Le présent travail entend développer une théorie permettant de décrire, d’expliquer et de réguler les désaccords moraux. Il privilégie une approche empirique du désaccord moral, mobilisant en priorité les données fournies par la psychologie sociale et la psychologie morale.La morphologie du désaccord moral (partie 1) indique que ce dernier puise sa source dans un imaginaire polémique, structuré par trois éléments : l’analogie, la métaphore, et le symbole. L’hybridation de ces éléments génère des réseaux symboliques, organisant la relation entre les protagonistes du désaccord.La généalogie du désaccord moral (partie 2) vise à déterminer empiriquement les origines de ces réseaux symboliques. Nous examinerons les processus psychologiques, anthropologiques, et socio-historiques sous-jacents au désaccord. Le rôle central de la famille –en tant que matrice, modèle, et objet du désaccord– sera ici souligné.La polémologie du désaccord moral (partie 3) s’emploie à réorganiser les réseaux symboliques dans une approche pragmatique et normative. Nous détaillerons les procédures visant à réguler les désaccords moraux et à transformer l’imaginaire polémique en imaginaire consensuel.S’ouvre alors la perspective d’une valorisation du désaccord, préalable indispensable à la réhumanisation de l’espace moral.Mots-clés : désaccord moral, philosophie morale, psychologie sociale, psychologie morale, imaginaire, analogie, métaphore, symbole, famille. / The aim of this study is to develop a theory in order to describe, explain, and regulate moral disagreements. Ours is an empirical approach to moral disagreement, based mainly on empirical data provided by social and moral psychology.The morphology of moral disagreement (part 1) reveals that it is drawn from polemical imagination, which consists of three key elements: analogy, metaphor, and symbol. Such hybridization gives birth to symbolic networks, organizing the relationship between the moral opponents.The genealogy of moral disagreement (part 2) aims to determine the sources of these symbolic networks. We will analyse the psychological, anthropological, and socio-historical processes underlying the moral disagreements. The key role of family – as matrix, model and object of disagreement – will be emphasized.The polemology of moral disagreement (part 3) attempts to reorganize the symbolic networks through a pragmatic and normative approach. We will analyse the procedures in view of a regulation including the transformation of polemical imagination into consensual imagination.Thus, moral disagreement must be reasserted, before any attempt to rehumanising the moral field.Key-words: moral disagreement, moral philosophy, social psychology, moral psychology, imagination, analogy, metaphor, symbol, family

This paper concerns the issue of ignorance about values, and how to best deal with it.I try to find out what we ought to do when we are ignorant of what it is valuable topromote. The proposed solution is an indirect system of “provisional values”, builtaround three goals that are likely to increase our chances of achieving real value,should such a thing be possible.These three provisional goals the system gives us are as follows: knowledge,optionality, and diversity.Knowledge is the traditional way of trying to relieve our ignorance and has beenthe focus of most philosophizing about value.Optionality means having options, or the power to act differently. This is likelyto become important should we ever discover what it is actually valuable to do.Finally, diversity is simply the idea that, not knowing what truly is valuable, weshould do as much as possible of everything in the hope that some of it may bevaluable. / Denna uppsats handlar om problemet med vår brist på kunskap om värde och hur manbäst hanterar det. Jag försöker ta reda på vad vi borde göra i situationer där vi ärokunniga om vilka mål som är värdefulla att uppnå. Den lösning som föreslås är ettindirekt system av ”provisoriskt värde”. Detta system är uppbyggt kring tre mål somsannolikt kommer att öka våra chanser att uppnå direkta eller verkliga värden, om ensådan sak skulle vara möjlig. Dessa tre provisoriska mål som systemet ger oss ärföljande: kunskap, optionalitet och mångfald.Kunskap är det traditionella sättet att försöka lindra vår okunnighet, och harvarit fokus för det mesta filosoferandet om värde.Optionalitet innebär att ha alternativ eller makten att agera annorlunda. Dettakommer sannolikt att bli viktigt om vi någonsin upptäcker vad det är värdefullt attgöra.Slutligen är mångfald helt enkelt tanken att om vi inte vet vad som verkligen ärvärdefullt så bör vi göra så mycket som möjligt av allt i hopp om att något av det kanvisa sig värdefullt.

This paper concerns the semantic branch of meta-ethics, and examines a version of so called semantic pluralism advocated by Michael Gill. Briefly put, Gill suggests that ordinary people’s usage of moral terms is rather messy in the sense that the meaning of moral terms can vary not only between different people, but also for one and the same person in different contexts. Such variability in word-meaning is explained by his assumption that people’s meta-ethical commitments are part of their moral thought and language, which is to say that their meta-ethical commitments have implications for the meaning of moral terms. In this paper I pursue two objectives. The first is exegetical and aim to clarify how Gill’s semantic pluralism in general, and his Indeterminacy- and Variability theses in particular, are intended to be understood—specifically in relation to the cognitivist/non-cognitivist debate. The second objective is argumentative. I first present and evaluate an objection to Gill’s semantic pluralism from Walter Sinnott-Armstrong who argue that Gill’s Variability thesis implies that interlocutors with different meta-ethical commitments are talking past each other rather than having genuine first order moral agreements and disagreements. I then argue that a similar problem occurs also for certain second order moral disagreements, particularly those in which moral terms are used rather than mentioned. I then argue that this is problematic not only on independent grounds, but also because it is inconsistent with the very assumptions Gill makes to support his view. My argument therefore appears forceful by Gill’s own lights. Combined, Sinnott-Armstrong’s objection and my own leads me to conclude that Gill’s semantic pluralism does not look promising.