This thesis is an attempt to understand the accomplishment and restrictions of present liberalism from the viewpoint of communitarianism. Liberalism (or constitutional democracy) is the representation of the long-term history of mutual influences among political, cultural and economic structures in western civil society. It is not an abstract noun; on the contrary, it represents the result of dialogues among numerous individuals and communities under specific contexts of time and space. Civil society emerges at the same time when individuals depart from the traditional community. Accordingly, there is a qualitative change in the citizenship from active republicanism to passive liberalism. In other words, citizens are no longer interested in political participation, and turn to self-realization in personal matters. On the one hand, it results in a diverse and prosperous society; on the other hand, the positive citizen participation gradually collapses during this process. The phenomenon mentioned above requires us to find an institution or procedure to balance the common goods and private interests. Meanwhile, certain virtues of the citizenry are requisite to maintain the system. If not, no matter how perfect the institution is, it will be threatened by failure. Therefore, in order to promote the virtues of the citizens and to respond to the vigorous individuality and a diverse and prosperous society, constitutional democracy should be taken as the core of our civil education.

In this thesis, I address two issues. First, I reject the supposed conflict between international law and constitutional democracy. And second, I explore the role of international law in domestic constitutional law, particularly in Canada. In order to address both of these issues, I draw an analogy between the “Incompatibilist” critiques of international law and constitutional democracy, and the arguments against judicial review made by “the Critics” that Waluchow responds to in his book, A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review: the Living Tree. I argue that both the Incompatibilists and the Critics describe in-principle problems, structural problems, and decision-making problems in their respective critiques. The Incompatibilists are describing these problems in the context of the interaction between international law and constitutional democracies, while the Critics are focusing on constitutional judicial review, but I argue that the theory Waluchow presents as an answer to the Critics can also be directly applied to the Incompatibilists. Waluchow’s theory of common law judicial review and the community’s constitutional morality gives support and democratic legitimacy to judicial review in a domestic constitutional context. By applying his reasoning to cases involving international norms, I address problems in domestic courts’ application of international law and the democratic challenges they face. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

Democratization is a fragile process, easily reversed when and where its advance is most recent. African countries present particular challenges to democratization, given generally low levels of economic and social development, often combined with ethnic and cultural fractionalization. Debates about democratization have not been sufficiently developed with the African context in mind. In particular, assessment of the effects of presidential systems on democratization has not been sensitively applied to African cases where most regimes are Presidential. Moreover, a particular feature of African democracy, the dominant party within a multi-party system, also raises questions that have not been so pertinent elsewhere. Debates about the merits and demerits of electoral system options for democratic consolidation also require more empirical analysis in Africa. This study is based on the assumption that debates about the relationship between political institutions and democratization in Africa can only be advanced by recognition of the interactions that can be identified between the institutions of presidential, parliamentary and party systems, particularly within the dynamics of one-party dominance. Empirical leverage takes advantage of an important case with a parliamentary system and proportional representation: South Africa. The most appropriate comparator from the Presidential and majoritarian camp is Nigeria. These are the two largest and most important states in Africa, sharing a British colonial heritage and a federal system and each dominated by a single party for about two decades. The thesis conceptualizes democratization in terms of legitimation and institutionalization. Legitimation focuses on the micro-level: the quality of elections and the voting process, the presence or absence of government-sponsored violence or coercion, the extent of public confidence in politicians and public support for democratic principles and practices. Institutionalization is focused at the macro-level: elite compliance to constitutional norms, political accountability, and the absence of violent intervention against the state, by the military or other internal forces. The thesis finds that leadership transitions within the parties take place with more accountability in South Africa than Nigeria. While corruption is a problem in both countries, it is more pervasive and there are more incentives to generate it in Nigeria due to a combination of the candidate-centred nature of politics, the country’s great dependence on oil exports, and its lower accountability in leadership transitions. Mechanisms to promote consensus politics differ in both countries and within-party arrangements call into question an assumption that one-party government is necessarily majoritarian. Although the process of legitimation has advanced well in both countries, they share many problems associated with lack of development. The main threat to democracy in Nigeria lies partly in the mutual distrust occasioned by the unsettled issues of ‘power rotation’, ‘resource sharing’ as well as the widening economic disparity between regional blocs of the principally Islamic North and largely Christian South with possible central state responses that might increase rather than reduce the conflicts, while in South Africa the threat lies in the high level of inequality between the white and black communities. Radical political action to address this inequality might increase the already high level of violence in the country. Such tension could ultimately lead to the break-up of the ANC, but an end to dominant-party politics in South Africa could as well destabilise rather than consolidate democracy. Similarly, in Nigeria, a break-up of the PDP, which has been nearly made possible due to a crisis of confidence in an ‘elite consensus’ on power rotation among the regional blocs, could as well constitute a threat to democratic consolidation and national integration.

<p>The history of prison reform after 1994 was shaped by the relationship between governance and human rights standards / the requirements for both are set out in the Constitution and elaborated on in the Correctional Services Act. Good governance and human rights converge in five dimensions of a constitutional democracy: legitimacy, transparency, accountability, the rule&nbsp / of law / and resource utilisation. The new constitutional order established a set of governance and rights requirements for the prison system demanding fundamental reform. It de-legitimised the existing prison system and thus placed it in a crisis. This required its reinvention to establish a system compatible with constitutional demands. The thesis investigates whether&nbsp / constitutionalism provided the necessary transformative basis for prison reform in South Africa after 1994. The Department of Correctional Services (DCS) senior management failed to&nbsp / anticipate this in the period 1990 to 1994. In the five years after 1994 senior management equally failed to initiate a fundamental reform process. This lack of vision, as well as a number of external factors relating to the state of the public service in the period 1994 to 2000, gave rise to a second crisis: the collapse of order and discipline in the DCS. By the late 1990s the state had lost control of the DCS and its internal workings can be described as a mess &ndash / a highly interactive set of problems in causal relationships. In many regards the problems beleaguering the prison system were created in the period 1994 &ndash / 1999. The leadership at the time did not recognize that the prison system was in crisis or that the crisis presented an opportunity for&nbsp / fundamental reform. The new democratic order demanded constitutional and political imagination, but this failed to materialise. Consequently, the role and function of imprisonment within the&nbsp / criminal justice system has remained fundamentally unchanged and there has not been a critical re-examination of its purpose, save that the criminal justice system has become more punitive. Several investigations (1998-2006) into the DCS found widespread corruption and rights violations. Organised labour understood transformation primarily as the racial transformation of the staff corps and embarked on an organised campaign to seize control of management and key positions. This introduced a culture of lawlessness, enabling widespread corruption. w leadership by 2001 and facing pressure from the national government, the DCS responded to the situation by focusing on corruption and on regaining control of the Department. A number of&nbsp / gains have been made since then, especially after 2004. Regaining control of the Department focused on addressing systemic weaknesses, enforcing the disciplinary code and defining a&nbsp / new employer-employee relationship. This has been a slow process with notable setbacks, but it continues to form part of the Department&rsquo / s strategic direction. It is concluded that the DCS&nbsp / has engaged with and developed a deeper understanding of its constitutional obligations insofar as they pertain to governance requirements in the Constitution. However, compliance with&nbsp / human rights standards had not received the same attention and areas of substantial non-compliance remain in violation of the Constitution and subordinate legislation. Overcrowding,&nbsp / violations of personal safety, poor services and/or lack of access to services persist. Despite the detailed rights standards set out in the Correctional Services Act, there is little to indicate that&nbsp / legislative compliance is an overt focus for the DCS. While meeting the minimum standards of humane detention, as required by the Constitution, should have been the strategic focus of the&nbsp / DCS in relation to the prison population, the 2004 White&nbsp / Paper defines &ldquo / offender rehabilitation&rdquo / as the core business of the DCS. In many regards the DCS has assigned more prominence&nbsp / and weight to the White Paper than to its obligations under the Correctional Services Act. In an attempt to legitimise the prison system, the DCS defined for itself a goal that is required neither&nbsp / by the Constitution nor the Correctional&nbsp / Services Act. Compliance with the minimum standards of humane detention must be regarded as a prerequisite for successful interventions to reduce&nbsp / future criminality. After&nbsp / seven years, delivery results on the rehabilitation objective have been minimal and not objectively measurable. The noble and over-ambitious focus on rehabilitation at&nbsp / policy level distracted the DCS from its primary constitutional obligation, namely to ensure safe and humane custody under conditions of human dignity Throughout the period (1994 to 2012)&nbsp / the DCS has been suspicious if not dismissive of advice, guidance and at times orders (including court orders) offered or given by external&nbsp / stakeholders. Its relationship with civil society&nbsp / &nbsp / &nbsp / &nbsp / organisations remain strained and there is no formal structure for interaction. Since 2004 Parliament has reasserted its authority over the DCS, not hesitating to criticise poor decisions and&nbsp / sub-standard performance. Civil society organisations have increasingly used Parliament as a platform for raising concerns about prison reform. Litigation by civil society and prisoners has&nbsp / also been used on a growing scale&nbsp / to ensure legislative compliance. It is concluded that prison reform efforts needs to refocus on he rights requirements set out in the Correctional Services&nbsp / Act and approach this task in an inclusive, transparent and accountable manner.&nbsp / &nbsp / </p>

<p>The history of prison reform after 1994 was shaped by the relationship between governance and human rights standards / the requirements for both are set out in the Constitution and elaborated on in the Correctional Services Act. Good governance and human rights converge in five dimensions of a constitutional democracy: legitimacy, transparency, accountability, the rule&nbsp / of law / and resource utilisation. The new constitutional order established a set of governance and rights requirements for the prison system demanding fundamental reform. It de-legitimised the existing prison system and thus placed it in a crisis. This required its reinvention to establish a system compatible with constitutional demands. The thesis investigates whether&nbsp / constitutionalism provided the necessary transformative basis for prison reform in South Africa after 1994. The Department of Correctional Services (DCS) senior management failed to&nbsp / anticipate this in the period 1990 to 1994. In the five years after 1994 senior management equally failed to initiate a fundamental reform process. This lack of vision, as well as a number of external factors relating to the state of the public service in the period 1994 to 2000, gave rise to a second crisis: the collapse of order and discipline in the DCS. By the late 1990s the state had lost control of the DCS and its internal workings can be described as a mess &ndash / a highly interactive set of problems in causal relationships. In many regards the problems beleaguering the prison system were created in the period 1994 &ndash / 1999. The leadership at the time did not recognize that the prison system was in crisis or that the crisis presented an opportunity for&nbsp / fundamental reform. The new democratic order demanded constitutional and political imagination, but this failed to materialise. Consequently, the role and function of imprisonment within the&nbsp / criminal justice system has remained fundamentally unchanged and there has not been a critical re-examination of its purpose, save that the criminal justice system has become more punitive. Several investigations (1998-2006) into the DCS found widespread corruption and rights violations. Organised labour understood transformation primarily as the racial transformation of the staff corps and embarked on an organised campaign to seize control of management and key positions. This introduced a culture of lawlessness, enabling widespread corruption. w leadership by 2001 and facing pressure from the national government, the DCS responded to the situation by focusing on corruption and on regaining control of the Department. A number of&nbsp / gains have been made since then, especially after 2004. Regaining control of the Department focused on addressing systemic weaknesses, enforcing the disciplinary code and defining a&nbsp / new employer-employee relationship. This has been a slow process with notable setbacks, but it continues to form part of the Department&rsquo / s strategic direction. It is concluded that the DCS&nbsp / has engaged with and developed a deeper understanding of its constitutional obligations insofar as they pertain to governance requirements in the Constitution. However, compliance with&nbsp / human rights standards had not received the same attention and areas of substantial non-compliance remain in violation of the Constitution and subordinate legislation. Overcrowding,&nbsp / violations of personal safety, poor services and/or lack of access to services persist. Despite the detailed rights standards set out in the Correctional Services Act, there is little to indicate that&nbsp / legislative compliance is an overt focus for the DCS. While meeting the minimum standards of humane detention, as required by the Constitution, should have been the strategic focus of the&nbsp / DCS in relation to the prison population, the 2004 White&nbsp / Paper defines &ldquo / offender rehabilitation&rdquo / as the core business of the DCS. In many regards the DCS has assigned more prominence&nbsp / and weight to the White Paper than to its obligations under the Correctional Services Act. In an attempt to legitimise the prison system, the DCS defined for itself a goal that is required neither&nbsp / by the Constitution nor the Correctional&nbsp / Services Act. Compliance with the minimum standards of humane detention must be regarded as a prerequisite for successful interventions to reduce&nbsp / future criminality. After&nbsp / seven years, delivery results on the rehabilitation objective have been minimal and not objectively measurable. The noble and over-ambitious focus on rehabilitation at&nbsp / policy level distracted the DCS from its primary constitutional obligation, namely to ensure safe and humane custody under conditions of human dignity Throughout the period (1994 to 2012)&nbsp / the DCS has been suspicious if not dismissive of advice, guidance and at times orders (including court orders) offered or given by external&nbsp / stakeholders. Its relationship with civil society&nbsp / &nbsp / &nbsp / &nbsp / organisations remain strained and there is no formal structure for interaction. Since 2004 Parliament has reasserted its authority over the DCS, not hesitating to criticise poor decisions and&nbsp / sub-standard performance. Civil society organisations have increasingly used Parliament as a platform for raising concerns about prison reform. Litigation by civil society and prisoners has&nbsp / also been used on a growing scale&nbsp / to ensure legislative compliance. It is concluded that prison reform efforts needs to refocus on he rights requirements set out in the Correctional Services&nbsp / Act and approach this task in an inclusive, transparent and accountable manner.&nbsp / &nbsp / </p>

This thesis is a situational study of the use and exercise of emergency powers in Malaysia, undertaken from the perspective of the principles underlying the Malaysian Constitution. The primary focus and perspective are Malaysian, and I use comparative materials where I consider they may help to Illuminate that perspective and the way in which emergency powers have been used. A unique situation has been created whereby the Malaysian Government has the option of taking measures under one or other of two legal regimes. The thesis, therefore, examines the development of this parallel government system. it includes discussion of the considerations that animated writing reserve powers into the Malaysian Constitution and the near Institutionalisation of the state of emergency In Malaysia, using this historical background to focus on the role of the judiciary In crisis situations, the incorporation of certain traditional elements of Malay society into the Constitution, and the existence of racial 'bargaining' in developing the Constitution. The thesis then examines the distinct legal order created by a state of emergency, within the context of the reality of the Malaysian polity. Hence, there is an examination of the four actual instances when an emergency was proclaimed in the country. An examination is also undertaken of the various amendments made to Article 150 over the years which has reduced much of the safeguards originally built into the provision. This examination suggests that Article 150 in Its present form, is debilitative of parliamentary government largely because of the dual system of law-making created by a state of emergency. The thesis therefore provides an insight into the working of a major constitutional democracy seeking to reconcile the need to maintain emergency powers and realise the objective of a parliamentary system envisaged by its Federal Constitution.

Doctor Legum - LLD / The history of prison reform after 1994 was shaped by the relationship between governance and human rights standards; the requirements for both are set out in the Constitution and elaborated on in the Correctional Services Act. Good governance and human rights converge in five dimensions of a constitutional democracy: legitimacy, transparency, accountability, the rule of law; and resource utilisation. The new constitutional order established a set of governance and rights requirements for the prison system demanding fundamental reform. It de-legitimised the existing prison system and thus placed it in a crisis. This required its reinvention to establish a system compatible with constitutional demands. The thesis investigates whether constitutionalism provided the necessary transformative basis for prison reform in South Africa after 1994. The Department of Correctional Services (DCS) senior management failed to anticipate this in the period 1990 to 1994. In the five years after 1994 senior management equally failed to initiate a fundamental reform process. This lack of vision, as well as a number of external factors relating to the state of the public service in the period 1994 to 2000, gave rise to a second crisis: the collapse of order and discipline in the DCS. By the late 1990s the state had lost control of the DCS and its internal workings can be described as a mess – a highly interactive set of problems in causal relationships. In many regards the problems beleaguering the prison system were created in the period 1994 – 1999. The leadership at the time did not recognize that the prison system was in crisis or that the crisis presented an opportunity for fundamental reform. The new democratic order demanded constitutional and political imagination, but this failed to materialise. Consequently, the role and function of imprisonment within the criminal justice system has remained fundamentally unchanged and there has not been a critical re-examination of its purpose, save that the criminal justice system has become more punitive. Several investigations (1998-2006) into the DCS found widespread corruption and rights violations. Organised labour understood transformation primarily as the racial transformation of the staff corps and embarked on an organised campaign to seize control of management and key positions. This introduced a culture of lawlessness, enabling widespread corruption. Under new leadership by 2001 and facing pressure from the national government, the DCS responded to the situation by focusing on corruption and on regaining control of the Department. A number of gains have been made since then, especially after 2004. Regaining control of the Department focused on addressing systemic weaknesses, enforcing the disciplinary code and defining a new employer-employee relationship. This has been a slow process with notable setbacks, but it continues to form part of the Department’s strategic direction. It is concluded that the DCS has engaged with and developed a deeper understanding of its constitutional obligations insofar as they pertain to governance requirements in the Constitution. However, compliance with human rights standards had not received the same attention and areas of substantial non-compliance remain in violation of the Constitution and subordinate legislation. Overcrowding, violations of personal safety, poor services and/or lack of access to services persist. Despite the detailed rights standards set out in the Correctional Services Act, there is little to indicate that legislative compliance is an overt focus for the DCS. While meeting the minimum standards of humane detention, as required by the Constitution, should have been the strategic focus of the DCS in relation to the prison population, the 2004 White Paper defines “offender rehabilitation” as the core business of the DCS. In many regards the DCS has assigned more prominence and weight to the White Paper than to its obligations under the Correctional Services Act. In an attempt to legitimise the prison system, the DCS defined for itself a goal that is required neither by the Constitution nor the Correctional Services Act. Compliance with the minimum standards of humane detention must be regarded as a prerequisite for successful interventions to reduce future criminality. After seven years, delivery results on the rehabilitation objective have been minimal and not objectively measurable. The noble and over-ambitious focus on rehabilitation at policy level distracted the DCS from its primary constitutional obligation, namely to ensure safe and humane custody under conditions of human dignity. Throughout the period (1994 to 2012) the DCS has been suspicious if not dismissive of advice, guidance and at times orders (including court orders) offered or given by external stakeholders. Its relationship with civil society organisations remain strained and there is no formal structure for interaction. Since 2004 Parliament has reasserted its authority over the DCS, not hesitating to criticise poor decisions and sub-standard performance. Civil society organisations have increasingly used Parliament as a platform for raising concerns about prison reform. Litigation by civil society and prisoners has also been used on a growing scale to ensure legislative compliance. It is concluded that prison reform efforts needs to refocus on the rights requirements set out in the Correctional Services Act and approach this task in an inclusive, transparent and accountable manner.

Magister Philosophiae - MPhil / The South African negotiations process, in the true spirit of classical liberalism, emphasised juridical continuity, legality, and gradual political change. But in spite of this and the fact that South Africa’s constitution-making process is acclaimed as the most successful negotiated revolution, it is generally recognised that there is incongruity between the promise and hope brought about by South Africa’s constitution-making process and the political and social crises that ensued after the advent of constitutional democracy in the country. I argue in this analysis that the South African constitutional discourse must undergo a fundamental shift by abandoning the normative regulation of the constituent power of the people in order to allow for the people to truly govern. The acknowledgement of the possibility of the unregulated exercise of constituent power through people-driven initiatives can mitigate the current malaise facing South Africa’s constitutional democracy.

Doctor Legum - LLD / The history of prison reform after 1994 was shaped by the relationship between governance and human rights standards; the requirements for both are set out in the Constitution and elaborated on in the Correctional Services Act. Good governance and human rights converge in five dimensions of a constitutional democracy: legitimacy, transparency, accountability, the rule of law; and resource utilisation. The new constitutional order established a set of governance and rights requirements for the prison system demanding fundamental reform. It de-legitimised the existing prison system and thus placed it in a crisis. This required its reinvention to establish a system compatible with constitutional demands. The thesis investigates whether constitutionalism provided the necessary transformative basis for prison reform in South Africa after 1994. The Department of Correctional Services (DCS) senior management failed to anticipate this in the period 1990 to 1994. In the five years after 1994 senior management equally failed to initiate a fundamental reform process. This lack of vision, as well as a number of external factors relating to the state of the public service in the period 1994 to 2000, gave rise to a second crisis: the collapse of order and discipline in the DCS. By the late 1990s the state had lost control of the DCS and its internal workings can be described as a mess – a highly interactive set of problems in causal relationships. In many regards the problems beleaguering the prison system were created in the period 1994 – 1999. The leadership at the time did not recognize that the prison system was in crisis or that the crisis presented an opportunity for fundamental reform. The new democratic order demanded constitutional and political imagination, but this failed to materialise. Consequently, the role and function of imprisonment within the criminal justice system has remained fundamentally unchanged and there has not been a critical re-examination of its purpose, save that the criminal justice system has become more punitive. Several investigations (1998-2006) into the DCS found widespread corruption and rights violations. Organised labour understood transformation primarily as the racial transformation of the staff corps and embarked on an organised campaign to seize control of management and key positions. This introduced a culture of lawlessness, enabling widespread corruption. w leadership by 2001 and facing pressure from the national government, the DCS responded to the situation by focusing on corruption and on regaining control of the Department. A number of gains have been made since then, especially after 2004. Regaining control of the Department focused on addressing systemic weaknesses, enforcing the disciplinary code and defining a new employer-employee relationship. This has been a slow process with notable setbacks, but it continues to form part of the Department’s strategic direction. It is concluded that the DCS has engaged with and developed a deeper understanding of its constitutional obligations insofar as they pertain to governance requirements in the Constitution. However, compliance with human rights standards had not received the same attention and areas of substantial non-compliance remain in violation of the Constitution and subordinate legislation. Overcrowding, violations of personal safety, poor services and/or lack of access to services persist. Despite the detailed rights standards set out in the Correctional Services Act, there is little to indicate that legislative compliance is an overt focus for the DCS. While meeting the minimum standards of humane detention, as required by the Constitution, should have been the strategic focus of the DCS in relation to the prison population, the 2004 White Paper defines “offender rehabilitation” as the core business of the DCS. In many regards the DCS has assigned more prominence and weight to the White Paper than to its obligations under the Correctional Services Act. In an attempt to legitimise the prison system, the DCS defined for itself a goal that is required neither by the Constitution nor the Correctional Services Act. Compliance with the minimum standards of humane detention must be regarded as a prerequisite for successful interventions to reduce future criminality. After seven years, delivery results on the rehabilitation objective have been minimal and not objectively measurable. The noble and over-ambitious focus on rehabilitation at policy level distracted the DCS from its primary constitutional obligation, namely to ensure safe and humane custody under conditions of human dignity Throughout the period (1994 to 2012) the DCS has been suspicious if not dismissive of advice, guidance and at times orders (including court orders) offered or given by external stakeholders. Its relationship with civil society organisations remain strained and there is no formal structure for interaction. Since 2004 Parliament has reasserted its authority over the DCS, not hesitating to criticise poor decisions and sub-standard performance. Civil society organisations have increasingly used Parliament as a platform for raising concerns about prison reform. Litigation by civil society and prisoners has also been used on a growing scale to ensure legislative compliance. It is concluded that prison reform efforts needs to refocus on he rights requirements set out in the Correctional Services Act and approach this task in an inclusive, transparent and accountable manner. / South Africa

This thesis explores the influence of far-right parties on constitutional democracies in Europe, focusing on their adherence to human rights standards and state obligations within the European legal framework. Against the backdrop of rising electoral support for far-right parties across Europe, this thesis aims to examine the common features of far-right party programs and assess the potential consequences of their actions on human rights and democratic values. The concept of militant democracy serves as a theoretical framework, examining the tension between democratic self-preservation and the exercise of individual human rights. Using the doctrinal method, the thesis presents a systematic analysis of existing legal materials, with anemphasis on the European legislative framework developed after World War II and its impact on European constitutional democracies. By grounding the study in the theoretical framework, it seeks to identify safeguards for the efficient functioning of democracy within contemporary legal settings.