Thesis (doctoral)--Lund University, 1985. / Summary in Chinese. Added thesis t.p. and abstract (2 p.) inserted. Bibliography: p. [141]-176.

Thesis--Munich. / Includes bibliographical references (v. 2, p. 1-25).

A. Anthony Moon's Thesis--Catholic University of America. / Includes Latin text. Description based on print version record. "Select bibliography": p. xi-xvii.

No description available.

The original document does not provide an abstract. McMaster Digitization Centre, 14 March 2019. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

This thesis will explore whether Augustine of Hippo altered his theological views and what influences might have precipitated the alleged modifications. Augustine’s early "De libero arbitrio" argued for an individual’s ability to respond freely to God while his later anti-Pelagian writings rejected any human ability to believe until God infuses grace creating belief as his gift. Does his theology exhibit continuity or discontinuity? Four commonplace assertions within Augustinian studies are questioned in this thesis: 1.) Augustine changed his theology in AD 396; 2.) while he was writing the letter to Bishop Simplicianus (Simpl.); 3.) with his transition occurring through reading scripture (Rom.7, 9;1 Cor.15); 4.) which he developed through merely modifying prevalent doctrines. No scholarly work has researched Augustine’s entire corpus from AD 386–430 specifically analyzing his theology in the five final doctrines of: 1.) God giving initial faith as a gift, 2.) inherited damnable reatus from Adam, 3.) the gift of perseverance, 4.) unilateral pre-determination of persons’s eternal destinies independently of foreknowledge, and 5.) God’s neither desiring nor providing for the salvation of all persons. Only a comprehensive methodological approach—reading systematically, chronologically, and comprehensively through his entire corpus—can legitimately demonstrate changes. Did a Patristic consensus exist regarding post-Adamic free choice? What was Augustine’s contribution to this theology? To what degree did the combination of Stoicism, Neoplatonism, and Manichaeism contribute to his liberum arbitrium captivatum? Chapters include an introduction followed by chapters on free choice versus determinism in the: 1.) ancient philosophical-religious world, 2.) Christian authors AD 95–215, 3.) Christian authors AD 216–430, 4.) Augustine’s works AD 386–395, 5.) Augustine’s works AD 396–411, 6.) Augustine’s works AD 412–426, 7.) Augustine’s works AD 427–430, 8.) sermons and epistles, 9.) Augustine’s exegesis of scripture, and 10.) conclusion. Conclusions will be established via extensive primary quotations and references with supporting secondary sources.

Several commentators make the claim that Augustine is not a systematic thinker. The purpose of this thesis is to refute that claim in one specific area of Augustine's thought, the metaphysical foundations underlying his solutions to the problem of evil. Through an exegetical examination of various works in which Augustine writes on evil, I show that his solutions for both natural and moral evil rely on a coherent metaphysical system, conceived of and expounded upon within a Platonically influenced Christian context.

My dissertation focuses on a set of Anglo-American novels that deal with the events of 9/11. Identifying thematic and stylistic differences in the fiction on this topic, I distinguish between novels that represent directly the jolts of trauma in the wake of the attacks, and novels that, while still holding the events as an underlying operative force in the narrative, do not openly represent them but envision their long-term aftermath. The first group of novels comprises Lynne Sharon Schwartz’s The Writing on the Wall (2005), Don DeLillo’s Falling Man (2007) and Jonathan Safran Foer’s Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close (2005). The second one includes Lorrie Moore’s A Gate at the Stairs (2009), John Updike’s Terrorist (2006) and Joseph O’Neill’s Netherland (2008). Drawing on concepts from trauma theory, particularly by Cathy Caruth and Dominick LaCapra, and combining them with the ethical philosophies of Levinas and Heidegger, I argue that the constructions of 9/11 in Anglo-American fiction are essentially twofold: authors who narrate 9/11 as a tragic human loss in the city of New York turn it into an occasion for an ethical dialogue with the reader and potentially with the “Other,” whereas authors who address 9/11 as a recent sociopolitical event transform it into a goad toward a bitter cultural indictment of the US middle-class, whose ingrained inertia, patriotism and self-righteousness have been either magnified or twisted by the attacks. Considering processes of meaning-making, annihilation, ideological reduction and apathy that arose from 9/11 and its versions, I have identified what could be called, adapting Peter Elbow’s expression from pedagogical studies, the “forked” rhetoric of media and politics, a rhetorical mode in which both discourses are essentially closed, non-hermeneutic, and rooted in the same rationale: exploiting 9/11 for consensus. On the contrary, in what I call the New-Yorkization of 9/11, I highlighted how the situatedness of the public discourses that New Yorkers constructed to tell their own tragedy rescues the Ur-Phaenomenon of 9/11 from the epistemological commodification that intellectual, mediatic and political interpretations forced on it. Furthermore, pointing to the speciousness of arguments that deem 9/11 literature sentimental and unimaginative, I claim that the traumatic literature on the attacks constitutes an example of ethical practice, since it originates from witnesses of the catastrophe, it represents communal solidarity, and it places a crucial demand on the reader as an empathic listener and ethical agent. Ethical counternarratives oppose the ideological simplification of the 9/11 attacks and develop instead a complex counter-rhetoric of emotions and inclusiveness that we could read as a particular instantiation of an ethics of the self and “Other.” As much as the 9/11 “ethical” novels suggest that “survivability” in times of trauma depends on “relationality” (J. Butler), the “cultural” ones unveil the insensitivity and superficiality of the actual US society far away from the site of trauma. The binary framework I use implies that, outside of New York City, 9/11 is narrated neither traumatically (in terms of literary form), nor as trauma (in terms of textual fact). Consequently, on the basis of a spatial criterion and in parallel to the ethical novels, I have identified a category of “cultural” fiction that tackles the events of 9/11 at a distance, spatially and conceptually. In essence, 9/11 brings neither shock, nor promise of regeneration to these peripheral settings, except for Joseph O’Neill’s Netherland, a story in which we are returned to a post-9/11 New York where different ethnic subjects can re-negotiate creatively their identities. The cultural novels are ultimately pervaded by a mode of tragic irony that is unthinkable for the ethical novels and that is used in these texts to convey the inanity and hubris of a politically uneducated and naïve America – one that has difficulties to point Afghanistan on a map, or to transcend dualistic schemes of value that embody precisely Bush’s Manichaeism. The potential for cultural pluralism, solidarity and historical memory set up by the New York stories does not ramify into the America that is far away from the neuralgic epicenter of historical trauma. This proves that the traumatizing effects and the related ethical calls engendered by 9/11 remain confined to the New York literature on the topic.

Augustine, the fourth-century Christian philosopher, is perhaps best-known for his spiritual autobiography Confessions. Two aspects of the problem of evil are arguably critical for comprehending his life in Books 1 through 9 of the work. His search for the nature and origin of evil in the various philosophies that he encounters (the intellectual aspect) and his struggles with his own weaknesses (the experiential aspect) are windows for understanding the actual dynamics of his sojourn. I defend the idea above by providing a fuller examination of the key role that both aspects play in his spiritual journey. Examining relevant events from Augustine's life chronologically, I analyze his philosophical wanderings from his encounter with Cicero's work Hortensius through his eventual disillusionment with the Manichaean religion, and finally, his move in the direction of Christian teachings with the help of Neo-Platonism. Along the way his philosophical questions (the intellectual aspect) and his struggles with his own depravity (the experiential aspect) have an effect on each other until his ultimate move toward Christianity resolves both problems of evil.

Several commentators make the claim that Augustine is not a systematic thinker. The purpose of this thesis is to refute that claim in one specific area of Augustine's thought, the metaphysical foundations underlying his solutions to the problem of evil. Through an exegetical examination of various works in which Augustine writes on evil, I show that his solutions for both natural and moral evil rely on a coherent metaphysical system, conceived of and expounded upon within a Platonically influenced Christian context.