This paper is an analysis of aspects of Daniel Dennett's theory of human consciousness. For Dennett, the reasons why human consciousness is so unique among earthly creatures, and so manifestly powerful, are not to be found in the differences between our brains and those of other higher mammals, but rather in the ways in which the plasticity of our brains is harnessed by language and culture. According to Dennett, the best way to understand the enhancements and augmentations that result from enculturation is as a von Neumannesque virtual machine implemented in the parallel-distributed processing brain. This paper examines two questions that arise from the latter hypothesis: (1) If nonsymbolic, parallel-distributed networks accomplish all the representation and computation of the brain, what kind of explanation of the functionality of that brain, can legitimately maintain descriptions of procedures that are symbolic, serial, and real? (2) What kind of structural design, training, and resultant processing dynamics could enable a (human) brain to develop a competency for symbolic, serial procedures? Through addressing these questions, I argue that Dennett's theory of consciousness is broadly correct, investigate some other theorist's ideas that are highly compatible with Dennett's work, and consider some criticisms that have been levelled against it. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal, Durban, 2003.

The current study examined whether there is a curvilinear association between differential parenting and children’s Theory of Mind (ToM) and two similar abilities we defined as “ToM- in-Action”. These were, use of perspective taking language and cognitive sensitivity (providing tailored verbal or non-verbal guidance) while completing a challenging task with a younger sibling. A community sample of 372 children (52% were males, average age=5.6), their younger siblings (average age=3.14) and their mothers were observed in their homes. Findings showed a linear association rather than a curvilinear effect, where favored older siblings had significantly poorer cognitive sensitivity and perspective taking when interacting with their younger sibling in a challenging task. This relationship remained significant when other variables such as age and SES were controlled. The relationship between differential parenting and ToM was non-significant. Results demonstrate the specific and complex impact of differential parenting on children’s social cognition.

The aim of this dissertation is to analyse two notions which inform contemporary evolutionary psychology. In Part I Tooby and Cosmides' (1992) Standard Model thesis of the history of twentieth century social science is examined with regard to social psychology. In Part II the practical and theoretical fecundity of the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness is examined, again with regard to social psychology. The analysis of the Standard Model thesis yields the result that it is not reliable as an intellectual history of social psychology. A principal reason for this is the failure of the thesis to acknowledge the instinct debate of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Further consideration of the instinct debate leads to the conclusion that evolutionary psychology may be in the process of repeating the history of social psychology rather than making substantive advances. The analysis of the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness concept yields two results. Firstly, in use it fails to accommodate the findings of palaeontology. Secondly, it promotes a view of mental capacity and functioning that is at odds with that of modern humans. Further consideration of the natural history of the human lineage leads to the conclusion that the past was not, in some sense, ontogenetically prior to the present and that it will not furnish social psychology with an adaptation that functions in a predictable manner. In Part III it is recommended that an evolutionary approach to social psychology should dispense with the concept of adaptation as proposed by evolutionary psychology.

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DeGood and Kiernan (1996) demonstrated that chronic pain patients who assigned blame to others for their pain reported greater concurrent mood distress, behavioural disturbance, poorer response to past treatment, and lesser expectations of future treatment benefits than participants who did not blame anyone for their pain. The present study partially replicated the DeGood and Kiernan study. Subjects were 210 (110 males and 100 females) chronic pain patients from the Flinders Medical Centre Pain Management Unit in Adelaide, South Australia. Participants completed self-report measures of demographic, psychosocial, and behavioural variables. Contrary to DeGood and Kiernan's (1996) results, other-blame was not found to be a significant predictor of poor response to past pain treatments. Rather, linear multiple regression analyses revealed that a perceived sense of control over pain was a significant predictor of confidence in past pain relief treatments. A logistic regression revealed that time since onset of pain was the only significant predictor of the tendency to blame others. Implications of this study for chronic pain research and treatment are discussed. / Thesis (MPsy(Clinical))--University of South Australia, 2005.

Thesis (Specialist in School Psychology)--Eastern Illinois University, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 35-36).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2004. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 332-343).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 127-132).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2000. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 110-113). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users. Address: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p9963444.