to what extent the Armed Forces military strategic doctrine is applicable for conflicts with irregular armed forces and also to answer the question: Can the military strategic doctrine be considered a relevant guide in solving the tasks of the Armed Forces in conflicts with irregular armed forces?</p><p>The paper describes the background and characteristics of conflicts with irregular armed forces. It also describes aspects of these conflicts which are considered essential for the efforts to succeed in establishing peace. Using this theory as a starting point, operational indicators are formed that can be textually analysed qualitatively to investigate the military strategic doctrine. The result shows that the Armed Forces Military Strategic doctrine cannot be considered a relevant guide when dealing with conflicts with irregular armed forces. The doctrine does not contain enough information deemed essential for success. The doctrine no longer fills its purpose, but needs to be revised.</p>

Förändringar i den svenska säkerhetspolitiken under 2000-talet har gjort att Försvarsmakten i större utsträckning bidrar med trupp till internationella fredsfrämjande insatser världen över. Dessa har endast varit i konfliktområden med så kallade irreguljära aktörer. Förändringarna har gått fort och det finns delar av Försvarsmakten som inte hunnit med i omställningen. Reglementen och doktriner är ett av dessa områden. Arbetet med doktrinerna har precis börjats men det finns idag inget arbete som påvisar hur relevanta doktrinerna är för den verksamhet som Försvarsmakten bedriver i internationella insatser idag. Syftet med uppsatsen är att börja fylla detta kunskapshål och undersöka i vilken grad Försvarsmaktens militärstrategiska doktrin är tillämpbar för irreguljära konflikter och besvara frågeställningen: Är Militärstrategisk doktrin relevant som vägledning för att lösa Försvarsmaktens uppgifter i irreguljära konflikter? I uppsatsen beskrivs irreguljära konflikters bakgrund och karaktär samt aspekter som anses viktiga för att insatser skall lyckas med att skapa fred i konflikterna. Utifrån teorin formas operationella indikatorer vilka används i en kvalitativ textanalys för att undersöka den militärstrategiska doktrinen. Resultatet visar att Försvarsmaktens Militärstrategiska doktrin inte är relevant som vägledning i irreguljära konflikter. Den innehåller inte tillräckligt mycket information som anses vara viktig för att insatser skall lyckas. Doktrinen fyller inte längre sitt syfte utan behöver revideras. / Changes in the Swedish security policy during the 21st century have made the armed forces extending their international peacekeeping efforts worldwide. These missions have only been in conflicts with so-called Irregular armed forces since year 2000. The changes have been rapid and there are areas within the Armed Forces who haven’t kept up with them. Regulations and doctrines is one of those areas. The work with revising these doctrines has just begun but there is currently no efforts being made to demonstrate the relevance of the doctrines for the work the Armed Forces is undertaking in international operations. The purpose of the paper is to start the process of amending this lack of knowledge and to examine to what extent the Armed Forces military strategic doctrine is applicable for conflicts with irregular armed forces and also to answer the question: Can the military strategic doctrine be considered a relevant guide in solving the tasks of the Armed Forces in conflicts with irregular armed forces? The paper describes the background and characteristics of conflicts with irregular armed forces. It also describes aspects of these conflicts which are considered essential for the efforts to succeed in establishing peace. Using this theory as a starting point, operational indicators are formed that can be textually analysed qualitatively to investigate the military strategic doctrine. The result shows that the Armed Forces Military Strategic doctrine cannot be considered a relevant guide when dealing with conflicts with irregular armed forces. The doctrine does not contain enough information deemed essential for success. The doctrine no longer fills its purpose, but needs to be revised.

This is a sociological study of the views of officers in the Swedish Army and its Amphibious Forces on tactics in Irregular Warfare (IW), in particular, Counterinsurgency (COIN). IW comprises struggles, where the military weaker part uses an indirect approach with smaller units and integrates the civilian and military dimensions in a violence spectrum including subversion, terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare and infantry actions. IW is the main armed warfare style in insurgencies. COIN is the combined political, military, economic, social and legal actions in counter insurgencies. Data has been collected by means of interviews with almost all (n =43) officers, who were either commanding battalions or rifle and manoeuvre companies while undergoing training for general warfare and international operations. The main theoretical and methodological inspiration is the traditional one for research on social fields, inaugurated by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. The statistical technique used is Multiple Correspondence Analysis. As a background and context base, an inquiry inspired by the Begriffsgechichte (Conceptual History) tradition explores the genesis and development of understandings of the term Irregular Warfare. The research question is outlined as; “how can contemporary Swedish military thought on tactics in Irregular Warfare be characterized using descriptive patterns, mapped in relation to background factors and normative standards? The most significant findings are that there are two main opposing notions separating the officers’ views on tactics in Irregular Warfare: (1) a focus on larger, combat oriented and collectively operating military units versus smaller and larger, more intelligence oriented and dispersed operating units, and (2) a focus on military tasks and kinetic effects versus military and civilian tasks as well as “soft” effects. The distribution of these views can be presented as a two-dimensional space structured by the two axes. This space represents four categories of tactics, partly diverging from normative military standards for Counterinsurgency. This social space of standpoints shows different structural tendencies for background factors of social and cultural character, particularly dominant concerning military backgrounds, international mission experiences and civilian education. Compared to military standards for Counterinsurgency, the two tactical types characterized by a Regular Warfare mind-set stands out as counter-normative. Signs of creative thought on military practice and theory, as well as a still persistent Regular Warfare doxa are apparent. Power struggles might thus develop, effecting the transformation to a broadened warfare culture with an enhanced focus also on Irregular Warfare. The result does not support research results arguing for a convergence of military thought in the European transformation of Armed Forces. The main argument goes beyond tactics and suggests sociological analysis on reciprocal effects regarding strategy, operational art, tactics as well as leadership, concerning the mind-set and preferences for Regular, Irregular and Hybrid Warfare.

Doctor of Philosophy (Economics) / This dissertation asks how foreign assistance to one or both sides in a civil war affects the dynamics of the conflict. This overarching question is subsequently divided into two further questions: 1) how does foreign intervention affect the capabilities of the recipient, and 2) how does this affect the nature of the warfare. The puzzle for the first is that the impact of foreign intervention on combat effectiveness frequently varies significantly between recipients. This variation is explained by recipients’ different abilities to convert the inputs of foreign intervention into the outputs of fighting capability. The nature of the warfare in civil war will change in line with the balance of military capabilities between the belligerents. The balance of capabilities will be responsible for the form of warfare at a particular place and time whether it be conventional, irregular or guerrilla/counter-guerrilla. The argument is then illustrated with two extensive case studies, of civil wars in Angola and Afghanistan, where temporal and spatial variation in the type of warfare is shown to correlate with the type, degree, and direction of foreign intervention.