Thesis (M.A.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2004. / Typescript. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (M.A.) - Carleton University, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 167-171). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 400-422).

No description available.

1 Material Tensions between Natural Law and Positive Law and Approaches to its Solution Jakub Kříž Abstract The title of my dissertation - "Material Tensions between Natural Law and Positive Law and Approaches to its Solution" - refers to everlasting contrapositions of two different approaches to law: (i) natural law tradition which is concerned with a necessary continuity between law and the requirements of practical reasonableness and that describes law as "rational standard for conduct"1 and (ii) tradition of legal positivism, which understands law only as a social fact. Actually, in the world of jurisprudence, there is no single natural law theory on one side2 and unique legal positivism on the other side.3 It is 1 MURPHY, Mark C. Natural Law Jurisprudence. Legal Theory. 2003, No. 9, p. 244, MURPHY, Mark C. Natural Law Theory. In: GOLDING , Martin P., EDMUNSON, William A. (eds.). The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. s.l. : Blackwell Publishing, 2006, p. 15. 2 For many of them we can mention classical natural law theory of the thomistic philosophy, new natural law theory of G. Grisez and J. Finnes, legal realism of J. Hervada, "modern" natural law theories such as L. Fuller's concept of the Rule of Law and the inner morality of law or R. Dworkin's theory of the unique right...

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo justamente contribuir para uma melhor compreensão do papel da moral no projeto positivista de Hart. Estudando sua obra, recuperando textos importantes para o entendimento de seu sistema de pensamento, embora menos conhecidos, somos capazes de avaliar a coerência de sua tese da separabilidade entre o direito e a moral, tão complexa e diferente da tradição positivista clássica, e a viabilidade de uma teoria puramente descritiva, nos termos como seu modelo teórico foi concebido. Apresentarei, porém, um argumento bastante desafiador, porque atribui a esse sofisticado modelo uma intencionalidade que o próprio autor não estaria disposto a reconhecer. A seguir encontra-se, em breves linhas, uma visão panorâmica desse argumento, cujos termos, aqui expostos de maneira bastante superficial, serão elucidados com maior profundidade ao longo dos capítulos. / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo justamente contribuir para uma melhor compreensão do papel da moral no projeto positivista de Hart. Estudando sua obra, recuperando textos importantes para o entendimento de seu sistema de pensamento, embora menos conhecidos, somos capazes de avaliar a coerência de sua tese da separabilidade entre o direito e a moral, tão complexa e diferente da tradição positivista clássica, e a viabilidade de uma teoria puramente descritiva, nos termos como seu modelo teórico foi concebido. Apresentarei, porém, um argumento bastante desafiador, porque atribui a esse sofisticado modelo uma intencionalidade que o próprio autor não estaria disposto a reconhecer. A seguir encontra-se, em breves linhas, uma visão panorâmica desse argumento, cujos termos, aqui expostos de maneira bastante superficial, serão elucidados com maior profundidade ao longo dos capítulos.

Nesta dissertação pretendo reler o debate entre Ronald Dworkin e o positivismo jurídico. Farei isto sob o prisma da filosofia analítica, especificamente, contextualizando o debate no âmbito de uma discussão travada entre três teorias semânticas específicas: a descricional, o externalismo semântico e o bi-dimensionalismo ambicioso. Há algum tempo Dworkin lançou uma crítica ao positivismo, qual seja, o positivismo jurídico pretende reduzir a forma direito de como as coisas são à conformação puramente descritiva de como o mundo é. Disse, ainda, que somente quando concebido como uma teoria semântica é que o positivismo jurídico tornar-se-ia inteligível. Os posivistas, a seu turno, argumentam que a Jurisprudência analítica é um projeto teórico pelo direito e não pelo significado do termo direito e que, portanto, deveríamos manter separados dois tipos de questionamentos: O que é direito? e O que é direito?. Se tudo correr bem, ao reler o debate entre os positivistas e Ronald Dworkin a partir do instrumental obtido no âmbito da teoria semântica, poderemos perceber que pode ser verdade que o positivismo jurídico, enquanto projeto teórico, é sobre o direito, o referente, e não sobre o direito, o termo; entretanto, a forma pela qual o positivismo concebe o questionamento O que é direito?, ele mesmo, parece acabar por qualificá-lo, num sentido não trivial, como semântico. / I intend to reread the debate between Ronald Dworkin and legal positivism. I will do that through the prism of analytic philosophy, specifically in the context of the debate between three specific semantic theories: descriptional, externalism and the ambitious bidimensionalism. Dworkin criticized legal positivism: the legal positivism aims to reduce the law-way of things to the purely descriptive form of the world. He also said that only when conceived as a semantic theory is that legal positivism would become intelligible. The posivists argue that analytical Jurisprudence is a theoretical project about law and not about the meaning of \"law\", therefore we should keep separated two types of questions: \"What is law?\" and \"What is \'law\'?\". If all goes well, when rereading the debate through the prism of the discussion in the context of semantic theories, we will realize that it may be true that legal positivism is about law, the referent, and not about \"law\". However, the way in which positivism conceives the question \"What is law?\" seems to qualify it as semantic in a nontrivial sense.

In the postscript to The Concept of Law, H.L. A. Hart describes the on-going debate inspired by his book, focusing on the criticisms of Ronald Dworkin. In this essay, I will discuss Dworkin’s criticisms of Hart, as well as Hart’s responses, showing that while Hart responds adequately to some criticisms, he fails to respond adequately to others. I will also reconstruct and evaluate the arguments given for and against the separation thesis by Dworkin and Hart. Finally, I will argue that the debate about the separation thesis – the thesis that morality and law are separable – is misguided, conflating as it does two distinct questions. These are the questions of what the positive law is, that is, the law that is posited in a specific time and place, and of what the natural law is, that is, the law that (if it exists) is universal and timeless. Once we distinguish these questions, we will see that the answer to the question of whether law is separable from morality depends on which sense of ‘law’ is relevant, and that there are two different answers corresponding to the two senses of positive law and natural law. Positive law is separable from morality while natural law is not. / text

During the past 10 years Sweden has updated its penal code for sexual crimes twice. Despite this few are convicted for the crime of rape in Sweden. As the majority of perpetrators being male, this is a problem concerning women’s rights to respect for their bodies and personal integrity. A possible explanation, and this study’s point of departure is a potential discrepancy between the intention of the law and the interpretation of the same as the Swedish legal system rests on a foundation of legal positivism. Hence focus of this study has been the motives behind the definition of rape in the law and the interpretation of the same. The purpose has been to establish the development of the rape law and its political motives, how the judicial system has interpreted the legal text in actual cases and if this is in alignment. As to explain why so few are convicted for the crime of rape and to critically examine how this affects women’s rights as well as how the interpretation of the definition of rape can be carried out in a more legally secure way for the victims. This has been done firstly by examining the states public investigations and state bills before the update of the penal codes definition of rape in 2005 and 2013. Secondly by an analysis of arguments used by the Swedish courts, mainly the district courts, in two rape convictions and three verdicts of acquittal. Arguments used by the courts have then been compared to the motives behind the legal definition of rape to see if the perceived discrepancy between the intended meaning of the law and the interpretation of the same existed. Thirdly, the judicial systems legal basis for interpretation was criticised from the two theoretical perspectives of the study; a criticism to legal positivism and a gender hierarchical perspective.   The analysis shows that the updates of the rape law are clearly morally motivated and women’s rights based. In contrast to the legal positivistic judicial system interpretations, avoiding morally based argumentation relying on the systems foundation solely. The critical investigation shows that both a the perceived gender neutral system as well as legal positivistic tradition of sidestepping moral argumentation in courts result in lack of questioning the system and how it comes to its decisions.  Hence the discrepancy between the two systems can be a part of the explanation why women’s rights are not secured in Sweden.

Issued also as inaugural dissertation, Zürich. / "Literatur-Verzeichnis": p. [127]-129.