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Brandom's normative deontic theory of languageLee, Jin-soo, January 2010 (has links)
Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 155-157). Also available in print.
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Brandom and Hegel on Objectivity, Subjectivity and Sociality: A Tune Beyond Us, Yet OurselvesDeMoor, Michael James 07 1900 (has links)
This dissertation is an exposition and critique of Robert Brandom's theory of discursive objectivity. It discusses this theory both within the context of Brandom's own systematic philosophical project and, in turn, within the ideas and questions characteristic of the Kantian and post-Kantian tradition in German philosophy. It is argued that Brandom's
attempt to articulate a theory of the objectivity of discursive norms (and hence also of the content of discursive attitudes) resembles J.G. Fichte's development of themes central to Kant's philosophy. This "Fichtean" approach to the problem of objectivity is then compared and contrasted to that of G.W.F. Hegel. Though Brandom, Fichte and Hegel share the desire to derive an account of the conditions of objectivity from the social character is discursive practices, Hegel offers a version of this project that differs with respect to the nature of self-consciousness, sociality and truth. It is then argued that Brandom's theory suffers significant internal inconsistencies that could be avoided by adopting a more "Hegelian" approach to these three themes. More specifically, Brandom's own project requires that he recognize the necessity and irreducibility of firstperson and second-person discursive attitudes, as well as that he recognize the role of "I-We" social practices for discursive objectivity. Furthermore, he must include in his explanations some form of natural teleology and hence he must abandon his deflationary approach to semantic explanation. However, Brandom's methodological and metaphysical commitments prevent him from doing so.
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La rationalité d'un point de vue logique : entre dialogique et inférentialisme, étude comparative de Lorenzen et BrandomTremblay, Frédérick 12 1900 (has links) (PDF)
Cette thèse présente une conception de la rationalité qui évite les idéalisations des capacités cognitives des agents logiques, typiques des conceptions statiques de la rationalité axiomatique dans laquelle un agent n'est rationnel que dans la mesure où il ne se contredit pas et ce, peu importe les capacités cognitives qui lui sont allouées par les axiomes qui énoncent les normes auxquelles il doit se conformer pour être considéré rationnel (comme dans la théorie de la décision « standard » et les systèmes de preuve hilbertien). Afin d'obvier à ces idéalisations, je suggère d'utiliser l'approche dialogique de la logique (Lorenzen) dans la mesure où elle permet de délaisser la logique classique au profit d'une logique plus « faible » et de déployer une conception alternative de la rationalité « non monotone », c'est-à-dire « non cumulative » et dynamique. Dans ce contexte, je discute de la possibilité de procéder à une radicalisation des conditions d'assertabilité de la théorie anti-réaliste de la signification de Dummett qui prenne mieux en compte les actes judicatifs réellement à la portée des agents logique ainsi que les conséquences de cette radicalisation sur le choix de la logique. Sur cette base, je défends une conception de la rationalité des agents en termes de leurs capacités réelles, et non idéalisées, à justifier leurs assertions dans un cadre dialogique. Je suggère finalement de regarder du côté de la théorie de la rationalité « Socratique » de Sellars-Brandom que je compare à l'approche pragmatique de Lorenzen, car toutes les deux visent à rendre explicite ce qui est implicite dans nos jeux de langage, c'est-à-dire d'être capable de justifier ce que nous assertons.
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MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Philosophie, Logique, Rationalité, Inférence, Épistémologie
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THE LAW’S CLAIM TO JUSTICE: NORMATIVITY AND THE MORALITY OF THE LAW -BRANDOM, KORSGAARD, AND SOPER-Seifried, Michael Matthew 11 May 2005 (has links)
No description available.
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Responsibility, spontaneity and libertyvan Zwol, Erik January 2009 (has links)
Isaiah Berlin maintains that there are two distinct forms of freedom or liberty: negative and positive. Berlin’s principal claim is that negative liberty does not require that the self be somehow separate from the empirical world (causally aloof, or an originator of causal chains). My principal claim is that to be an agent is to be committed to a separation of self in this sense, thus that the self for its very being requires to possess a species of positive liberty. This conception proceeds in part from Immanuel Kant’s claim that there is a separation between spontaneity and receptivity. Commitment to this assertion allows there to be an understood distinction between the self as a spontaneous self-active agent that makes choices, and the self as a mere reactionary brute that does what it does by biological imperatives. In this thesis, I defend the view that negative liberty is subsumed under positive liberty: you cannot have the former without the latter. I am therefore taking a rationalist stance towards Berlin’s thinking. My methodology is to bring into consideration two perspectives upon the underlying normative principles within the space of reason. The first is of Kant’s understanding of the principle of responsibility and the activity of spontaneity; the second is John McDowell’s understanding of that principle and activity. The key claim of this thesis is that Berlin misunderstands what it is to be a chooser. To be a chooser is to be raised under the idea that one is an efficient cause; human children are brought up being held responsible for their reasons for acting. This principle allows mere animal being to be raised into the space of reason, where we live out a second nature in terms of reason. Using their conclusions I further investigate Berlin’s understanding of conceptual frameworks, taking particular interest in historic ‘universal’ conceptions that shape human lives. He too finds that that we are choosers is necessary for what it is to be human. I take his conclusion, and suggest that if he had had a clear understanding of the space of reason, the historic claim that we have choice would find a more solid footing in the principle of that space, in that we are responsible for our actions. I conclude that the upshot of understanding the ‘I’ as an originating efficient cause is that we treat ourselves as free from a universal determinism that Berlin himself disparages; and that the cost to Berlin is that all choice is necessarily the activity of a higher choosing self. It is part of a Liberal society’s valuing, by their societal commitment to, the ideology of raising our children to understand themselves as choosers, that we have choice at all. This is irrespective of whether that which fetters choice is internal or external to the agent, or of whether having self-conscious itself requires such a cultural emergence of second nature.
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