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1	SORTE MORAL E RESPONSABILIDADE / MORAL LUCK AND RESPONSIBILITY Silva, Paulo Henrique de Toledo da 28 April 2015 (has links) Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / In the present work, we seek to elucidate the relations between the problem of moral luck and our assignments of responsibility. The problem of moral luck emerges from two dimensions of human life. On the one side, we are autonomous and rational beings, we have control over our actions and are moral agents. On the other side, we are vulnerable to every sort of external contingency that eliminates the complete control we have over our actions and their results. The contingency, also, has a significant weight on the formation of our character and personality. Therefore, the problem of moral luck takes a real importance: how can we assign responsibility to the agents, given that a lot of what configures a moral action are contingent elements? The research was elaborated based on Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel s articles on Moral luck. Williams, in his article, seeks to show that morality, as we conceive it, is (in fact) distant from our moral evaluations. Williams introduces the role of regret and recognizes the need to understand moral justification as retrospective. Nagel, in turn, finds the center of the moral luck problem in the control principle. In trying to understand how we assign responsibility to an agent for things beyond his control, Nagel defines four methods in which luck influences our moral judgements, and lists the kinds of moral luck: resultant, circumstantial, constitutive and causal luck. Finally, we take a look at critiques pertinent to the moral luck and responsibility problem, both negating and accepting the influence of luck in moral responsibility. From the epistemic argument and Zimmerman s postulates to Walker s pure agency critique and Otsuka s strawsonian considerations about reactive attitudes. / No presente trabalho, buscamos elucidar as relações entre o problema da sorte moral e nossas atribuições de responsabilidade. O problema da sorte moral emerge a partir de duas dimensões da vida humana. Por um lado, somos seres autônomos e racionais, temos o controle sobre nossas ações e somos agentes morais. Por outro, somos vulneráveis a toda espécie de contingência externa que elimina o controle total que temos de nossas ações e de seus resultados. A contingência, também, tem um peso significativo na formação de nosso caráter e personalidade. Por isso, o problema da sorte moral assume importância real: como podemos atribuir responsabilidade aos agentes, visto que muito do que configura uma ação moral são elementos contingentes? Elaboramos esta pesquisa a partir dos artigos Moral luck de Bernard Williams e Thomas Nagel. Williams, em seu artigo, busca mostrar que a moralidade, como a concebemos, mostra-se distante de nossas avaliações morais. Williams introduz o papel do arrependimento e reconhece a necessidade de entendermos a justificação moral como retrospectiva. Nagel, por sua vez, encontra no princípio do controle o centro do problema da sorte moral. Na tentativa de entender como atribuímos responsabilidade a uma agente por coisas além de seu controle, Nagel define quatro meios pelos quais a sorte influencia nossos juízos morais e elenca os tipos de sorte moral: sorte resultante, circunstancial, constitutiva e causal. Por fim, procuramos as críticas pertinentes ao problema da sorte moral e responsabilidade, as quais neguem ou aceitem a influência da sorte na responsabilidade moral, indo do argumento epistêmico e os postulados de Zimmerman à crítica da agência pura de Walker e as considerações strawsonianas de Otsuka sobre as atitudes reativas. Sorte moral Responsabilidade Juízos morais Bernard Williams Thomas Nagel Moral luck Responsibility Moral judgements Bernard Williams Thomas Nagel CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
2	Confucian Responses to the Amoralist Griffith, Connor E. 16 September 2022 (has links) No description available. Philosophy Amoralist Mengzi Bernard Williams Moral Motivation Confucian Moral Psychology Yang Zhu
3	The morality of common sense : problems from Sidgwick Krishna, Nakul January 2014 (has links) Much modern moral philosophy has conceived of its interpretative and critical aims in relation to an entity it sometimes terms 'common-sense morality'. The term was influentially used in something like its canonical sense by Henry Sidgwick in his classic work The Methods of Ethics (1874). Sidgwick conceived of common-sense morality as a more-or-less determinate body of current moral opinion, and traced his ('doxastic') conception through Kant back to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and the practice of Plato's Socrates before him. The Introduction to this thesis traces the influence of Sidgwick's conception both on subsequent (mis)understandings of Socratic practice as well as on the practice of moral philosophy in the twentieth century. The first essay offers a challenge to Sidgwick's understanding of Socratic practice. I argue that Socrates' questioning of his interlocutors, far from revealing some determinate body of pre-existing beliefs, is in fact a demonstration of the dynamic and partially indeterminate quality of common-sense morality. The value for the interlocutor of engaging in such conversation with Socrates consisted primarily in its forcing him to adopt what I term a deliberative stance with respect to his own practice and dispositions, asking himself not 'what is it that I believe?' but rather, 'what am I to believe?' This understanding of Socratic practice gives us a way of reconciling the often puzzling combination of conservative and radical elements in Plato's dialogues. The second essay is a discussion of the reception of Sidgwick's conception of ethics in twentieth-century Oxford, a hegemonic centre of Anglophone philosophy. This recent tradition consists both of figures who accepted Sidgwick's picture of moral philosophy's aims and those who rejected it. Of the critics, I am centrally concerned with Bernard Williams, whose life's work, I argue, can be fruitfully understood as the elaboration of a heterodox understanding of Socratic practice, opposed to Sidgwick's. Ethics, on this conception, is a project directed at the emancipation of our moral experience from the many distortions to which it is vulnerable. Williams's writings in moral philosophy, disparate and not entirely systematic, are unified by these emancipatory aims, aims they share with strains of psychoanalysis except in that they do not scorn philosophical argument as a tool of emancipation: in this respect among others, I claim, they are fundamentally Socratic. 170
4	The Moral Constraint on Political Principles in Bernard Williams’s Political Realism Sundman, Hugo January 2023 (has links) This essay argues that Bernard Williams’s political realism presupposes a moral constraint on the political principle of legitimacy, and that Williams’s realism does not articulate a distinctive political normativity. To critically engage with the ethical idea of a moral constraint on political principles, Williams’s ethics is contrasted with Rosalind Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. Williams’s critique of objectivity in Aristotelian virtue ethics says that we have no reason to believe that an individual can harmonise personal needs with capacities to achieve an objectively virtuous character. This is an idea which has not received much attention from neither the political realists themselves nor their critics, and it can be called Williams’s empirical premise. The thesis first criticises the empirical premise from Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian perspective which defends the idea that it is not irrational to believe in the harmony of needs and capacities and avoid the empirical premise. The thesis also defends a broader critique of the premise. The broad critique focuses on that even if the empirical premise cannot be refuted, it should be questioned for pragmatic reasons, since specific negative consequences follow from embracing it. Both counterarguments provide good reasons to question Williams’s ethics, and in extension, his political realism. political realism Bernard Williams virtue ethics Rosalind Hursthouse Ethics Etik Philosophy Filosofi
5	Facets of judgment : towards a reflexive political psychology Hall, David John January 2014 (has links) The knowledge base of empirical psychology is more expansive than ever before. So too is the impulse to integrate this factual knowledge into political theory. But how should this psychological turn be undertaken? What would a political psychology for political theorists look like? How could psychology credibly tackle the questions that political theorists characteristically ask, especially regarding the nature and consequences of prescriptive political judgment? In this thesis, I explore this issue through the framework of recent debates between political moralists—specifically, John Rawls, G. A. Cohen, and Peter Singer—and political realists—largely Bernard Williams. Deploying the insights of political realists, I argue that moralists cannot quarantine the relevance of psychological facts through the ideal of a 'pure' normative judgment. To explore what this empirical engagement might look like, I contrast these moralist ideals of judgment with Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionism, which proposes a more affectively laden and pluralistic model of judgment. I then redeploy the insights of political realism to critique social intuitionism, to uncover its weaknesses from the perspective of existing political theory. Finally, to stabilize this critique, I lay out the framework for a reflexive political psychology, which acknowledges the co-constitutive relationship between the discipline of psychology and its subject matter: human psychology. This reflexive political psychology offers an agenda by which we can investigate the political usefulness of psychological and political theories. 320.01
6	Bringing Out The Feminist In Bernard Williams: Constructing An Anti-Moralistic Care Ethic Kenofer, Benjamin David Hershey 01 January 2014 (has links) There are different versions of the ethical approach known as “care ethics”, making care ethics more like a cluster of approaches rather than a singular one. Hence the question is not just whether care ethics is a suitable feminist ethic, but which version(s) of care ethics feminists should endorse. Considering which versions of care ethics are capable of recommending the sort of political activism that is required for progressive political change goes some distance in answering this question. The concern about whether care ethics can recommend the political activism needed for feminist aims arises because such activism exposes those the activist has intimate relationships with to various sorts of harm. I argue that when construed as an ethical theory that incorporates a decision procedure for generating correct conduct, care ethics recommends against the sorts of actions that are required of political activists and for the practical goals of feminists. Construed as an ethical framework that has the more modest concern of providing conceptual orientation and critical tools for interpreting and reflexively interrogating the ethical landscape, however, care ethics can overcome the challenge presented by political activism when including what Bernard Williams calls “ground projects” amongst its available tools. However, because feminist care theorists and others sympathetic with care ethics have criticized aspects of Williams’ account of ground projects, I first respond to these concerns in order to accommodate these criticisms and demonstrate that I am not importing something into care ethics as a framework that does not have a place there. Thesis University of North Florida UNF Dissertations Dissertations Academic -- UNF -- Philosophy Bernard Williams Care Ethics Feminist Ethics Integrity Arts and Humanities Feminist Philosophy Philosophy
7	On reasons and disagreement in ethics Gaff, Andrew Douglas January 2007 (has links) This thesis explores reasons and disagreement in ethics, and their connection to personal identity. I begin by arguing that reasons are open; what gives them direction is how they feature in my life and weigh with me. Of course, this does not tell us what reasons are available to a person when they act. In this connection I argue against Bernard Williams’ internal reasons thesis, showing that there are occasions when we will want to say someone has a reason to act even though they are unable to see it. Continuing with Williams, I explore moral necessity, drawing also on the works of Winch, Rhees and Cordner, arguing that Williams too readily conflates psychological with ethical limits. In particular, the possibility of recanting what we took to be necessary should inform our view of moral necessity, since it can show that I had misconstrued the nature of the limits I took myself to have reached. Following this use of recantation, I explore narrative in detail, arguing that my narrative is partly constitutive of who I am. My agency is therefore interpretive. This has ramifications for thinkers such as Christine Korsgaard and Jonathan Dancy, whose work I explore in two excursuses. In different ways, both fail to appreciate the significance of our interpretive identities.
8	Overeating, Obesity, and Weakness of the Will Sommers, Jennifer Heidrun 28 August 2015 (has links) The philosophical literature on akrasia and/or weakness of the will tends to focus on individual actions, removed from their wider socio-political context. This is problematic because actions, when removed from their wider context, can seem absurd or irrational when they may, in fact, be completely rational or, at least, coherent. Much of akrasia's apparent mystery or absurdity is eliminated when people's behaviours are considered within their cultural and political context. I apply theories from the social and behavioural sciences to a particular behaviour in order to show where the philosophical literature on akrasia and/or weakness of the will is insightful and where it is lacking. The problem used as the basis for my analysis is obesity caused by overeating. On the whole, I conclude that our intuitions about agency are unreliable, that we may have good reasons to overeat and/or neglect our health, and that willpower is, to some degree, a matter of luck. / Graduate / 0630 / 0573 / 0422 / felshereeno@aol.com akrasia action theory addiction agency Alison McIntyre applied ethics Bernard Williams body studies Bourdieu Cartesian dualism Christine Korsgaard compulsion continence deviance diet Distinction Donald Davidson dualism externalism incontinence inequality internalism intuition Irving K. Zola Marx medicalization morality Nichomachean Ethics Nomy Arpaly obesity epidemic orthorexia overeating overweight personal identity Petr Skrabanek Philip Kitcher philosophical intuition picoeconomics Pierre Bourdieu fat free will Gary Watson George Ainslie habitus healthism rat park rational choice rationality Richard Holton Robert Crawford social class stigma taste for luxury temperance utility maximization virtue weakness of the will willpower

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