This thesis is a defense of the Content View on perceptual experience, of the idea that our perceptual experiences represent the world as being a certain way and so have representational content. Three main issues are addressed in this work. Firstly, I try to show that the Content View fits very well both with the logical behaviour of ordinary ascriptions of seeing-episodes and related experiential episodes, and with our pretheoretical intuitions about what perceiving and experiencing ultimately are: that preliminary analysis speaks for the prima facie plausibility of such a view. Secondly, I put forward a detailed account of perceptual episodes in semantic terms, by articulating and arguing for a specific version of the Content View. I provide arguments for the following theses: Perceptual content is two-layered so it involves an iconic level and a discrete or proto-propositional level (which roughly maps the seeing-as ascriptions in ordinary practices). Perceptual content is singular and object-dependent or de re, so it includes environmental objects as its semantic constituents. The phenomenal character of perceptual experience is co-determined by the represented properties together with the Mode (ex. Visual Mode), but not by the perceived objects: that is what I call an impure representationalism. Perceptual content is 'Russellian': it consists of worldly objects, properties and relations. Both perceptual content and phenomenal character are 'wide' or determined by environmental factors, thus there is no Fregean, narrow perceptual content. Thirdly, I show that such a version of the Content View can cope with the objections which are typically moved against the Content View as such by the advocates of (anti-intentionalist versions of) disjunctivism. I myself put forward a moderately disjunctivist version of the Content View, according to which perceptual relations (illusory or veridical) must be told apart from hallucinations as mental states of a different kind. Such a disjunctivism is 'moderate' insofar as it allows genuinely relational perceptual experiences and hallucinations to share a positive phenomenal character, contrary to what Radical Disjunctivism cum Naïve Realism holds. Showing that the Content View vindicates our pre-theoretical intuitions and does justice of our ordinary ascriptive practices, articulating a detailed and argued version of the Content View, and showing that such a version is not vulnerable to the standard objections recently moved to the Content View by the disjunctive part, all that can be considered as a big, multifaceted Argument for the Content View.

A broad review of assessment and intervention research relevant to Theory of Mind (Baron-Cohen, 1985) and Autism Spectrum Disorders from birth to age twelve was conducted. Nine assessment articles were reviewed to examine the major differences between children with autism spectrum disorders and children who are typically developing, particularly in the area of social perception. Assessment tasks aimed to discover a child's thoughts relevant to another's thoughts, beliefs, and emotions. It was discovered that children with autism spectrum disorders performed less well on Theory of Mind tasks, and tended to provide responses that were more egocentric and idiosyncratic in nature. A review of the intervention research revealed improvement in Theory of Mind domains is possible when teaching strategies explicitly target goals relevant to perspective taking. Generalization of skills to natural environments was a lacking area across all twelve articles, indicating a need for more intensive practice in natural environments. Interestingly, when social skills were taught in the absence of Theory of Mind training, no collateral effects were observed to Theory of Mind domain. / text

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This study was conducted to investigate the extent to which affectionate physical contact (i.e., cuddling) affects preschoolers’ and parents’ abilities to engage in theory-of-mind reasoning. We explored the hypothesis that if affectionate contact affected theory-of-mind, then preschoolers and parents who cuddled would outperform those who did not. To test this hypothesis, we recruited 44 preschool aged children (3.8-4.6-year-olds) and their primary caregivers. We found that children who cuddled with their primary caregiver during a storybook reading task performed significantly better on theory-of-mind tasks compared to children who did not receive a cuddle. Importantly, our findings support the contention that affectionate contact affected children’s performance on theory-of-mind related tasks specifically, but not performance on executive functioning or non-mental representation tasks. A secondary goal of this study was to explore whether any effects of affectionate contact would be mediated by functional polymorphisms of the oxytocin receptor gene (OXTR). Although we were unable to obtain a sample size that was sufficient to directly test this hypothesis, we found that parents homozygous for the G allele at rs2254298 were significantly better at decoding the affective mental states of others compared to those who carried at least one A allele. Thus, our results support the hypotheses that affectionate contact promotes children’s theory-of-mind reasoning abilities and that adult’s mental state decoding skills can be predicted by allelic variations on the OXTR gene. This study offers preliminary support for the role of affectionate contact and, separately, the oxytocinergic system on tasks related to theory-of-mind reasoning. These claims are discussed with respect to possible alternative explanations for our findings, as well as future directions to directly test the extent to which such experiential and psychobiological factors can affect theory-of-mind reasoning. / Thesis (Master, Neuroscience Studies) -- Queen's University, 2013-08-15 14:13:54.174

The philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche was significantly influenced by the theory of evolution, though his interest was almost solely in relation to the human psyche. However, while many topics of his philosophy are similar to current topics of discussion in science, reflection on these thoughts is rare. The aim of this dissertation is to present Nietzsche's pivotal thoughts about the nature, function and evolution of human consciousness, with subsequent reflection on these thoughts and on their embedding in the broader context of current scientific discussion. From the standpoint of Nietzsche's philosophy, the main themes of this work are the conception of consciousness as "social instinct"; the critique of conception of consciousness as human essence and related topics; and, from the standpoint of current science, the question of the mechanism of the evolution of the human consciousness. The conclusion deals with cognitive archaeology and its attempt to reconstruct the evolutionary history of the human mind. The appendix is about Nietzsche's relation to Darwinism.

Thesis advisor: Ronald Tacelli / Thesis advisor: Micah Lott / Physicalism has a problem: experience must derive from wholly physical things, but how can physical matter produce experience? An answer to this question may require a drastic change in the physicalist paradigm. Some propose Panpsychism as the best available response. Panpsychism contends that all physical matter has mental properties. To many such a notion is a sheer absurdity. Two mainstream responses may be more tolerable: Reductionism and Emergentism. Panpsychism is defensible only if these alternate approaches fail. This project lays out the logic of the panpsychist arguments against reductionism and emergentism, as well as stating an overall case for physicalist panpsychism. The apparent absurdity of panpsychism will be found trivial in comparison with the remaining difficulties for more traditional physicalist approaches. Panpsychism should therefore be considered a viable option on the mind-body problem. Despite outstanding difficulties with the view, it has considerable theoretical value and cannot be merely considered an absurd position. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2015. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Arts and Sciences Honors Program. / Discipline: Philosophy.