The United States emerged from the Second World War determined to play a leading role in the maintenance of international order. Increasing levels of tension between the United States and the forces of communism after 1945, however, slowly forced a redefinition of what might be more distinctly termed America's "global" responsibilities, such that by 1961 John F. Kennedy declared that the United States would "pay any price. . .in order to assure the survival and success of liberty." An identifiable Cold War consensus took shape based on the assumption that it was America's responsibility to lead, protect, and defend, the "free-world." Since America was effectively waging a battle to ensure the successful spread of its own values, the Cold War consensus also served to severely limit debate—dissent essentially implied disloyalty. By the mid-1960s, however, the Cold War consensus began to crack and a debate over American foreign policy began to emerge. That debate is the focus of this dissertation, which looks at the opposition to Cold War policies which emerged in the Senate, most notably among the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee --many of whom had once played a role in developing the very foreign policies they now protested. The war in Vietnam provided the focal point for much of the dissent, but the foreign aid program also became heavily criticized, as did America's NATO policy, particularly the size of the American military presence in Europe. More important, however, Senate dissenters came to question the United States' very position as the principle defender of the free world. They did not dispute the idea that America had a significant role to play in the global arena, but they did not believe that role should consist of being the world's policeman, the self-appointed arbiter of other’s affairs, and the keeper of the status quo. Because of their views, the so-called dissenters were labelled as "neo-isolationists." They saw themselves the true "internationalists," however, believing that the Cold War had led to confusion between internationalism and indiscriminate global involvement.

The end of the Cold War marks the beginning of the policy shift from strategic stability (the policy that guided U.S. and Soviet nuclear doctrine and acquisition strategies throughout the Cold War) to a new strategy privileging ballistic missile defence (BMD). Prior to this shift BMD programs were considered by both sides to be financially untenable, technologically unreliable, and dangerously destabilising and potentially catastrophic, primarily because they risked undermining the stability of a second strike capability and other stabilizing features of mutually assured destruction (MAD). I argue that this new environment is making missile defence a viable alternative to massive nuclear arsenals. In this new security environment Canada remains an anomaly. Canadian officials support NATO BMD programs but reject any bilateral and/or bi-national negotiations with Washington on continental BMD for North America. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I argue that Canada, through the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) agreement on early warning radars, is in fact part of missile defence.

The purpose of this study is to examine the utility of a just war explanation in understanding Canada’s decision to enter into the war in Afghanistan. It examines Canada’s three phases of the war under the lens of jus ad bellum. The concentration is upon jus ad bellum’s core criteria of legitimate authority, public declaration of intent, just cause, last resort, reasonable chance of success and proportionality and then applies it to the three phases. By examining Canada’s international role, paying close attention to Canada’s association with the UN, NATO and its ally status with the United State are important explanations of why Canada entered into the Afghanistan war. This analysis strives to provide a holistic comprehension by exploring the utility of an ignored body of explanation and extrapolates from this analysis the contemporary use of jus ad bellum.

24 mars 1999 påbörjar NATO för första gången i organisationens historia krigshandlingar med luftstridskrafter. Detta mot ett Serbien med Slobodan Milosevic i spetsen som utförde etniska rensningar på kosovoalbaner i Kosovo. Denna konflikt kom att från NATOs håll kallas operation Allied Force. Tre år innan denna konflikt urartade släppte Dr. Robert A. Pape en bok vid namn Bombing to win där Pape framför sina teorier för hur luftkrig och framförallt luftmakt skall genomföras. Tidigare forskning om Pape´s teorier och operation Allied Force visar att det finns vissa kopplingar mellan dennes teorier och den använda taktiken under luftkriget i konflikten. Syftet med denna undersökning är att försöka urskilja faktorer som påverkade utgången genom användandet av Pape´s teorier. Slutsatsen är att delar av Pape´s teorier inte applicerades tillräckligt mycket så att ett positivt resultat kunde nås. Analysen visar att NATO´s taktik i detta luftkrig är en blandning av olika teoretikers teorier, vilket kan förklaras med att flera olika politiska viljor har haft en stor inverkan på den utförda taktiken.

This paper evaluates the differences between U.S. multilateralism within ad hoc coalitions and U.S. multilateralism within permanent institutions – specifically NATO, the only standing defense alliance with which the U.S. is involved – within the context of the war in Afghanistan's COIN operations. Specifically, this work contrasts the strategies of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the portion of the war that was undertaken by U.S. forces and a coalition of allies, and the operations of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which were defined by U.S. cooperation with NATO. Along with contrasting the overarching strategies of OEF and ISAF, this thesis evaluates the tactical differences between the two operations as they presented themselves within two pairs of tactical maneuvers: OEF Operation Red Wings vs. ISAF Operation Siege of Sangin and OEF Operation Eastern Resolve II vs. ISAF Operation Panther’s Claw.

The purpose of this study is to examine the utility of a just war explanation in understanding Canada’s decision to enter into the war in Afghanistan. It examines Canada’s three phases of the war under the lens of jus ad bellum. The concentration is upon jus ad bellum’s core criteria of legitimate authority, public declaration of intent, just cause, last resort, reasonable chance of success and proportionality and then applies it to the three phases. By examining Canada’s international role, paying close attention to Canada’s association with the UN, NATO and its ally status with the United State are important explanations of why Canada entered into the Afghanistan war. This analysis strives to provide a holistic comprehension by exploring the utility of an ignored body of explanation and extrapolates from this analysis the contemporary use of jus ad bellum.

The United States emerged from the Second World War determined to play a leading role in the maintenance of international order. Increasing levels of tension between the United States and the forces of communism after 1945, however, slowly forced a redefinition of what might be more distinctly termed America's "global" responsibilities, such that by 1961 John F. Kennedy declared that the United States would "pay any price. . .in order to assure the survival and success of liberty." An identifiable Cold War consensus took shape based on the assumption that it was America's responsibility to lead, protect, and defend, the "free-world." Since America was effectively waging a battle to ensure the successful spread of its own values, the Cold War consensus also served to severely limit debate—dissent essentially implied disloyalty. By the mid-1960s, however, the Cold War consensus began to crack and a debate over American foreign policy began to emerge. That debate is the focus of this dissertation, which looks at the opposition to Cold War policies which emerged in the Senate, most notably among the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee --many of whom had once played a role in developing the very foreign policies they now protested. The war in Vietnam provided the focal point for much of the dissent, but the foreign aid program also became heavily criticized, as did America's NATO policy, particularly the size of the American military presence in Europe. More important, however, Senate dissenters came to question the United States' very position as the principle defender of the free world. They did not dispute the idea that America had a significant role to play in the global arena, but they did not believe that role should consist of being the world's policeman, the self-appointed arbiter of other’s affairs, and the keeper of the status quo. Because of their views, the so-called dissenters were labelled as "neo-isolationists." They saw themselves the true "internationalists," however, believing that the Cold War had led to confusion between internationalism and indiscriminate global involvement.

This thesis aims at analyzing the EU&rsquo / s quest for autonomous defence vis-&agrave / -vis NATO with a special reference to the ESDP. The major research question asked is what kind of relationship exists between the EU and NATO. Accordingly, the argument is that the EU&rsquo / s desire to gain autonomy through the ESDP is unlikely to pose a threat to the primacy of NATO in European Security. In this framework, firstly, the legacy of the Cold War and transition from the ESDI to the ESDP are discussed. Secondly, the political aspect of the EU-NATO relations is addressed by touching upon the views of major powers in the EU-NATO relations. The main obstacles for the development of the EU-NATO relations are explored in the third part. The last part is allocated to the recent developments in the EU-NATO relations within the post September 11 context. This thesis is concluded by suggesting that although the evolving nature of the EU-NATO relations does not provide sufficient evidence for giving a clear answer to whether the EU and NATO cohabitate or separate, the EU and NATO should strive for cohabitating and working together in a complementary and harmonious way.

This thesis attempts to portray the recent course of NATO-Russia relations in the post-Soviet era, especially in terms of the issue of NATO enlargement. In this thesis NATO has been considered not as military alliance but a security community in the sense that probably no NATO member would seriously consider the use of military force as a means of problem solving among themselves. Besides this thesis examines the current state of NATO and traces its transformation from the end of the Cold War to the post September 11 era. The thesis also examines the Russian foreign policy orientation in terms of NATO enlargement after the Cold War and it will also concentrate on the new security relationship after 11 September 2001 between NATO and Russia. The thesis argues that Russia&rsquo / s inability to improve its relations with NATO stands from the fact that post-Soviet Russian leadership has been unable to reform its military structure and security culture in accordance with NATO&rsquo / s attempts at redefining its identity and strategy in the post-Cold War.

Zugl.: Aachen,Techn. Hochsch., Diss., 2005