Global ETD Search

1	Can Adam Smith Answer the Normative Question? Richards, Samuel 13 August 2013 (has links) In The Sources of Normativity, Christine Korsgaard argues that in order to avoid the threat of moral skepticism, our moral theories must show how the claims they make about the nature of our actions obligate us to act morally. A theory that can justify the normativity of morality in this way answers what Korsgaard calls “the normative question.” Although Korsgaard claims that only Kantian theories of morality, such as her own, can answer the normative question, I argue that Adam Smith’s sentimentalist moral theory, as presented in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, can answer the normative question as well. As a result, it is possible to respond to the moral skeptic in the way Korsgaard outlines without accepting some of the theoretical drawbacks of Korsgaard’s own moral theory. Adam Smith Christine Korsgaard Ethics Normativity Sentimentalism Moral skepticism
2	Guilt, moral anxiety, and moral staining Ingram, Andrew Tice 11 December 2013 (has links) This is a work of moral psychology in the course of which is presented a theory on the nature of guilt. The point of departure is a psychological phenomenon that I call “scrupulousness.” Scrupulousness is present when someone is in doubt about the morality of a minor past action. He or she is obsessively driven to determine whether his act was right or wrong. The result for the individual is vexing preoccupation in a cycle of internal casuistry. I explain this unhappy phenomenon as the result of anxiety over guilt understood as moral staining. A moral stain is a persistent residue adhering to the self created by a past wrongful action. To better explain moral stains, I borrow Christine Korsgaard’s theory of personal identity as constituted by one’s choices. With the aid of Korsgaard’s theory, I then consider how a belief in guilt as moral staining accounts for the worry of the scrupulous person. The Postscript of the Report first considers whether scrupulousness is justified by the explanation I have furnished. I answer this question in the negative. I also consider how anticipation of scrupulous worry could drive a person away from morally ambiguous situations, sometimes preventing him from taking the correct course of action in a form of “moral cowardice.” The Postscript secondly explains the significance of investigating scrupulousness and moral staining for philosophers. I argue that moral staining captures important aspects of the phenomenology of guilt and that it correctly accounts for the reality of guilt as more than a mere psychological state or feeling. To exhibit these strengths of the moral staining view, I compare and criticize Herbert Morris’ prominent model of guilt as consisting in the severance of valued relationships. / text Guilt Moral staining Sin Christine Korsgaard Herbert Morris Scrupulousness Moral anxiety
3	Etik, humor, religion : Ett kantianskt perspektiv / Ethics, humour, religion : A kantian perspective Törnqvist, Agne January 2021 (has links) Denna uppsats kommer att utforska de etiska begränsningar skämt har när det kommer tillreligiöst laddade skämt. För att besvara detta syfte kommer det krävas att en teoretisk inriktad metod används. Metoden kommer inte att vara riktad mot att beskriva religion, utan istället hur religion bör bemötas. Arbetet kommer därför att bearbeta moralfilosofiska texters arguments hållbarhet. Metoden är alltså kraftigt normativ och inte bara deskriptiv. Utifrån en nytolkning av Immanuel Kants de ontologiska etik visar resultatet att pliktetik kan vara en vägledande utgångspunkt för att bemöta andra trosuppfattningar på ett empatiskt och lyhört sätt som strävar efter samtycke. Samtidigt finns möjligheter till att tolka skämt på ett nyanserat sätt vilket tillåter ett stort spelrum för personer att använda kontroversiella former av humor, särskilt när skämten riktar sig mot orättvisor. Etik Humor Immanuel Kant Christine Korsgaard Religion Samtycke Värdighet. Religious Studies Religionsvetenskap
4	Finding Obligations Within Second-Personal Engagement: A Critique of Christine Korsgaard's Normative Theory Ghaffari, Sara 22 September 2010 (has links) No description available. Philosophy Christine Korsgaard Stephen Darwall Second-Personal Engagement Tyler Burge Morality Autonomy Normative Ethics
5	Mobile Learning and Self-Worth : The Case of Syrian Refugees from a Kantian Perspective Alshoufani, Rama January 2018 (has links) As the war in Syria is about to enter its seventh year, Syrians continue to head towards Europe to seek safety and protection. This challenges European countries to provide urgent relief and services including education for a high number of Syrian refugees every year. However, the journey of Syrian refugees does not end with their arrival to safety. The refugee experience presents many difficulties including issues of wellbeing and self-worth. This qualitative comparative study examines the different platforms and solutions Mobile Learning could offer to refugees. In addition to that, it also discusses the possibility of leveraging Mobile Learning as a mean for Syrian refugees in Europe to achieve a sense of self-worth from the Kantian perspective of agency. The study starts with a comprehensive overview of the meaning of the term ‘refugee’ and the refugee experience, then it moves on to identify Mobile Learning and its impact and relationship to the recent refugee crisis. Then, the study introduces the Kantian philosopher Christine Korsgaard and her idea of agency, action, identity and value. The literature review after that discusses Korsgaard’s philosophy and links it to refugees and Mobile Learning. After viewing the research methods and methodology, the study comparatively analyses and discusses findings drawn from semi-structured interviews of 10 participants pertaining to the use of Mobile Learning platforms for higher education and language learning. The implications of these findings are that Syrian refugees in Europe have access to Mobile Learning platforms that vary in use and quality. However, when these platforms are used successfully, they do have the potential to support refugees’ sense of self-worth. The study then ends with a conclusion and suggestions for future research. Immanuel Kant Christine Korsgaard agency refugee Mobile Learning autonomous efficacious practical identity self-worth. Educational Sciences Utbildningsvetenskap
6	On reasons and disagreement in ethics Gaff, Andrew Douglas January 2007 (has links) This thesis explores reasons and disagreement in ethics, and their connection to personal identity. I begin by arguing that reasons are open; what gives them direction is how they feature in my life and weigh with me. Of course, this does not tell us what reasons are available to a person when they act. In this connection I argue against Bernard Williams’ internal reasons thesis, showing that there are occasions when we will want to say someone has a reason to act even though they are unable to see it. Continuing with Williams, I explore moral necessity, drawing also on the works of Winch, Rhees and Cordner, arguing that Williams too readily conflates psychological with ethical limits. In particular, the possibility of recanting what we took to be necessary should inform our view of moral necessity, since it can show that I had misconstrued the nature of the limits I took myself to have reached. Following this use of recantation, I explore narrative in detail, arguing that my narrative is partly constitutive of who I am. My agency is therefore interpretive. This has ramifications for thinkers such as Christine Korsgaard and Jonathan Dancy, whose work I explore in two excursuses. In different ways, both fail to appreciate the significance of our interpretive identities.
7	Overeating, Obesity, and Weakness of the Will Sommers, Jennifer Heidrun 28 August 2015 (has links) The philosophical literature on akrasia and/or weakness of the will tends to focus on individual actions, removed from their wider socio-political context. This is problematic because actions, when removed from their wider context, can seem absurd or irrational when they may, in fact, be completely rational or, at least, coherent. Much of akrasia's apparent mystery or absurdity is eliminated when people's behaviours are considered within their cultural and political context. I apply theories from the social and behavioural sciences to a particular behaviour in order to show where the philosophical literature on akrasia and/or weakness of the will is insightful and where it is lacking. The problem used as the basis for my analysis is obesity caused by overeating. On the whole, I conclude that our intuitions about agency are unreliable, that we may have good reasons to overeat and/or neglect our health, and that willpower is, to some degree, a matter of luck. / Graduate / 0630 / 0573 / 0422 / felshereeno@aol.com akrasia action theory addiction agency Alison McIntyre applied ethics Bernard Williams body studies Bourdieu Cartesian dualism Christine Korsgaard compulsion continence deviance diet Distinction Donald Davidson dualism externalism incontinence inequality internalism intuition Irving K. Zola Marx medicalization morality Nichomachean Ethics Nomy Arpaly obesity epidemic orthorexia overeating overweight personal identity Petr Skrabanek Philip Kitcher philosophical intuition picoeconomics Pierre Bourdieu fat free will Gary Watson George Ainslie habitus healthism rat park rational choice rationality Richard Holton Robert Crawford social class stigma taste for luxury temperance utility maximization virtue weakness of the will willpower

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