Abstract Since the 2006 election the country of Sweden is governed by four Liberal and Conservative parties. Parties that by cooperating maintain power in office and forms a so called coalition. A coalition that not only can be seen at the national but also at the local level. According to pervious research coalitions that holds control of the seats in the government at the national level tends to increase the total expenditures compared to other types of government formations. Can a similar connection be seen at the local level? This the fundamental issue of this essay. The study is a multiple case study of the Swedish local governments and their expenditures. The purpose of the study is to examine if Swedish local governments governed by a coalition of parties tend to spend more money than other types of local government formations. The hypothesis is that coalitions tend to increase the local expenditures compared to other government formations in the local governments due to the result of previous research at the national level. The empiric investigation examine the Swedish local governments after the 1994 and 2006 elections. The government formations are then compared with different types of measures of local expenditure. The investigation shows that local governments governed by a coalition of parties not tend to have increased expenditures compared to local governments governed by other types of government formations.

<p>Abstract</p><p>Since the 2006 election the country of Sweden is governed by four Liberal and Conservative parties. Parties that by cooperating maintain power in office and forms a so called coalition. A coalition that not only can be seen at the national but also at the local level. According to pervious research coalitions that holds control of the seats in the government at the national level tends to increase the total expenditures compared to other types of government formations. Can a similar connection be seen at the local level? This the fundamental issue of this essay. The study is a multiple case study of the Swedish local governments and their expenditures. The purpose of the study is to examine if Swedish local governments governed by a coalition of parties tend to spend more money than other types of local government formations. The hypothesis is that coalitions tend to increase the local expenditures compared to other government formations in the local governments due to the result of previous research at the national level. The empiric investigation examine the Swedish local governments after the 1994 and 2006 elections. The government formations are then compared with different types of measures of local expenditure. The investigation shows that local governments governed by a coalition of parties not tend to have increased expenditures compared to local governments governed by other types of government formations.</p>

State grants are perceived to mitigate the fiscal disparities among local governments in providing services. However, cutbacks in state grants as a result of changes in state grant policy in different states affect local expenditures dedicated to maintaining service provisions to citizens. This dissertation constructs a theoretical model to explain the extent to which and the ways in which types of state grants, revenue diversity, and form of local government impact local spending and the provision of public programs when local governments experience cuts in state grants. The dissertation also argues that when facing state grant cuts, local governments with a council-manager form of government and with higher revenue diversity will experience reduced change in local expenditures and that decreases in state categorical grants will lead to more cuts in distributive program expenditures. Given the diversity of state and local arrangements, this dissertation conducts a comparative and panel data study to test the hypotheses in 351 and 271 municipalities in Massachusetts and Colorado, respectively, in 2000 through 2008. The empirical results indicate that the form of government and the degree of revenue diversification have a greater impact on the local spending behaviors in Colorado than in Massachusetts. Meanwhile, decreases in state categorical grants lead to more cuts in distributive program expenditures in both Massachusetts and Colorado. This dissertation concludes that the theoretical model explains the effects of state grant reductions on local spending better in Colorado than it does in Massachusetts.