After the battle of Cannae, Hannibal retired to the confines of his camp to celebrate the greatest defeat the Romans had ever suffered, and as the future would hold, anyone would suffer. "Hannibal's officers crowded round him with congratulations on his victory. The others all advised him, now that he had brought so great a war to a conclusion, to repose and allow his weary soldiers to rest for the remainder of that day and the following night. But Maharbal, the commander of the cavalry, held that no time should be lost. 'Nay, ' he cried, 'that you may realize what has been accomplished by this battle, in five days you shall banquet in the Capitol! Follow after, I Will precede you with the cavalry, that the Romans may know that you are there before they know that you are coming! - To Hannibal the idea was too joyous and vast for his mind at once to grasp it. And so, while praising Maharbal's goodwill, 'he declared that he must have time to deliberate regarding his advice. Then said Maharbal, 'In very truth the gods bestow not on the same man all their gifts; you know how to gain a victory, Hannibal;, you know not how to use one. ' That day's delay is generally believed to have saved the City and the empire. "'

This thesis is an exercise in military history and takes the form of an investigation into a notable late-nineteenth century blunder; the British Army’s failure to relieve Gordon at Khartoum. It seeks to lay bare operational realities which to date have been obfuscated by substantially successful acts of scapegoating and cover-up. Although political procrastination in Whitehall did not abate until August, the thesis contends that a timely operation of war would still have been possible, if only General Lord Wolseley had recognized that the campaign plan he had designed in April might not, some four months later, be fit for purpose. It proceeds to demonstrate that given revised constraints on time, a full-length Nile Expedition was no longer tenable. Alternative courses of action are also tested. Popular myth would have it that the relief expedition arrived at Khartoum only two days too late. The thesis contends that this is a contrivance propagated by Wolseley out of selfishly motivated concern for his place in history. Wolseley explained away the purportedly critical 48-hours by asserting that Colonel Sir Charles Wilson had unnecessarily stalled the campaign for two days. It was inferred that Wilson was professionally inept, lost his nerve and did not press far enough upriver to be certain that Khartoum had fallen. The thesis traces the course of the ‘Wilson Controversy’, analyses ‘Campaign Design’ and ‘Campaign Management’ in order to identify how and why the relief expedition went awry, and culminates in a closely reasoned adjudication on the validity of the allegations levelled against Wilson. The thesis concludes that the true extent of the British failure was in the order of 60 days; that the failure occurred at the operational level of war, not the tactical; and that accordingly culpability should properly be attributed to Wolseley.

Research is currently being prepared and initiated to analyse the French army’s military leadership perspective, and in the process researchers are interested in how other leadership theories would be applicable in the French army’s officer education. The purpose of this thesis is to highlight the perspective of a national Swedish military leadership theory in an international environment, and to study if the Swedish theory of Developmental leadership is also applicable outside a Swedish military educational context, specifically during the French army’s officer education. The research consisted of a qualitative literature analysis on a French doctrinal document, an observation and eight in-depth interviews, in order to establish to what extent the Swedish theory of Developmental leadership could be applied in the French army’s officer education. The author found that the Swedish theory of Developmental leadership could be applied as a good French army military leadership, as far as several of the informants and parts the French doctrinal document were concerned. However, the author also found a lack of leadership theory, regarding the French army’s military leadership and gives four suggestions on further research on the subject. / <p>Erasmus</p>

This thesis is an exercise in military history and takes the form of an investigation into a notable late-nineteenth century blunder; the British Army’s failure to relieve Gordon at Khartoum. It seeks to lay bare operational realities which to date have been obfuscated by substantially successful acts of scapegoating and cover-up. Although political procrastination in Whitehall did not abate until August, the thesis contends that a timely operation of war would still have been possible, if only General Lord Wolseley had recognized that the campaign plan he had designed in April might not, some four months later, be fit for purpose. It proceeds to demonstrate that given revised constraints on time, a full-length Nile Expedition was no longer tenable. Alternative courses of action are also tested. Popular myth would have it that the relief expedition arrived at Khartoum only two days too late. The thesis contends that this is a contrivance propagated by Wolseley out of selfishly motivated concern for his place in history. Wolseley explained away the purportedly critical 48-hours by asserting that Colonel Sir Charles Wilson had unnecessarily stalled the campaign for two days. It was inferred that Wilson was professionally inept, lost his nerve and did not press far enough upriver to be certain that Khartoum had fallen. The thesis traces the course of the ‘Wilson Controversy’, analyses ‘Campaign Design’ and ‘Campaign Management’ in order to identify how and why the relief expedition went awry, and culminates in a closely reasoned adjudication on the validity of the allegations levelled against Wilson. The thesis concludes that the true extent of the British failure was in the order of 60 days; that the failure occurred at the operational level of war, not the tactical; and that accordingly culpability should properly be attributed to Wolseley.

Project Thesis (D. Min.)--Denver Seminary, 2003. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 257-270).

This thesis is a participant observer and action research case study of the Royal Air Force’s efforts to improve its senior leadership from2007 to 2010. It addresses the research question: what are the conditions required to establish an egalitarian team in a military hierarchy? It examines the establishment of the Senior Leadership Team, designed to operate as a forum for the dissemination of the leader’s intent, dissemination of information, and generation of ideas. The literature review argues there are four bodies of relevant knowledge that derive from the research question: forming large teams, use of power, changing culture, and building interpersonal trust. From the literature, two models are considered, one for formation of large teams and another for establishing an egalitarian culture in a hierarchy. The theoretical position to examine the case study from is a combination of the four areas and the two models. The conclusions emphasise the need for leadership and facilitation to deal with the issues of behaviour; charade of cooperation; homogeneity and heterogeneity; effects of power, particularly on trust; group size paradox; and creating open discussion. The thesis argues, in this context, culture is akin to organisational identity and it examines how culture might be changed and sustained in a strict hierarchical organisation to ensure open discussion where all opinions are equal. The thesis identifies the fundamental importance of interpersonal trust for large informational or consultative teams that hold a different culture to their host organisation. In conclusion, the thesis argues that the models examined do not provide an adequate framework for this case study and tentatively puts forward a 7-factor model representing the conditions required to establish an egalitarian team in a military hierarchy. / © Cranfield University, 2014

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1965. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Bibliography: l. 31-32.

This dissertation is a study of Plutarch's portrayal of military leadership in his Parallel Lives. I investigate Plutarch's use of extended military narrative to provide examples of good generalship for his readers, his conception of the importance and dangers of a military education, his attitude toward the moral use of deception in warfare, and the importance of synkrisis to the reader's final assessment of a general's military ability. I conclude with a case study of the Pyrrhus-Marius, in which I examine how Plutarch uses military narrative throughout the pair to compare the generalship of the two men. I demonstrate that Plutarch's conception of generalship in the Parallel Lives is nuanced, consistent, and often significant to the interpretation of a pair. Plutarch constructs his military narratives in such a way as to identify specific acts of generalship through which the military leaders among his readership could evaluate and improve their own generalship. Plutarch's treatment of the morality of generalship is consistent with his views on education and character; while he accepts the necessity and appreciates the effectiveness of military deception, he also recognizes its limitations and holds up for criticism those generals who do not use it appropriately. I also examine the importance of the formal synkrisis at the end of each pair of Lives to the structural integrity of the Plutarchan book and the evaluation of military leadership in each pair. These concluding synkriseis demonstrate that Plutarch had a consistent set of criteria for evaluating the generalship of his subjects, and encourage the reader to make similar judgments on military ability themselves. This process of evaluation and comparison of military leadership is particularly important to my reading of the Pyrrhus-Marius, as comparing the military careers of its subjects allows for a more complete reading of the pair than is otherwise possible.

Military sexual assault continues to be a persistent problem for the Department of Defense despite the development of new reporting procedures. A sexual assault in the military can cause a lapse in mission accomplishment, negatively interrupt the victim's career, and lead personnel to fail at meeting high standards and expectations. The management of sexual assault complaints in the military has not been effective in preventing sexual assaults from occurring. This grounded theory study looked to explain how military leadership approaches the sexual assault complaint management process. Bronfenbrenner's (1979) ecological model of human development was the conceptual lens used for this study. Data were collected and analyzed from a sample of 20 ex-Air Force leaders using internet-based open-ended questions. Data analysis included first- and second-cycle coding, theoretical sampling, reflection, and ultimately the construction of a substantive theory. The study identified a bio-social operative (BSO) theory that suggests operational management of sexual assault complaints must encompass positive relationships between leaders and subordinates, coupled with constructive sexual assault prevention strategies and the eradication of preconditions such as biasness. This study contributes to social change through discovery of a theory that may provide military leaders and researchers with insights on how sexual assault complaint management is perceived from former military leaders. It also provides a basis for the development of future support programs that are tailored to the specific needs of military populations. These findings may ultimately raise awareness and contribute to the well-being and quality of life of military personnel.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of South Africa, 2001.