Denna uppsats kommer att utforska de etiska begränsningar skämt har när det kommer tillreligiöst laddade skämt. För att besvara detta syfte kommer det krävas att en teoretisk inriktad metod används. Metoden kommer inte att vara riktad mot att beskriva religion, utan istället hur religion bör bemötas. Arbetet kommer därför att bearbeta moralfilosofiska texters arguments hållbarhet. Metoden är alltså kraftigt normativ och inte bara deskriptiv. Utifrån en nytolkning av Immanuel Kants de ontologiska etik visar resultatet att pliktetik kan vara en vägledande utgångspunkt för att bemöta andra trosuppfattningar på ett empatiskt och lyhört sätt som strävar efter samtycke. Samtidigt finns möjligheter till att tolka skämt på ett nyanserat sätt vilket tillåter ett stort spelrum för personer att använda kontroversiella former av humor, särskilt när skämten riktar sig mot orättvisor.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Full text release at OhioLINK's ETD Center delayed at author's request

As the war in Syria is about to enter its seventh year, Syrians continue to head towards Europe to seek safety and protection. This challenges European countries to provide urgent relief and services including education for a high number of Syrian refugees every year. However, the journey of Syrian refugees does not end with their arrival to safety. The refugee experience presents many difficulties including issues of wellbeing and self-worth. This qualitative comparative study examines the different platforms and solutions Mobile Learning could offer to refugees. In addition to that, it also discusses the possibility of leveraging Mobile Learning as a mean for Syrian refugees in Europe to achieve a sense of self-worth from the Kantian perspective of agency. The study starts with a comprehensive overview of the meaning of the term ‘refugee’ and the refugee experience, then it moves on to identify Mobile Learning and its impact and relationship to the recent refugee crisis. Then, the study introduces the Kantian philosopher Christine Korsgaard and her idea of agency, action, identity and value. The literature review after that discusses Korsgaard’s philosophy and links it to refugees and Mobile Learning. After viewing the research methods and methodology, the study comparatively analyses and discusses findings drawn from semi-structured interviews of 10 participants pertaining to the use of Mobile Learning platforms for higher education and language learning. The implications of these findings are that Syrian refugees in Europe have access to Mobile Learning platforms that vary in use and quality. However, when these platforms are used successfully, they do have the potential to support refugees’ sense of self-worth. The study then ends with a conclusion and suggestions for future research.

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This thesis explores reasons and disagreement in ethics, and their connection to personal identity. I begin by arguing that reasons are open; what gives them direction is how they feature in my life and weigh with me. Of course, this does not tell us what reasons are available to a person when they act. In this connection I argue against Bernard Williams’ internal reasons thesis, showing that there are occasions when we will want to say someone has a reason to act even though they are unable to see it. Continuing with Williams, I explore moral necessity, drawing also on the works of Winch, Rhees and Cordner, arguing that Williams too readily conflates psychological with ethical limits. In particular, the possibility of recanting what we took to be necessary should inform our view of moral necessity, since it can show that I had misconstrued the nature of the limits I took myself to have reached. Following this use of recantation, I explore narrative in detail, arguing that my narrative is partly constitutive of who I am. My agency is therefore interpretive. This has ramifications for thinkers such as Christine Korsgaard and Jonathan Dancy, whose work I explore in two excursuses. In different ways, both fail to appreciate the significance of our interpretive identities.