The aim of this thesis is to observe the implementation of the Copenhagen criteria in the context of &lsquo / respect for and protection of minority rights&rsquo / during the accession process of Slovakia. EU&rsquo / s membership conditionality enforces candidate countries to improve the situation of minority groups within their borders. The main motivation of the EU in this process is to eliminate the reasons which cause ethnic conflicts in the continent and to prevent the escalation of minority-related problems into the EU territory. Slovakia which experienced a difficult accession process depending on the fulfilment of political criterion, constitutes an important case for the evaluation of minority clause. This thesis examines minority issue in a historical framework and specifically investigates the implementation of the Copenhagen criteria&rsquo / s minority clause in the EU&rsquo / s enlargement process. EU&rsquo / s conditionality which is its main tool in the enlargement, lacks clear-cut norms and standards regarding minority rights. Furthermore, there is a duality between internal and external policies of the Union on the issue of minority rights. In addition to this duality, the approach of the Union towards minority issue acquires a different character in different accession processes. This thesis argues that the lack of well-defined norms and standards, the duality between EU&rsquo / s internal and external minority policies and changing approaches of the Union in different accession processes complicate the implementation and the monitoring of minority clause giving rise to allegations of double standards in the enlargement process.

The main aim of this thesis is to analyze EU-Western Balkans relations with regard to the prospective EU membership of the Western Balkans, and to make an analysis of the EU&rsquo / s Western Balkans enlargement strategy and the scope of membership conditionality imposed on the Western Balkans from post Dayton period (1995) to present (2006). This thesis examines how the EU membership conditionality worked in the Western Balkans&rsquo / preparatory stages for pre-accession, and to what extent it is different from the CEE enlargement process. Lastly, considering the discussions on rediscovered absorption capacity and the commitment of EU for further eastward enlargements after the CEE enlargement of 2004, it is looked into whether there has been a shift in EU&rsquo / s Western Balkans strategy. This thesis argues that the dominant factor determining the dynamics of the EU-Western Balkans relations are preferences, priorities and internal dynamics of the EU. The comparison between the CEE&rsquo / s and Western Balkans&rsquo / EU integration process reveals that EU tailored a long term and flexible enlargement strategy with increasing conditionality within SAP framework for the Western Balkans. Hence as long as the EU does not feel a sense of urgency straining the stability and EU integration of the region, a motivation for presenting an immediate enlargement platform will not emerge. In this sense, after the CEE enlargement, EU rediscovered its absorption capacity as a main membership condition and further differentiated the regional countries in terms of their own merits in fulfilling EU&rsquo / s conditionality and standards.

The uneven effects of EU membership conditionality on Eastern European reforms continue to puzzle the research community. Sometimes, the research focus has been too large, considering EU membership conditionality as a policy implemented uniformly across policy areas. Other efforts take a too narrow approach by trying to explain the effects of EU membership conditionality in single sectors. I suggest studying this phenomenon through a set of mid-level theories in a cross-country, cross-sectorial approach. I argue that both the intensity of EU membership conditionality and reform outcomes are contingent upon the policy sector context; hence, we should take a sectorial contextual approach in studying them. Reform outcomes result from the interplay between EU’s and domestic leaders’ interests in a particular sectorial reform. I assume domestic leaders to be rational, power driven actors. I argue that, since they act in some weakly institutionalized political environments such as Eastern European societies, they represent the principal actors in the power game. I assume the EU to be a rational actor as well; yet, differently from Eastern Europe, the role of individual leaders is less distinguishable in the highly institutionalized EU political theatre. In this case, EU institutions are the primary political agents. They are interested in maintaining and enlarging the Union as a stable democracy. Expanding an earlier argument that views the EU as established through consociational practices, I argue that EU membership conditionality is a tool to impose institutional reforms in the EU aspirant countries, so their institutions can be receptive to the EU consociational practices once they join the Union. In these countries, the consociational character of conditionality is more visible, since it seeks to impose in aspirant countries the same practices that have brought democratic stability in some member states. The EU does not impose consociational practices on unified societies, but simply seeks to make their institutions receptive to the EU consociational practices. I test these arguments with the cases of institutional reforms in postcommunist Albanian and Macedonia. I conclude that, generally, EU membership manages to change Eastern European leaders’ interests in institutional reforms, but when it cannot, the reforms are almost impossible.

This dissertation argues that European Union membership conditionality operates as a modality of political-economic governance directed at securing the conditions of possibility for a harmoniously functioning political economy of Europe. I argue that conditionality can best be understood not as a series of requirements for EU membership, a set of incentives for rule adoption, or a vehicle for the transmission of European norms to candidate states, but as an ensemble of discursive and material practices – fragile, dispersed circuits of governmental activity directed at a particular strategic ambition. I argue that existing accounts of EU membership conditionality are informed by predominantly rationalist understandings of political economy which work to conceal various cultural, social, and subjective sources of disharmony in political-economic life. Thinking about the political economy of conditionality through rationalist lenses privileges the study of bargaining and negotiation and institutional reform and overlooks the ways that conditionality targets the transformation of problematic socio-cultural and subjective elements of political economy – among them particular habits of culture, patterns of sociality, and subjective qualities and capacities of the person deemed essential to securing order and abundance. Re-reading canonical works in classical and critical traditions of political economy by James Steuart, Adam Smith, and Karl Marx makes clear that political economy as a field of knowledge and practice has long been concerned with understanding the political, legislative-legal, institutional, socio-cultural, and subjective conditions of possibility for securing order and abundance and has long reflected on the potential and limits of governance to secure these conditions in a world of shifting circumstance. I argue that a political economy of EU membership conditionality concerned with disharmony should investigate the ways that particular socio-cultural and subjective features of political-economic life are problematized in the discourse of conditionality and subsequently targeted for transformation through the work of instruments and agents of conditionality operating in a variety of institutional contexts. On this basis, I analyze conditionality as practice – tracing the emergence of instruments of conditionality currently at work in the Republic of Macedonia through official documents produced by the EU and the Republic of Macedonia from 2001-2011. I then examine the ambitions and limits of the Operational Programme Human Resources Development 2007-2013 (OP-HRD) – a program tasked with translating the aims of conditionality on paper into concrete activities for implementation in the fields of employment, education and training, and social inclusion. I outline some limits to the program derived from personal interviews with officials of the EU and the Republic of Macedonia who work to implement the OP-HRD "on the ground." In reflecting on these limitations, I return to the political economy of disharmony, concluding that constraints on the operation of conditionality in practice are not merely the product of technical and political impediments but are also derived from inherent limits to the old dream of political-economic harmony to which the ambitions of conditionality are ultimately directed. / Ph. D.