Among the most important choices made by groups fighting a civil war -- governments and rebels alike -- is how to allocate available military and pecuniary resources across the contested areas of a conflict-ridden territory. Combatants use military force to coerce and money to persuade and co-opt. A vast body of literature in political science and security studies examines how and where combatants in civil wars apply violence. Scholars, however, have devoted less attention to combatants' use of material inducements to attain their objectives. This dissertation proposes a logic that guides combatants' use of material benefits alongside military force in pursuit of valuable support from communities in the midst of civil war. Focused on the interaction between the military and the local population, the theory envisions a bargaining process between a commander and a community whose support he seeks. The outcome of the bargaining process is a fiscal strategy defined by the extent to which material benefits are distributed diffusely or targeted narrowly. That outcome follows from key characteristics of the community in question that include its sociopolitical solidarity (or fragmentation) and its economic resilience (or vulnerability). I evaluate the theory of fiscal strategies through a series of case studies from the Philippine-American War of 1899-1902. As a further test of external validity, I consider the theory's applicability to key events from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. / Government

Longtemps en marge des pratiques militaires occidentales, la guerre irrégulière fut réintroduite au cours de la Seconde Guerre mondiale sous l’impulsion de la stratégie indirecte adoptée par la Grande-Bretagne. Les réseaux de coopération interalliés permettent alors à ces nouvelles conceptions de se diffuser auprès d’acteurs français et américains, formant ainsi le creuset d’une nouvelle communauté stratégique. L’émergence de la « menace subversive » au début de la guerre froide favorise le renouvellement de cette communauté et le développement des savoirs stratégiques irréguliers tels que la guérilla ou la guerre psychologique. Tantôt dans la coopération, tantôt dans la rivalité, les alliés tissent leur communauté de pratiques, d’abord en Asie du Sud-Est, face à la menace maoïste, puis dans l’ensemble du Tiers-Monde. Au cours des années 1960, ce sont les États-Unis qui prennent la tête de la croisade contre les « guerres de libération nationale » et développent en réponse une stratégie intégrée sous le nom de « contre-insurrection ». L’échec de sa mise en œuvre au Vietnam, ainsi que ses dérives politiques conduisent pourtant au rapide déclin de la stratégie irrégulière en Occident jusqu’à sa réapparition au début du XXIe siècle. En s’appuyant sur un grand nombre de sources primaires et en adoptant les nouvelles méthodes de l’histoire connectée, ce travail met en lumière les structures, les réseaux et les vecteurs qui contribuèrent à la circulation des savoirs associés à la guerre irrégulière. Il en explore également les motivations, ainsi que les limites et tente de proposer un narratif global permettant d’appréhender l’évolution des concepts de guerre irrégulière. / After being marginalized for centuries by the Western military model, irregular warfare was reintroduced during the Second World War through the indirect strategy adopted under British leadership. These new concepts then spread to the French and the American allies, thus contributing to forge the crucible of a new strategic community. The emergence of a "subversive threat" at the beginning of the Cold War allowed the renewal of such a community and the development of strategic knowledge such as irregular guerrilla or psychological warfare. Sometimes in cooperation, sometimes in rivalry, Western allies weaved their community of practice, first in Southeast Asia, facing the Maoist threat of people’s war, and then throughout the whole Third World. In the 1960s, the United States took the head of the crusade against the "wars of national liberation" and thus developed an integrated strategy, known as "counterinsurgency". The failure of its implementation in Vietnam and its political excesses yet lead to the rapid decline of irregular strategy in the West until its reappearance in the early twenty-first century, in the context of the global war on terror. Based on a large number of primary sources and adopting new methods of connected history, this work highlights the structures, networks and vectors which contributed to the circulation of strategic knowledge associated with irregular warfare. It also explores the motivations and limitations for such a circulation and attempts to offer an global narrative to apprehend the evolution of irregular warfare concepts.

This PhD thesis examines the status of ‘expert knowledge’ in the history of U.S. asymmetric, or ‘counterinsurgency’ (COIN), warfare during the last century. The historical rise of expert influence has so far been neglected in the study of wars within the field of International Relations and the thesis will give us an indication of the importance and utility of expert knowledge. With a specific focus on the campaigns in the Philippines (1899-1902), Vietnam (1954-75) and Iraq (2003-11), the central research question guiding the project is as follows: “What were the conditions for the evolution, the constitution and the use of ‘outside’ expert knowledge in U.S. counterinsurgency campaigns?” The thesis claims that military and academic ‘experts’ had a key role in framing and implementing the problem-sets and solutions to these conflicts. They have, in Iraq in particular, played an important part in developing the campaigns’ ex-post-facto justification of success. Within the framework of organisational knowledge production, this knowledge does not necessarily play an instrumental role for the military. Instead, it can also serve a merely symbolic function, demonstrating to the audience and stakeholders within the political environment that the organisation is willing to solve the problems the insurgents pose, but without any interest in long-term utilisation of the knowledge. This thesis argues that across time, from the beginning of the Philippine-American War in 1898 to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011, ‘counterinsurgency’ has developed from a tactical and operational tool, used instrumentally to fight insurgencies, to a strategy or even ‘ideology’ in its own right. Whilst the methods or techniques of counterinsurgency remain basically the same, expert knowledge is increasingly used in modern – that is post-World War II – campaigns to support a politico-strategic narrative.

This paper examines naval irregular warfare by developing the theory Guerre de razzia written by Benjamin Armstrong. In its ambition to develop Guerre de razzia this paper analyses recent events of maritime conflicts containing at least one state actor. The analysis is based on the three main categories described in the theory: methods, goals, and success factors. Past research on naval irregular warfare determines it as warfare conducted by non-state actors. Events as recent as April 2020 shows the use of irregular methods in maritime conflicts by state actors when Iran employed swarming attacks against the US Navy. Contemporary research emphasizes that irregular methods are no longer reserved to rebels and guerrillas but a way for state actors to reach their goals more efficiently. The analysis establishes Guerre de razzia as a theory with high level of explanatory value for naval irregular warfare used in recent maritime conflicts. In terms of developing Guerre de razzia the analysis makes the following conclusions: -Methods used in naval irregular warfare utilizes a higher degree of nonviolent approaches with the ambition of keeping the conflict from escalating -Partnership as a mean of receiving logistics enables a small actor to expand its area of operation -The specialized equipment required to undertake naval irregular warfare should increase mobility as a way of approaching the opponent with greater diversity

Johan A. Warden tog fram sin modell om motståndaren som ett system för att genom denna hitta dess svagheter. Modellen visade sig vara mycket användbar inom mellanstatliga konflikter och var mycket effektiv vid planerandet och genomförandet av USA:s offensiv mot Irak under inledningen av Gulfkriget. Men kopplat mot irreguljära konflikter har Wardens modell stött på mycket kritik då den anses spelat ut sin roll och därför inte längre kan anses applicerbar vid planerandet av luftoperationer inom denna typ av krigföring. Denna uppsats skall se om det är precisionsvapen och användandet av dessa som räddar kvar Warden inom planeringen av luftoperationer inom irreguljär krigföring. / John A. Warden developed the Five ring model and the enemy as a system. These models where used as a tool to find the enemies weak points. These models proved useful in a conventional conflict, and where very effective during the planning and execution of Operation Desert Storm. In recent times Wardens theories has been a subject of a debate, stating that they have played out there role as an effect of irregular warfare. This essay is going to try to see if it is precision-guided munitions that save Wardens theories in the fields of modern air-warfare planning in irregular warfare.

This diplomatic and military history offers a new interpretation of the origins of the three fighting fronts during the final phase of the Cold War in Angola, Central America, and Afghanistan. Vaguely remembered today as proxy wars on the periphery, in fact, these were protracted revolutionary civil wars and regional contests for the balance of power in which millions died, while at the same time they were central to global superpower confrontation. Analysis focuses on the strategy and policy of the United States. The chronology from 1975 to 1982 covers the Ford administration's covert action intervention in the Angolan Civil War, which came to grief at the hands of Cuban troops; Jimmy Carter's effort to conduct foreign policy based on principles, which ran foul of power considerations in Angola, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Afghanistan; and Ronald Reagan's embrace of these wars early in his first term as part of the revival of U.S. strength in its competition with the Soviet Union. The principal argument is that, while generally undervalued as controversial small wars of dubious significance, these wars were in fact integral to U.S. experience of limited war during the Cold War following victory in World War II. In strategic terms, the main conclusion is that the U.S. restricted itself to conducting economy of force contingency operations in Angola, Central America, and Afghanistan as a result of its costly struggles in Korea and Vietnam. Despite declaring these peripheral wars to be central to the Cold War, avoiding the costs of involving U.S forces directly in Third World conflicts and minimizing the risks of escalation with the Soviet Union were overriding political and military imperatives.

Les déboires, notamment récents, des démocraties en guerre ne peuvent êtreexpliqués par les théories de la « victoire démocratique ». Dominantes dans le champacadémique contemporain des Relations internationales, celles-ci confèrent aux démocraties unavantage militaire décisif. Rendre compte de cette anomalie, tel est l’objectif de cette recherche.Pour cela, nous posons l’hypothèse que la défaite survient pour un État démocratique lorsquel’exécutif présente publiquement des objectifs de guerre fallacieux : nous parlons de« contournement » (de la démocratie).Une telle pratique rend la guerre illégitime en interne. Les gouvernants en ont conscience et,anticipant la réaction négative du public, ils se restreignent dans l’engagement armé. Leurschoix stratégiques dépendent de cette contrainte. Trop prudents, et surtout trop discrets pourêtre efficaces, ils connaissent des difficultés sur le terrain. Constatant finalement l’existenced’une tromperie quant aux objectifs de la guerre, le public la conteste à mesure qu’elle provoquela mort des soldats de la nation. Les contraintes pesant sur les gouvernants augmentent, et avecelles les difficultés militaires et donc la contestation. Ces facteurs se renforcent mutuellementjusqu’à ce que les gouvernants renoncent à atteindre les objectifs majeurs qu’ils se sont fixés,trop coûteux politiquement. Un temps affaiblie, la démocratie se rétablit irrésistiblement, auxdépens de ceux qui l’ont contrariée. Ainsi les démocraties perdent-elles des guerres, ce quenous tentons de démontrer par l’analyse minutieuse de deux cas d’études représentatifs : laguerre du Vietnam pour les États-Unis et celle du Liban en 1982 pour Israël. / Democracies can be in trouble in war, as their recent military failures have shown.The theories of « democratic victory », that put forth that democratic states enjoy a decisivemilitary advantage, have not been able to provide a logical explanation of this occurence. Yet,this proposition dominates the contemporary academic field of International Relations. Thisresearch seeks precisely to solve this puzzle. In order to do so, I argue that democracies losewars when the executive publicly announces fallacious war aims, or as I refer to it as“circumvention” (of democracy).This practice makes war illegitimate internally. Leaders are aware of this, and they must showrestraint in war as they anticipate the negative reactions from the public. Their strategic choicesbecome dependent upon this constraint. Too careful and, above all, too discreet to be effective,they face difficulties in the theater of war. The public eventually discovers the existence of adeception about the aims of the war, and objects to the latter as it provokes the death of thecountry’s soldiers. As the constraints endured by the leaders increase, so do military difficultiesand the contestation of the war. These factors reinforce each other until political leadersabandon their major objectives, realizing it would be too costly to achieve them. Onceweakened, democracy irresistibly recovers at the expenses of those who unsettled it. And thusdemocratic states lose wars, which is evidenced through the meticulous analysis of tworepresentative case studies: the wars that the U.S. and Israel fought in Vietnam and in Lebanon(1982) respectively

While the world is urbanising at an exponential rate, so does the conflicts. The common environment for a conventional military force has changed from the open fields normally dominated by tanks and artillery, to narrow streets and buildings in a city. While the actors and environment for combat changes, the tactics doesn’t seem to. Maneuver warfare was mainly developed from the lessons learned from WW2 and was focused on warfare with large units using firepower and movement. But since the last two decades most of the fighting has taken part in urban areas against another type of enemy, which won’t allow for the full extent of the maneuvering and firepower due to structures and other obstructions in a city. This study will analyse how western militaries utilised the principles of maneuver warfare in urban combat. The goal is to measure how well the principles of maneuver warfare applicable in an urban environment against the ever-increasing irregular threat. The purpose is to indicate the complexity the urban environment brings to military units when planning and conducting operations.  The results find that maneuver warfare relates well but can’t fully explain military success in urban warfare.