L’objet de ce travail est d’étudier un discours, une prise de position identifié(e) sur un forum qui revendique la possibilité pour chaque individu de pouvoir poser, en toute liberté, la décision d’en finir avec la vie. Le travail a le souci de répondre à deux objectifs : un objectif empirique d’abord, puisqu’il s’agit d’observer et de décrire un discours précis à l’aide des enseignements clefs de l’ouvrage de Boltanski et Thévenot De la justification, mais aussi théorique, dès lors que l’empirie permet de participer au dialogue théorique initié par ces deux auteurs et peut-être de l’enrichir.

Love and romantic relationships have the capacity to influence one's welfare in the most profound ways. Intimate partner psychological aggression (IPPA), defined as verbal and nonverbal behaviours that aim to belittle, coerce, isolate, or control (Baldry, 2003; Shorey et al., 2012), is the most prevalent form of partner aggression (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2019), and can have significant negative outcomes on its victims. The detrimental outcomes of IPPA warrant additional research on factors that may be associated with its sustained prevalence in men and women. While various studies have revealed that justifying a harmful behaviour can maintain and, in some cases, aggravate the behaviour (e.g., Martens & Kosloff, 2012; Mulder & van Dijk, 2020), few have explored its associations to IPPA. This doctoral dissertation focuses on IPPA and how it is justified. Specifically, the two complementary studies investigated how justifications for using IPPA relate to other features of psychological functioning (e.g., adult romantic attachment, relationship satisfaction, anger management, psychopathy, childhood trauma, drug and alcohol use) to better understand the IPPA phenomenon. The present dissertation is in article format and contains four sections: a general introduction, two articles, and a general discussion. The general introduction presents the topic of the dissertation, defines the primary constructs, states the problem statement, provides a robust theoretical basis, and specifies its main objectives. The two articles contain the following sections: introduction, objectives and hypotheses, method, analyses, results and discussion. Both articles are presented according to the format requested by their respective peer-reviewed journal. Lastly, the general discussion summarizes the findings of both articles, presents their implications and outlines limitations and future directions for prospective studies. All study materials (i.e., ethics approval notice, consent form, self-report measures) are included as appendices. The first study explored the association between how individuals justify their use of IPPA and their adult romantic attachment (i.e., defined through levels of attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance) in Canadian community couples experiencing bi-directional aggression. The sample consisted of 162 adult participants (81 mixed-sex couples). The data were analyzed using structural equation modelling (i.e., actor-partner interdependence model) to test the study's hypotheses, as it is one of few statistical models to account for variances between and within partners. Path analysis based on the APIM model revealed statistically meaningful associations between attachment anxiety and all types of justifications, as well as no statistically significant associations between attachment avoidance and the justifications. In addition, a small but significant association was found between men's attachment avoidance and women's use of external justifications for their use of IPPA. The results are discussed using the theoretical lenses of attachment theory and cognitive dissonance, and highlight the significance of justifications in adults with higher levels of attachment anxiety. The second study investigated a new typology of men's use of IPPA. A sample of 456 men seeking therapeutic services for their couple relationship problems was recruited to complete a battery of questionnaires. Latent profile analyses revealed a final five-profile solution model. The five profiles were then compared on a series of IPPA-related variables to offer more descriptive information on each profile. Overall, the results emphasize the importance of inquiring about the justifications accompanying men's use of IPPA to support the conceptualization and orient treatment for this population. Taken together, these independent studies provide a complementary overview of the associations between justification for IPPA use and other features of psychological functioning. While the first study focuses on the associations between justifications and romantic attachment, the second uses justifications as an indicator variable to classify participants and then compares the profiles on a multitude of variables, including adult romantic attachment. Moreover, the studies' complementary analytical and methodological approaches offer results that, combined, refer to men and women, individuals and couples, and investigates justification across a community and a middle-ground sample (i.e., sharing characteristics of both a community and a clinical sample). Moreover, the combination of the studies’ variable-centered analyses (i.e., study 1; focus the analysis on the relationship among variables) and person-centered analyses (i.e., study 2; focus the analysis on the classification of individuals) reflects an important strength of this dissertation. The results highlight the importance of considering the justifications for using IPPA and stress its relevance with other dimensions of psychological functioning. The results contribute to the literature and overall understanding justifications for intimate partner aggression and add support to some of the theories that inform conceptualizations and treatment of individuals who are dealing with IPPA.

The starting point of the thesis is an acceptance of the principles of a moderately naturalized epistemology which allow for the traditional questions of epistemology, especially that of empirical justification, to be addressed in a recognizable way. It is argued that naturalism construed in this way is not compatible with scepticism regarding empirical knowledge, at least as far as the justification condition goes. Five general consequences of a moderately naturalistic position are deduced. It is shown how these general conclusions lead to a modest foundationalism, that is, they imply the corrigibility of all empirical beliefs and the basic status of some. The sensory character of basic beliefs is argued for, as is the claim that basic beliefs are not about the character of experience but about physical facts in the subject's immediate environment. The way in which an empirical belief is brought about (its 'dependence relations') is then examined. The important conclusion, for a theory of justification, to be drawn from this examination, is that sensory beliefs depend on no other beliefs but themselves for their empirical justification. This points to the fact that, if they are justified for their subjects, they must be self-evident and prima facie justified. Before explicating the nature of prima facie justification, the general requirements for a satisfactory theory of epistemic justification are set out. Such a theory must account for the reasonableness of the agent in believing as she does; it must accommodate deontological aspects and explain how justified belief is distinguishable from unjustified belief; and it must provide some objective link between the justified belief and its likely truth. It is shown that the theory of prima facie justification of sensory beliefs which emerges from a naturalized epistemology, satisfies these requirements, and that a conception of prima facie justification which ignores naturalistic constraints cannot explain immediate justification. / Philosophy & Systematic Theology / D. Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)

<p>Sverige kan ses som ett av världens mest jämställda länder. Människor kan dock inneha ambivalenta stereotyper om kvinnor, vilka kan vara sexistiska i sin karaktär. Syftet med föreliggande studie är att validera Glick och Fiskes (1996) Ambivalent Sexism skala översatt till svenska samt undersöka eventuella kopplingar mellan sexism, politisk inställning och system justification. Undersökningsdeltagarna tog i stor utsträckning avstånd från sexistiska attityder. Hostile sexism skattades högre än benevolent sexism, vilket skulle kunna kopplas till landets strävan efter jämställdhet. Männen skattade dock högre än kvinnorna på samtliga sexismskalor. Sambandet mellan system justification och politisk inställning var svagt. Det fanns dock en mindre skillnad mellan könen gällande uppfattningen om det svenska samhället, där män fann samhället aningen mer legitimt än kvinnorna, något som kan vara en antydan till en rådande samhällssituation där män fortfarande har högre social och ekonomisk status än kvinnor.</p>

The central thesis of this dissertation is that it is not possible to determine the nature of epistemic justification apart from psychological investigation. Two sub-theses provide the primary support for this claim. The first sub-thesis is that no account of epistemic justification is correct which requires for the possession of justified beliefs a psychological capacity which humans do not have. A different way of stating this view is that the correct account of epistemic justification must be psychologically realistic. The second sub-thesis is that it is not possible to determine whether an account of epistemic justification is psychologically realistic apart from psychological investigation. In sum, there is a meta-theoretical constraint of psychological realism on accounts of epistemic justification which requires appeal to psychological investigation in its employment. After defending these proposals, I illustrate how the constraint of psychological realism has been and can be used both to test candidate accounts of epistemic justification and to guide the construction of such an account which is intuitive and psychologically realistic. These two kinds of applications of the constraint can involve either scientific or non-scientific psychological investigation. I give examples from current epistemological literature of critical employments of the constraint which appeal to both of these kinds of psychological investigation. Finally, in illustrating the role of the constraint of psychological realism in guiding the construction of an account of epistemic justification, I consider both reliabilist views and a variety of positions which feature the notion of cognitive design. I suggest that this latter approach holds out promise for yielding an account of epistemic justification which is both psychologically realistic and intuitive.

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Capital Punishment Abstract This paper is aimed at the capital punishment and its usage in modern society. The basic question examined is, whether death penalty can ever be justified as a tool to fight the most heinous crimes. In order to determine the answer this question, I am examining the capital punishment from the point of view of possible functions it can have and weighting it against inherent risks and harms created by it. The first chapter of this thesis is based on description. Firstly it shows the history of using the capital punishment in the area of Czech Republic; secondly I describe the usage around the world - mainly in USA, China and Middle East. Lastly I analyze international law concerned with capital punishment - namely International Covenant on Civil and Political rights and European Charter of Human rights, optional protocols to them and of course court decisions regarding these treaties. The second chapter is aimed at evaluating the possible benefits that using of capital punishment can have - especially when compared to life imprisonment. It is divided according to these functions, which are deterrence of potential criminals, protection of the society from sentenced criminals and the retribution for the crimes committed. In the end I find no clear benefit that executing of felons...

The thesis of this study is that influential evangelicals have adopted views regarding the relation of faith, obedience, and justification (or, in other words, justification sola fide ) that are in conflict with the historic, Reformation doctrine of justification sola fide . Having departed from the historic, Reformation doctrine, their professions of holding justification sola fide are misleading and meaningless for the purpose of certifying their evangelical identity. To establish the unity of the Protestant tradition with regard to the meaning of sola fide , the views of Martin Luther, John Calvin, and the major Protestant creeds and confessions are examined. The thesis that unity existed among Protestants with regard to sola fide requires the examination of the development of the doctrine in Luther found in chapter 2. It shows that Luther's views gradually developed in his spiritual experience and that the major features of his mature understanding of sola fide are consistent with Calvin's systematic development of sola fide . In chapter 3 the views of John Calvin are examined. Three key perspectives on the meaning of sola fide through which the Reformation tradition can be examined and the views of current evangelicals tested are isolated: the passive definition of justifying faith, the distinction between justifying faith and obedience, and the dichotomy between the law and the gospel. Chapter 4 examines the Reformation tradition. An accurate assessment of the meaning of sola fide for that tradition may be best achieved by the examination of its a major creeds and confessions. The three key perspectives on the meaning of justification by faith alone previously isolated are found consistently embedded in the 16 th and 17 th century creeds of Protestantism. Having seen the unified meaning of justification sola fide in Calvin, Luther, and the Protestant tradition, chapters 5, 6, and 7 examine the views of three influential evangelical theologians in light of this crucial tradition. The views of Daniel Fuller, Norman Shepherd, and Don Garlington are weighed in the balance of the historic Reformation doctrine of justification by faith alone and found to depart from the historic doctrine. Chapter 8 seeks to make clear a number of important conclusions from the study as a whole. / This item is only available to students and faculty of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. If you are not associated with SBTS, this dissertation may be purchased from <a href="http://disexpress.umi.com/dxweb">http://disexpress.umi.com/dxweb</a> or downloaded through ProQuest's Dissertation and Theses database if your institution subscribes to that service.

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Traditional accounts of justification can be characterized as trying to analyze justification in such a way that having a justified belief brings with it assurance of truth. The internalist offers a demanding requirement on justification: one's having a justified belief requires that one see what the belief has going for it. Externalists worry that the internalist's narrow conception of justification will lead to unacceptably radical and implausible skepticism. According to the externalist, one need not know what a belief has going for it in order for that belief to be justified. Externalism, though, comes with its own problems. Ernest Sosa has attempted to bridge the divide between internalism and externalism by pairing the strengths of internalism (assurance) with the strengths of externalism (an answer to skepticism). Sosa distinguishes two kinds of knowledge: animal knowledge that is essentially externalist in character and reflective knowledge that is intended to capture our best intellectual procedure in regards to knowledge. On Sosa's view, one gains reflective knowledge by building upon (by adding further epistemic components to) animal knowledge. As a result, Sosa's view seems to illustrate a bottom-up approach to the analysis of knowledge (or justification): reflective knowledge is the result of animal knowledge and some other epistemic factor. My project, in contrast to Sosa's, is to argue that one should start with an account of ideal justification (justification that is paradigmatically internalist) and then proceed by loosening the standards on ideal justification in an effort to develop the possibility of non- ideal kinds of justification. The view that I will develop will adopt Sosa's strategy of distinguishing kinds of knowledge (or justification), but will result in a top-down approach to the analysis of justification. Instead of starting with an undemanding standard and layer levels on top, I will start with an ideal standard and strip layers away. I will also argue that my view has some important advantages over Sosa's. Not only does Sosa's view seem to run into many of the problems that threaten externalism, but his view is incapable of offering the kind of assurance that the internalist is after. The view I develop will maintain the internalist's interest in assurance while also providing a response to some of the skeptical problems that have plagued internalists. If my project is successful, then, even if the justification that results in many of the cases I will be exploring is (admittedly) not ideal, we can use these conceptions of justification to help explicate how one might have justified beliefs about a great number of things. The essentially internalist account that I have offered will not only illustrate a serious approach to dealing with skepticism, but it will also capture how many of our commonsensically justified beliefs are in fact justified (albeit in a less than ideal sense).