I argue that, because fundamental scientific theories are attempts to tell us something about reality, we are required to take into account the metaphysical features of those theories. I claim that a guarded realism is the proper stance to take toward fundamental scientific theories: philosophically, one must guard against accepting every posit at face value. Laws of nature are one of the posits of fundamental scientific theories and, since they are part of the nomic, I argue that they cannot be eliminated from the ontology of the world. I consider whether the nomic can be reduced to the Humean base and argue that doing so leaves us with no metaphysical explanation for the regularities we observe. I agree with Galen Strawson that the world requires a metaphysically real glue to hold it together and argue that this glue is accounted for by reifying the nomic and not reducing any of the nomic concepts to the Humean base. I argue, against Helen Beebee, that a regularity theorist about laws of nature and causation makes the world out to be a world without reasons for the regularities, which is not acceptable. I consider the Best System Analysis of laws of nature in conjunction with Humean Supervenience and show that it is not able to account for objective chance in a metaphysically acceptable way. I then turn to Armstrong’s contingent relation among universals account of laws of nature and consider Bird’s ultimate argument against it. I argue that one way to overcome the argument is to allow that some universals have nontrivial modal character, which is an acceptable solution for the nomic realist.

This thesis discusses questions about the legitimacy and scope of Aristotle's metaphysics as it applies to both living and non-living substances. Resolving such questions is necessary for articulating Aristotle's philosophical anthropology, and understanding the connections between Aristotle's major works. Terence Irwin provides one approach to establishing these connections, so I defend his account of Aristotle's Metaphysics from challenges that Aristotle's metaphysics of living things is mistaken and the scope of what things count as substances. I provide supporting arguments to show how Irwin's interpretation answers the first challenge and speculate how he could answer the second. By supporting Irwin, I hope to show that Irwin's argument, that a common philosophical method unites Aristotle's works, provides strong grounds for constructing Aristotle's philosophical anthropology. / Graduate

Intentionality is a feature of mental states that are directed towards objects. One puzzle of intentionality is that mental states can be directed towards nonexistent objects. We may relate to fictional characters, or worry about events that never take place. However, if these objects do not exist, then it is difficult to make sense of how it is that we bear these relations towards them. In this thesis I outline Graham Priest’s world-based semantic and metaphysical theory of intentionality intended to accommodate these intentional relations born towards nonexistent objects. Priest supposes that this theory is compatible with any conception of worlds. I argue that this is not the case. Within Priest’s framework merely possible worlds should be understood as existent genuine worlds, and impossible worlds can be neither existent genuine worlds, nor should they be conceived of as nonexistent objects. Instead impossible worlds must be something quite revolutionary. / Graduate / 0422 / carolynegarland@gmail.com

<p> This psychobiographical study explores the research and conclusions of Michael Murphy's theories on evolutionary panentheism and metanormal human potential. Murphy's diverse oeuvre renders it impossible to produce a comprehensive study without accounting for Murphy's integrality; multiple ways in which separate personal and professional events unite to create a whole. The current literature on Murphy appears as segmented overviews which inhibit thorough chronicling of his work. This lacuna contributes to a resistance to attend to Murphy's philosophy within an academic schema. By addressing his achievements as components within the totality of his worldview, the researcher demonstrates that Murphy deserves stronger academic recognition. </p><p> This qualitative study incorporates features of psychobiography, hermeneutics, and narrative analysis. Psychobiology emphasizes biographical and psychological development, allowing the researcher to use these aspects of Michael Murphy's activities to provide additional insight into his motivations, philosophies, and work-product. </p><p> This psychobiography uses Michael Murphy's literary and nonliterary works, as well as data obtained from interviews with Murphy, as representative constituents of his philosophical totality. Murphy's works integrate his (1) theory on evolutionary panentheism, which proposes a God that not only desires humanity within Its consciousness, but also "cares" for Its creations, residing within and evolving with them, (2) faith in the theories of involution&ndash;evolution, which maintain the existence of accessible levels of advancement, (3) innate trust in the interrelationship of all things, (4) evidence that advanced human potential has been part of humanity's development since the origins of contemplation, (5) conviction, stemming from data-driven research of metanormal occurrences, that humanity can evolve and transmute, (6) commitment to overcome the divisiveness of science and religio-mysticism, as well as the disparities of religious tenets, (7) humanist efforts to mitigate problems of the disenfranchised, persecuted, diasporic, and powerless factions of humanity; and finally, (8) trust in the inherent value and possibilities of human life. These components reflect Murphy's overarching goal: building a bridge between science and religion in order to facilitate an intelligent, integrated understanding of the natural and cosmological order--and the future it portends.</p>

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I argue that, because fundamental scientific theories are attempts to tell us something about reality, we are required to take into account the metaphysical features of those theories. I claim that a guarded realism is the proper stance to take toward fundamental scientific theories: philosophically, one must guard against accepting every posit at face value. Laws of nature are one of the posits of fundamental scientific theories and, since they are part of the nomic, I argue that they cannot be eliminated from the ontology of the world. I consider whether the nomic can be reduced to the Humean base and argue that doing so leaves us with no metaphysical explanation for the regularities we observe. I agree with Galen Strawson that the world requires a metaphysically real glue to hold it together and argue that this glue is accounted for by reifying the nomic and not reducing any of the nomic concepts to the Humean base. I argue, against Helen Beebee, that a regularity theorist about laws of nature and causation makes the world out to be a world without reasons for the regularities, which is not acceptable. I consider the Best System Analysis of laws of nature in conjunction with Humean Supervenience and show that it is not able to account for objective chance in a metaphysically acceptable way. I then turn to Armstrong’s contingent relation among universals account of laws of nature and consider Bird’s ultimate argument against it. I argue that one way to overcome the argument is to allow that some universals have nontrivial modal character, which is an acceptable solution for the nomic realist.

Thesis (Ph.D.) -- McMaster University, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 332-339). Also available via World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, 1909. / "First part of an essay upon theology and metaphysics." Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet. Also issued online.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 236-245).