<p>According to Swedish tax legislation, investment funds are taxed differently depending on if the are Swedish or foreign. The difference between the investment funds lies within the taxation of received dividends and the opportunity to shift the liability of tax of received dividends on to the funds shareholders. This measure is only available to Swedish funds. The question in this thesis is whether this difference is discriminatory against foreign investors and therefore constitutes a forbidden restriction against the free movement of capital stated in article 63 EUF Treaty.</p><p>The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has given several preliminary rulings on this type of legislation and its compatibility with the principle of free movement of capital. It is not compatible with the free movement according to the court. The reason is that the consequence of the legislation is less attractive for foreign investment funds because the taxation on received dividends, which leads to less dividends to shareholders. This national measure is therefore a forbidden restriction against the free movement of capital. The Swedish legislation has not been under such ruling from the ECJ, but it can be tested based on ECJ other rulings on the matter. The Swedish legislation has been tested in the domestic county administrative court, (Länsrätten i Dalarnas Län), who concluded that the legislation was discriminatory. They based their reasoning on ECJ case law.</p><p>However it has been stated within the treaty and from ECJ case law, that measures which has the result of a restriction can be justified as long the national rule is not discriminatory. The national rule on received dividends is discriminatory as it hinders investment funds to invest capital were they like and prevents Swedish companies from obtaining foreign capital.</p><p>Based on ECJ reasoning on the matter of tax upon received dividends for foreign investment funds and the aim of free movement of capital the Swedish legislation constitute a restriction against the free movement of capital. This restriction is discriminatory. On those grounds the legislation is no longer compatible with EU-law and a change in the legislation of taxation on received dividends is necessary in order to obtain the requirements EU has on the member states.</p>

According to Swedish tax legislation, investment funds are taxed differently depending on if the are Swedish or foreign. The difference between the investment funds lies within the taxation of received dividends and the opportunity to shift the liability of tax of received dividends on to the funds shareholders. This measure is only available to Swedish funds. The question in this thesis is whether this difference is discriminatory against foreign investors and therefore constitutes a forbidden restriction against the free movement of capital stated in article 63 EUF Treaty. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has given several preliminary rulings on this type of legislation and its compatibility with the principle of free movement of capital. It is not compatible with the free movement according to the court. The reason is that the consequence of the legislation is less attractive for foreign investment funds because the taxation on received dividends, which leads to less dividends to shareholders. This national measure is therefore a forbidden restriction against the free movement of capital. The Swedish legislation has not been under such ruling from the ECJ, but it can be tested based on ECJ other rulings on the matter. The Swedish legislation has been tested in the domestic county administrative court, (Länsrätten i Dalarnas Län), who concluded that the legislation was discriminatory. They based their reasoning on ECJ case law. However it has been stated within the treaty and from ECJ case law, that measures which has the result of a restriction can be justified as long the national rule is not discriminatory. The national rule on received dividends is discriminatory as it hinders investment funds to invest capital were they like and prevents Swedish companies from obtaining foreign capital. Based on ECJ reasoning on the matter of tax upon received dividends for foreign investment funds and the aim of free movement of capital the Swedish legislation constitute a restriction against the free movement of capital. This restriction is discriminatory. On those grounds the legislation is no longer compatible with EU-law and a change in the legislation of taxation on received dividends is necessary in order to obtain the requirements EU has on the member states.

Since 2015, the tax avoidance rule in the Amending Directive 2015/121 imposes minimum requirements on the EU member states to take measures to prevent abuse of the withholding tax exemption granted under the Parent-Subsidiary Directive 2011/96/EU. The applicable Swedish abuse rule in section 4(3) of the Swedish Withholding Tax Act, according to which the Amending Directive in this respect has been implemented, has been criticised for not meeting the minimum requirements of the directive. This investigation shows that the Swedish abuse rule is deficient, which is why an adjustment and adaptation of the Swedish tax abuse law to the EU law is necessary. It has been argued that the Swedish Tax Avoidance Act (STAA), which is not applicable in the context of withholding tax, in this respect would better meet the minimum requirements of the Amending Directive than the current abuse rule. The aim of this study is to determine the possibility of applying the STAA to avoidance of withholding tax. This is achieved by examining the relationship of the STAA with EU law in two steps. Firstly, the study investigates whether section 2 of the STAA meets the minimum requirements of the Amending Directive. However, the scope of the Amending Directive is ultimately determined by the general principle of EU law, according to which abuse of rights is prohibited, and the public interest in preventing tax avoidance is applied as a justification under the rule of reason doctrine for restricting treaty freedoms. Secondly, the study therefore investigates whether an application of the STAA in the context of withholding tax would be compatible with the free movement of capital. The study indicates that there is a risk that an application of the STAA in the context of withholding tax would neither fully meet the minimum requirements of the Amending Directive nor be fully compatible with the free movement of capital. For this reason, the conclusion is that it would not be possible to make the STAA, as its section 2 is currently formulated, applicable in the context of withholding tax. To ensure the impact of EU law and the compliance of Swedish law with both primary and secondary EU law there are, in my opinion, two effective alternatives. One is to adjust section 2 of the STAA to comply with the EU abuse rules and make the STAA applicable also in the context of withholding tax. Alternatively, the Supreme Administrative Court of Sweden could clarify that the general prohibition of abuse of rights under EU law should always be applied on abuse of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive.

Inom ramen för både det svenska och finska pensionssystemet finns offentliga pensionsinstitut, vilka förvaltar obligatoriska och lagstadgade pensionsavgifter i syfte att främja finansiell stabilitet för statliga pensioner. Förvaltningen omfattar huvudsakligen investeringar, både i inhemska och utländska företag. I ett pågående mål i HFD har frågan om svensk kupongskatt på finska offentliga pensionsinstitut aktualiserats i relation till EU-rättens regler om fri rörlighet för kapital. Detta beror på att finska offentliga pensionsinstitut betraktas som utländska juridiska personer och därmed påförs kupongskatt på erhållna utdelningar, medan svenska offentliga pensionsinstitut, AP-fonderna, omfattas av undantaget för skattskyldighet för svenska staten. I ljuset av den pågående EU-rättsliga prövningen innebär de svenska reglerna en negativ särbehandling av de finska offentliga pensionsinstituten. Om denna särbehandling är tillåten eller ej avgörs av huruvida finska offentliga pensionsinstitut befinner sig i en objektivt jämförbar situation med de svenska AP-fonderna vid utdelningar från svenska företag. Genom analys av EU-domstolens praxis på området för källskatt på utdelningar, fokuserar uppsatsen på att bedöma om finska och svenska offentliga pensionsinstitut befinner sig i en objektivt jämförbar situation samt om en eventuell otillåten negativ särbehandling kan rättfärdigas på ett proportionerligt sätt. Analysen av EU-domstolens praxis och ändamålet med de svenska reglerna ger huvudsaklig vikt åt funktionen som instituten fyller inom respektive pensionssystem vid jämförbarhetsprövningen. Trots vissa skillnader mellan instituten, särskilt med hänsyn till att pensionssystemen är strukturerade på olika sätt, framstår det tydligt vid en analys av institutens funktion att de fyller samma roll. Inga objektiva skillnader återfinns mellan instituten som kan motivera en negativ särbehandling, vilket indikerar att det föreligger en objektivt jämförbar situation mellan de finska offentliga pensionsinstituten och de svenska AP-fonderna. När det gäller rättfärdigande med hänsyn till tvingande skäl av allmänintresse antyder analysen av EU-domstolens praxis en relativt restriktiv syn i både tillvägagångssätt och bedömning. Inom ramen för tvingande skäl av allmänintresse bedöms i denna uppsats (1) bevarande av skattesystemets inre sammanhang, (2) den välavvägda fördelningen av beskattningsrätten och (3) finansiell stabilitet inom ramen för socialpolitiken som allmänintresse. Efter att ha bedömt möjligheterna för rättfärdigande med dessa tre grunder anses ingen av dem kunna rättfärdiga det svenska kupongskatteuttaget på ett proportionerligt sätt. Därför, med hänsyn till att det föreligger en otillåten negativ särbehandling som inte kan rättfärdigas på ett proportionellt sätt, är det svenska kupongskatteuttaget på finska offentliga pensionsinstitut vid utdelning från svenska företag inte förenligt med EU-rättens regler om fri rörlighet för kapital. / Within the framework of both the Swedish and Finnish pension systems, there exist public pension institutions that manage mandatory and legislated pension contributions with the aim of promoting financial stability for state pensions. The management primarily involves investments in both domestic and foreign companies. In an ongoing case in the Supreme Administrative Court (HFD), the issue of Swedish withholding tax on Finnish public pension institutions has been brought into focus in relation to the rules of the European Union regarding the free movement of capital. This is due to Finnish public pension institutions being considered foreign legal entities and, consequently, being subject to withholding tax on received dividends, while Swedish public pension institutions, the AP funds, are exempt from Swedish taxation since they are covered by the income tax exemption for the Swedish state. In the context of the EU legal examination, the Swedish regulations result in a negative differential treatment of Finnish public pension institutions. Whether this differential treatment is permissible is determined by whether Finnish public pension institutions are in an objectively comparable situation with the Swedish AP funds concerning dividends from Swedish companies. Through an analysis of the European Court of Justice's jurisprudence on dividend withholding tax, the essay focuses on assessing whether Finnish and Swedish public pension institutions are in an objectively comparable situation and whether any impermissible negative differential treatment can be justified in a proportional manner. The analysis of the European Court of Justice's jurisprudence and the purpose behind the Swedish regulations places significant emphasis on the function that these institutions fulfill within their respective pension systems during the comparability assessment. Despite certain differences between the institutions, especially considering that the pension systems are structured differently, a clear analysis of the functions performed by the institutions suggests that they serve the same purpose. Hence, no objective differences between the institutions are found that can justify a differential treatment, indicating that there is an objectively comparable situation between Finnish public pension institutions and the Swedish AP funds. Regarding justification based on compelling reasons of public interest, the analysis of the European Court of Justice's jurisprudence suggests a relatively restrictive approach in both methodology and assessment. Within the realm of compelling reasons of public interest, this essay evaluates (1) the preservation of the internal coherence of the tax system, (2) the well-balanced distribution of taxation rights, and (3) financial stability within the framework of social policy as public interests. After assessing the justifiability based on these three grounds, none of them are deemed capable of justifying the Swedish withholding tax on Finnish public pension institutions in a proportional manner. Therefore, considering the existence of impermissible negative differential treatment that cannot be justified proportionally, the Swedish withholding tax on Finnish public pension institutions in the context of dividends from Swedish companies is not in line with the European Union's rules on the free movement of capital.