Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duquesne University, 2005. / Title from document title page. Abstract included in electronic submission form. Includes bibliographical references (p. 595-621) and index.

Texte remanié de: Doctoral diss.--Milwaukee--Marquette university. / Bibliogr. p. 279-285.

No description available.

This dissertation considers the mystery of the relationship between human free choice and God by focusing on the Controversy de Auxiliis (1582-1607) and the thought of Domingo Báñez, O.P. (1528-1604) in particular. The dissertation comprises four chapters and a conclusion preceded by a preface and brief historical introduction. The preface introduces the issue to be explored and the motivations for exploring it before providing a general synopsis of the dissertation that is more detailed than the present abstract. The historical summary that follows introduces a theological debate that has become widely unfamiliar to contemporary theology, even while conceptually, that debate remains perennial. The four-chapter body that follows may be divided into two general parts: Broadly, chapters One and Two exposit Báñez’s thought, while chapters Three and Four critique it. Chapter One explores Báñez’s positive account of physical premotion, human freedom and sin. Chapter Two examines Báñez’s critique of Luis de Molina S.J.’s alternative proposal, in conjunction with some contemporary sources from both sides of the debate (Molina was Báñez’s principal adversary in the Controversy de Auxiliis). Báñez’s line of critique in Chapter Two is found to be cogent. Chapter Three investigates Molina’s critique of Báñez and finds it too to be cogent, even though Molina’s positive account was found to be problematic in Chapter Two. Chapter Four begins by exploring Bernard Lonergan S.J.’s work on divine causality and human free choice. Lonergan attempts to provide a fresh historical reading of Aquinas that is unencumbered by the presuppositions of the Controversy de Auxiliis. The first part of Chapter Four explains Lonergan’s critique of Báñez and finds it convincing, while the second part of the chapter finds Lonergan’s interpretation of Aquinas problematic from a theoretical standpoint. Chapter Four then offers a constructive critique of Lonergan’s interpretation before advancing an alternative way to think about God’s causation of human free choices. In closing, this dissertation argues that God creates human free choices, but that in creating a human free choice, God, or God’s creative will, is not an antecedent condition that determines choice. Rather, God creates the entire reality of a human free choice—both what it is and that it is—and in so doing, part of the reality God creates just is that choice’s being up to its human agent.

Thesis (D. Min.)--Catholic Theological Union at Chicago, 2000. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 216-224).

Thesis (D. Min.)--Catholic Theological Union at Chicago, 2000. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 216-224).

Thesis (D. Min.)--Catholic Theological Union at Chicago, 2000. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 216-224).

The goal of this doctoral thesis is to take a close look at the process of human understanding as foundations of theological method in postmodern age. In the very center of my research is so called "dynamic cognitional structure" presented by Canadian thinker, Bernard Lonergan. The purpose of the study is to analyze his epistemology in the context of the "generalized empirical method" and to investigate the relevance of this method for contemporary theology. The thesis also focuses on the question if theological epistemology could be based on intellectual knowledge only, or how far it requires authentic spiritual life of an existential subject. Key words: transcendental theology, cognitional structure, method in theology, Bernard Lonergan, authenticity

Le présent travail concerne la connaissance humaine, telle que comprise par Bernard Lonergan. Ce dernier a proposé de concevoir la connaissance de la connaissance comme une quête, et de définir celle-ci comme une recherche de l'inconnu. Qu'est-ce que la connaissance? Cette question vise le sens de toute recherche et elle est problématique lorsque l'on ne sait pas comment y répondre. Avec l'intention d'expliquer la solution que l'on peut trouver chez Lonergan concernant cette question de la connaissance, nous aborderons la dynamique cognitive des sujets qui connaissent. Nous étudierons ces processus cognitifs en effectuant une division en trois catégories principales, qui correspondent à l'attention aux données, aux activités de l'intelligence et aux activités de la réflexion. Nous nous engagerons alors dans une recherche qui envisage la connaissance comme une activité, c'est-à-dire comme une démarche des sujets qui désirent connaître. De ce point de vue, connaître, c'est pratiquer une série d'activités récurrentes. Ces activités, en plus d'être décrites telles qu'elles peuvent apparaître au sujet connaissant si celui-ci est attentif à ce qui se passe en lui-même, seront expliquées par les relations intelligibles qui les unissent selon le modèle de Lonergan. Sans trop attendre, nous allons considérer la source de ces activités, c'est-à-dire que le sujet sera envisagé comme étant lui-même l'objet à connaître, tout en étant celui qui connaît. Il sera alors question de la possibilité d'une connaissance objective de soi-même, en tant que sujet connaissant. Cette analyse nous amènera vers une étude de la conscience intelligente et rationnelle, et de l'affirmation de soi de cette conscience. En étudiant ce processus, nous serons contraints d'admettre que cette affirmation ne peut qu'être rationnelle, et que ce jugement, qui peut être formulé par l'expression «je suis un sujet intelligent et rationnel », implique ses propres conditions de vérité lorsqu'il est effectué concrètement. Le sujet connaissant, qui est aussi un sujet conscient d'être connaissant, peut vérifier cette thèse par introspection, et affirmer catégoriquement son contenu. Cette affirmation de soi de la conscience rationnelle permet à la conscience de répondre à l'invitation de Lonergan, et de réaliser sa responsabilité relativement aux positions qu'elle soutient. Si elle accepte cette invitation à croître, cette conscience se développera et le sujet connaissant s'habilitera à discerner les positions qui encouragent son propre développement. Cette aptitude sera tout particulièrement importante dans sa vie reflexive lorsqu'elle s'appliquera à évaluer les thèses fondamentales de son rapport au réel. Nous pourrons alors conclure : si « je » suis bien le fondement de ma connaissance des choses, et si ma relation au réel tient de ma propre compréhension et de mon propre jugement, alors je suis responsable de mon propre rapport à moi-même, au monde et à l'existence en général.

<p>“What characterizes an acceptable theory of self-realization?” The thrust of the present dissertation is towards seeking an answer to this central problem, which stems from the fundamental human experience that life involves change, and that in a modern society such change is often expected to be towards a realization of potentials and the good life for the individual. </p><p>The dissertation has a three-fold purpose. The first is to clarify the content of five modern theories of self-realization from three academic fields. The theories are those of the psychologist Abraham H. Maslow, the philosophers Charles Taylor and Alan Gewirth, and the theologians Reinhold Niebuhr and Bernard Lonergan. These are methodologically studied by the help of seven analytical questions. The second purpose is to perform a lengthwise comparatative analysis of the five theories, the results of which lead to the third; namely to critically discuss several elements of the reality of human life which have proven to be missing or supressed in much of the material.</p><p>The theoretical framework for the dissertation runs along two axes: one concerns what is developed as a distinction between internalism and relationalism, and the other is to cast a critical light on the lack of attention paid by the the theories of self-realization to experiences which run counter to optimistic ideas of individual development, such as death, loss and dependence. </p><p>The dissertation concludes with an outline for a constructive position based on the necessity of a theory’s closeness to experience, and on the need for reconcilitation of what may seem to be unabridgeble in human life. A theory of self-realization must do more than formulate positive conditions for change. It must also take into consideration conditions that are not directly related to, and sometimes even run contrary to, realization of the self.</p>