A presente dissertação tem por objetivo analisar o desenvolvimento da proposta fleckiana de uma teoria comparativa do conhecimento, seu estatuto epistemológico, bem como o diagnóstico de algumas de suas dificuldades teóricas. Defenderemos o caráter potencialmente científico de sua teoria e indicaremos que a incomensurabilidade entre estilos de pensamento constitui o problema mais imediato para sua efetivação. Nesse ínterim, sintetizaremos as principais diretrizes metodológicas esboçadas em sua teoria, entendida como um programa de pesquisa aberto, e indicaremos possíveis desdobramentos futuros. Esta dissertação terá início, em sua Introdução, com uma sucinta análise das principais fases de recepção da obra de Fleck, tendo em vista a compreensão de suas tradições de leitura e do significado atual de seus escritos. No Capítulo I, reconstituiremos o quadro conceitual da teoria comparativa de Ludwik Fleck a partir da análise de suas principais linhas e dimensões de desenvolvimento: médico-imunológica, sociológica, de crítica ao positivismo lógico e histórica. O Capítulo II será dedicado à análise dos processos comunicativos de sua teoria tanto ao nível diacrônico como ao nível sincrônico, bem como do fenômeno da incomensurabilidade. Estabeleceremos paralelos sobre a manifestação desse fenômeno com as formulações de Thomas Kuhn e Paul Feyerabend. No Capítulo III, abordaremos a tese do relacionismo cognitivo defendido por Fleck, indicando que sua teoria comparativa do conhecimento não possui um estatuto epistemológico privilegiado, sendo, portanto, um saber também relacional. Diante disso, defenderemos seu caráter científico, em conformidade, em linhas gerais, com as demais ciências naturais. Por fim, em nossas Considerações finais indicaremos, a partir das diretrizes lançadas pelo filósofo, algumas das possíveis linhas metodológicas que o programa da teoria comparativa deve seguir diante do problema da incomensurabilidade e da necessidade de um desenvolvimento metodológico mais preciso. / This dissertation aims to analyze the development of Fleck\'s proposal of a comparative theory of knowledge, its epistemological status and the diagnosis of some of its theoretical difficulties. We will defend the potentially scientific status of its theory and indicate that the incommensurability between thinking styles constitutes the most immediate problem for its effectiveness. Meanwhile, we intend to synthesize the main methodological guidelines outlined in his theory, understood as an open research program, and indicate possible future developments. This dissertation will start in its Introduction with a brief analysis of the main stages of reception of Fleck\'s work, so as to understand its traditions of readings and the current meaning of his writings. In Chapter I, we will reconstitute the conceptual framework of Fleck\'s comparative theory from the analysis of its main lines and dimensions of development: medical and immunological, sociological, as well as his criticism of historical and logical positivisms. Chapter II is devoted to the analysis of his theory of communicative processes at both the diachronic and synchronous level, as well as the phenomenon of incommensurability. We will establish parallels with Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend\'s formulations of this phenomenon. In Chapter III, we discuss the thesis of cognitive relationalism defended by Fleck, indicating that his comparative theory of knowledge does not have a privileged epistemological status, being, by its turn, also a relational knowledge. In the face of it, we will defend its scientific character, in accordance, in general, with the other natural sciences. Finally, in our final considerations we indicate, from guidelines released by the philosopher, some of the possible methodological lines that the program of comparative theory must follow regarding the problem of incommensurability and the need for a more precise methodological development.

Le relationnalisme affirme que le caractère phénoménal de la perception est en partie constitué par les objets que l’on voit. Malgré son attrait intuitif, il est souvent rejeté en vertu de l'argument de l'hallucination. L'objectif de cette thèse est de défendre le relationnalisme. L'argument fait valoir que, puisque le relationnalisme ne peut être vrai pour les hallucinations, il doit forcément être faux pour les perceptions aussi. En cela, l'argument repose sur le principe de l’indiscernabilité (IND), affirmant que deux expériences qui sont introspectivement indiscernables les unes des autres ont le même caractère phénoménal. Je considère et rejette les autres versions de l'argument qui ne reposent pas sur l'IND. Bien que largement accepté, aucun support satisfaisant pour l'IND n'a encore été présenté. Dans cette thèse, je soutiens que la défense de l'IND requiert que l’on entende la notion d’indiscernabilité employée dans l'IND en un sens impersonnel. Ensuite, j’identifie ce qui motive l'IND : l'intuition que, en vertu de sa superficialité, la nature d'un caractère phénoménal doit être accessible par l'introspection, de concert avec l’idée qu’il est impossible de nier l'IND sans nier par là même la superficialité des caractères phénoménaux.Je soutiens que le relationnaliste peut nier l'IND tout en préservant la superficialité des caractères phénoménaux en adoptant une thèse négative de l'hallucination et en reconsidérant la nature de la relation entre le caractère phénoménal d’une expérience et l’accès introspectif qu'il peut y avoir. / Relationalism claims that the phenomenal character of perception is constituted by the obtaining of a non-representational psychological relation to mind-independent objects. Although relationalism provides what seems to be the most straight forward and intuitive account of how experience strikes us introspectively, it is very often believed that the argument from hallucination shows that the view is untenable. The aim of this thesis is to defend relationalism against the argument from hallucination. The argument claims that the phenomenal character of hallucination and perception deserves the same account, and that relationalism cannot be true for hallucinations, therefore relationalism must be rejected. This argument relies on the Indistinguishability Principle (IND), the claim that two experiences that are introspectively indistinguishable from each other have the same phenomenal character. Before assessing the plausibility of this principle, I first consider and dismiss versions of the argument which wouldn’t depend on IND.Although widely accepted, no satisfactory support for IND has been presented yet. In this thesis I argue that defending IND requires that we understand the notion of ‘indiscriminability’ employed in IND in an impersonal sense. I then identify what underwrites IND: the intuition that, in virtue of its superficiality, the nature of a phenomenal character must be accessible through introspection, together with the claim that it is not possible to deny IND without denying the superficiality of phenomenal characters too.I argue that the relationalist can deny IND while preserving the superficiality of phenomenal characters. This can be done by adopting a negative view of hallucination and an account of introspection whereby the phenomenal character doesn’t exist independently of one’s introspective awareness of it and where having introspective access to our experience depends on our perceptual access to the world.

A presente dissertação tem por objetivo analisar o desenvolvimento da proposta fleckiana de uma teoria comparativa do conhecimento, seu estatuto epistemológico, bem como o diagnóstico de algumas de suas dificuldades teóricas. Defenderemos o caráter potencialmente científico de sua teoria e indicaremos que a incomensurabilidade entre estilos de pensamento constitui o problema mais imediato para sua efetivação. Nesse ínterim, sintetizaremos as principais diretrizes metodológicas esboçadas em sua teoria, entendida como um programa de pesquisa aberto, e indicaremos possíveis desdobramentos futuros. Esta dissertação terá início, em sua Introdução, com uma sucinta análise das principais fases de recepção da obra de Fleck, tendo em vista a compreensão de suas tradições de leitura e do significado atual de seus escritos. No Capítulo I, reconstituiremos o quadro conceitual da teoria comparativa de Ludwik Fleck a partir da análise de suas principais linhas e dimensões de desenvolvimento: médico-imunológica, sociológica, de crítica ao positivismo lógico e histórica. O Capítulo II será dedicado à análise dos processos comunicativos de sua teoria tanto ao nível diacrônico como ao nível sincrônico, bem como do fenômeno da incomensurabilidade. Estabeleceremos paralelos sobre a manifestação desse fenômeno com as formulações de Thomas Kuhn e Paul Feyerabend. No Capítulo III, abordaremos a tese do relacionismo cognitivo defendido por Fleck, indicando que sua teoria comparativa do conhecimento não possui um estatuto epistemológico privilegiado, sendo, portanto, um saber também relacional. Diante disso, defenderemos seu caráter científico, em conformidade, em linhas gerais, com as demais ciências naturais. Por fim, em nossas Considerações finais indicaremos, a partir das diretrizes lançadas pelo filósofo, algumas das possíveis linhas metodológicas que o programa da teoria comparativa deve seguir diante do problema da incomensurabilidade e da necessidade de um desenvolvimento metodológico mais preciso. / This dissertation aims to analyze the development of Fleck\'s proposal of a comparative theory of knowledge, its epistemological status and the diagnosis of some of its theoretical difficulties. We will defend the potentially scientific status of its theory and indicate that the incommensurability between thinking styles constitutes the most immediate problem for its effectiveness. Meanwhile, we intend to synthesize the main methodological guidelines outlined in his theory, understood as an open research program, and indicate possible future developments. This dissertation will start in its Introduction with a brief analysis of the main stages of reception of Fleck\'s work, so as to understand its traditions of readings and the current meaning of his writings. In Chapter I, we will reconstitute the conceptual framework of Fleck\'s comparative theory from the analysis of its main lines and dimensions of development: medical and immunological, sociological, as well as his criticism of historical and logical positivisms. Chapter II is devoted to the analysis of his theory of communicative processes at both the diachronic and synchronous level, as well as the phenomenon of incommensurability. We will establish parallels with Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend\'s formulations of this phenomenon. In Chapter III, we discuss the thesis of cognitive relationalism defended by Fleck, indicating that his comparative theory of knowledge does not have a privileged epistemological status, being, by its turn, also a relational knowledge. In the face of it, we will defend its scientific character, in accordance, in general, with the other natural sciences. Finally, in our final considerations we indicate, from guidelines released by the philosopher, some of the possible methodological lines that the program of comparative theory must follow regarding the problem of incommensurability and the need for a more precise methodological development.

Magister Philosophiae - MPhil / The South African negotiations process, in the true spirit of classical liberalism, emphasised juridical continuity, legality, and gradual political change. But in spite of this and the fact that South Africa’s constitution-making process is acclaimed as the most successful negotiated revolution, it is generally recognised that there is incongruity between the promise and hope brought about by South Africa’s constitution-making process and the political and social crises that ensued after the advent of constitutional democracy in the country. I argue in this analysis that the South African constitutional discourse must undergo a fundamental shift by abandoning the normative regulation of the constituent power of the people in order to allow for the people to truly govern. The acknowledgement of the possibility of the unregulated exercise of constituent power through people-driven initiatives can mitigate the current malaise facing South Africa’s constitutional democracy.

This thesis is a critical examination of civic nationalism that focuses on the disconnect between nationalist ideology and the social bases of nationhood, and the implications that this disconnect has for the feasibility of civic nationalism as a policy prescription for issues such as intra-state nationalist conflict and immigrant integration. While problems with the principles of civic nationalist ideology are important, my focus here is the more significant problem that civic nationalism is based on a general theory of nations and nationalism that treats them as solely ideological phenomena. Against this I argue that the term ‘nationalism’ refers to several different phenomena, most importantly a ‘system of culture’ or way of organizing society as described by Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson, and that augmenting Gellner and Anderson’s theories with the kind of relational social theory used by authors such as Rogers Brubaker and Charles Tilly provides an alternative explanation that is a better match for the evidence. If this is the case, I contend, then civic nationalism is both a misrepresentation of the history of nations and nationalism and infeasible as a prescription for policy issues such as intra-state nationalist conflict and immigrant integration. These arguments are supported with empirical evidence that is principally drawn from four cases: France, the United States, Northern Ireland, and Canada. / Thesis (Ph.D, Political Studies) -- Queen's University, 2012-11-27 11:21:47.013

<p>“What characterizes an acceptable theory of self-realization?” The thrust of the present dissertation is towards seeking an answer to this central problem, which stems from the fundamental human experience that life involves change, and that in a modern society such change is often expected to be towards a realization of potentials and the good life for the individual. </p><p>The dissertation has a three-fold purpose. The first is to clarify the content of five modern theories of self-realization from three academic fields. The theories are those of the psychologist Abraham H. Maslow, the philosophers Charles Taylor and Alan Gewirth, and the theologians Reinhold Niebuhr and Bernard Lonergan. These are methodologically studied by the help of seven analytical questions. The second purpose is to perform a lengthwise comparatative analysis of the five theories, the results of which lead to the third; namely to critically discuss several elements of the reality of human life which have proven to be missing or supressed in much of the material.</p><p>The theoretical framework for the dissertation runs along two axes: one concerns what is developed as a distinction between internalism and relationalism, and the other is to cast a critical light on the lack of attention paid by the the theories of self-realization to experiences which run counter to optimistic ideas of individual development, such as death, loss and dependence. </p><p>The dissertation concludes with an outline for a constructive position based on the necessity of a theory’s closeness to experience, and on the need for reconcilitation of what may seem to be unabridgeble in human life. A theory of self-realization must do more than formulate positive conditions for change. It must also take into consideration conditions that are not directly related to, and sometimes even run contrary to, realization of the self.</p>

“What characterizes an acceptable theory of self-realization?” The thrust of the present dissertation is towards seeking an answer to this central problem, which stems from the fundamental human experience that life involves change, and that in a modern society such change is often expected to be towards a realization of potentials and the good life for the individual. The dissertation has a three-fold purpose. The first is to clarify the content of five modern theories of self-realization from three academic fields. The theories are those of the psychologist Abraham H. Maslow, the philosophers Charles Taylor and Alan Gewirth, and the theologians Reinhold Niebuhr and Bernard Lonergan. These are methodologically studied by the help of seven analytical questions. The second purpose is to perform a lengthwise comparatative analysis of the five theories, the results of which lead to the third; namely to critically discuss several elements of the reality of human life which have proven to be missing or supressed in much of the material. The theoretical framework for the dissertation runs along two axes: one concerns what is developed as a distinction between internalism and relationalism, and the other is to cast a critical light on the lack of attention paid by the the theories of self-realization to experiences which run counter to optimistic ideas of individual development, such as death, loss and dependence. The dissertation concludes with an outline for a constructive position based on the necessity of a theory’s closeness to experience, and on the need for reconcilitation of what may seem to be unabridgeble in human life. A theory of self-realization must do more than formulate positive conditions for change. It must also take into consideration conditions that are not directly related to, and sometimes even run contrary to, realization of the self.

Au sein de l’économie libérale, est né un modèle d’entreprise conjuguant altruisme et recherche du profit : l’Économie de Communion. À travers sa responsabilité sociale, cette entreprise adopte des stratégies particulières de gestion qui tentent de replacer l’homme au centre de l’activité de l’entreprise. L’objectif du mémoire est de présenter l’Économie de Communion, son but et les différents axes qui la soutiennent, ainsi que sa compréhension de l’interaction du monde des affaires avec l’éthique, la morale et le droit. À la lumière des expériences vécues par 811 entreprises, cet agir économique rend compte de l’efficacité de son mode de gestion au niveau de l’optimisation de la performance entrepreneuriale. L’Économie de Communion met en exergue notamment une approche où la dynamique économique repose sur la solidarité et la fraternité. / Within the liberal economy, a business model was born combining altruism and profit-seeking: the Economy of Communion. Through its social responsibility, this model adopts specific management strategies that try to put people at the center of the firm's activities. The aim of the paper is to present the Economy of Communion, its purpose and the various axes that support it, as well as its understanding of the interaction of the business world with ethics, values and law. In the light of the experience of 811 firms, the Economic of Communion acknowledges the efficiency of its management mode in terms of optimizing entrepreneurial performance. It emphasizes in particular an approach where economic dynamics are based on solidarity and fraternity.