Thesis (M.A.)--Southern California College, 1986. / Includes bibliography references (leaves 159-164).

Thesis (Th. D.)--Grace Theological Seminary, 1981. / Abstract. Bibliography: leaves [220]-238.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business, March 2001. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

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This research was designed to explore the nature of reasoning. In general, three categories of theories about reasoning (the inferential rule approach, the mental models approach, and the operational constructive approach) are used to explain reasoning. In this research, a simple transitivity of length task was selected as the experimental vehicle to explore these approaches for their veracity. Each approach was assessed for spatial and linguistic conditions which might influence reasoning about transitive length relations. The length difference under consideration in the reasoning task, the order in which the premise statements about the length differences were presented and the linguistic relational term used to describe the length difference were selected as the experimental variables. Three measures of reasoning about transitive length relations were assessed: judgements, judgements-plus-justifications, and necessity understanding. A between-within factorial, cross-sectional design was employed. The order of the premise statements (optimal/control) was manipulated as the experimental between-subjects factor. The two experimental within-subjects factors, length difference (large/small) and linguistic relational term (“longer”/”shorter”), were fully crossed and counterbalanced. Ninety-six preschool and school-age children, evenly divided by gender and age (5-6 years, 7-8 years, 9-10 years), participated in the study. The developmental character of transitive reasoning in the age range studied was confirmed for two of the three measures of reasoning. More failures of judgement were observed when a large length difference was matched with the linguistic relational term “longer” and when a small length difference was matched with the linguistic relational term “shorter” than when the length differences and relational terms were mismatched. The arrangement of the premise figure did indirectly influence any measure of transitive reasoning but a large length difference in combination with the control premise figure was found to increase the frequency of transitive judgements-plus justifications. It is concluded from the analysis of the findings of this research that transitive reasoning about length is likely to result from constructive processes, rather then from application of logical rules. However, it is unclear whether the constructive processes in question are best explained in terms of cognitive operations or in terms of figurative mental models. / Arts, Faculty of / Psychology, Department of / Graduate

The aim in this thesis is to investigate the logical status of meta-ethical theories which attempt to analyse ethical sentences in terms of other types of sentences or other types of human activity. That is, an investigation of the logic of statements like "Value judgements are simply expressions of emotion", "Value judgements are (disguised) commands", "Ethical statements are (peculiar) descriptions" is presented. To do this, one such theory, the Emotive Theory, is considered in some detail. This theory was chosen above the others for more detailed treatment as it has proved the most influential in the development of contemporary philosophy since the 1930s when it was first presented. It is here shown that in its historically important presentation, the Emotive Theory is literally false, although it can be made true by suitable re-definition. It can then be seen that the process of making the theory true by re-definition removes it from the type of theory which it is the aim of this thesis to investigate for the theory then ceases to analyse ethical sentences in terms of other types of sentences or other types of human activity. Thus there is no lengthy investigation of the theory when it involves new definition for this falls outside the scope of the thesis. Having presented a detailed refutation of the Emotive Theory as an attempt to analyse ethical sentences in terms of other types of sentences or other types of human activity, a general refutation of all such attempts is developed. It is shown that such statements as "Value judgements are simply expressions of emotion", "Value judgements are (disguised) commands", "Ethical statements are (peculiar) descriptions" are all literally false however much they may point up important facts. This is followed by a short discussion of the implications of the thesis in respect to philosophical investigations of the logic of ethical statements. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

Using the hierarchy of moral judgement stages developed by Lawrence Kohlberg as a theoretical framework, this study investigated the ways that adults make judgements about moral issues. Specifically examined were differences between the stages of moral development of husbands and wives, older and younger respondents, college and non college educated respondents, church attending and non attending respondents and working and non working women. Respondents were sixteen married couples randomly selected from the parish list of St. Faith's Anglican Church, Vancouver. Data were collected by means of a structured interview, the Kohlberg Moral Dilemma Interview, Form A. A qualitative analysis of data from the interviews was done so that judgements of respondents could be assigned to stages in the hierarchy of moral judgements. Data were further analyzed using the Mann Whitney U. test, Wilcoxon Matched Pairs and Chi square. The majority of respondents were found to be at a conventional stage 3 and 4 level of moral judgement with about one quarter able to use principled forms of judgement. Most respondents used a mixture of stage thinking in the resolution of moral dilemmas. Less than one quarter were consistent from stage to stage. Over all, men and women tended to be at the same stage of moral development but husbands and their non working wives were found to be at different stages. Husbands were at stage 4 and their wives stage 3. There were no differences between men and working women. Working women tended to score higher on a test of moral judgement than non working women. They were also better educated. Neither age nor church attendance were found to be related to stages of moral development. Respondents who had completed college scored higher on a test of moral judgement than respondents who had not completed college. / Education, Faculty of / Educational Studies (EDST), Department of / Graduate

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