This dissertation is about two attitudes we might have in thinking about language. Linguistic naturalism is an attitude premised on the claim that language is a natural phenomenon, capable of being studied using methods familiar from the natural sciences. Linguistic normativism, on the other hand, is an attitude taking language to be a distinctly social and normative phenomenon that must be investigated by methods distinct from those used in the natural sciences. In this dissertation, I investigate three points at which these attitudes appear to come into conflict: justifying advice about language, determining the metaphysical character of linguistic content, and deciding on a proper methodology for linguistic study. My goal is to show that, contrary to appearances, these attitudes are capable of being reconciled with each other. In the first chapter, I briefly introduce linguistic naturalism and normativism. In Chapter 2, I consider how these attitudes bear on a practical question: What justifies advice about grammar and usage? I begin by considering the two most popular answers to the question, before arguing that neither succeeds in producing a satisfying account of advice. Instead, I argue for a hybrid model that requires adopting normativist and naturalist attitudes at different stages in the advice-giving process. In Chapter 3, I turn my attention to semantics and defend the claim that linguistic meaning is, in some real sense, a normative phenomenon, concluding with an investigation of Robert Brandom’s normativist-pragmatist semantics. In Chapter 4, I examine and critique another approach to meaning—the naturalist, internalist semantics provided by Noam Chomsky and James McGilvray. In Chapter 5, I explore the common methodological assumptions underlying Chomskian and Brandomian approaches to meaning, arguing that a common antipathy to a representationalist order of explanation provides the basis for a reconciliation of our normativist and naturalist attitudes to language. In Chapter 6, I argue that such reconciliation is best pursued if we start from the assumption that all projects of linguistic study involve doing some naturalist and some normativist work. In the final chapter, I briefly consider examples of other phenomena sharing the same natural-normative character as language.

This dissertation defends a certain view of the mind/body relation, according to which although there is a sense in which everything is physical, there is also a sense in which mental phenomena are irreducible to physical phenomena. The reason for this irreducibility, according to the position defended in this work, is that the mental has a certain normative character which the physical lacks. The central thesis defended in the first part of the work is the claim, advanced by Donald Davidson among others, that the mental realm is governed by constitutive principles of rationality. I both attempt to explain what this means precisely and provide arguments as to why we should think that it is true. Having defended the thesis, I then turn to show that it entails that certain mental phenomena are normative. If the normative is generally irreducible to the non-normative -- as I argue there is good reason to hold -- it then follows as a special case that the mental phenomena in question are irreducible to any (non-normative) physical phenomena. Is this form of antireductionism scientifically respectable? In the second part of the dissertation I attempt to establish that it is by showing that the view can be reconciled with a physicalistically acceptable account of mental causation. Focusing on the causal exclusion problem advanced by Jaegwon Kim among others, I critically discuss both reductive and certain nonreductive solutions to the problem that have been advanced by various philosophers. I then propose my own nonreductive solution to the problem, and attempt to draw out some of the consequences of this solution both for physicalism and for the nature of normativity. / text

Si le contrat est un acte de prévision, il est également à l’origine de certains risques. Ces risques contractuels désignent l’éventualité d’un écart avec la réalisation de l’opération contractuelle. Lorsqu’ils sont pensés en corrélation avec la norme contractuelle, il est possible de classer les risques contractuels en trois selon qu’il s’agit de risques sémantiques, opérationnels ou financiers. Avant d’observer la marge de manœuvre des parties pour gérer ces risques, il faut délimiter la répartition par défaut desdits risques. Une telle répartition varie considérablement en fonction du type contractuel, de l’unilatéralisme du contrat-échange vers le partage dans le contrat-alliance en passant par l’équilibre des risques au sein des contrats-coopération. La gestion des risques par les parties repose sur le principe de liberté contractuelle, mais cette possibilité doit être plus ou moins encadrée selon la nature de la relation contractuelle. Par conséquent, il est possible de proposer un contrôle distinct pour les contrats d’adhésion et les contrats négociables. Toutefois, même valides, les clauses de gestion des risques contractuels sont limitées au stade de leur application que ce soit en raison de l’extinction du contrat ou du comportement des parties. / The contract is often thought of as an act of anticipation. However, it can also be viewed as the origin of certain risks. These contractual risks refer to the possibility of a discrepancy in achieving the completion of the contractual operation. When these risks are compared with the contractual norm, it is possible to classify them in three groups: semantic, operational and financial. Before studying how these risks can be managed by the parties, it is important to examine how the legal system allocates these risks by default. Such an allocation varies considerably from one contractual type to another. In exchange-contracts the risks are allocated unilaterally to one of the parties. Whereas in cooperation-contracts an equilibrium is sought, whilst in alliance-contracts the risks are shared. The possibility for parties to manage these risks rests upon the principle of freedom of contract. However, this possibility must be regulated depending on the nature of the contractual relationship. Therefore, regulation must be more severe in certain standard contracts and less intrusive in negociable contracts. Even when valid, certain risk-management clauses may be affected by external factors such as the extinction of the contract or the behaviour of the parties.

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro / Neste trabalho foram analisadas e comparadas as principais teorias da conduta. Com isso buscou-se não apenas aprofundar um debate frequentemente mediado pelos manuais, mas também, por meio do recurso aos aportes críticos da bibliografia latino-americana, verificar se a concepção ontológica de conduta é de fato a mais limitadora ao poder punitivo. Parte do eixo analítico deste trabalho passa pelo estudo da articulação entre o respeito à estrutura lógico-objetiva da conduta humana como base de sucessivas valorações e a função limitadora da conduta. Com isso, pretende-se debater se a minimização dessa estrutura lógico-objetiva, acarretando a um acréscimo potencial de uma normativização do direito penal, representaria uma maior exposição do sujeito ao poder punitivo. A partir do conceito de praxis, como desenvolvido por Lukács, busca-se paralelamente uma base filosófica que não se esgote na compartimentalização jurídica. Trata-se de uma corrente que reivindica criticamente a herança teórica das principais contribuições filosóficas ocidentais, desde proposições aristotélicas, passando pelos conceitos hegelianos, chegando ao debate sobre objetificação hegeliano-marxista. / This study analyzed and compared the major theories about human conduct. The intent behind this was to not only deepen a debate often mediated by the manuals, but also, through the use of the critical contributions of Latin-american literature, to verify if the ontological conception of conduct is indeed the most limiting of punitive power. Part of the analytical axis of this work involves the study of the relationship between the respect for logical-objective structures of human conduct, as the basis of successive value attributions, and conduct in its limiting function. With this, we intend to debate whether the reduction of recognition of logical-objective structures, leading to increased potential for normative aspects of criminal law, represents a greater exposure of the subject to punitive power. From the concept of praxis, as developed by Lukacs, we aim to find a philosophical basis that is not exhausted in legal compartmentalization. This theoretical path critically claims the heritage of major Western philosophical contributions, from Aristotelian propositions through the Hegelian concepts, reaching the debate on Hegelian-Marxist objectification.

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro / Neste trabalho foram analisadas e comparadas as principais teorias da conduta. Com isso buscou-se não apenas aprofundar um debate frequentemente mediado pelos manuais, mas também, por meio do recurso aos aportes críticos da bibliografia latino-americana, verificar se a concepção ontológica de conduta é de fato a mais limitadora ao poder punitivo. Parte do eixo analítico deste trabalho passa pelo estudo da articulação entre o respeito à estrutura lógico-objetiva da conduta humana como base de sucessivas valorações e a função limitadora da conduta. Com isso, pretende-se debater se a minimização dessa estrutura lógico-objetiva, acarretando a um acréscimo potencial de uma normativização do direito penal, representaria uma maior exposição do sujeito ao poder punitivo. A partir do conceito de praxis, como desenvolvido por Lukács, busca-se paralelamente uma base filosófica que não se esgote na compartimentalização jurídica. Trata-se de uma corrente que reivindica criticamente a herança teórica das principais contribuições filosóficas ocidentais, desde proposições aristotélicas, passando pelos conceitos hegelianos, chegando ao debate sobre objetificação hegeliano-marxista. / This study analyzed and compared the major theories about human conduct. The intent behind this was to not only deepen a debate often mediated by the manuals, but also, through the use of the critical contributions of Latin-american literature, to verify if the ontological conception of conduct is indeed the most limiting of punitive power. Part of the analytical axis of this work involves the study of the relationship between the respect for logical-objective structures of human conduct, as the basis of successive value attributions, and conduct in its limiting function. With this, we intend to debate whether the reduction of recognition of logical-objective structures, leading to increased potential for normative aspects of criminal law, represents a greater exposure of the subject to punitive power. From the concept of praxis, as developed by Lukacs, we aim to find a philosophical basis that is not exhausted in legal compartmentalization. This theoretical path critically claims the heritage of major Western philosophical contributions, from Aristotelian propositions through the Hegelian concepts, reaching the debate on Hegelian-Marxist objectification.

Magister Philosophiae - MPhil / The South African negotiations process, in the true spirit of classical liberalism, emphasised juridical continuity, legality, and gradual political change. But in spite of this and the fact that South Africa’s constitution-making process is acclaimed as the most successful negotiated revolution, it is generally recognised that there is incongruity between the promise and hope brought about by South Africa’s constitution-making process and the political and social crises that ensued after the advent of constitutional democracy in the country. I argue in this analysis that the South African constitutional discourse must undergo a fundamental shift by abandoning the normative regulation of the constituent power of the people in order to allow for the people to truly govern. The acknowledgement of the possibility of the unregulated exercise of constituent power through people-driven initiatives can mitigate the current malaise facing South Africa’s constitutional democracy.

La thèse propose une théorie du discours de l’avocat devant la Cour de cassation. Plus précisément, c’est une partie du contenu de ce discours, les moyens de cassation, qui sont au cœur de l’analyse. Trop souvent, l’attention des théoriciens du droit se porte sur les discours qui sont traditionnellement perçus comme normatifs, à savoir le discours législatif et le discours jurisprudentiel. Assimilé au discours doctrinal parce qu’il n’est ni scientifique, ni à l’origine d’une norme, le discours de l’avocat demeure quant à lui dans une catégorie (les discours de « politique juridique » selon Kelsen, et les discours de « dogmatique juridique » selon Michel Troper) vouée à l’indifférence. Pourtant, ce n’est parce que les interprétations des avocats sont des actes guidés par la seule volonté de leurs auteurs qu’elles ne gagnent pas à faire l’objet d’une étude scientifique. Certains discours universitaires, également prescriptifs, font l’objet d’analyse visant à montrer leur incidence sur l’évolution de la jurisprudence alors même que d’un point de vue ontologique, le discours de l’avocat est mieux doté pour agir sur l’œuvre jurisprudentielle, notamment lorsqu’il est, comme celui de l’avocat aux Conseils, immédiatement et systématiquement destiné aux juridictions suprêmes. Cette spécificité du discours étudié, dégagée à travers l’étude de sa nature, nous permettra d’en étudier la portée. De ce point de vue, notre thèse, qui doit s’entendre comme une contribution à la théorie réaliste de l’interprétation et à son complément, la théorie des contraintes juridiques, propose une explication de la cohérence jurisprudentielle. Si la Cour de cassation, alors même qu’elle est libre d’interpréter les énoncés législatifs comme elle le souhaite (proposition centrale de la TRI), se montre généralement cohérente par rapport à sa jurisprudence antérieure, c’est parce qu’un ensemble de contraintes spécifiquement juridiques la conduisent à être cohérente (proposition centrale de la TCJ). Or, ces contraintes sont principalement produites ou relayées par les moyens de cassation (notre proposition). Sauf à relever un moyen d’office, procéder à une substitution de motifs ou énoncer un obiter dictum, techniques qui seront exceptionnellement utilisées par cet homo juridicus, la Cour de cassation est généralement contrainte d’effectuer un choix binaire, prédéterminé par le moyen de cassation : réaffirmer l’interprétation des juges du fond (arrêt de rejet) ou retenir celle de l’avocat du demandeur (arrêt de cassation). Autrement dit, le moyen de cassation définit le cadre de l’interprétation authentique, cadre qui favorise la circulation de la jurisprudence antérieure, et qui contraint la Cour de cassation à agir de façon prévisible. / In France, legal realism is currently represented by Michel Troper who is supporting the fact that the law resides in its interpretations by the Supreme Court. Supreme Court interpret legal text with complete freedom because those text do not contain any significations that necessarily need to be apply. This freedom regarding legal text does not exclude the existence of specific legal constraints which determine the supreme Court decisions. Even tough the lawyer’s discourse addressed to supreme jurisdictions does not look like any other legal discourses, it has never been apprehended as a source of constraint limiting sovereign courts freedom. This is what about I will discuss on my thesis.

A profound dichotomy lies at the heart of this master’s thesis. It is a clash between a heuristic and fertile field of possibilities and a limited, even chained, concrete experience. Rooted in the works of Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), Karl Mannheim (1893-1947), and Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005), this dissertation examines the influences of Ideology on the discursive and politico-philosophical realms surrounding the English constitution over the past one hundred and fifty years. Departing from a strictly pejorative conception of Ideology, it is an opportunity to witness various conceptions of the constitution overlapping and colliding while defining a discourse universe. By first recognizing the fertile material provided by the unwritten and customary nature of the English constitution, we chronologically approach the major currents of constitutional thought to highlight a fundamental antinomy between normative conservative approaches and their functionalist critique. Where the field could have flourished, we acknowledge an arc that, closing in on itself, limits the possibility of new discourses. Our research initially addresses the undeniable contribution of Albert Venn Dicey to the study of English constitutionalism. In response to this redefinition of the field of study, we delve into the functionalist approach, referring to William Robson, Ivor Jennings, and J.A.G. Griffith. Building upon this opposition, we examine the more modern responses of T.R.S Allan and Martin Loughlin while acknowledging the exhaustion of discourses. Thus, this master’s thesis is driven by a dual purpose. On one hand, we define various ideological approaches to the constitution historically and comparatively. On the other hand, we observe how these ideological discourses limit themselves and greatly restrict the discursive universe of constitutionalism. / Une dichotomie profonde est au cœur de ce mémoire. Un choc entre un champ des possibles heuristique et fécond et une expérience concrète limitée, voire enchaînée. Prenant racines dans les travaux d’Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), Karl Mannheim (1893-1947) et Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005), ce mémoire s’intéresse aux influences de l’Idéologie sur les champs discursifs et politico-philosophiques entourant la constitution anglaise au courant des cent-cinquante dernières années. S’éloignant d’une conception strictement péjorative de l’Idéologie, c’est l’occasion de voir se chevaucher et s’entrechoquer diverses conceptions de la constitution tout en définissant un univers de discours. En reconnaissant d’abord un matériau fertile étant donné l’aspect non-écrit et coutumier de la constitution anglaise, nous abordons de manière chronologique les grands courants de pensée du constitutionnalisme pour faire ressortir une antinomie fondamentale entre l’approche conservatrice normative et sa critique fonctionnaliste. Là où le champ aurait pu proliférer, nous reconnaissons un arc qui, se refermant sur lui-même, limite la possibilité de nouveaux discours. Notre recherche aborde dans un premier temps, l’apport indéniable d’Albert Venn Dicey à l’étude du constitutionnalisme anglais. En réponse à cette redéfinition du champ d’étude, nous abordons l’approche fonctionnaliste se référant à William Robson, Ivor Jennings et J.A.G. Griffith. Sur la base de cette opposition, nous étudions les réponses plus modernes de T.R.S Allan et Martin Loughlin tout en reconnaissant l’épuisement des discours. Ce mémoire est donc animé par un double objet. D’une part, nous définissons diverses approches idéologiques de la constitution de manière historique et comparative. De l’autre, nous observons comment ces discours idéologiques se limitent en eux-mêmes et restreignent grandement l’univers discursifs du constitutionnalisme.

O presente trabalho faz análise da hermenêutica jurídica entre o positivismo e pós-positivismo a fim de apresentar como produto o método jurídico axiológico enquanto nova forma de conhecimento científico a ser empregado no Direito Civil. Para sua formulação, foi preciso percorrer o pensamento positivista, que ganhou força pela simplificação que promoveu ao Direito, e também a corrente pós-positivista, alicerçada em interpretações valorativas que terminam por refinar uma hermenêutica reflexiva sobre ideias de justiça. O Direito assume roupagem funcional e a proposta de sociedade aberta é incorporada para permear edificação jurídica ajustada à realidade social. A teleologia desta conjugação é afastar a pura e simples aplicação lógico-dedutiva para buscar uma nova racionalidade afinada com a ideia de tutela material e concretizadora de direitos. Neste diapasão, é que o enredo dialógico da “sociedade aberta” possibilita a edificação de um Direito Civil comunicativo com outras fontes. Porém, teorias como a do diálogo das fontes e da hermenêutica heterorreflexiva foram apontadas, porém criticadas, ou por insuficiência de conteúdo, ou porque promoviam retorno aos construtos do modelo positivista. A interpretação do Código Civil, a partir do método jurídico axiológico, prima pela mensuração entre a justiça pretendida e a segurança necessária, tarefa que parte do conteúdo da norma-padrão, cujo ensaio formador se passa entre o raio de ação dos três “Entes comunicantes”: Sociedade, Estado e Direito e que permeia a construção do normativismo, que corresponde a um todo interpretativo de caráter transdisciplinar. O método jurídico axiológico visa a construção valorativa do pensamento arrimado nos reflexos que podem surtir para os particulares e para a sociedade. Difere do juízo de equidade por ser operacional e por não se debruçar sobre a justiça no plano abstrato. Seu arremate, assim, se processa quando faz a conjugação dos juízos de valor e de realidade (juízos de adequação), cuja concretude pode ser vislumbrada diante da análise de situações factuais e hipotéticas, nas quais o método pode ser contextualizado. / The present work analyzes the juridical hermeneutics between positivism and post-positivism in order to present as product the axiological juridical method as new form of scientific knowledge to be used in civil law. For its formulation, it was necessary to go through the positivist thought, which gained strength by the simplification it promoted to the law, as well as the post-positivist current, grounded on evaluative interpretations that end up refining a reflective hermeneutics on ideas of justice. The law assumes functional drapery and the proposal of open society is incorporated to permeate juridical edification adjusted to social reality. The teleology of this conjugation is to withdraw the simple logical-deductive application to seek a new rationality in tune with the idea of material protection and concretizing rights. This diapason is where the dialogical plot of the "open society" enables the building of a civil law that is communicative with other sources. However, theories like the dialogue of sources and hetero-reflexive hermeneutics were pointed, but criticized, whether by lack of content, or because they promoted regress to the constructs of the positivist model. The interpretation of the Civil Code, from the axiological juridical method, values and chases the measurement between the desired justice and the necessary security, task which parts from the standard norm content, which forming essay passes between the action radius of the three "Communicating Entities": Society, State and Law and that permeates the construction of the normativism, which corresponds to an all interpretive transdisciplinary character. The axiological juridical method aims the evaluative construction of thought supported on the reflexes that can bear fruit for individuals and for society. Differs from judgment of equity by being operational and not dwelling on justice on abstract plan. Thus, its tailpiece is processed when it does the conjugation of judgments of value and reality (judgments of adequacy), which its concreteness can be perceived in face of the analysis of factual and hypothetical situations, where the method can be contextualized.

Três são os objetivos centrais deste trabalho: (a) especificar, por meio de uma reconstrução histórico-evolutiva do pensamento teórico, os elementos constitutivos (objeto, método, princípios primeiros, teoria da verdade e comunidade científica) e as exigências normativas (objetividade, coerência, clareza e transparência, justificação e consensualização) de um empreendimento que pretenda se qualificar como ciência, de modo propor uma concepção analógica de ciência que possa ser aplicável ao campo do direito; (b) identificar e detalhar os três diferentes paradigmas científicos que se desenvolveram no direito tributário brasileiro (Empírico-econômico, Normativo-comportamental e Formalista-linguístico), de modo a analisar, criticamente, os seus pressupostos teóricos, buscando, com isso, demonstrar a insuficiência dos modelos teóricos que foram até hoje utilizados no campo da ciência tributária brasileira, principalmente em razão do seu reducionismo explicativo; e (c) propor uma concepção mais abrangente e complexa de ciência jurídica – pautada na concepção de ciência prática (scientia practica) desenvolvida pela tradição filosófica aristotélico-tomista – a qual teria pretensões de, não apenas descrever o direito positivo, mas também de explicar, esclarecer e tornar mais inteligível as diferentes dimensões do fenômeno tributário, não apenas no que se refere ao momento da positivação das normas jurídicas, mas também no que se refere aos momentos anteriores e posteriores a esse processo, ou seja, que também se dedique a analisar os motivos, causas, efeitos, consequências e fins das normas de tributação. Portanto, a concepção de ciência prática aplicável ao direito tributário pressupõe o desenvolvimento de uma dimensão formal, material, eficiente/instrumental e final do seu respectivo objeto de estudo, o que culmina na elaboração de uma deontologia tributária, de uma ontologia tributária, de uma metodologia tributária e de uma teleologia tributária. / Three are the central goals of this thesis: (a) first to specify, by means of a historical and evolutionary reconstruction of the scientific thought, which are the constitutive elements (object, method, first principles, theory of truth and scientific community) and the normative requirements (objectivity, consistency, clarity and transparency, justification and consensualization) of a theoretical enterprise that intends to affirm itself as scientific, as to propose an analogical conception of science that could be applied to the field of Law; (b) to identify and detail the three different scientific paradigms that have been developed in Brazilian Tax Law (Empirical-economical, Normative-behavioral and Formalistic-linguistic), in order to, critically, analyze its theoretical assumptions, seeking to demonstrate the inadequacy of these theoretical models applied in Brazilian Tax Law, especially because of their explanatory reductionism; and (c) to propose a more comprehensive and complex notion of legal science, based on the conception of practical science (scientia practica) – based on the philosophical tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas – which would have claims, not only describe the positive law, but also to explain, clarify and make more intelligible the different dimensions of the taxation phenomenon, not only regarding the procedure that creates legal norms, but also that pays attention to the moments that come before and after this process, namely, that also focuses on analyzing the motives, causes, effects, consequences and ends of taxation. Therefore, a concept of practical science applicable to Tax Law demands the development of a formal, a material, an efficient/instrumental and a finalistic dimension of its object of study. This will require a Theory of Taxation that has a Deontological aspect, an Ontological aspect, a Methodological aspect and a Teleological aspect.