Ce travail propose une interprétation d’ensemble de la théorie du droit et de la théorie du contrôle judiciaire de constitutionnalité des lois de l’auteur canadien contemporain Wilfrid Waluchow, à partir d’une étude de la manière dont elles s’inspirent de la conception classique de la common law. La partie préliminaire présente de façon synthétique la conception classique de la common law et la critique que lui adresse Thomas Hobbes, pour montrer comment elles font apparaître, dès les origines de la modernité, deux façons opposées de concevoir le droit, qui sous-tendent la pensée contemporaine. La première partie étudie le rapport que les conceptions du droit des inspirateurs plus immédiats de Wilfrid Waluchow entretiennent avec la conception classique de la common law. Elle explique comment H. L. A. Hart contribue à rapprocher le positivisme juridique de la vision coutumière des common lawyers à l’aide de la notion de règles secondaires et comment Ronald Dworkin associe plutôt l’approche de la common law à une méthode d’interprétation centrée sur la dimension argumentative du droit. La deuxième partie examine le positivisme juridique inclusif de Wilfrid Waluchow et la théorie de common law du contrôle judiciaire qu’il élabore à partir de celui-ci et elle montre comment l’effort de l’auteur canadien pour conjuguer dans sa pensée les influences des conceptions du droit de Hart et de Dworkin, à l’aide en particulier de la notion de moralité constitutionnelle, l’amène à développer une vision qui possède des affinités importantes avec la conception classique de la common law. / This work offers a general interpretation of the theory of law and the theory of judicial review of Canadian contemporary author Wilfrid Waluchow, through the study of their relation to classical common law jurisprudence. The preliminary section offers a summary of classical common law jurisprudence and of Thomas Hobbes’s critique of classical common law jurisprudence, and shows how they define two opposite ways of conceptualizing law that still underlie contemporary jurisprudence. The first section studies how the jurisprudence of H. L. A. Hart and of Ronald Dworkin, which directly inspire Wilfrid Waluchow’s theory of law, relate to classical common law jurisprudence. It shows how Hart, with his concept of secondary rules, moves legal positivism closer to classical common law’s customary understanding of the law and how Dworkin defines the common law approach otherwise, by proposing an interpretive method concentrating on the argumentative character of law.The second section studies Wilfrid Waluchow’s inclusive legal positivism and his common law theory of judicial review. It shows how Wilfrid Waluchow’s effort to reconcile Hart’s theory of the law with Dworkin’s jurisprudence, notably through the idea of constitutional morality, leads him to develop an understanding of the law which has important affinities with classical common law jurisprudence.

A relação entre razão e direito faz parte da tradição do pensamento ocidental. No período moderno, essa relação serviu de base para o surgimento de uma cultura jurídica autônoma, dentro da qual foram elaboradas as idéias de sujeito de direito e sistema jurídico. No entanto, a modernidade também criou condições para o nascimento das chamadas teorias jurídicas, que se constituem como uma nova forma de discurso jurídico, distinta das teorias filosóficas e das dogmáticas jurídicas, por não manifestarem o modelo de racionalidade tradicional, associado à concepção de lei natural. Para compreender a racionalidade nesse novo âmbito do discurso dos juristas, é proposto, nesta tese de doutoramento, um caminho peculiar: por um lado, tomam-se por objeto teorias jurídicas que se tornaram referência no contexto anglo-saxônico, ou seja, fora dos marcos habituais da racionalização na Europa continental moderna; por outro lado, são considerados como fio condutor para esta investigação os enfoques interpretativos construídos como legítimos por essas teorias, em vez de configurar sua racionalidade a partir de divisões escolares ou matrizes epistemológicas. Essa delimitação permite revelar três modelos novos e distintos de racionalidade jurídica, que resultam do desenvolvimento de diferentes concepções de pontos de vista no contexto do debate entre as teorias jurídicas de John Austin, Oliver W. Holmes Jr., Hans Kelsen, Herbert L. A. Hart, Robert Alexy e Ronald Dworkin. Esses três modelos, por sua vez, contribuem para ressaltar os limites heurísticos da contraposição positivismo vs. antipositivismo para tratar da racionalidade no direito contemporâneo. / The relation between reason and law is part of the Western thought tradition. In the modern period, this relation served as basis for the emergence of an autonomous legal culture, within which the ideas of \"subjects of law\" and \"legal system\" were elaborated. However, modernity has also created conditions for the birth of the so-called legal theories, which were constituted as a new form of legal discourse (distinct from the legal dogmatics and philosophical theories of law), for they do not present the traditional model of rationality associated with the conception of natural law. A peculiar method is proposed in this doctoral thesis, in order to understand the rationality in this new sphere of legal discourse: on the one hand, legal theories which have become reference within the Anglo-Saxon world i.e., theories outside the usual landmarks of rationalization in modern continental Europe are taken as object; on the other hand, the interpretive approaches (focuses) formulated as legitimate by these theories are considered as expressions of rationality, instead of rationality as originated from divisions by schools of thought or epistemological matrices. By means of this method, three new distinct models of legal reasoning are revealed. These models are the outcome of different concepts of \"point of view\" which were defended throughout the dialogue which took place between the theories of John Austin, Oliver W. Holmes Jr., Hans Kelsen, Herbert L. A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin and Robert Alexy. These three models, in turn, contribute to highlighting the heuristic limits of the opposition legal positivism vs. non-positivism in the debate over rationality in contemporary law.

Thomas Hobbes é considerado o pai do conceito moderno de Estado. O núcleo de seu pensamento nasce do esforço de construir as bases da convivência a partir da demonstração dos fundamentos racionais da autoridade política. O liame entre o debate contemporâneo, polarizado entre interpretativistas e positivistas, e o pensamento moderno, simbolizado pelo pensamento hobbesiano, identifica-se com a seguinte pergunta: sob qual justificativa devemos obedecer os mandamentos da autoridade ainda que eles nos pareceram injustos? / Thomas Hobbes is considered the father of the modern concept of state. The core of his thinking arises from the effort to build the foundations of acquaintanceship from the demonstration of the rational foundation of political authority. The link between the contemporary debate which is polarized between positivists and interpretativists and the modern thought, which is symbolized by hobbesian thinking relates to the following question: \'Under which justification must we obey the commandments of the authority even if they seemed unfair to us ?

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-04-11T11:51:16Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Leonardo José Rafful.pdf: 1264577 bytes, checksum: 48941699ba0e98c577a29912286be6cf (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-11T11:51:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Leonardo José Rafful.pdf: 1264577 bytes, checksum: 48941699ba0e98c577a29912286be6cf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-08 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This dissertation has the scope of the analysis of the paper: "An introduction to the principals of morals and legislation" by the philosopher Jeremy Bentham, the discussion of his theory and the application of it within a system in which legal positivism prevails. For this purpose, the descriptive method was used, based on an accurate bibliographic analysis of national and foreign papers about the author’s masterpiece and backbone of his work. We started from the hypothesis that the application of this theory could result in greater legal certainty. The application of utilitarianism in our legal system would remove arbitrariness and insecurity from the application of law as it does in the common law system. As so, the concepts of hedonistic and eudaimonist happiness were studied in order to verify what kind of individualistic happiness, utilitarianism can be embedded. In the following act, David Hume's principle of causality was analyzed in order to integrate those concepts, since Jeremy Bentham, in the first chapter of the work under analysis, states textually that the human being would be inextricably linked to the chain cause and effect. Finally, in order to insert in this research a counterpoint to the thought of Jeremy Bentham, the theory of Hebert Hart was analyzed, in his paper: "The concept of right", being verified that, while the first one takes care of the construction of a theory which would guarantee the elaboration of norms that lead to happiness, the second concerns about the application of law, concluding that utilitarianism is a theory directed to the legislators with the application in a positivist system, so that through it, society can achieve happiness without compromising legal security, social order, and caring, on the other hand, for causal relations / Esta dissertação tem por escopo a análise da obra: “An introduction to the principals of morals and legislation” da lavra do filósofo Jeremy Bentham, a discussão de sua teoria e a aplicação da mesma dentro de um sistema em que prevalece o positivismo jurídico. Utilizou-se, para tanto, o método descritivo, a partir da efetivação de uma acurada análise bibliográfica de obras nacionais e estrangeiras que comentam a obra mestra e espinha dorsal deste trabalho. Parte-se da hipótese de que a aplicação desta teoria traria, como conseqüência, uma maior segurança jurídica. A aplicação do utilitarismo em nosso sistema jurídico afastaria a arbitrariedade e a insegurança da aplicação do direito tal como ocorre no sistema do common law. Para tanto, foram estudados os conceitos de felicidade hedonista e eudaimonista com a finalidade de se verificar em qual tipo de felicidade individualista, o utilitarismo pode ser encaixado. Em ato seguinte, analisou-se o princípio da causalidade, defendido por David Hume, com o objetivo de integrar esses conceitos, uma vez que Jeremy Bentham, no primeiro capítulo da obra sob análise, afirma textualmente que o ser humano estaria ligado indissociavelmente da cadeia de causa e efeito. Por derradeiro, visando inserir na pesquisa um contraponto ao pensamento de Jeremy Bentham, analisou-se a teoria de Hebert Hart, em sua obra: “O conceito de direito”, constatando-se que, enquanto o primeiro cuida da construção de uma teoria que venha a garantir a elaboração de normas que acarretem a felicidade, o segundo preocupou-se com a aplicação do direito, concluindo-se que o utilitarismo é uma teoria direcionada aos legisladores com a aplicação em um sistema positivista, para que por meio dela, a sociedade possa alcançar a felicidade sem comprometer a segurança jurídica, a ordem social e cuidar, em contrapartida, das relações causais

Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-05T17:16:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 11 / Nenhuma / A presente dissertação tem por objetivo construir, a partir da hermenêutica filosófica, uma justificação filosófica ao dirigismo constitucional, no contexto da superação do paradigma positivista que impera no Direito brasileiro. Com base no modelo estrutural do jogo e na noção de arte, de matriz gadameriana, e com suporte na fenomenologia ontológica heideggeriana, o texto se propõe a analisar criticamente os elementos que formatam e sustentam o imaginário jurídico positivista dominante, para posteriormente apresentar, por meio da hermenêutica filosófica, caminhos à desconstrução desse imaginário e à conseqüente superação do positivismo jurídico, possibilitando o reconhecimento da força normativa da Constituição dirigente. O dirigismo constitucional é concebido a partir da superação do dualismo metafísico do esquema sujeito-objeto oriundo da filosofia cartesiana da consciência, de forma coerente com uma teoria material da Constituição, entendida como uma teoria da Constituição constitucionalmente adequada, ada / The purpose of this thesis, based on philosophical hermeneutic, is developing the constitutional dirigisme philosophic grounds, in the context of surpassing the dominant paradigm of legal positivism of Brazilian Law. Founded on the Gadamerian structural model of art and play, and on the Heideggerian ontological phenomenology, the text intends to analyze critically the components of the dominant legal imaginary, aiming to show the ways to deconstruct the legal imaginary and consequently to surpass the legal positivism. The accomplishment of this task makes the recognition of the normative force of the dirigent Constitution possible. The constitutional dirigisme is conceived in the context of the surpassing of the metaphysical dualism of the subject-object scheme derived from the Cartesian philosophy of conscience, coherently with a material theory of Constitution, understood as a constitutionally appropriated Constitution theory. The theory of Constitution developed in the text is adapted to the needs of a soc

Submitted by Flávio Nunes (fnunes) on 2015-03-13T17:05:47Z No. of bitstreams: 1 HenriqueAbel.pdf: 993226 bytes, checksum: 57859baa9adf587ecd167b1f74beceef (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-13T17:05:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 HenriqueAbel.pdf: 993226 bytes, checksum: 57859baa9adf587ecd167b1f74beceef (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-12-12 / Nenhuma / O presente trabalho busca fazer uma análise do status quaestionis do positivismo jurídico na atualidade, compreendido em dois planos: primeiro, enquanto construção teórica que busca se renovar e se reafirmar dentro das ciências jurídicas após a ampla repercussão da famosa - e já bem assentada - crítica de Dworkin ao positivismo; segundo, na forma de práticas que continuam presentes no senso comum teórico dos juristas brasileiros, dentre as quais se destaca a questão da discricionariedade judicial. Deseja-se, com isso, superar o debate clássico Hart-Dworkin de trinta anos atrás e analisar como esse debate evoluiu, ou seja, como os positivistas contemporâneos lidaram com as críticas de Dworkin e o que este autor, hoje, tem a dizer do positivismo jurídico que ainda sobrevive no meio acadêmico. Pretendemos, também, demonstrar que a discricionariedade judicial que herdamos do positivismo normativista pós-Kelsen possui um Calcanhar de Aquiles filosófico, qual seja, a sua necessária vinculação com o ceticismo filosófico, uma postura historicamente superada dentro da filosofia desde os tempos de Platão e Aristóteles. Além dessa má fundamentação filosófica, sustentaremos ainda que a discricionariedade judicial positivista é intrinsecamente incompatível com o Estado Democrático de Direito, nascido no Século XX dentro do paradigma do neoconstitucionalismo (Constitucionalismo Contemporâneo) do segundo pós-Guerra. / The present study attempts to analyze the status quaestionis of legal positivism today, understood on two levels: first, while theoretical construct that seeks to reassert itself within the legal sciences after the famous and well established critics of Ronald Dworkin. Second, in the form of practices that are still present in the common sense of Brazilian jurists, among which highlights the issue of judicial discretion. This study seeks to overcome the classic Hart-Dworkin debate of thirty years ago to look at how this debate evolved. In other words: how today positivists dealt with the critics of Dworkin and what this author now has to say about contemporary positivist theories in Law academy. We also wanted to demonstrate that judicial discretion inherited from Kelsens normativism has an Achilles Heel philosophy, namely, its necessary connection with the philosophical skepticism, a position historically overcome within the philosophy since the times of Plato and Aristotle. In addition to this poor philosophical background, the positivist judicial discretion is inherently incompatible with the modern models of democratic rule of law, born in the twentieth century within the paradigm of neoconstitutionality (Contemporary Constitutionalism) after the Second World War.

Thomas Hobbes é considerado o pai do conceito moderno de Estado. O núcleo de seu pensamento nasce do esforço de construir as bases da convivência a partir da demonstração dos fundamentos racionais da autoridade política. O liame entre o debate contemporâneo, polarizado entre interpretativistas e positivistas, e o pensamento moderno, simbolizado pelo pensamento hobbesiano, identifica-se com a seguinte pergunta: sob qual justificativa devemos obedecer os mandamentos da autoridade ainda que eles nos pareceram injustos? / Thomas Hobbes is considered the father of the modern concept of state. The core of his thinking arises from the effort to build the foundations of acquaintanceship from the demonstration of the rational foundation of political authority. The link between the contemporary debate which is polarized between positivists and interpretativists and the modern thought, which is symbolized by hobbesian thinking relates to the following question: \'Under which justification must we obey the commandments of the authority even if they seemed unfair to us ?

Le droit naturel a servi tout au long de la Troisième République d’outil épistémologique qui a permis de discuter le droit de manière rationnelle. La doctrine civiliste a fourni à cette époque de multiples séries des discours examinant les prises de position juridico-politiques dans le langage du droit naturel. L’intérêt d’écrire l’histoire d’un concept, celui du droit naturel, conçu le plus souvent comme éternel, universel et absolu, est non seulement de découvrir les mutations et les incohérences existant dans les discours portant sur ce concept mais aussi de constater ce que nous pouvons apprendre à propos des interactions entre l’histoire socio-politique, l’histoire juridique, et l’histoire doctrinale. Les usages de la notion démontrent à quel point ceux-ci varient selon les époques et selon les auteurs qui la mettent forme. L’idée du droit naturel implique l’existence d’un système juridique idéal et universel. Les législations nationales, considérées à la lumière du droit naturel, ne peuvent être que des créations arbitraires limitées par les frontières d’un État. Par conséquent, la recherche scientifique du droit ne devrait plus se borner à l’examen des textes législatifs. Les règles coutumières et jurisprudentielles sont devenues aussi la source du droit. Cette démarche, en réalité, a accordé à la doctrine le pouvoir de décider la source et l’interprétation du droit. Partant d’une telle observation, nous nous intéressons sur le rôle du droit naturel dans les discours des juristes face aux crises politiques, sociaux, mais aussi scientifiques. / If “natural law” is understood as a set of principles, legal or moral, that is eternal, immutable and universal, human understandings of this idea never cease to change in different time and location. These understandings, existing in form of discourse, enters into the interaction in context and circumstance. The dissertation examines the usages of natural law in the Third French Republic. It argues that French jurists use the idea of universal and ideal law as the response to socio-political issues: the establishment of republican regime and its anticlericalism, the rise of social sciences and social problems, and the construction of an international order after the WWI. Their responses, in turn, enrich the conceptions of natural law: metaphysically secular justifications of natural law are made by lawyers who are deeply catholic. This old idea is made compatible with social progress, and the universalism and idealism consisted in this idea are used to serve the patriotic cause.

In 1966, the High Court of Uganda legitimised the new nation's first coup d'etat. After two decades of civil war, Ugandans enacted their first popular constitution in 1995. However, the judiciary's dominant positivist ideology, Matovu's ghost, still haunts the new legal order. The author sets out this ideology's presumptions and then critiques them against an alternative, pluralist map of laws in Uganda. / The constructive analysis of recent case law (or lack thereof) that follows shows how this ideology undermines the constitution's promises of equality and freedom. This pluralist methodology is also essential to explain contemporary crises like the Lord's Resistance Army, arms proliferation in Karamoja and Museveni's "no-party" rule. In conclusion, exorcising Matovu's ghost is a priority for Ugandans and the process deserves considered thought for legal scholars advocating the "rule of law" or interventions by the International Criminal Court.

Los partidarios de las nuevas teorías de la referencia defienden que los nombres propios y los términos de clase natural refieren directamente a los objetos. De este modo, recuperan la distinción intuitiva entre nombres propios y descripciones definidas puesto que rechazan que los primeros refieran en virtud de que el objeto en cuestión satisfaga una serie de descripciones. Al mismo tiempo, extienden sus apreciaciones acerca de los nombres propios a los términos de clase natural. En este trabajo sostendré que puede desvincularse la asunción de las nuevas teorías de la referencia de concepciones no positivistas del derecho y defenderé su incidencia en la interpretación de algunos términos jurídicos en un marco positivista. Ello posibilitará, además, una respuesta plausible por parte del positivismo al problema de los desacuerdos planteado por Dworkin. / Authors that advocate for the new theories of reference defend that proper names and natural kind terms refer directly to objects. In this sense, they bring back the intuitive distinction between proper names and definite descriptions because they reject the idea that proper names refer to objects given that they satisfy a set of descriptions. At the same time, they extend their considerations to natural kind terms. In this work I argue that the new theories of reference can be dissociated from non-positivist conceptions of law; moreover, I claim they are relevant for the interpretation of some legal terms within a positivistic framework. This will allow me to provide a plausible positivistic answer to the problem of disagreements pointed out by Dworkin.