This dissertation reconstructs Ashkenazi and Sephardi German Jews’ intensive pursuit of civil and religious rights before Germany’s Imperial Supreme Court (Reichskammergericht, the Imperial Chamber Court) in the context of the wide-ranging religious and legal reforms in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Through my systematic analysis of 75,000 court records and my examinations of manuscripts and early printed materials from more than thirty archives across three continents, I study hundreds of previously untapped Supreme Court cases alongside religious and legal sources in German, Hebrew, Yiddish, Spanish, Portuguese, and Latin. I take an integrative approach to this wealth of sources to argue that by using the Supreme Court in numbers that far exceeded their proportion of the population, including in matters that pertained to Jewish law, this litigious minority generated grounds for inter-religious exchanges with the court’s Christian lawyers and judges. These lawyers endeavored to understand and incorporate Jewish law into imperial procedure, not merely due to their commitment to conflict resolution, but also due to their interest in advancing the universal applicability of Roman law as a sophisticated tool to conjoin the different limbs of the empire into a cohesive state. These efforts led the Supreme Court, and therefore the state, to protect rabbinic law and secure the continuation of a Jewish presence in Germany, thus moving in an opposite direction from key religious reformers and local authorities. This dissertation reveals that the study of Jews’ surprising strategies of interconnecting law and religion in defense of themselves and their religious laws promoted Jews’ civil rights in radical ways, and attained a de facto status of imperial citizenship for Ashkenazi and Sephardi-Portuguese Jews. Unearthing knowledge from the archives, this dissertation redraws the porous boundaries between Jewish and non-Jewish legal cultures and calls for a reconsideration of early modes of Jewish citizenship. Showing how Jewish women and men, including Iberian refugees, employed litigation as an anti-nomadic tool against pending expulsions, this dissertation also challenges prevalent conventions on weak Jewish responses to persecution, forced migration, and the agency that ethnic and religious minorities can wield in state-building processes.

Mozambique is a least developed country (LDC), and is among the five lowest on the Human Development Index and is known to have no specific protection of people with disabilities (PWDs) with as up to specific legislation has been adopted but g but general laws on social welfare. Although the 2004 Constitution has a generic protection norm nothing much can be found in the whole system. Unfortunately, the 1990 Constitution was more protective and more specifics; the former roughly reduced the extent of protection that existed before. It can be said that Mozambique does not have any protection of PWDs at all. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2011. / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/ / nf2012 / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

MPM / Oliver Tambo Institute for Governance and Policy Studies.

The purpose of this study is to gather and to present information on the liability structure of our legal system in such a manner as to help the classroom teacher to understand more fully his legal responsibilities and thus relieve him of unwarranted fears regarding accidents and injuries resulting from classroom activities. It is hoped that this study will ultimately contribute to the security of those who read it and give encouragement to those who seek to enrich their classes by means of the experience type curriculum. / Typescript. / "A Paper." / "Submitted to the Graduate Council of Florida State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science." / "August, 1956." / Advisor: Edna E. Parker, Professor Directing Paper. / Includes bibliographical references.

This thesis critically examines the statutory unfair prejudice remedy provided for in section 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (‘the Act’). Section 163 is evaluated against its equivalents in England, Australia and Canada. Section 163 is considered against its predecessors to determine whether problems associated with the formulation and application of its predecessors have now been eradicated. It is argued that although it is important to ensure that company legislation is able to provide protection of an international standard to shareholders to be able to attract capital investment in a competitive market, one has to be cautious of slavishly following legislative trends in foreign jurisdictions. The South African legislature indiscriminately incorporated only parts of the Canadian unfair prejudice remedy in section 163. This approach also resulted, amongst others, in the introduction of foreign concepts. The legislature further failed to take cognisance of the unique historical developments relating to the unfair prejudice remedy in South Africa. This has led to the reintroduction of problems experienced with previous formulations of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy in South Africa and left certain problems relating to the interpretation and application of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy unresolved. Consideration is also given to the interrelationship between section 163 and some of the statutory remedies in the Act. Section 163 is also assessed in the context of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. In conclusion, recommendations for possible legislative amendments are made and an interpretational framework for the interpretation and application of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy in section 163 is provided. / Mercantile Law / LL. D. (Mercantile Law)

The substitution of the dominant Western jurisprudence for South Africa’s indigenous normative values during colonial and apartheid times has resulted in a perverted conception of law that presents Western jurisprudence as synonymous with law. In the era of the constitutional recognition of African law where the application of the democratic principle demands that the newly re-enfranchised African communities deserve to be regulated by their own indigenous values, the resilience of this legal culture has become problematic. To reverse this situation legal and constitutional interpreters must rethink and reshape their contributions to the achievement of the post-apartheid version of African law envisioned by the South African Constitution. The application of African law in a free and liberated environment must reflect its own social, political and legal cosmology in which its institutions operate within their own indigenous frame of reference. A study of the anatomy of African jurisprudence as a means of gaining insight into the indigenous worldview which was characterised by the culture of communal living and the ethos of inclusiveness to counter the prevailing hegemony of autonomous individualism, has become urgent. To achieve this such pillars of African jurisprudence as the philosophy of ubuntu must be exhumed in order for African law’s rehabilitation under the Constitution to be undertaken on the basis of its authentic articulation uncontaminated by colonial and apartheid distortions. The task of developing the African law of the 21st century to the extent required by the Constitution is a challenge of enormous proportions which demands an appreciation of the historical and political environment in which African law lost its primacy as the original legal system of South Africa after Roman-Dutch law was imposed on the South Africa population. The revival of African law becomes more urgent when one considers that when Africans lost control of their legal system they had not abdicated sovereignty voluntarily to the newcomers. The validity of the imposition of Western jurisprudence is vitiated by the colonial use of such imperial acts as colonisation, conquest, and annexation as the basis on which the regime of Roman-Dutch law was imposed on South Africa. Ever since, African law has been subordinated and denigrated through colonial and apartheid policies which relegated it, via the repugnancy clause, to a sub-system of Roman-Dutch law with whose standards it was forced to comply. The repugnancy clause left African law a distorted system no longer recognisable to its own constituency. The advent of the new dispensation introduced a constitutional framework for re-capacitating South Africa’s post-apartheid state institutions to recentre African law as envisioned by the Constitution. This framework has become the basis on which legislative and judicial efforts could rehabilitate the indigenous value system in the application of African law. The courts of the new South Africa have striven to find the synergy between indigenous values and the Bill of Rights in order to forge areas of compatibility between African culture and human rights. An analysis of this phase in the development of African law, as evidenced by the present study, reveals successes and failures on the part of the courts in their efforts to rehabilitate African law in line with both its value system and the Bill of Rights. These findings lead to the conclusion that whilst South Africa’s legislative and judicial institutions have not yet achieved the envisioned version of African law, there is an adequate constitutional framework through which they could still do so. This study, therefore, recommends that the above institutions, especially the courts, should adopt a theory of re-indigenisation that would guide them as they proceed from the indigenous version of African law which is the basis on which to apply the Bill of Rights. The application of such a theory would ensure that the distorted ‘official’ version of African law which was imposed by colonial and apartheid state institutions is progressively discredited and isolated from the body of South African law and gives way to the version inspired by the Constitution. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL. D.

The overall purpose of this study was to evaluate the current status of the Sherman Act's application to the professions, with emphasis on the accounting profession. This was further stated as two purposes. 1. The primary purpose was to interpret the historical development and current status of the most important defenses used in the courts by the professions and professionals against alleged violations of the Sherman Act. 2. The second purpose was to evaluate the relative importance of variables, including the defenses used, that have affected the outcomes of court cases involving alleged violations of the Sherman Act.

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