Text in English / Summary: This work aims at establishing Jung's importance as a Nietzsche commentator. Although Jung's work is generally unacknowledged by the mainstream of Nietzsche scholarship, a number of philosophers have joined him in recognizing the relevance of Iranian religious lore to Nietzsche; the visionary nature of Nietzsche's experiences of Zarathustra; and the link between these experiences and his criticism of ethics. Jung sees Nietzsche as something of a kindred spirit, "and refers to that philosopher again and again throughout his writings. In his seminar on Nietzsche's Also sprach Zarathustra, Jung analyzes that work much as he would a patient's dream. While this approach allows Jung to project his own views onto Nietzsche, it also succeeds in restoring essential aspects of Nietzsche's thought which other, less foolhardy commentators fail to capture. Nietzsche and Jung both speak of going "beyond good and evil" (jenseits von Gut und Bose) as an integral part of their respective conceptions of human fulfillment. The notion that we ought to try to transcend the distinction between good and evil, rather than obstinately cling to the good, potentially constitutes an immense, fundamental challenge to our ordinary beliefs about ethics. At the same time, Jung's elaboration of this into a more general form of nonduality suggests a solution to that most basic problem of ethics--which Nietzsche raised most forcefully--namely that of how ethical standards might be justified without falling prey to such basic obstacles as the "is/ought" problem. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / D.Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)

This paper concerns the semantic branch of meta-ethics, and examines a version of so called semantic pluralism advocated by Michael Gill. Briefly put, Gill suggests that ordinary people’s usage of moral terms is rather messy in the sense that the meaning of moral terms can vary not only between different people, but also for one and the same person in different contexts. Such variability in word-meaning is explained by his assumption that people’s meta-ethical commitments are part of their moral thought and language, which is to say that their meta-ethical commitments have implications for the meaning of moral terms. In this paper I pursue two objectives. The first is exegetical and aim to clarify how Gill’s semantic pluralism in general, and his Indeterminacy- and Variability theses in particular, are intended to be understood—specifically in relation to the cognitivist/non-cognitivist debate. The second objective is argumentative. I first present and evaluate an objection to Gill’s semantic pluralism from Walter Sinnott-Armstrong who argue that Gill’s Variability thesis implies that interlocutors with different meta-ethical commitments are talking past each other rather than having genuine first order moral agreements and disagreements. I then argue that a similar problem occurs also for certain second order moral disagreements, particularly those in which moral terms are used rather than mentioned. I then argue that this is problematic not only on independent grounds, but also because it is inconsistent with the very assumptions Gill makes to support his view. My argument therefore appears forceful by Gill’s own lights. Combined, Sinnott-Armstrong’s objection and my own leads me to conclude that Gill’s semantic pluralism does not look promising.

The aim of the work is to present the possibilities of ethics in late Wittgensteinian framework. In course of the investigation will be presented: (1) early Wittgensteinian ethics, (2) late Wittgensteinian anti-foundationalism and (3) its consequences for analytical meta-ethics - it will be argued (a) against epistemologization of ethics and (b) for need of more complex understanding of ethics, by which traditional meta-ethical disputes of realism with anti-realism and of cognitivism with non-cognitivism will be overcame -, which will result in (4) development of late Wittgensteinian ethics. Ethics will be presented as consisting in ethical ways of seeing of the world, through which various phenomena arise as ethically relevant and late Wittgensteinian ethical investigation will be developed as clarification, cultivation and enrichment of our ethical ways of seeing in overall - partially subjective and partially intersubjective - context of language, life forms and life stories from which they arise. Keywords Ethics, meta-ethics, Wittgenstein, anti-foundationalism, truth in ethics, aspect seeing, perspicuous representation, ethics as clarification, life forms