No / This article develops a novel approach for measuring market expectations and term premia in the term structure of interest rates. Key components of this approach are generic impact measures of state variables in a Gaussian dynamic term structure model. These measures are inherent in a particular state variable regardless of how other state variables are defined within the model. With the help of these measures, the approach gives rise to market expectations that predict yield changes well, and term premia with a legitimate impact on the forward curve. In my empirical analysis, I show the generic impact of the short rate on the yield curve, and present observations of the historical dynamics of market expectations and term premia. The calibrated model is also employed to study the impacts of recent unconventional monetary policies.

本研究旨在探討我國一般產業之上市公司，其分析師盈餘預測與管理當局盈餘預測間之差異，並且檢視在資本市場中是否具有抑制公司經理人員任意發佈預測之機制。除此之外，亦檢測市場達成共識之程度是否為管理者盈餘管理之誘因，以及其盈餘管理的程度與方向。 研究樣本取自我國上市公司一般產業之財務預測年資料與實際經營結果財務年資料，研究期間涵蓋自民國85年至88年止。 實證結果發現管理當局不論是對市場傳遞好消息或壞消息，皆是其盈餘管理之結果。再者，當市場預期趨近於一致時，公司管理當局愈會對市場傳遞出中性消息，亦即分析師之盈餘預測與管理當局盈餘預測趨於無差異。同時公司亦可能基於市場壓力，而利用裁決性應計項目以從事盈餘管理。當操縱前盈餘高於分析師預期之平均盈餘時且市場達成共識時，經理人員會傾向不從事盈餘管理，而在市場預期一致性程度低時，從事盈餘管理；反之，當操縱前盈餘低於分析師預期之平均盈餘，且市場預期一致性程度高時才會進行盈餘管理以增加盈餘而達成市場的預期。 / I test a market expectations and market consensus hypothesis about earnings management in Taiwan's public firms from 1996 to 1999. First of all, no matter what a good news or bad news that managers spread in markets is the result of earnings management. Furthermore, when analysts have reached a consensus in their earnings forecasts, managers' earnings forecasts are close to market expectations as possible. At the same time, managers also have an incentive to manage earnings through discretionary accruals to achieve market expectations. Finally, all sample-corporations are split into two groups. Group 1 observations have nondiscretionary earnings below the mean analysts' forecast, and Group 2 observations have nondiscretionary earnings above the mean analysts' forecast. The results suggest the corporation managers in Group 1 make greater use of discretionary accruals to manipulate earnings to achieve market expectations when analysts have reached a consensus in their earnings predictions. Oppositely, the corporation managers in Group 2 make less use of discretionary accruals to save them in use of next period when analysts lacks consensus in their earnings forecasts.