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<p> The evolving complexity of our engagement with the world and the many challenges we now face as a numerous and technologically advanced species require us to develop a vision of reality and a way of participating within it that honors its dynamic complexity, creative potentiality, and ecological sensitivity. Drawing on the thought and vision of three inspiring and transformative thinkers who each sought to bridge the growing gap between the richness and complexity of lived experience and the barrenness and disconnection of scientific materialist philosophy&mdash;Carl Gustav Jung, Alfred North Whitehead, and Rudolf Steiner&mdash;this dissertation seeks to elaborate a relational, participatory, and evolutionary vision of reality and human existence in which individuality, relationality, and creative expression are understood as interdependent dimensions of a paradoxically single and manifold spiritual reality and evolutionary process. It then examines some of the essential implications of this emerging vision, with particular emphasis on the importance of the aesthetic, moral, and spiritual dimensions of human creative participation, including the existential participation that is inherent in thought and experience. This vision thus also suggests a fundamental shift in epistemological perspective, so that thinking and knowing are understood as inherently relational and creative acts, which both reflect and transform the realities they engage, and which are characterized by the moral, aesthetic, and spiritual consequences that accompany all influential action.</p>

The biological sciences are changing the ways in which we understand ourselves Biological Being is a philosophical exploration of biology, mapping some of the features of the field that make it so important in generating these changes Two central themes are at the heart of this exploration: biology is a science that should be grasped from a realist position, and it is a science that reveals a disunified, pluralistic world of kinds of things. After an introduction of some the issues involved, in three substantial chapters these themes are unpacked and analysed. The first major chapter is about experimentation and biology. In it the experimental realism of Hacking is rejected, whilst the core notion of intervention and manipulation of the world as a vital epistemic tool is retained. Similarities and differences between experiments in the physical and biological science are investigated. This comparison is continued in the second major chapter, which is about natural kinds and biology’s relationship to the physical sciences. Reductionism. even in its weaker forms, is rejected along with the notion of scientific unity Recent attempts by Rosenberg to understand biology as an instrumental science are contrasted with Dupré's realism, and a system of type-hierarchies that could support realism for biology described. The third major chapter then looks at biology and the construction of human kinds by the social sciences. A reading of Foucault is given that attacks the idea that there can be a simple distinction drawn between those sciences that discover and those which construct kinds. Biology's role in the social sciences is explored. A final chapter draws the components of the thesis together and seeks a general understanding of rationality underpinning the whole discussion in recent work by Putnam.

Orientador: Jonas Gonçalves Coelho / Banca: Paulo César Rodrigues / Banca: Eli Vagner Francisco Rodrigues / Resumo: Esta dissertação propõe um modo particular de leitura da obra do filósofo alemão Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). Partindo desse princípio, iremos nos defrontar com um problema que permeia a literatura acerca desse pensador, a saber, a questão da Kehre ou virada de pensamento, que ocorreu ao longo de sua vida filosófica, para isso, utilizaremos como fiocondutor os conceitos de linguagem e verdade, recorrentes nas suas obras. Ademais, perscrutamos os limites que tais ideias implicam dentro de alguns textos do filósofo, com vistas a vislumbrar o valor que essas ideias possuem na reflexão da virada de pensamento e como depende delas a ocorrência da Kehre. / Abstract: Our work proposes a particular way of work of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger reading (1889-1976). Based on this principle, we may face a problem that pervades the literature on this thinker, namely the question of the Kehre or turn of thought, which occurred throughout his philosophical life, for that we will use as wire conductor concepts of language and truth, recurrent in his works . In addition, we watch for the limits that these ideas imply in some philosophical texts, in order to glimpse the value that these ideas have in reflecting the turn of thought and depends on them as the occurrence of Kehre. / Mestre

<p> What if it was possible to attain enlightenment, or union with God, in the physical body? What if instead of using meditation or prayer to merely transcend embodied existence, practitioners were to transform the experience of their body in order to bring a sense of transcendence into their very physicality and the world itself? These questions are timely. There is much dialogue around the relationship of enlightenment, or union with God, and the body. Using a hermeneutic methodology, this study first explores 8 spiritual concepts (in 8 different spiritual traditions) that refer to subtle spiritual phenomena occurring in the body. These phenomena are alternatively described as a liquid, oil, nectar, or water that penetrates the body, and hypothesized to relate to consciousness as experienced through somatic awareness or awareness occupying the body. These concepts and traditions are as follows: <i>amata</i> (and rapture and pleasure) in Theravada Buddhism, <i>amr&dotbelow;ita </i> in Vajray&amacr;na Buddhism according to the Nyingma and Geluk school, <i> amr&dotbelow;ita</i> in Hinduism according to Hat&dotbelow;ha Yoga, <i> amr&dotbelow;ita</i> in neo-Advaita Ved&amacr;nta, "the descending force" in &Sacute;ri Aurobindo's Integral Yoga, the "water of life" in Christianity according to St. Teresa of Avila, <i>shefa</i> in Judaism according to the <i>Zohar,</i> and "presence" in A. H. Almaas' Diamond Approach. The first part of the study uses canonical texts and authoritative commentaries for hermeneutical analysis. Subsequently, by adopting a comparative methodological approach, the second part compares and contrasts the findings to understand the differences, similarities, and role of the experiences to which these 8 concepts refer in relation to the body and enlightenment, or union with God, as these spiritual goals are understood by each tradition.</p><p>

This dissertation examines the phenomenon of faultless disagreement: situations in which it seems that neither of two opposing sides has made a mistake in upholding their respective positions. I explore the way in which we ought to conceive of the nature of the kinds of claims that give rise to faultless disagreement and what the possibility of such disagreement reveals with a view to the rationality of tolerance. My starting point is a rather simple observation: persistent disagreements about ordinary empirical claims, say, that it's now raining outside or that Columbia's Philosophy Department is located at 1150 Amsterdam Avenue, are significantly more puzzling than persistent disagreements about matters of taste and value. Suppose you and I are standing at 1150 Amsterdam Avenue and you deny that this is where Columbia's Philosophy Department is located. My immediate--and I believe justifiable--reaction is to suspect that you suffer from some sort of cognitive shortcoming: bad eyesight, the influence of drugs, or what have you. As opposed to that, I am not particularly shocked to see that our disagreement about the tastiness of snails persists. More importantly, I would not want to say that you are mistaken in any real way if you call snails tasty. The problem is of course that if we are prepared to allow for the possibility of faultless disagreement, it seems inevitable to conclude that for certain subject matters the law of non-contradiction does not hold. The tension between this rather uncomfortable consequence and what seems to be a datum of our linguistic practices motivates the guiding question of my dissertation--namely, if there is a way to make sense of the phenomenon of faultless disagreement. In trying to do so, I make three central claims. First, I argue that the possibility of faultless disagreement is characteristic of what I call "basic evaluations." Evaluations are basic, on my account, not by being fundamental or universal, but by being rooted in the agent's sensibilities. Such evaluations are basic insofar as the agent cannot step outside of her inner frame of personal tastes and preferences. Second, I argue that what characterizes faultless disagreements is that there are no established methods of determining who has gotten things right. This is why we tend to think that the opponents may rationally stick to their respective positions--or, as I put in my dissertation, why we do not epistemically downgrade each other whenever we encounter such disagreements. The absence of established methods of resolution entails various epistemological challenges for realist accounts of the kinds of claims that give rise to faultless disagreement. The realist insists that despite the appearance that these disagreements are rationally irresolvable, at least one of the opposing sides must have made a mistake. But then she is forced to maintain either that we might lack epistemic access to the realm of evaluative facts and properties, or that we have access to this realm due to special evaluative capacities. Neither option is particularly attractive from the point of view of an agent. In response to such challenges I therefore propose a non-cognitivist, robustly anti-realist account of the subset of the evaluative domain of discourse that allows for faultless disagreement. I argue that we can make sense of the dimension of faultlessness, if we construe the relevant claims as expressions of our individual evaluative attitudes. More precisely, I suggest that we can construe them as dispositional intentions or plans to bring the world into line with what one deems worthy of pursuit. I also show how we can make sense of the dimension of disagreement by proposing a pragmatic account of the way in which evaluative attitudes can stand in relations of inconsistency. Third, I argue that whenever there is no way of demonstrating that one side has gotten things wrong, it is unjustified--at least from the point of view of a cognizer who abides by the norms of rationality--to reject a given conflicting evaluation as mistaken. When it comes to the kinds of claims that give rise to faultless disagreement it is thus a rational requirement to be tolerant of our opponents' positions. Contrary to a long-standing tradition that goes back to Locke and Mill I therefore take toleration to be not a moral, but an epistemic value. Moreover, I show that what is sometimes taken to be paradoxical about the kinds of situations that call for toleration is the result of a switch of perspectives: from the perspective of a valuer I genuinely disagree, say, with your claim that it's permissible to lie if this prevents hurting someone's feelings. But from the perspective of a cognizer I realize that I would be unjustified in rejecting your conflicting evaluation as mistaken.

This dissertation claims that Fenelon's political theory is ontologically instead of epistemologically based. His political theory is a moral theory of civic virtue. The ontological focus places the emphasis of his theory on the question of why and how individuals relate and contribute to civic society. This means that inner atonement of independency and dependency is a key to civic society and determination of free will, a connection Rousseau made at a later date. Fenelon does not approach this question from the standpoint of duty or obligation. He claims that the goodness of human nature has the potential of unselfish civic virtue. This goodness is perfected when the motives of action do not end in the self. It is the role of civic education, particularly through the example of words and deeds of those who hold political authority, to inculcate unselfishness. The viability and flourishing of civic society depend upon character development toward unselfishness. Because unselfish members do what they should because they want to do it, there is harmony between the individual and his tendency toward association. There is personal ownership of consciousness and action toward the well being of others. Fenelon's political theory is based on the principle of disinterestedness, a theological term with a rich history in Christian contemplative mysticism. Disinterestedness refers to detachment from selfish interest in sense based, emotional, or temporal acquisitiveness in favor seeking the welfare of others. Indifference to a person's actions stems from his motives. For Fenelon, love is the will's determining motive toward action. Motives vary on a spectrum from interest that is mercenary, or selfish, to that which is purely unselfish. All humans are capable of perfectibility toward unselfishness during temporal life, and social improvement is possible. Fenelon's concept of love provides an alternative to the seventeenth century Jansenist focus on human corruptibility, although Fenelon concedes the influences of social corruption. His concept of disinterestedness brought to a head the question of whether happiness has anything to do with interest. Because he maintains that personal happiness, satisfaction of desire, and utility are not factors in the concept of interest, he detaches happiness from the motive of ethical action. Fenelon's theory of property is a primary example of disinterestedness in his political theory. Fenelon's voluntaristic theory of free will is also crucial to his moral and political thought. Unfettered will determines itself with the impressions of reason, senses, emotions, and experience with that which incorporates all being, Infinite Goodness. Fenelon maintains the Cartesian distinction between the mind and the body. He also maintains Descartes's distinction between la pensa and la volonta. However, Fenelon expands Descartes's concept of will by incorporating influences of Christian contemplative mysticism. Here, Fenelon shifts from epistemology to ontology. The primary source of experience in the will is ontological and is not limited by what reason can ascertain about infinity. Morality stems from the fact that experience is relational. Good will is what is most perfect in man, and the will can experience its goodness only when it is creative and free of encumbrance, including limits of reason. The basis of the morally good will is ontological. The idea of union as Infinite Goodness is the basis of Fenelon's system of ethics One of the goals of this dissertation is to explain the role of language and rhetoric in Fenelon's theology and politics of virtue. Because moral value and inspiration are integral parts of phenomenological being, persuasiveness has a role in inculcating the spirit of association. Through rhetoric, persuasiveness has a vital role in communication within the polis. Rhetorical language is the means of communication among political beings. When moral value is identified as caring for others, rhetoric is the language of civic virtue and education. Civic education of disinterested virtue beckons individuals to bond unselfishly This dissertation uniquely provides an ontological explanation that connects the dots between Fenelon's metaphysics, theology, moral theory, and political theory. It also provides a strong foundation for further research.

We have two main aims: to construct mathematical models for analysing determinism, causality and supervenience; and then to use these to demonstrate the possibility of constructing an ontic construal of the operation of free will - one requiring both the presentation of genuine alternatives to an agent and their selecting between them in a manner that permits the attribution of responsibility. Determinism is modelled using trans-temporal ontic links between discrete juxtaposed universe states and shown to be distinct from predictability. Causality is defined on a temporal sequence of δ-algebras and quantified using a measure. The measure leads to definitions of causal overdetermination and epiphenomena. Proofs are constructed to demonstrate deterministic universes must carry their properties essentially but not necessarily locally. We argue determinism and causality are separate doctrines. These models and results are marshalled to put the case that a counterfactual construal of ontic choice cannot work. In response we propose ‘immanence' - a modified form of indeterminism whereby a universe can present choices to its denizens. We prove that beings subsumed within a universe cannot pilot their own actions. We then argue these beings can exercise free will only when selecting between choices inhering within immanent relata. A being is responsible for its selections if and only if it is constituted of a temporally evolving deterministic substructure. Our proposal is novel: it avoids injecting indeterminism into the decision process. Topological models for property supervenience are developed and used to reconstruct standard definitions from the literature. These are then used to demonstrate considerations of supervenience do not affect our arguments. We have demonstrated that a model of the exercise of free will involving both genuine choices and responsibility is possible but can only operate within a non-deterministic universe possessing specific traits.

In this dissertation, I re-interpret Spinoza's parallelism theory in the Ethics according to an original ontological, dualistic and idealistic perspective. The main thesis I put forward is that parallelism, and the dualism it harbours, is the only possible mediation between Spinoza's monism and his pluralism, i.e. between the unique substance and the 'infinite things in infinite modes' that follow from it. Second, I argue that the theory of parallelism is both coherent and unitary and no fracture should be viewed between Proposition 7 of Part II of the Ethics and its following Scholium. This interpretative strategy is original as it takes a route that is generally neglected by Spinoza scholarship, and thus is in contrast to those interpretations that see an unsurmountable contradiction in Spinoza's parallelism or that distinguish an ontological variant from an epistemological variant of it. Moreover, my interpretation of parallelism originally clarifies some obscure passages in later parts of the Ethics, such as the Spanish poet anecdote and the eternal mind doctrine. My interpretation is the result of a full-fledged idealistic interpretation that is based on the pronounced pre-eminence of the attribute of thought in Spinoza's system and that leads me to originally re-interpret some key doctrines of Spinoza's metaphysics, such as the conceptual independence of attributes that can be found in Proposition 10 of Part I. Additionally, in my dissertation, I draw some theoretical and historico-philosophical comparisons between Spinoza and past thinkers or his contemporaries (Scholastic authors, Descartes, Leibniz) as they clearly indicate that parallelism is an original and unprecedented thesis in the history of philosophy.

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