People around the world are meeting in places that consist of little more than a touch of some hardware, a dash of electricity, and a pinch of code. As the Internet becomes increasingly incorporated into our lives the subject of online identity becomes increasingly relevant. How are we to conceive of ourselves as selves on the Internet? Is there anything unique or special about the way in which we relate to ourselves in cyberspace?<p> Sherry Turkle answers this question affirmatively, arguing that the Internet is suggestive of a decentered theory of self which ought to make us reconsider our very notion of our identities. In chapter one, Turkles position is examined, and I argue that while her encompassing view on online identity presents some incredible insights, in the end it falls short because her argument draws a false conclusion.<p> In chapter two, Christine Korsgaards theory of practical identity is taken up as a means of addressing the weakness in Turkles theory and, at the same time, salvages the insights revealed in the first chapter.<p> With a theory of unified online identity established, in chapter three it is applied to both show its applicability to case studies and scenarios one may face as they traverse cyberspace, and to explain how it is we can understand our relation to our online selves in a deep sense.

Christine M. Korsgaard and Jean-Paul Sartre both locate the source of ethical normativity in human reflective consciousness. Korsgaard’s claims that human beings are essentially rational, and that our rational nature is an adequate source of ethical content. Sartre argues that a conception of human nature this minimal is insufficient to provide ethical content, and that we must look to our particular projects and identities to provide moral content. I will argue that Sartre is correct that a view of human nature this minimal is inadequate to generate moral content, but that because Sartre is unable to demonstrate how norms based contingent projects and identities can produce universally binding ethical norms, his theory also fails. The failure of both projects illustrates the weakness of a conception of ethics as universal obligation because it fails by its own standard to produce it goal of universally binding ethical norms with content.

People around the world are meeting in places that consist of little more than a touch of some hardware, a dash of electricity, and a pinch of code. As the Internet becomes increasingly incorporated into our lives the subject of online identity becomes increasingly relevant. How are we to conceive of ourselves as selves on the Internet? Is there anything unique or special about the way in which we relate to ourselves in cyberspace?<p> Sherry Turkle answers this question affirmatively, arguing that the Internet is suggestive of a decentered theory of self which ought to make us reconsider our very notion of our identities. In chapter one, Turkles position is examined, and I argue that while her encompassing view on online identity presents some incredible insights, in the end it falls short because her argument draws a false conclusion.<p> In chapter two, Christine Korsgaards theory of practical identity is taken up as a means of addressing the weakness in Turkles theory and, at the same time, salvages the insights revealed in the first chapter.<p> With a theory of unified online identity established, in chapter three it is applied to both show its applicability to case studies and scenarios one may face as they traverse cyberspace, and to explain how it is we can understand our relation to our online selves in a deep sense.

Metaethical constructivism approaches metaethical questions from the perspective of the nature of normativity; and it approaches questions about the nature of normativity from the perspective of agency. According to constructivism, normativity originates in the agent. The agent gives herself laws, and these laws are normative because the agent has given them to herself. Placing the agent as the source of normativity enables constructivism to answer metaphysical and epistemological questions about morality with ease. It also allows it to account for the relation between moral judgements and action. But placing the agent as the source of normativity raises two questions. First, if the laws that the agent issues to herself are normative because she issues them to herself, what are the standards of correctness of those laws? Second, if the agent is her own source of normativity, how can she accommodate the normative status of others? In this thesis I explore whether constructivism can answer those questions. In Chapter 1 I argue that the constructivist account of normativity is rich enough to answer the first question. From Chapter 2 onwards I argue that constructivism cannot answer the second question. I argue that its account of normativity requires that the agent does not accommodate the normative status of others.

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In The Sources of Normativity, Christine Korsgaard argues that in order to avoid the threat of moral skepticism, our moral theories must show how the claims they make about the nature of our actions obligate us to act morally. A theory that can justify the normativity of morality in this way answers what Korsgaard calls “the normative question.” Although Korsgaard claims that only Kantian theories of morality, such as her own, can answer the normative question, I argue that Adam Smith’s sentimentalist moral theory, as presented in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, can answer the normative question as well. As a result, it is possible to respond to the moral skeptic in the way Korsgaard outlines without accepting some of the theoretical drawbacks of Korsgaard’s own moral theory.

The following is an attempt to ground personal duty – duty which is both believed and felt by all agents. To do this, I look at two contrasting attempts. The first is a rationalist attempt, which tries to ground it in conceptual necessity, the second an empiricist one, which uses empirical fact as its basis. In particular, it uses contingent facts about the things which are agents (people, for example), and what makes them feel a sense of duty. I argue that, ultimately, it is this type of grounding of duty which can be successful. Throughout, I emphasize two crucial points. The first is the freedom of the individual; the second is that duty is not a "want" or "desire;" rather, it is quite often what one does against one's own wants or desires. I argue that a paradigmatic example of establishing duty is Harry Frankfurt's theory of autonomous love.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2008. / Thesis directed by David Solomon for the Department of Philosophy. "July 2008." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 359-378).

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This is a work of moral psychology in the course of which is presented a theory on the nature of guilt. The point of departure is a psychological phenomenon that I call “scrupulousness.” Scrupulousness is present when someone is in doubt about the morality of a minor past action. He or she is obsessively driven to determine whether his act was right or wrong. The result for the individual is vexing preoccupation in a cycle of internal casuistry. I explain this unhappy phenomenon as the result of anxiety over guilt understood as moral staining. A moral stain is a persistent residue adhering to the self created by a past wrongful action. To better explain moral stains, I borrow Christine Korsgaard’s theory of personal identity as constituted by one’s choices. With the aid of Korsgaard’s theory, I then consider how a belief in guilt as moral staining accounts for the worry of the scrupulous person. The Postscript of the Report first considers whether scrupulousness is justified by the explanation I have furnished. I answer this question in the negative. I also consider how anticipation of scrupulous worry could drive a person away from morally ambiguous situations, sometimes preventing him from taking the correct course of action in a form of “moral cowardice.” The Postscript secondly explains the significance of investigating scrupulousness and moral staining for philosophers. I argue that moral staining captures important aspects of the phenomenology of guilt and that it correctly accounts for the reality of guilt as more than a mere psychological state or feeling. To exhibit these strengths of the moral staining view, I compare and criticize Herbert Morris’ prominent model of guilt as consisting in the severance of valued relationships. / text