När den amerikanska investmentbanken Lehman Brothers ansökte om konkurs den 15 september 2008 ökade oron på den globala finansiella marknaden. Detta ledde till svårigheter för finansiella aktörer i Sverige att finansiera sin verksamhet eftersom det blev dyrare att ta upp lån internationellt samtidigt som misstänksamheten gentemot andra aktörer pressade upp riskpremierna. Vid denna tidpunkt var inflationsnivån i Sverige den högsta på 15 år vilket fick Riksbanken att höja styrräntan dagarna innan konkursansökan. När den amerikanska investmentbanken Lehman Brothers ansökte om konkurs den 15 september 2008 ökade oron på den globala finansiella marknaden. Detta ledde till svårigheter för finansiella aktörer i Sverige att finansiera sin verksamhet eftersom det blev dyrare att ta upp lån internationellt samtidigt som misstänksamheten gentemot andra aktörer pressade upp riskpremierna. Vid denna tidpunkt var inflationsnivån i Sverige den högsta på 15 år vilket fick Riksbanken att höja styrräntan dagarna innan konkursansökan. Uppsatsens undersökning har till stor del bestått av en litteraturstudie. Utöver detta har även en intervju genomförts med riksbankschefen Stefan Ingves. Materialet som har använts har främst tagits från Riksbanken. Riksbanken vidtog ett flertal åtgärder för att stärka den svenska finansmarknadens motståndskraft. Åtgärderna var under krisens gång en kombination av penningpolitik och finansiella stabiliseringsåtgärder. Utöver räntejusteringar erbjöds bland annat obegränsade lånemöjligheter till Riksbankens motparter, vilket enligt Stefan Ingves även var den viktigaste åtgärden. Detta syftade främst till att sänka den allmänna räntenivån och återskapa förtroendet på den svenska finansiella marknaden. Till följd av Riksbankens åtgärder föll den allmänna räntenivån. Vilka effekter Riksbankens åtgärder hade på inflations och BNP utvecklingen är dock svårt att fastställa då utvecklingen av dessa berodde på flera olika faktorer. Riksbankens agerande under finanskrisen stämmer väl överens med vad teorierna förespråkar. Problemet med de penningpolitiska teorierna är att handlingsutrymmet begränsas när styrräntan närmar sig nollgränsen samtidigt som konjunkturnedgången är ihållande. Trots att Riksbanken agerade i enlighet med de penningpolitiska teorierna kan händelseförloppet inte enbart förklaras av dessa. Riksbanken agerande som en Lender of Last Resort är teorienlig förutom att en alldeles för låg straffränta togs ut.

published_or_final_version / Sociology / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

Modern banking theories provide a host of explanations for the existence of intermediaries, highlight their important influence on economic growth, delineate the risks inherent in the services they provide, and illustrate the market failures and real costs of bank failures that precipitate the need for regulation and oversight of the sector. This thesis is a collection of three essays that looks at three of these key aspects of financial intermediaries - the development of financial intermediaries, the function of the lender of last resort that has emerged as an important part of the safety net afforded to financial intermediaries, and the occurrence of financial crises. The first chapter of this thesis provides an introduction to the academic literature on financial intermediation covering different theories put forward to explain their emergence, and highlighting the risks inherent in their operation. It emphasizes the crucial functions they perform in the economy and makes a case for regulation and oversight of the sector to reduce the incidence and alleviate the effects of financial crises. The second chapter seeks to determine the policy and institutional factors that influence the development of financial institutions as measured across three dimensions - depth, efficiency, and stability. Applying the concept of the financial possibility frontier, developed by Beck and Feyen (2013) and formalized by Barajas et al. (2013b), we determine key policy variables affecting the gap between actual levels of development and benchmarks predicted by structural variables. Our dynamic panel estimation shows that inflation, trade openness, institutional quality, and banking crises significantly affect financial development. We also assess the impact of the policy variables across the different dimensions of development thereby identifying complementarities and potential trade-offs for policy makers. The third chapter models the role of the lender of last resort (LoLR) in a general equilibrium framework. We allow for heterogeneous agents and a risk-averse banking sector, and incorporate the frictions of endogenous default, liquidity, and money. Adverse supply shocks in monetary endowments trigger default, leading to deterioration in the value of bank assets, and subsequent bank illiquidity in some states of the world. LoLR intervention is then assessed with regards to its economy-wide effect on welfare, bank profitability, and the level of default. The results provide a justification for constructive ambiguity. The fourth chapter aims to provide an explanation for the incidence of financial crises by combining insights from agency theory and Minsky's financial instability hypothesis (Minsky, 1992) in a model with endogenous default. Our theoretical model shows that the probability of a financial crisis increases as the quality of shareholder information decreases. We then develop a measure for the quality of shareholder information following Simon (1989) and show that the market-wide quality of shareholder information: i) is poor (with no trend) in the Pre-SEC period (1840 to 1934); ii) improves substantially following the SEC reforms; and iii) gradually declines starting in the 1960s/70s until it is now back to pre-SEC levels. This matches up with the standard list of US financial crises (as in Reinhart and Rogoff 2009; Reinhart 2010) and supports our hypothesis that the likelihood of a financial crisis increases with deterioration in the quality of shareholder information.

Legal and economic aspects of the institute of the lender of last resort Abstract The master thesis deals with the legal and economic aspects of the institute of the lender of last resort, as a key institute that helps ensure the stability of financial markets. The thesis is divided into four parts. The first part is focused on the economic aspects of this institute, especially deals with the general definition of the term lender of last resort and its historical genesis, as well as the principles and forms of assistance of the lender of last resort. The key knowledge of this part is the Thornton-Bagehot doctrine of the lender of last resort. The second part of the thesis deals with the legal regulation of the lender of last resort in the Czech Republic. The third part is aimed at relevant European legislation and provides a summary of the relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, namely the cases Pringle, Gauweiler and Weiss. The fourth and final part of the thesis outlines the legal framework of this institute in the USA. The second to fourth part of the thesis also analyzes the behavior of 3 central banks (CNB, ECB and FED) in fulfilling the role of lender of last resort during the global financial crisis of 2008, the European debt crisis and the current coronavirus crisis,...

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-10-22T12:31:48Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Roberto Rosio Figueredo.pdf: 874407 bytes, checksum: 74c72d7897266e683cb9bbe66467c77b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-10-22T12:31:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Roberto Rosio Figueredo.pdf: 874407 bytes, checksum: 74c72d7897266e683cb9bbe66467c77b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-09-04 / The interlocutory appeal, specifically as an appeal against interlocutory decisions rendered in the Courts, in relation to appeals to the Superior Courts, is a remedy widely used in forensic practice in Brazil, being truly rooted in our legal culture. However, over time, the interlocutory appeal has been subject of several and constant changes, because it is invariably related as one of the obstacles to a speedy judicial provision. Perhaps, therefore, legal practitioners often do not navigate quiet waters in dealing with the interlocutory appeal and its enforceability in court. The present work intends to help, both law practitioners and undergraduate law students, to better understand this recursal modality. In order to do so, care was taken to work on the topic in all its useful angles and questions applicable in our legal system. We have examined, through bibliographical and jurisprudential research, the historical evolution of exceptional resources and interlocutory appeals; the requirements for the admissibility of appeals in general as well as the specific aspects of the Extraordinary and Special appeals were closely monitored; and then went on to analyze each of the modes of interlocutory appeals in the superior courts, their procedures, judgments and effects, always emphasizing the most controversial issues, which are presented in the various interpretations formed in doctrine and jurisprudence, seeking to resolve doubts as to the practical and theoretical aspects of this remedy, specifically with regard to judgments in the Superior Courts. The purpose of this dissertation is to assist lawyers, judges, prosecutors and academics, who deal with legal matters, especially civil procedural law; so that the importance of our study of the constant changes in this area is justified in order to prevent them from becoming obstacles to a speedy judicial procedure. In order to concretize such scope, we opted for bibliographical and jurisprudential research, favoring a systemic approach that merges the historical study with the monographic one. Thus, the ultimate goal to be achieved will be to analyze the legal-procedural applicability of resources / O agravo, especificamente como recurso contra decisões interlocutórias proferidas nos Tribunais, é remédio amplamente utilizado na prática forense no Brasil, contudo, ao longo do tempo, tem sido alvo de diversas e constantes modificações posto que costuma estar relacionado a entraves e à celeridade da prestação jurisdicional e talvez, por isso, os operadores do direito, não se sintam à vontade ao lidarem com o agravo e sua aplicabilidade nos Tribunais. Este trabalho se propõe a auxiliar os operadores e acadêmicos do direito a melhor compreender esta modalidade recursal. Tomou-se o cuidado de trabalhar o tema sob todos os seus ângulos úteis na perspectiva do sistema jurídico-processual pátrio. Examinaram--se a evolução histórica dos recursos excepcionais e dos agravos; verificaram-se detidamente os requisitos de admissibilidade dos recursos em geral, bem como os aspectos específicos dos Recursos Extraordinário e Especial; posteriormente, passou-se à análise das modalidades de agravo nos tribunais superiores, seus procedimentos, julgamentos e efeitos, sempre enfatizando as questões mais controvertidas, procurando dirimir as dúvidas quanto ao tema, especificamente no tocante aos Tribunais Superiores. Assim, o objetivo desta dissertação é auxiliar os operadores do direito principalmente do processual; o que justifica pelas constantes alterações nesta seara de modo a evitar que se constituam em entraves a uma prestação jurisdicional célere. No intuito de concretizar tal escopo, optou-se pela pesquisa bibliográfica e jurisprudencial, privilegiando uma abordagem sistêmica que mescla o estudo histórico com o monográfico

This dissertation analyzes the emergence of the Austro-Hungarian Bank (OeUB) as a modern lender of last resort (LLR) between 1868 and 1914. In order to evaluate policy responses to specific periods of financial distress, an in-depth knowledge of the context and dynamics at hand is indispensable. Chapter I sets the groundwork for this dissertation. It shows that bank failures during the Austro-Hungarian crisis of 1873 followed mainly from the break-down of a large repo market on the Viennese stock exchange. Credit institutions granted repo loans against securities that turned into highly illiquid and depreciated collateral. Banks that were forced to sell repossessed collateral in response to heavy funding withdrawals had to write-off substantial portions of their repo portfolios and thus incurred heavy losses. This chapter reinterprets the Austro-Hungarian crisis of 1873 as a historical "run on repo". It is the first study to examine a historical repo market crisis using microdata. I use semi-parametric survival analysis as well as stratification techniques new to the literature on bank distress to identify the causes of bank failures. Bank failures in 1873 did not spring from a pure liquidity problem, nor did they derive from a simple solvency shock. The complex roots of bank distress in 1873 posed difficult questions for policy-makers who needed to decide whether and how to intervene. Although central banks may be first-best candidates for the role of a LLR, they can also face constraints which obviate an elastic supply of liquidity during crises. Some of these constraints may be ideational, institutional or technical. Others are driven by market characteristics: quantity rationing can be the result of asymmetric information problems in financial markets. In Chapter II, I study a historical experiment implemented to overcome the specter of a credit rationing LLR during the Austro-Hungarian crisis of 1873. I explore bank-level information on treatment by a LLR mechanism designed as a public-private partnership between the central bank and market players. Drawing on inverse probability weighted regression adjustment (IPWRA) to tease out the causal effect of liquidity support, I show that this unconventional LLR was effective in mitigating bank distress: it worked as a remedy for the under-provision of a good particularly desirable in times of crises central bank liquidity. No matter how successful it is in calming financial distress and independently of the concrete form it takes, the LLR always comes at a cost. Moral hazard is a central issue in the literature on last resort lending. In Chapter III, I provide a new explanation for how central banks dealt with moral hazard historically. I focus on one specific component of central banks' risk frameworks: credit limits for discount window customers. I argue that credit limits as operationalized by the Austro-Hungarian Bank (OeUB) after 1878 constituted the backbone of an early form of microprudential regulation that was designed to check moral hazard in normal times. Credit limits empowered the Austro-Hungarian Bank to enforce minimum liquidity and capital standards for its counterparties at the discount window. Rather than contradicting the tenet of free lending in times of distress, credit limits functioned as "contingent rules": enforced in normal times, limits were increased or lifted during liquidity crises perceived as exogenous. Moreover, even during crises, the Bank did not simply relax limits for all credit institutions: it differentiated between banks depending on their fundamentals prior to the crisis. Chapter III provides the first economic interpretation and empirical analysis of the credit limit frameworks employed by central banks in the past.

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I likhet med i andra länder har det i Sverige under vissa högkonjunkturer uppstått ett så betydande kapitalöverskott, att den finansiella marknaden fått problem att bemästra flödena. Konsekvensen har blivit att den aggregerade risknivån ökat i takt med stigande tillgångspriser. När väl en kontraktion uppstått, har det saknats kapital för att i ordnade former bemästra de nya ekonomiska förutsättningarna. Det är den utvecklingen som föregått kriserna 1878/79, 1921/22 och 1991/92. Temporära insatser har då måst ske vid sidan av det befintliga institutionella systemet. Forskningen ger för Sveriges del en kriskronologi för det finansiella området med krisåren 1763, 1817/18, 1857/58, 1878/79, 1907/08, 1921/22, 1932/33 och 1991/92. Det har vid kriserna 1878/79, 1921/22 och 1991/92 förelegat ett betydande hot om kollaps av det finansiella systemet. Vid dessa tre tillfällen har det efter förhandlingar mellan bankerna och staten kommit att skapas temporära krishanteringsorganisationer – Järnvägshypoteksfonden 1879, AB Kreditkassan 1922 samt Securum AB 1992 – vid sidan om den svenska Riksbanken. Kriserna har hävts med hjälp av de temporärt skapade krisorganisationerna, vilka samtliga har haft en Lender of Last Resort-funktion. Krishanteringstekniken vid krisen 1921/22 kan ses som en vidareutveckling av den som kommit till användning 1878/79. Även om bakgrunden till krisen 1991/92 skiljer sig åt från de två här tidigare nämnda tillfällena, kom tekniken med överflyttandet av tyngande engagemang till ett nytt bolag att likna den teknik som användes redan av AB Kreditkassan. Trots detta betydde tidigare svenska erfarenheter mindre för krisen 1991/92 i detta fall. Idéerna till Securum hämtades istället från senare tids bankkrishantering i USA med inrättandet av så kallade ”bad banks”. Syftet med denna avhandling är att med en institutionell ansats klarlägga och analysera hur de två första av dessa tre finansiella kriser har hanterats. Avhandlingen belyser i detalj det förhandlingsdrama mellan statens och marknadens aktörer som föregått inrättandet av respektive krisorganisation.

The topic of the final thesis is The Lender of Last Resort. Author of the final thesis has dealt with the issue through the analysis of the European current legislation, available Czech or foreign literature or other relevant sources. The function of the national banks, or other institutions, as a lender of last resort is very complex the final thesis examines from the legal and economical perspective. This matter even has obvious global societal dimension when the adequate performance of the lender of last resort has positive effect on the prosperity of the society. On the other hand when the performance is defective the opposite effect arises. The final thesis is divided into five chapters. First two chapters present and clarify the term of lender of last resort and provide us definitions. Second chapter, which builds upon the first two, is providing the reader with the historical context of the lender of last resort, whose development started on the British Islands at the end of the 18th century. The fourth chapter of the final thesis is dedicated to the criteria for granting financial aid by the lender of last resort and the means of the provision of the financial aid. The author has especially focused on the danger of the systemic risk and the too-big-to-fail doctrine. Last fifth chapter...