The main objective of this thesis was to investigate the proposition that moral emotions act as antecedents of political attitudes. My approach (Chapter 1) stems from moral foundations theory, which proposes that liberals and conservatives have different moral values (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Chapter 2 presents Study 1, an experimental test of the hypothesis that induced disgust leads participants to adopt more left-wing economic attitudes in comparison to a control condition (sadness). Results supported this hypothesis. Chapter 3 reviews emotion-regulation theories, and presents Study 2, which investigated whether emotion-regulation strategies, disgust sensitivity (DS-R), and private body consciousness (PBC) moderate the effects found in Study 1. As predicted, disgust led to more left-wing economic attitudes, but this was only the case for high-PBC and high-DS-R participants. Chapter 4 presents Study 3, which replicated Study 2, and showed dissociations between the effects of disgust on economic and social attitudes. Chapter 5 presents a cross-sectional investigation (Study 4) that tested for associations between the predisposition to experience disgust and both social and economic attitudes. As predicted, core disgust and pathogen disgust were associated with left-wing economic attitudes and these effects applied only to British participants, and not non-British participants. Chapter 6 presents Study 5 – an experiment investigating the relationship between disgust and prejudiced attitudes towards outgroups. Induced disgust led to more prejudiced attitudes towards a novel group than both sadness and neutral emotion. Chapter 7 is focused on two self-conscious moral emotions: guilt and shame. Study 6, presented in this chapter, found a positive association between guilt proneness and left-wing economic attitudes, and a relationship between shame proneness and social-conservative attitudes. Study 7 failed to reveal causal relationships between incidental guilt and shame and political attitudes. Chapter 8 presents the general discussion addressing limitations, implications, and future research directions.

This study examined self-reported emotions and emotional facial expressions following moral transgressions using an ethnically diverse sample of 242 4-, 8-, and 12-year-old children. Self-reported emotions were examined in response to three transgression contexts: an intentional harm, an instance of social exclusion, and an omission of a prosocial duty. Children’s emotional expressions of sadness, happiness, anger, fear and disgust were analyzed immediately after being asked how they would feel if they had committed one of the described transgressions. Emotional expressions were scored using automated emotion recognition software. Four-year-olds reported significantly more happiness as compared to 8- and 12-year-olds. In addition, self-reports of sadness decreased between 8- and 12-year-olds, while self-reported guilt increased between these age groups. Furthermore, 4- and 8-year-olds demonstrated higher levels of facially expressed happiness than 12-year-olds. These findings highlight the role of automatic affective and controlled cognitive processes in the development of children’s emotions following moral transgressions.

This study examined self-reported emotions and emotional facial expressions following moral transgressions using an ethnically diverse sample of 242 4-, 8-, and 12-year-old children. Self-reported emotions were examined in response to three transgression contexts: an intentional harm, an instance of social exclusion, and an omission of a prosocial duty. Children’s emotional expressions of sadness, happiness, anger, fear and disgust were analyzed immediately after being asked how they would feel if they had committed one of the described transgressions. Emotional expressions were scored using automated emotion recognition software. Four-year-olds reported significantly more happiness as compared to 8- and 12-year-olds. In addition, self-reports of sadness decreased between 8- and 12-year-olds, while self-reported guilt increased between these age groups. Furthermore, 4- and 8-year-olds demonstrated higher levels of facially expressed happiness than 12-year-olds. These findings highlight the role of automatic affective and controlled cognitive processes in the development of children’s emotions following moral transgressions.

Results from 10 empirical studies and 1 review article are described and can be summarized as follows: Only moral emotions represent an evaluation of person's behavior, whereas non-moral emotion provide information about outcomes. Positive moral emotions (e.g. pride, respect) signal that a person's (self or other) behavior was right, whereas negative moral emotions (e.g., guilt, indignation) signal that a person's behavior was wrong. These evaluations and signals are elicited by judgments of ought, goal attainment and effort (see Heider, 1958). Some moral emotions (e.g., shame or admiration) are also elicited by judgments on a person's ability. A person's responsibility (Weiner, 1995, 2006) and the perceived morality of a person's behavior (i.e., with regard to rightness and wrongness) represent further cognitive antecedents of moral emotions. Some moral emotions (e.g., regret, sympathy) are also influenced by a person's empathy (see Paulus, 2009) towards others. There are specific moral emotions that are closely connected to help-giving (e.g., sympathy), whereas other moral emotions are more closely related to reward (e.g., admiration) or punishment (e.g., anger). With regard to the cognitive effort underlying emotions, moral emotions require more cognitive effort (i.e., longer reaction times) than non-moral emotions.

xiii, 173 p. : ill. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number. / Prior research has tended to focus on rational (e.g., collective social action and cost-benefit factors) rather than emotional processes when predicting boycott intention. The current dissertation proposes that both processes contribute to a boycotting decision and that each is premised on a perceived moral violation. A model is offered in which boycott intention is conceptualized as a consumer coping response. Three studies provide support that moral emotions and cost-benefit factors independently contribute to overall consumer boycott intention. In Study 1, online survey responses from active boycotters (N = 121) indicated that participants felt other-condemning moral emotions more acutely in symbolic boycotts than in non-symbolic boycotts. In Study 2, the theoretical relationship between perceived moral violation, boycott intention, and boycott behavior was established in a simple experiment (N = 201). In Study 3, experimental results from a real world consumer panel (N = 709) indicated that the key to diffusing consumer boycott intention is counter-message tactics aimed at reducing overall perceived moral violation. Path analysis using the data from Study 2 and 3 provided additional insight into the structure of the proposed model. Other-condemning and self-conscious emotions, along with perceived boycott benefit (ability to make a difference and self-enhancement), contributed to boycott intentions whereas cost perceptions played a lesser role in predicting boycott intention. Comparisons between the hypothesized model and a set of alternatives supported the proposition that boycott intention may be conceptualized as a coping behavior. Finally, the results of a path analysis indicated that two individual difference variables were determinants of perceived moral violation: humanitarian- egalitarian orientation and negative attitude towards big businesses. / Committee in charge: Robert Madrigal, Chairperson, Marketing; Lynn Kahle, Member, Marketing; David Boush, Member, Marketing; Robert Mauro, Outside Member, Psychology

This thesis aims to investigate and present what the most recent research can disclose about moral emotions and their neural correlates. This literature review provides an overview of some frameworks and theories regarding moral emotions and their neural correlates, with a specific focus on positive and negative moral emotions such as compassion, pride, gratitude, guilt, shame, and embarrassment. The theoretical background of moral emotions within cognitive neuroscience has been introduced together with research of the emotional brain and morality to further clarify the main topic of this thesis, moral emotions and their neural correlates. Moral emotions are very crucial in understanding humans’ behavioural adherence to their moral standards. For example, shame is described as the way we relate and perceive ourselves. It is related to how we believe and think other people see us and our incompetence or failure to fulfil the desire to be a good person, e.g. “I think, feel and believe that I am a bad person for lying to someone”. These topics have been discoursed through this thesis showing significant results. There are many neural regions, e.g. medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) which get activated whilst experiencing distinct moral emotions. However, studies have shown that there is no one-to-one correspondence between a specific brain area and a specific emotion, instead, research has suggested there are particular topographical anatomical networks in the brain which get activated when experiencing different emotions. There are few studies in this field; their results should be taken with caution. The field continues to grow, and we can learn more about moral emotions and their neural correlates today and in the future.

Background:  The comfort of buying online satisfies consumers more than the traditional way of shopping in stores. Buying fashion online is highly influenced by consumers' fashion consciousness and their personal values which enhances the willingness and dependence to buy new products. Emotional needs come from moral emotions and can be felt frequently by consumers in the thought of purchasing, and can interfere with the sustainability aspects.    Purpose: The purpose of this study to understand how moral emotions can shape the consumers decision making in regards to consumption of fashion. Since sustainability awareness is increasing, the study further aims to investigate whether or not this aspect will further have an effect. Methods:  The research is a qualitative study, which is made by semi-structured interviews of different consumers with different buying behaviour. It is analysed with a deductive and inductive approach to thematically analyse and enable an interpretative method to find differences, themes and new experiences.  Conclusion: There is evidence on moral emotions affecting the decision-making of fashion purchases. It does not necessarily shape a sustainable consumer behaviour but rather find obstacles for the consumers to act according to their own ethical obligations.

Shame is a self-conscious emotion that characterizes the life of all individuals. It arises when a moral violation occurs and the person is judged negatively by others for a way of being that does not correspond to the standards of society. Although over the years it has been widely treated from a theoretical point of view, there are few attempts in the literature to approach it scientifically by psychologists and neuroscientists. Using an integrated approach, based on neuroimaging, behavioral and neuropsychological investigations, in this thesis we aimed to investigate what are the cognitive mechanisms through which shame operates and what are its neural bases. After an initial theoretical introduction in which a novel model of shame functioning is proposed, two behavioral studies are presented in which an innovative experimental paradigm of shame elicitation has been validated and tested. Subsequently, the single-case of a patient with rare bilateral amygdala damage has been described. Since this region is notoriously crucial for emotional aspects, we tested the possibility that an amygdala injury could also lead to deficits in perception and recognition of shame. Afterward, to investigate if shame had its own specific neural activation map, a meta-analysis on functional studies in the literature that investigated the neural bases of shame and guilt (another self-conscious emotion) has been carried out. Finally, given the heterogeneity of the paradigms included in the meta-analysis, we run an fMRI study using our novel paradigm in order to detect shame neural signal. In general, by combining different methodologies, this work allowed us to approach shame from different perspectives, from simple elicitation and behavioral measurement to its neural basis. This has added a piece of knowledge in the field of affective neuroscience regarding a moral emotion (i.e. shame) that is fundamental to individual well-being within our society.

This research investigates the intricate interplay between the moral emotions of shame and guilt, within justice-involved populations, with a special focus on those deemed Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) due to Mental Disorder. Recognizing the pivotal role of offense-related shame and guilt in motivating behavior and influencing psychological functioning, we conducted an extensive investigation to underscore the significance of acknowledging moral injury (MI) and its symptoms within this context. By synthesizing two comprehensive studies, our objective was twofold: to shed light on the prevalence and effects of shame and guilt, and to introduce the concept of moral injury as a fundamental lens for understanding their impact. In the first study, we examined the influence of shame and guilt on motivating behavior and psychological well-being among offending populations. We found that shame consistently relates to adverse outcomes, including defensive behaviors, self-loathing, and externalizing behaviors such as blame-shifting. Contrary to our predictions, guilt was associated with constructive responses, such as self-forgiveness, empathic concern, and assuming responsibility for one's actions. However, both shame and guilt contributed to the risk of recidivism among certain offenders. This study illuminates the intricate dynamics between moral emotions, psychopathology, and recidivism, underscoring the need to acknowledge the differential influences of the moral emotions, shame, and guilt. In the second study, we developed and validated the Moral Injury Screener in the Offending Population NCR (MIO-NCR), a self-report measure that assesses MI in justice-involved individuals, particularly NCR individuals. Through rigorous psychometric analysis, the MIO-NCR demonstrated promising criterion and construct validity. Our findings emphasized the centrality of guilt and betrayal in MI experienced by NCR individuals, aligning with contemporary syndromal definitions. The MIO-NCR, an invaluable tool, enables promising identification of MI within the NCR population. By consolidating these studies, we found that shame and guilt manifest profoundly withinthe justice-involved population, underscoring the value of MI and its core symptoms. The current thesis not only reaffirms the importance of understanding moral emotions but also advances knowledge on MI within this unique context. Our research provides a framework for developing a comprehensive approach to intervention and rehabilitation that recognizes the intricate relations between moral emotions, psychopathology, and recidivism, ultimately fostering healthier outcomes for justice-involved individuals. / Thesis / Master of Science (MSc) / This study delves into moral injury experienced by individuals labelled non-criminally responsible (NCR) due to mental health issues within the criminal justice system. Moral injury captures the emotional turmoil, including guilt and shame, arising from engaging in morally conflicting actions or facing betrayal. Our research explores the influence of moral emotions like shame and guilt on those involved in criminal activities. We discovered shame often leads to negative behaviors and self-disapproval, while guilt promotes self-forgiveness and empathy. Both emotions impact the likelihood of reoffending. We also designed and validated a new tool, the Moral Injury Screener, to grasp moral distress in NCR individuals. This tool revealed that guilt and perceived betrayal are central to their moral struggles. Recognizing these feelings is vital for understanding and addressing moral injury within the criminal justice system.

Why does it appall us if the CEO of a German prime bank lays off his employees despite sufficient revenue? Why do we feel contempt for Klaus Zumwinkel, a well-known tax evader? Why is Bill Gates admired for donating billions of dollars to a foundation? The answer to these questions appears to be remarkably simple: Because one seems wrong whereas the other right. More precisely, it is either morally right or morally wrong. This dissertation deals with emotions that arise when we assess peoples’ actions. Such emotions can be described as moral emotions. On the one hand, I am particularly interested in how these emotions are created. On the other hand, the consequences of identifying these emotions and therefore the function of moral emotions take on a significant role for me as well. I proceed on the assumption that these emotions have a mediating role for subsequent actions. Therefore, the key issues are why we experience the emotions we have and moreover, what is to be expected when we feel these emotions. Here, moral emotions are of major importance when transitioning from thinking to acting. Weiner (2006) and Rudolph, Roesch, Greitemeyer and Weiner (2004) previously described emotional reactions as mediating factors between cognitive processes (attributions) and subsequent behavior. Similar to this sequential model, moral emotions supposedly serve as a quick and efficient basis for decision-making regarding subsequent behavior as the heuristics advocated by Gigerenzer and Todd (1999). Here, moral emotions function as ‘heuristic cues’ that can channel our behavior. Even modern theories in computer and information science depict the human being as an “emotional machine” making use of emotionally driven programs in order to mediate between dynamic input factors from nature and adaptive output processes in terms of behavioral reactions. (Minsky, 2007) The methods of my research rely on a true role model: Charles Darwin. In his work “The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals” from 1872, Darwin also considered the question of what role emotions play and how they are created. Darwin (1872) proposed six potential methods to examine emotions in more detail (for an overview see Meyer, Schützwohl, & Reisenzein, 2008). Although Darwin mainly focused on the phylogenetic history and particularly dealt with the expression of mimicking as well as the congenital and inherited trigger conditions of emotional reactions, his findings and methods nevertheless were the role model for generations of emotion researchers and are still of great relevance (Izard, 1971, 1991, 1992; Lazarus, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Rudolph, Schulz, & Tscharaktschiew, 2013; Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014; Tomkins, 1963, 1962; Weiner, 2006). So far, Rudolph, Schulz and Tscharaktschiew (2013) have presented an empirically supported taxonomy of moral emotions and thereby have identified universally valid leading conditions of moral emotions. They are guided by attributional concepts as previously described by Heider (1958) in the context of his naïve analysis of action using forced-choice methods for selecting emotions with their subjects. Rudolph et al. (2013) divided moral emotions into emotions that assess one’s own actions (so-called actor emotions) or other people’s actions (so-called observer emotions). It becomes apparent that our moral identification of emotions depends on whether a) this action was considered as good or bad in terms of a moral standard, b) the goal of an action was or was not attained and c) the acting person made or did not make an effort in doing so. These dimensions are known as ought (a), goal-attainment (b) and effort (c). I am particularly interested in whether the dimensions discovered by Rudolph et al. (2013) will appear in autobiographical and free reports. Furthermore, I will examine more in depth the scenarios predicted by the theory and individual emotions in different test settings. All studies are conducted on an empirical basis using quantitative and qualitative methods that were previously applied by Darwin (1872) in modified form. First, I will examine whether the categories ought, goal-attainment and effort established by Rudolph et al. (2013) could be traced in recalled reports of emotional episodes using qualitative methods. Afterwards, extremely similar emotions will be distinguished in enhanced detail using a category system. Emotions such as anger, disgust and despite will be scrutinized in an experimental setting for the first time. It will be determined whether a sequential model of cognition emotion behavior already develops by the early stages using the complex emotions schadenfreude and sympathy with preschool children. For prisoners and people suffering from a personality disorder, the emotions of guilt and shame will be distinguished. In addition, the link to future behavior as well as neurological particularities of such groups of people will be taken into consideration. In my work, I will intensively scrutinize the category system assumed by Rudolph et al. (2013). Simultaneously, emotions that have been extremely similar or strongly connected thus far will be analyzed and described to a finer extent. Eventually, results will allow for a better understanding regarding the prediction of subsequent behavior. / Wieso empört es uns, wenn der Vorstandsvorsitzende einer deutschen Großbank trotz sprudelnder Kassen Mitarbeiter entlässt? Wieso empfinden wir Verachtung für Klaus Zumwinkel, einen prominenten Steuersünder? Warum bewundern wir Bill Gates für seine Milliardenschenkung an eine Stiftung? Die Antwort auf diese Fragen scheint denkbar einfach: Weil das eine falsch, das andere dagegen richtig erscheint. Genauer gesagt: Es ist moralisch richtig oder moralisch falsch. In meiner Arbeit geht es um eben jene Emotionen, die entstehen, wenn Handlungen von Personen bewertet werden. Solche Emotionen kann man als moralische Emotionen bezeichnen. Dabei interessieren mich einerseits die Entstehung, andererseits die Konsequenzen eines solchen Emotionsempfindens und damit die Funktion der moralischen Emotionen. Ich gehe dabei davon aus, dass diese Emotionen einen vermittelnden Charakter für nachfolgende Handlungen haben. Die entscheidenden Fragen sind also: Warum haben wir die Emotionen, die wir haben? Und: Was ist zu erwarten, wenn wir diese Emotionen verspüren? Dabei nehmen die moralischen Emotionen eine Schlüsselrolle auf dem Weg vom Denken zum Handeln ein. Bereits Weiner (2006) oder Rudolph, Roesch, Greitemeyer und Weiner (2004) haben emotionale Reaktionen als vermittelnde Größen zwischen kognitiven Prozessen (Attributionen) und nachfolgendem Verhalten beschrieben. Ähnlich diesem Sequenzmodell sollten moralische Emotionen wie die von Gigerenzer und Todd (1999) propagierten Heuristiken als schnelle und sparsame Entscheidungsgrundlage für das nachfolgende Verhalten dienen. Bei einer solchen Betrachtung fungieren die moralischen Emotionen als ‚heuristic cues’, die unser Verhalten bahnen können. Sogar moderne Theorien im Fachbereich Informatik zeichnen das Bild vom Menschen als „emotionale Maschine“, die gefühlsgesteuerte Programme benutzt, um zwischen dynamischen Input-Größen aus der Natur und adaptiven Output-Prozessen im Sinne von Verhaltensreaktionen zu vermitteln (Minsky, 2007) Meine Untersuchungen folgen in der Auswahl der Methoden einem großen Vorbild: Charles Darwin. In seinem Werk „Der Ausdruck der Gemütsbewegungen bei dem Menschen und den Tieren“ (im englischen Original: The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals) geht Darwin (1872) ebenfalls den grundlegenden Fragen nach, welche Funktion Emotionen haben und wie sie entstehen. Dabei legt Darwin sechs mögliche Methoden vor, um sich mit Emotionen genauer zu beschäftigen (für einen Überblick siehe Meyer et al., 2008).Zwar liegt Darwins Fokus dabei eher auf der Stammesgeschichte und er beschäftigt sich vor allem mit dem mimischen Ausdruck sowie den angeborenen und vererbten Auslösebedingungen emotionaler Reaktionen. Dennoch waren und sind seine Erkenntnisse und die von ihm verwendeten Methoden das Vorbild für Generationen von Emotionsforschern (Izard, 1971, 1991, 1992; Lazarus, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c; Ortony et al., 1988; Rudolph et al., 2013; Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014; Tomkins, 1963, 1962; Weiner, 2006) Bisher haben Rudolph, Schulz und Tscharaktschiew (2013) eine empirisch gestützte Taxonomie moralischer Emotionen vorgelegt und damit allgemeingültige vorauslaufende Bedingungen moralischer Emotionen identifiziert. Sie orientieren sich dabei an attributionalen Konzepten, wie sie bereits Heider (1958) mit seiner naiven Handlungsanalyse beschreibt und benutzen dabei vor allem hypothetische Szenarien und vorgegebene Emotionswörter zur Untersuchung der Emotionen ihrer Probanden. Moralische Emotionen unterscheiden Rudolph et al. (2013), in solche Emotionen welche eigene Handlungen (so genannte Actor Emotionen) oder die Handlungen anderer (so genannte Observer Emotionen) bewerten. Es zeigt sich, dass unser moralisches Emotionsempfinden davon abhängt, ob diese Handlung a) bezogen auf einen moralischen Standard als gut oder schlecht gilt, b) das Ziel der Handlung erreicht wurde oder nicht und c) sich der Handelnde dabei angestrengt hat oder nicht. Diese Dimensionen bezeichnen wir als ought (a), goal-attainment (b) und effort (c). Mich interessiert in dieser Arbeit vor allem, ob sich die von Rudolph et al. (2013) gefundenen Dimensionen auch in autobiografischen Schilderungen und in freien Berichten wiederfinden. Darüber hinaus nehme ich die Voraussagen der Theorie und einzelne Emotionen in verschiedenen Untersuchungssettings genauer unter die Lupe. Alle Untersuchungen sind empirischer Natur und orientieren sich an den quantitativen und qualitativen Methoden, die in abgewandelter Form bereits Darwin (1872) benutzte. Als erstes prüfe ich anhand qualitativer Methoden, ob sich die von Rudolph et al. (2013) gefundenen Kategorien von ought, goal-attainment und effort auch in erinnerten Schilderungen emotionaler Episoden nachzeichnen lassen. Stark ähnliche Emotionen werden anschließend mithilfe eines Kategoriensystems noch besser unterschieden. Die Emotionen Ärger, Empörung und Verachtung werden in einem experimentellen Setting erstmals genauer unterschieden. Die Frage, ob sich ein Sequenzmodell von Kognition  Emotion  Verhalten bereits in frühen Entwicklungsstadien ausbildet, wird anhand der komplexen Emotionen Schadenfreude und Mitleid mit Vorschulkindern untersucht. Bei Strafgefangenen und Personen mit Persönlichkeitsstörungen werden die Emotionen Scham und Schuld näher unterschieden. Außerdem werden hier Zusammenhänge mit zukünftigem Verhalten sowie neurologischen Besonderheiten solcher Personengruppen betrachtet. Meine Arbeiten unterziehen einerseits das postulierte Kategoriensystem von Rudolph et al. (2013) einem harten Test. Gleichzeitig werden bisher stark ähnliche oder zusammenhängende Emotionen feiner analysiert und beschrieben. Schließlich ermöglichen die Ergebnisse ein besseres Verständnis für die Vorhersage von nachfolgendem Verhalten.