Submitted by Pedro Barros (pedro.silvabarros@ufpe.br) on 2018-10-02T21:57:23Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 811 bytes, checksum: e39d27027a6cc9cb039ad269a5db8e34 (MD5) DISSERTAÇAO Vinícius Gomes Lobo.pdf: 1350530 bytes, checksum: 87262bf3614e5affd7e3f8555c69f17c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Alice Araujo (alice.caraujo@ufpe.br) on 2018-11-22T22:34:36Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 811 bytes, checksum: e39d27027a6cc9cb039ad269a5db8e34 (MD5) DISSERTAÇAO Vinícius Gomes Lobo.pdf: 1350530 bytes, checksum: 87262bf3614e5affd7e3f8555c69f17c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-11-22T22:34:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 811 bytes, checksum: e39d27027a6cc9cb039ad269a5db8e34 (MD5) DISSERTAÇAO Vinícius Gomes Lobo.pdf: 1350530 bytes, checksum: 87262bf3614e5affd7e3f8555c69f17c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-08-02 / CNPq / O objetivo desta dissertação é compreender como o social é abordado pelo pensamento de Karl Marx. Nesse sentido, é preciso que se destaque que não queremos apontar a compreensão que tem Marx das formas históricas ou empíricas através das quais se manifesta o social, ou seja, sua análise das engrenagens que movem a sociedade capitalista, mas sim as ideias que orientam sua compreensão sobre a natureza do social, sobre a forma como o mesmo existe enquanto objeto específico. A questão fundamental aqui, portanto, é a seguinte: o que é o social para Marx? A partir de nossas primeiras leituras e investigações, chegamos à conclusão que não se poderia responder adequadamente a tal pergunta sem nos remetermos às influências filosóficas que marcam o pensamento desse autor, dentre as quais, consideramos a filosofia de Hegel como aquela que, no sentido de nossa questão de pesquisa, é a mais decisiva. Assim, tentaremos chegar à resposta sobre o social em Marx por um caminho que começa com algumas ideias da filosofia hegeliana. Após essa etapa inicial, veremos então como Marx, primeiro, faz uma apropriação crítica de tais ideias e, segundo, como agrega a estas algumas ideias e posicionamentos próprios. Ao final, o que esperamos deixar claro ao leitor é como Marx elabora um novo quadro conceitual para se pensar a manifestação do social, quadro este que, como observaremos pormenorizadamente, fundamenta-se em dois pressupostos: o de que social é uma realidade sintética e o de o mesmo depende basicamente da experiência econômica ou material. Assim, a partir de uma análise pormenorizada da manifestação desses dois pressupostos na obra de Marx, observaremos que, para esse pensador, o social não é um objeto unívoco, um ente com uma forma particular transcendente, mas uma totalidade articulada de forças diversas cujo epicentro é realidade material ou a reprodução coletiva da subsistência vital. / The objective of this dissertation is to understand how social is approached by the thought of Karl Marx. In this sense, it is necessary to highlight that we do not want to point the understanding that Marx has of the empirical or historical forms through which the social manifests itself, that is to say, his analysis of the gears that move capitalist society, but the ideas that guide his understanding of the nature of the social, of how it exists as a specific object. The key question here, therefore, is: what is social to Marx? From our first readings and investigations, we’ve concluded that one could not adequately answer the question above without referring to the philosophical influences that characterize the thinking of this author, among which we consider Hegel's philosophy as one that, in the sense our research question, is the most decisive. Thus, we will arrive at the answer on the social Marx by path that begins with some ideas of Hegel's philosophy. After this initial step, we'll see then how Marx, first, makes a critical appropriation of such ideas and, second, how he aggregates some of his own ideas and positions. At the end, what we hope to make clear to the reader is how Marx elaborates a new conceptual framework for thinking the manifestation of the social, which it is, as we will observe in detail, based on two assumptions: that the social is a synthetic reality and that it basically depends on the economic or material experience. Thus, from a detailed analysis of the expression of those two assumptions in the work of Marx, we will observe that, for this thinker, the social is not a univocal object, a being with a particular transcendental form, but an aggregate of diverse forces whose epicenter is material reality or collective reproduction of vital livelihood.

No description available.

Thesis--Tübingen. / Vita. Bibliography: p. 199-220a.

SOUSA, Albertino Servulo Barbosa de. Conceito de natureza em Marx: intercâmbio entre homem e natureza: produção e reprodução da vida material e social. 2013. 122f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2013. / Submitted by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-13T12:16:48Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2013-DIS-ASBSOUSA.pdf: 505703 bytes, checksum: d4c074f998da49726eb1cea86dc24620 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo(marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-13T12:51:08Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2013-DIS-ASBSOUSA.pdf: 505703 bytes, checksum: d4c074f998da49726eb1cea86dc24620 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-11-13T12:51:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2013-DIS-ASBSOUSA.pdf: 505703 bytes, checksum: d4c074f998da49726eb1cea86dc24620 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Esta dissertação, desenvolvida no Programa de Pós-Graduação do Curso de Filosofia da Universidade Federal do Ceará, é um conciso delineamento do pensamento do filósofo alemão Karl Marx, com o objetivo de apresentar, a partir das obras, Manuscritos Econômico-Filosóficos, Ideologia Alemã e O Capital, as determinações conceituais desse filósofo a respeito da categoria natureza. Esta investigação se concentra no âmbito da filosofia política, uma vez que a inquirição do conceito de natureza em Marx está imbricada a análise dos pressupostos filosóficos da economia política clássica. A relevância desse estudo situa-se no fato de que a critica de Marx a sociedade industrial moderna revela o trabalho estranhado, que promove a segregação prático-teórica entre sociedade e natureza. Nessa objeção, encontramos o conceito marxiano de natureza, que ressalta a determinação de objetividade da natureza, quando faz a redarguição da lógica especulativa contra a história do criacionismo da natureza. Essa discordância se estende ao próprio materialismo, evidenciando contra este a determinação histórica da natureza a partir da produção material, o fator determinante da consciência. Na obra, O Capital, Marx reitera essas determinações no exame da mercadoria e do intercâmbio entre homem e natureza. Porém, considera que a natureza é o pressuposto fundamental, por ser munida de valor intrínseco. Finalmente, na exposição sobre a dialética entre homem e natureza é evidenciado um processo de reciprocidade entre essas instâncias, inferido a partir da relação necessária de intercâmbio com a natureza, haja vista que esta diz respeito à produção e manutenção da vida material e social.

Orientador: Fausto Castilho / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-20T03:08:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Azara_H.O._D.pdf: 1631494 bytes, checksum: e26383ca657090125921c431f8e9d7e5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / Resumo: Esta tese procura reconstituir as categorias essenciais do "conceito marxiano de capital como tal", entendido como o núcleo da crítica de Marx à Economia Política e à sociedade capitalista, a que esta ciência corresponde. Nessa reconstituição nosso fio condutor é o uso heurístico feito por Marx de operadores da Lógica hegeliana. Procuramos explicitar o modo como Marx se utiliza da dialética da finitude, que tem como operadores lógicos as noções de limite e barreira, para caracterizar a subjetividade do capital, uma subjetividade marcada pela infinitude da vontade de valor e mais-valor. Essa vontade infinita de valorização se constitui no traço característico do capital como tal, ou seja, o não reconhecimento de limites ou a transformação reiterada de seus próprios limites em barreiras e sua consequente superação. Procuramos mostrar em que consiste a afirmação do capital como relação, isto é, como o capital tem o poder de fixar e subordinar a si o seu outro, o trabalho assalariado. Buscamos explicitar ainda como o capital, seguindo seu impulso sem limites por mais-valor, irá revolucionar completa e incessantemente as bases técnicas e científicas da produção e com isto gerar o processo de negação do trabalho vivo pelo morto que caracteriza a contradição-capital / Abstract: The thesis intends a reconstruction of the essential categories of the "marxian concept of capital as such", which is understood as a pivotal Marx's critique both the political economy and capitalist society in which this science is related. We aim to perceive the heuristic use done by Marx with the operators of the hegelian logic. We seek to demonstrate how Marx takes into account the Hegel's dialectic theory of finitude - which has as logic operators the notions of limit and barriers - to characterize the subjectivity of the capital, which is defined by the infinitude of the will of the value and surplus value. This will infinity of valorization is a fundamental feature of the capital as such. It does not recognize the limits of its own limits in barriers and your consequent overcoming. Furthermore we demonstrated what means the statement of the capital as a relation, this is, how it has the power to fix and subordinate itself and the others - the wage labor. Moreover we addressed how the capital following its momentum without limits from surplus value will increase both the structure of the technique and science production, engendering therefore the process of the denial of living labor by the dead labor which features the contradiction-capital / Doutorado / Filosofia / Doutor em Filosofia

Orientadores: Paulo Sérgio Fracalanza, Adriana Nunes Ferreira / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Economia / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-27T05:13:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Silva_DanielPereirada_M.pdf: 1450979 bytes, checksum: 6a4c458d5f5805902448763c9a2698e6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 / Resumo: Neste trabalho de economia política, tratamos de apresentar uma forma de conceber o sujeito econômico através da abordagem psicanalítica de Jacques Lacan. Por esses meios, buscamos abranger os caracteres que contemplam a subjetividade do homem e as complexas relações de composição entre sujeito e a sociedade. Nesse intuito, para muito além de uma aproximação interdisciplinar, nos munimos das severas implicações analíticas que se estabelecem a partir da declaração de Lacan quanto à existência uma homologia estrutural entre o conceito marxiano de mais-valia e o seu conceito de mais-de-gozar. Mostramos, então, como se estabelece essa homologia e de que forma ela proporciona uma abordagem dos sujeitos econômicos no capitalismo. Por fim, tomados dos elementos analíticos que articulamos, empreendemos uma apreciação dos sujeitos econômicos contemporâneos em suas ações de consumo, tendo em vista o estabelecimento de uma sociedade de produção em massa / Abstract: In this political economy study, we aim to present a way of conceiving the economic subject through the psychoanalytic approach of Jacques Lacan. By such means, we seek to comprehend the characters which contemplate the subjectivity of the human and the complex relation of composition between the subject and the society. For that purpose, far beyond of an interdisciplinary approximation, we equip ourselves of the severe analytical implications which are set up from the Lacan¿s declaration on the existence of a structural homology between the Marxian concept of surplus value and his concept of plus-the-jouissance. We demonstrated, then, how to establish this homology and how it provides an analysis of the economic subjects in the capitalism. Finally, we undertook an assessment of the contemporary economic subjects in their consumer actions, in view of the mass production society settlement / Mestrado / Teoria Economica / Mestre em Ciências Econômicas

No abstract available. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Durban-Westville, 1988.

Until a few years ago, it was widely held that, ‘apartheid cannot be reformed, it can only be destroyed’. Today, all participants in the negotiation process are agreed that one fundamental characteristic of the social order must be preserved: the new South Africa is to be a capitalist society; the productive wealth of the country will be the private property of a small number of capitalists, and the vast majority will try to sell their labour for a wage to capitalists who will buy it only when that labour can contribute to their profits. There is still disagreement about how small or large the number of capitalists will be; about the colour of their skins; about who they will appoint to manage their mines, banks, factories and farms for them; about the rules that will govern disputes over wages; and above all about the use that the state will make of the taxes paid from their profits. There is also disagreement about the extent to which capitalism can afford to meet popular needs. But all of these disagreements take place within the framework of a common belief that the future is capitalist. The aim of this seminar series, held by the Marxist Theory Seminar at the University of the Western Cape in April/May 1993, was to pose the question: What are the limits of social reform in a capitalist South Africa? Can the fundamental needs and aspirations of the vast majority of South Africans be met within a capitalist framework? Very often these questions are brushed aside with the argument that, given the present balance of local and international forces, there is no alternative to capitalism in SA today. Even if this argument is correct, it still remains necessary to ask what can be achieved within the framework of the capitalist society to which there is no alternative. If that question is not posed in the most rigorous way, all kinds of illusions will be created about what the future holds in store for us. The question of the limits of capitalist reform in SA is posed as it concerns five different areas; democracy, education, economic growth and employment, land and the oppression of women. What will democracy mean in a new SA which depends on foreign investment and capitalist profitability? Can the education crisis be resolved while meeting the needs of capitalist growth? Will economic growth take place in a capitalist SA, and will this lead to the creation of jobs and a higher standard of living for the majority? Can land be restored to the dispossessed, the virtual slavery of millions of farm workers ended, and land used in a way that produces food for all? What are the prospects of ending the oppression of women in a capitalist South Africa? MTS does not believe that there are simple answers to these questions. Certainly, these questions cannot be answered by a general condemnation of the inequality and inhumanity of capitalism. In each case, it is necessary to give clear answers to such questions as: Has capitalism served historically to support the struggle for democracy or to oppose it? How has it affected education in SA? What are the present interests of the capitalists in solving the land question, or giving women control of their lives? To what extent can capitalism be forced to make concessions - to provide jobs, for example - by the struggles of the oppressed? In the past, capitalism has shown itself to be much more flexible than its critics have supposed. That does not mean that capitalism can do anything it likes, nor that the working class can force it to meet whatever demands it has. One of the indispensable insights of Marxism is that processes of social change are not determined by the intentions or integrity of political leaders, but rather by the fundamental relationships of society and the ability of the major classes to pursue their interests created by these relationships. We hope that the publication of this seminar series contributes to making this insight available to a wider audience. / Marxist theory seminar

Ce n’est guère le mouvement jeune-hégélien qui vient immédiatement à l’espritlorsque sont évoqués les noms de Bakounine, d'Engels, de Marx ou même deStirner. Le premier et le dernier sont généralement associés à l’anarchisme,les deux autres, plus indubitablement encore, au marxisme. L'histoire de cespersonnages et le devenir de leurs œuvres n'ont pu que faire de l'ombre à leurappartenance commune et concomitante, trente ans avant que ne se cristallisentlesdits courants politiques, à ce qui a parfois été apparenté à une écolephilosophiqueLa présente thèse propose une lecture immanente, laquelle ne s'efforce pasmoins de restituer un contexte, des principaux écrits rédigés par ces auteursentre 1842 et 1843. La pensée de chacun d'entre eux est présentée dans sesinterrogations et ses enjeux propres, en s'intéressant aux emprunts et auxinnovations conceptuelles réalisées pour y répondre et tout en maintenantd’incessants aller-retours avec le champ problématique relatif au mouvementdans lequel elle prend corps et s’introduit.Il ne s'agit pas, par là, de procéder à une simple mise au point en matièred'histoire des idées. L'un des intérêts majeurs des textes abordés réside dansce qu'ils nous disent, dans une perspective post-hégélienne, de la philosophie.Les descriptions du présent que l'on trouve dans ces textes concordent, eneffet, quant à l'impossibilité d'établir l'unité du rationnel et de l'effectif.Tout reste encore à faire pour qui ne renonce pas à la réalisation de laliberté dans l'histoire. À suivre Hegel, pourtant, la philosophie doit secontenter de décrire ledit procès ou ses résultats. Doit-on se résoudre à ceque la philosophie ne puisse concourir à un destin dont elle a donné la clé ?N'est-il pas possible de la renouveler ? Et comment ? S'agit-il plutôt d'ensortir et d'imaginer d'autres formes d'intervention théoriques et pratiques ?Et qu'en est-il alors de ce qui reste de philosophique ? / The names of Bakunin, Engels, Marx, or Stirner are hardly ever associated withthe Young Hegelian movement. Bakunin and Stirner are generally associated withanarchism and Marx and Engels with marxism. Their lives and the fate of theirworks could do no more than obliterate the mutual and concomitant contributionsof these authors to what has sometimes been described as a philosophicalschool. This participation, in any case, occured thirty years before thecristallisation of the aforesaid political movements.This research proposes an immanent, and at the same time contextual, reading ofthe main texts written by these authors between 1842 and 1843. The theories ofeach of them are presented in accordance with their own questions and issues,focusing on the conceptual borrowings and innovations realised as aconsequence. They are expounded through a perpetual to and fro between theproblematic field related to the movement from which they were born and inwhich they participated.Nevertheless this study cannot be reduced to a mere contribution to the historyof ideas. One of the key interests of the analysed texts lies in what they tellus, from a post-hegelian perspective, about philosophy. When they describetheir epoch, they all conclude that there is no identity of the rational andthe real. There is still much to do for those who do not abandon the idea of therealisation of freedom in history. However, according to Hegel, philosophy canonly describe the process or the results of this realisation. Cannot philosophycontribute to the destiny it revealed? And if not, is it possible to renewphilosophy? How? Would an exit from philosophy be preferable? Other forms oftheoretical and practical intervention could be invented. But then, what aboutthe "philosophical" that remains?

L'Occident se serait sécularisé lorsque l'islam aurait échoué : cette frontière organise les discours de l'Occident séculier. L'islam y apparaît sous la figure d'une impossible sécularisation, comme un processus dont l'échec historique enfanterait une Loi religieuse. Faire l'histoire de cette frontière est l'objet de cette enquête. Le tracé de cette frontière a permis à la sécularisation de s'énoncer comme un mot d'ordre bien avant que ce mot ne désigne le processus d'émergence des sociétés modernes. Le concept de sécularisation est saisi comme l'effet d'une géographie des religions mondiales qui les compare et les hiérarchise. L'histoire de cette frontière commence avec l'Expédition d’Égypte et se formalise à Berlin, au croisement de l'hégélianisme et de l'orientalisme savant. Elle se déploie ensuite à travers le républicanisme français et structure son rapport à l'Afrique en même temps qu'elle infiltre les réformes culturelles qui mèneront à l'Empire allemand. A travers l'histoire de cette frontière et de ses déplacements, c'est un processus d'enchevêtrement permanent des modèles dits de « sécularisation » et de «laïcité» qui apparaît. Sécularisme est le nom de cet enchevêtrement qui semble être indissociable des circulations impériales qui s'effectuent au XIXe siècle. / How did the boundary between a secular West and a theocratic Islam emerge? When did Islam appear as an impossible secularization, as a religious Law supposed to stem from its historical failures? This work is a history of this boundary of secular reason. It shows how the very concept of secularization emerged from a religious geography through a study of Nineteenth Century French and German Imperial Thought. It begins with the Enlightenment and the French Expedition in Egypt and studies Hegelianism as an early form of Secularism. It studies the mutations of this boundary through French Republicanism in its relation to Africa and through the German Imperial tradition in its relation to the Ottoman Empire.