The intervention in Libya is the best example to date to judge the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect. In 2011, public demonstrations started in Libya seeking political and economic reforms in the country. In return, the Libyan President Maummar Al-Qaddafi threatened mass atrocities in Libya. This allowed the UNSC to sanction the use of force against Qaddafi’s regime in order to protect civilians. First, under resolution 1970 (2011), the UNSC referred the case to the International Criminal Court and applied sanctions. Second, via resolution 1973 (2011), the application of force was approved for the express purpose of “protecting civilians.” This thesis assess whether the military intervention in Libya in 2011 was R2P case. This question is answered by an analysis based upon the UNSC’s Resolutions, Council’s proceedings, and other official documents. / May 2016

Germany’s position of power within the European Union disguises how impacted the German economy was by the 2008 Financial Crisis and Europe’s subsequent Sovereign Debt Crisis. Two of Germany’s major banks-Commerzbank and Bayerische Landesbank- suffered major losses and required emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) to survive. Walter Bagehot wrote the theory underpinning lenders of last resort (LLRs) in 1873 but how has the development of systemically important banks affected the usefulness of Bagehot’s theory? This paper aims to explain why Germany is in need of updated LLR recommendations through an analysis of the ELA Germany at large, Commerzbank and Bayerische Landesbank received. It also aims to empirically prove the stigma and public distrust of ELA through a regression of Commerzbank’s daily stock returns using an augmented Fama/French model. I find that Bagehot’s theory and recommendations are out of date for our current global financial sector. I cannot empirically prove any stigma or public distrust of Commerzbank, there is no relationship between Commerzbank stock returns and the augmented Fama/French factors.

La thèse se propose, dans une première partie, de décrire l'origine des débats sur la nécessité d'une banque centrale jusqu'aux formulations actuelles. Sont examinés les éléments qui ont posé les bases d'un prêteur ultime et favorisé la maturation de ce métier, de même que sont mis en relief les résultats accumulés depuis deux siècles. Notre attention porte sur la Réserve Fédérale des Etats-Unis. Les économistes sont en quête de solutions afin de prévenir les crises financières. Ainsi a été proposé un élargissement du tableau de bord de manière à contenir les prix d'actif dans une approche macro et micro-prudentielle. Parallèlement, sont analysés les canaux par lesquels la politique monétaire influence les variables réelles et financières de l'économie, et qui attestent alors du rôle pouvant être théoriquement assumé par la banque centrale sur les marchés financiers. La deuxième partie concentre le propos sur les ressorts des crises financières. Nous nous intéressons au paradoxe de la surliquidité et du surendettement, en insistant sur les particularités des marchés financiers devenant plus vulnérables. La contribution de la thèse dans cette étape consiste à vérifier si la banque centrale contribue à la manifestation de comportements abusifs et excessifs sur les marchés financiers par l'abondante création de liquidité. Notre étude empirique devrait permettre de répondre à cette question à travers une modélisation économétrique et des tests statistiques (dont le test de Chow) appliqués à une politique monétaire active (type règle de Taylor). En ce sens, cette recherche sur les actions de la Fed vise à forger une opinion sur le métier de banquier central et sur son devenir. / The thesis proposes, in a first part, to describe the origin of the debate on the need for a central bank up until the recent formulations. They were examined the elements which have posed the bases of an "ultimate lender" and promoted the maturation of this function, as were highlighted the results accumulated over two centuries. Our attention is drawn to the Federal Reserve of the United States. The economists are always in search for solutions to prevent financial crises. It has thus been proposed to extend the dashboard of central banks as to contain asset prices in a macro and micro-prudential approach. In parallel, in order to support this debate, we analyze the mechanisms by which the monetary policy affects the real and financial variables of the economy, which also affirm the role that can be assumed in theory by a central bank on financial markets. The second part focuses on the recurrence and intensity of financial crises. We consider the paradox of excess liquidity and over-indebtedness, with an emphasis on properties of financial markets becoming more vulnerable and their recent development. The contribution of the thesis in this stage consists of checking whether the central bank is responsible of abusive and excessive behavior on the financial markets by the abundant creation of liquidity. Our empirical study should help to answer this question through an econometric modeling and statistical tests (including the Chow test) applied to an active monetary policy (type Taylor rule). In this way, our research on the actions of the Fed aims to forge an opinion on the profession of modern central bankers, and perhaps on the future of central banks themselves.

Cette thèse comprend trois essais sur le futur des banques centrales et sur la manière dont elles doivent réguler la liquidité. Réguler la liquidité pour le futur, nécessite pour les banques centrales, de justifier et de concevoir une politique de la liquidité. Cette politique de la liquidité existe de fait sous la forme des mesures non conventionnelles mais n’est pas formalisée. L’apport de cette thèse est de proposer une conceptualisation de la politique de la liquidité, comme élément marquant du futur des banques centrales et comme fondation théorique des rôles en dernier ressort des banques centrales. La thèse montrera qu’il s’agit en fait d’une politique des liquidités du fait de l’existence de différents types de liquidités. Elle l’illustrera par la proposition d’un modèle théorique et mettra en relation théorie et pratique des liquidités. La thèse traite le rôle de la banque centrale sur la liquidité tout d’abord sous la forme d’un preneur de risque en dernier ressort puis ensuite sous la forme d’un agent central agissant sur les différentes formes de liquidité. Les deux premiers essais couvrent la problématique de la banque centrale, preneur de risque en dernier ressort, sous un aspect positif dans le premier essai puis sous un aspect normatif dans le deuxième. Le dernier essai intègre le concept de preneur de risque en dernier ressort dans un ensemble plus large d’actions de la banque centrale, couvrant les différentes formes de liquidité. / This PhD thesis includes three essays on the future of central banks and how they should regulate liquidity. Regulating liquidity for the future, requires for central banks to justify and design a liquidity policy. This policy of liquidity actually exists in the form of unconventional measures but is not formalized. The contribution of this thesis is to propose a conceptualization of a liquidity policy as a key element for the future of central banks and as a theoretical foundation for the roles of central banks as last resorts. The thesis will show that it is actually a policy of liquidities because of the existence of different types of liquidity. It will illustrate it by proposing a theoretical model and by linking theory and practice of liquidity. The thesis deals with the role of the central bank on liquidity, first in the form of a risk taker of last resort and then in the form of a central agent acting on the various forms of liquidities. The first two essays cover the problem of the central bank as risk taker of last resort, under a positive aspect in the first essay and then under a normative aspect in the second. The last essay incorporates the concept of risk taker of last resort into a broader set of central bank actions covering different forms of liquidities.

Main goal of the diploma thesis is to research liquidity management problems of the Federal Reserve System during banking crisis 1929 -- 1933. Monetary policy implementation based on the implicit reserve targeting was not convenient in times of sharp expansion of the demand for reserves. FED was misled by Real-bills and Riefler-Burgess doctrine and considers monetary condition to be easy. Money interest rates responded very moderately to the shortage of the banking system's liquidity. We can find origin of the first quantitative easing in 1932 when FED first bought larger quantities of the government securities. Expansionary monetary policy during the banking crisis 1929 -- 1933 was also potentially limited by the conflict among U.S. financial stability and sustainability of the gold standard.

Cette thèse analyse les opérations de crédit et d’émission de billets de la Banque de France, entre 1870 et 1897 et les relations entre l’État républicain et l’institution financière. Elle suppose que la Guerre franco-prussienne (1870-1871) et l’arrivée de Joseph Magnin, républicain, sous la Troisième République (mandat 1881-1897), ont influé sur la politique de la Banque de France. Après la Guerre et alors que l’Europe vit une période de stagnation économique, l’Allemagne et les États-Unis connaissent un développement rapide qui intensifie la concurrence entre les pays. La nomination d’un Gouverneur républicain à la tête de la Banque permet à l’État d’intervenir dans la politique de l’institution, pour permettre l’extension de l’offre de crédit. Néanmoins, beaucoup de dirigeants de la Banque insistent sur le fait qu’elle est encore une société anonyme, au nom de son indépendance. Cette opposition s’observe principalement dans la discussion sur le crédit agricole et l’extension du réseau de la Banque. L’intervention de l’État a aussi joué un rôle important pour le contrôle du désordre du marché résultant de l’échec du Comptoir d’escompte de Paris en 1889. Sous l’initiative du Gouverneur Magnin, l’accumulation de l’or à la Banque et l’augmentation de la monnaie fiduciaire se sont établies. En 1897, l’extension de l’offre de crédit est institutionnalisée lors de la discussion sur le renouvellement du privilège de l’émission des billets au Gouvernement et au Parlement et dans les années qui suivent, le Gouverneur Pallain permet le développement de l’accumulation de l’or. / This thesis analyses operations of credit and of issue of banknotes of the Bank of France between 1870 and 1897, and relations between the State and the financial institution. It supposes that the French-Prussian War (1870-1871) and the arrival of Joseph Magnin, republican (term 1881-1897), influenced the policy of the Bank under the Third Republic. After the war, and during a protracted recession in Europe, Germany and US achieved drastic economic growth and competition between countries escalated. The French government intervened the policies of the Bank of France by a republican assuming the post of the Governor of the Bank, and expanded credit facility. However, many executives of the Bank claimed the fact that it was still a private bank based on its independency. This conflict could be seen mainly in the discussion on expansion of agricultural credit and the base network of the Bank. The intervention of the State fulfilled an important role as well for the control of the confusion of the domestic market resulting from the collapse of the Comptoir d’escompte de Paris in 1889. Under the initiative of the Governor, Mr. Magnin, accumulation of gold was implemented and issuance of banknotes increased in the Bank. In 1897, expansion of credit facility was institutionalized in the discussion between the government and parliament on the renewal of the privilege to issue banknotes for the Bank, and after that, the next Governor Pallain further promoted accumulation of gold.

Syftet med denna studie har varit att undersöka den diskursiva konstruktionen av ekonomiskt bistånd som yttersta skyddsnät inom ramen för handläggning och bedömning. För att besvara syftet har gruppintervjuer med handläggare på ekonomiskt bistånd genomförts. Vid intervjuerna har tre vinjetter presenterats som handläggarna fått möjlighet att diskutera. I uppsatsen används Laclau och Mouffes diskursteori som teori och analysmetod. Vår studie visar på konstruktioner av ekonomiskt bistånd som det yttersta skyddsnätet i form av tre diskurser; diskursen om ett yttersta skyddsnät då alla andra möjligheter är uttömda, diskursen om ett yttersta skyddsnät mot någonting samt diskursen om ett yttersta skyddsnät när andra välfärdssystem brister. Vi har identifierat den första diskursen, med betoning på klientens skyldigheter och egna ansvar, som hegemonisk. I den andra diskursen betonas klientens rättigheter och hjälpbehov samt handläggarnas ansvar för den enskilde. I den tredje diskursen ligger fokus på kommunens yttersta ansvar för sina invånare när andra välfärdssystem brister. Det finns en motstridighet mellan diskurserna, vilket får konsekvenser för biståndshandläggarna i form av ett komplicerat arbete. Studien visar på variation mellan kommunerna i de diskursiva konstruktionerna, frågan om att stå till arbetsmarknadens förfogande, förmildrande omständigheter samt innebörden av nöd & kris. Variationerna leder till en osäkerhet för den biståndssökande avseende utfallet på ansökan om ekonomiskt bistånd. Vår studie visar på potentiella brister i välfärdssystemet och i organiseringen av ekonomiskt bistånd. Vi anser därför att ekonomiskt bistånd kan behöva reformeras i grunden.

Why do interest groups participate in state courts of last resort by filing amicus curiae briefs? Are they influential when they do? This dissertation examines these questions using an original survey of organized interests that routinely participate in state supreme courts, as well as data on all amicus curiae briefs and majority opinions in over 14,000 cases decided in all fifty-two state supreme courts for a four year period. I argue that interest groups turn to state judiciaries to achieve the dual goals of influencing policy and organizational maintenance, as amicus briefs can help organized interests achieve both outcomes. Furthermore, I contend that amicus briefs are influential in shaping judicial policy-making through the provision of legally persuasive arguments. The results suggest that interest groups do file amicus briefs to both lobby for their preferred policies and to support their organization's long-term viability. Additionally, the results indicate that organized interests also participate in counteractive lobbying in state courts of last resort by filing amicus briefs to ensure their side is represented and to dull the effect of oppositional amici. The findings also demonstrate support for the influence of amicus briefs on judicial policy-making on state high courts, as amicus briefs can influence the ideological direction of the court's majority opinions. Overall, this research extends our understanding of interest group lobbing in the judiciary and in state policy venues, and provides insight into judicial politics and policy-making on state courts of last resort.

Globally, the justice system has set up courts to respond to complaints of a criminal and civil nature. Courts also respond to complaints which require swift relief by way of shortened procedures, in the form of motion proceedings. In all these complaints, courts have to respond in a manner that leaves litigants with a feeling of satisfaction that justice has been done. To the end of ensuring that there is legal certainty, justice systems in all jurisdictions have established a hierarchy of courts, with lower courts being bound by the decisions of higher courts in their jurisdiction. There has been no problem in the application of this principle called stare decisis, or judicial precedent, in disputes of law. However, in disputes of constitutional interpretation, courts have demonstrated a marked shift from observing the rule of judicial precedent. The disregard for this rule manifests itself particularly in the adjudication of cases surrounded by controversy. It is argued herein that constitutional interpretation is no different from legal interpretation, in that the rule of judicial precedent which characterises court decisions in legal disputes, should characterise court decisions in constitutional interpretation disputes. The Constitutional Court of South Africa itself, though it is the highest arbiter in constitutional matters, is bound by its own previous decisions, unless its previous decisions have become manifestly wrong. Three constitutional rights are analysed. The right to life in its three manifestations, namely, the right to life of the unborn child, the right to life of the convicted criminal not to be hanged, and the right of the terminally ill to continue living by receiving medical care at state expense. The other two rights are the right to privacy, and the right to culture. The right to privacy is the right that has been claimed in political controversies. In isolated instances, specifically mentioned herein, the Constitutional Assembly and the drafters of the Constitution have also contributed to the resultant inconsistency in constitutional interpretation. This is especially so with regard to the right to practise one‘s culture. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / LL.D.

Cette thèse constitue une analyse historique évolutionniste de la fonction de prêteur en dernier ressort à travers les mutations du cadre institutionnel et opérationnel des Banques Centrales. L’enjeu de ce travail de recherche est de se pencher sur les origines de l’apparition de cette théorie d'un point de vue historique comme outil d’analyse des problématiques de gestion des crises modernes. Il convient de démontrer que le dévoiement de la doctrine du PDR entraîne une incompatibilité avec le cadre institutionnel de la politique monétaire de la Banque Centrale. Ainsi, les interventions « non conventionnelles » des Banques Centrales confirment qu’il est nécessaire de sortir du cadre institutionnel censé assurer une gestion efficiente de la politique monétaire. Par conséquent, ce cadre institutionnel qui garantit notamment l’indépendance de la Banque Centrale parait inadéquat à la nouvelle pratique du prêteur en dernier ressort. L’étude historique de cette fonction permet de mettre en perspective l’évolution du rôle de prêteur en dernier ressort en tant qu’outil de prédation monétaire pour les gouvernements. En définitive, les évolutions divergentes du cadre institutionnel et opérationnel de la Banque Centrale constituent l’un des principaux signes d’une déliquescence du système bancaire centralisé (Central Banking). L’exercice de la fonction de prêteur en dernier ressort par la BCE au sein de la zone euro représente un cadre d’analyse pertinent afin d’étudier les difficultés de cette fonction dans la gouvernance d'une zone économique hétérogène et politiquement inaboutie. / This paper offers an historical analysis of the evolution of lenders of last resort (LOLR) through the institutional and operational mutations of Central Banks framework. The aim of this research is to examine the origins of the appearance of this theory from a historical perspective. It should demonstrate that the perversion of the doctrine of LOLR causes incompatibility with the institutional framework of the Central Bank’s monetary policy. Thus, the "unconventional" interventions of central banks confirm the need to exit the institutional framework meant to ensure the efficient management of monetary policy. Therefore, this institutional framework which guarantees the independence of the Central Bank seems inadequate in the context of the new practice of the lender of last resort. Ultimately, diverging trends of the institutional and operational framework of the Central Bank is a major sign of demise of Central Banking. Last resort lending by the ECB in the euro zone provides a useful analytical framework to study the difficulties of the function of LOLR in the governance of a heterogeneous and politically unfulfilled economic zone.