Submitted by Rodrigo Naumann (naumann.rodrigo@gmail.com) on 2018-04-19T17:10:40Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertation_RNaumann.pdf: 979702 bytes, checksum: d1fa4b5a30cfc47fe78652e87c5fd4cf (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by GILSON ROCHA MIRANDA (gilson.miranda@fgv.br) on 2018-04-20T20:16:09Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertation_RNaumann.pdf: 979702 bytes, checksum: d1fa4b5a30cfc47fe78652e87c5fd4cf (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-08T14:39:53Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertation_RNaumann.pdf: 979702 bytes, checksum: d1fa4b5a30cfc47fe78652e87c5fd4cf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-28 / This paper studies incentives for information gathering in a monoposonist pricing setting. Our motivation stems from public procurement contracts where the government is the single buyer, and the true cost of providing the good is ex ante uncertain to potential suppliers. We develop a simple bilateral, monopsonistic trade model, based on Roesler and Szentes (2017), where the seller only observes a signal about actual production cost. The model is intended to highlight how information about seller's cost affects resource allocation, price, and buyer welfare. More specifically, for any given continuous cost distribution, we characterize the seller-optimal learning. Taking the uniform prior as our benchmark case, we illustrate that seller's equilibrium strategy induces less information acquisition than would be desired by the buyer. We also show that efficient trade may not happen with probability one under some seller-optimal signal structures.

This thesis deals with the determination of the player labour market for the American professional sports league Major League Soccer (MLS). In the theoretical part I focus on the description of the league's development along with the salary politics rules. Using the two stages least square method in the empirical part I then provide the model for the estimation of player's marginal productivity (MRP). In the first step I explain the correlation between the percentages of obtained points by teams with player statistics. In the second step I examine the influence of this variable along with other factors on team's revenues from attendance. Afterwards I compare the calculated player's MRP with their salaries and also test some additional factors that might influence players' salaries. Using this model and also some other simple regressions I conclude that MLS labour market is a monopsony market structure. Besides I found out that forwarders market seems to be the closest part of the MLS labour market to the competitive market structure. In conclusion I discuss possible model's weaknesses, which turned out to be especially dependency of players on their co-players' on-field performance.

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The focus of this dissertation is imperfectly competitive sports labor markets and the effects of league labor policy on player mobility, compensation, and job location choice. The analyses conducted herein contributes primarily to a broad area of research within sports economics that generally uses changes in league labor rules to examine employer monopsony power and the validity of the Invariance Principle, which states that the distribution of playing talent in a sports league is invariant to the ownership of the rights to players’ services. After a critical review of the literature and some background on the National Basketball Association (NBA), a broad-to-narrow approach is used to present evidence from three empirical essays. Essay one examines the effects of 40 years’ worth of institutional change on competitive balance in the NBA. Essay two investigates the effects of more recent free agency rules on player mobility and pay. Finally, essay three narrows the focus a bit further to the effects of nonwage job characteristics on player wages and the implications of such nonwage attributes for player movement. / Tourism and Sport

L'Organisation Internationale de Labellisation du Commerce Equitable FLO ( Fairtrade Labelling Organization ) a la responsabilité de l'élaboration des standards du Commerce Equitable pour les organisations de petits producteurs dans trois volets, soit les volets économique, social et environnemental. FLO élabore aussi des standards commerciaux pour les produits labellisés Commerce Equitable (aussi appelés dans ce travail : produits équitables) ; pour exemple, Max Havelaar est l'un des labels qui certifient que la production et la commercialisation d’un produit sont faits selon des standards du Commerce Equitable. Alors qu'il existe des informations sur le prix minimum du Commerce Equitable pour les fèves de cacao (Theobroma cacao) ou sur le prix équitable (prix minimum du Commerce Equitable + un prime) Free on Board (FOB) que reçoivent les producteurs certifiés Commerce Equitable de cacao de pays du Sud, il n’y a pas assez d’informations sur les prix que reçoit le producteur équitable « à la porte de sa ferme ». Afin de mieux connaître le prix équitable que reçoivent « directement » les producteurs de cacao, nous avons sélectionné la Coopérative « Le CEIBO » en Bolivie. Une démonstration basée sur l’étude du cas du prix des fèves de cacao et la comparaison du prix équitable et du prix conventionnel dans la Région de Alto Beni. Bien que le CEIBO soit en situation de monopsone, la tendance du pourcentage de prix FOB que reçoivent les petits producteurs de fèves de cacao d'Alto Beni en général est à la hausse entre la période 2000-2006. / The International Fair-Trade Labelling Organization has the responsibly of elaborating the norms of fair-trade applied to the organisations which group small producers in three sectors i.e. Economical, social and environmental. FLO also sets the trade standards for the products labelled Fair Trade (also named in this work: fair products): for example, Max Havelaar is one of the labels which certifies the production and commercialisation of a product made as per the norms of fair trade. Although there is some information on the minimum price for fair trade concerning the cocoa-nibs (Thobroma cacao) or on the fair price (minimum price for fair trade + Subsidy) Free On Board (FOB) which are allowed to the certified fair trade cocoa producers in Southern countries, there is not enough information about the price perceived by the fair trade producer at the “Farm Gate”. In order to know better the fair price that the producers of cocoa receive “directly”, we have chosen the Cooperative “Le CEIBO” in Bolivia, a model based on the study of the price of the cacao-nib and the comparison with the fair price and the conventional price in the Alto Beni region. Though the CEIBO is in a situation of monopsony, the perception of the small cacao-nibs producers is that the percentage of the FOB price has generally risen between 2000-2006 in Alto Beni.

This thesis deals with determination of the labor market structure for professional athletes, specifically the market for players of National Hockey League (NHL). The theoretical part focuses on the development of labor market for athletes and changes in rules that affected this development. In the empirical part I present a model for determining the marginal revenue product (MRP) of players. Further I determine the impact of other factors that have an influence on wage differences between players. Taking all the results I specify the type of market structure, which I determined on the basis of the relationship between MRP of players and their wages. I find out that the market for defenders and forwards of NHL is rather competitive, unlike the market for goalkeepers, which is best describable by the "winner-take-all" theory. At the end of the thesis, the possible errors in the model and data that could affect the outcome are summed up.

This dissertation is a collection of three economics essays on different aspects of carbon emission trading markets. The first essay analyzes the dynamic optimal emission control strategies of two nations. With a potential to become the largest buyer under the Kyoto Protocol, the US is assumed to be a monopsony, whereas with a large number of tradable permits on hand Russia is assumed to be a monopoly. Optimal costs of emission control programs are estimated for both the countries under four different market scenarios: non-cooperative no trade, US monopsony, Russia monopoly, and cooperative trading. The US monopsony scenario is found to be the most Pareto cost efficient. The Pareto efficient outcome, however, would require the US to make side payments to Russia, which will even out the differences in the cost savings from cooperative behavior. The second essay analyzes the price dynamics of the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), a voluntary emissions trading market. By examining the volatility in market returns using AR-GARCH and Markov switching models, the study associates the market price fluctuations with two different political regimes of the US government. Further, the study also identifies a high volatility in the returns few months before the market collapse. Three possible regulatory and market-based forces are identified as probable causes of market volatility and its ultimate collapse. Organizers of other voluntary markets in the US and worldwide may closely watch for these regime switching forces in order to overcome emission market crashes. The third essay compares excess skewness and kurtosis in carbon prices between CCX and EU ETS (European Union Emission Trading Scheme) Phase I and II markets, by examining the tail behavior when market expectations exceed the threshold level. Dynamic extreme value theory is used to find out the mean price exceedence of the threshold levels and estimate the risk loss. The calculated risk measures suggest that CCX and EU ETS Phase I are extremely immature markets for a risk investor, whereas EU ETS Phase II is a more stable market that could develop as a mature carbon market in future years.

Tratamos neste trabalho de um tema quase esquecido no direito brasileiro: a inconsistente interação entre antitruste e política de emprego na ação administrativa do CADE. Nesse contexto, o problema que se enfrenta é a falta de transparência do Conselho quanto às razões jurídicas para o abandono de antigas preocupações com nível de emprego no controle de concentrações. A questão que propomos responder é a seguinte: como o CADE deveria justificar seu definitivo distanciamento da regulação do mercado de trabalho? Em resposta, defendemos a tese normativa de que a utilização da análise econômica para justificar o rompimento da interação entre antitruste e política de emprego produziria uma forma de argumentação inaceitável do ponto de vista lógico. Diante da questão posta acima, este trabalho busca oferecer um juízo de valor acerca da plausibilidade de argumentos baseados em teoria econômica eventualmente adotados pelo CADE como justificativa para o abandono de suas preocupações com nível de emprego. Para tanto, tomamos o direito concorrencial como uma forma de discurso produzido por raciocínios práticos, dentro do qual a análise econômica do direito torna-se uma técnica de argumentação consequencialista. / This masters thesis deals with an almost forgotten topic in Brazilian competition law: the inconsistency in CADE decision-making as to the interactions between antitrust and employment policy. In this context, we face the problem of lack of transparency regarding the legal reasons for the Council to abandon its concerns with employment level in merger control. The research question to be answered is the following one: how should CADE justify its decision to definitively withdraw from the regulation of labor markets? In response, our claim is that the use of economic analysis to justify the broken interaction between antitrust and employment policy could lead to a form of argumentation logically unacceptable. In view of the question above, this thesis offers a plausibility evaluation of arguments derived from economic theory that CADE may further in support of its decision to give up concerns with employment level. To do so, we take competition law as a discourse produced by practical reasoning, in which the economic analysis of law becomes a technique for consequentialist argumentation.

Tratamos neste trabalho de um tema quase esquecido no direito brasileiro: a inconsistente interação entre antitruste e política de emprego na ação administrativa do CADE. Nesse contexto, o problema que se enfrenta é a falta de transparência do Conselho quanto às razões jurídicas para o abandono de antigas preocupações com nível de emprego no controle de concentrações. A questão que propomos responder é a seguinte: como o CADE deveria justificar seu definitivo distanciamento da regulação do mercado de trabalho? Em resposta, defendemos a tese normativa de que a utilização da análise econômica para justificar o rompimento da interação entre antitruste e política de emprego produziria uma forma de argumentação inaceitável do ponto de vista lógico. Diante da questão posta acima, este trabalho busca oferecer um juízo de valor acerca da plausibilidade de argumentos baseados em teoria econômica eventualmente adotados pelo CADE como justificativa para o abandono de suas preocupações com nível de emprego. Para tanto, tomamos o direito concorrencial como uma forma de discurso produzido por raciocínios práticos, dentro do qual a análise econômica do direito torna-se uma técnica de argumentação consequencialista. / This masters thesis deals with an almost forgotten topic in Brazilian competition law: the inconsistency in CADE decision-making as to the interactions between antitrust and employment policy. In this context, we face the problem of lack of transparency regarding the legal reasons for the Council to abandon its concerns with employment level in merger control. The research question to be answered is the following one: how should CADE justify its decision to definitively withdraw from the regulation of labor markets? In response, our claim is that the use of economic analysis to justify the broken interaction between antitrust and employment policy could lead to a form of argumentation logically unacceptable. In view of the question above, this thesis offers a plausibility evaluation of arguments derived from economic theory that CADE may further in support of its decision to give up concerns with employment level. To do so, we take competition law as a discourse produced by practical reasoning, in which the economic analysis of law becomes a technique for consequentialist argumentation.

The thesis analyzes how minimum wage influences unemployment in the Czech Republic. Firstly, the economic theory is researched and the conclusion is that the Czech labour market is very similar to a monopsony market due to the low mobility of the workforce and the low rate of immigration. Another result is that the level of wages in developed economies does not depend on the productivity of the workforce anymore, so minimum wage laws have psychological impacts rather than economical. The following part of this thesis is dedicated to the comparison of labour market indicators between european countries. The last chapter investigates the main hypothesis with a dataset from the Czech Republic between 1993-2014 using the econometric model. A 1% increase of real minimum wage resulted in a 0.01% increase in the general unemployment rate and a 0.1% increase of unemployment among the young population. But if the minimum wage will be raised during the times of real GDP growth, influence on unemployment will be eliminated.