The immense inequalities between the world’s poor and the world’s rich have compelledphilosopher Thomas Pogge to develop a moral framework based on the Universal Declarationof Human Rights that challenges our most commonsense political moral views. Poggedisputes minimally and universally that we all have a negative duty not to harm so long as theharm is foreseeable and avoidable, rather than a positive duty to do well. Furthermore Poggeargues for an institutional view of negative duties flown from the fact that we all shape,uphold and impose institutions.With the help of three philosophers; Polly Vizard, Tim Hayward and Mathias Risse, Idebate a number of their raised objections to Thomas Pogge’s theory of institutional globaljustice which all focus on the controversial causal claim that the present global order causesglobal poverty. The objections discussed are (a) Vizard’s scrutinizing of Pogge’s notion ofresponsibility (b) Hayward’s call for a full causal account of how the global order is harmingthe poor and (c) Risse’s alternative baseline for harm. I argue that although Pogge has somepotential problems, he nevertheless is not contradicted by these objections to the extent thatthey themselves claim. I hold that the debated criticism appeals for further investigation andthat in light of the arguments in this thesis we have a negative duty not to harm and a positiveobligation to reform global unjust institutions in responding to global poverty.

Do global financial institutions and the governments of developed nations owe anything to the global poor? I argue that they do. In my view, the global poor are owed a form of assistance because of the unjust harms imposed upon them. The negative rights of the global poor, which are the rights involving freedom from unjust interference, are consistently violated by the global economic order (GEO). I demonstrate that the causal chain that connects global poverty directly with the policies of institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization reveals that the negative rights of the global poor are being violated. These violations occur through the effects of trade policies, unjustified sovereignty, and loan conditions, which serve to trap the poor in inescapable cycles of poverty. I argue that rather than relying on controversial accounts of the positive rights of the poor, and the appeals to charity that follow from them, we can ground the obligation to alleviate global poverty in negative rights, which are more minimal and widely accepted. My argument establishes that poverty poses a problem even if one does not see inequality as a problem in itself. I argue in support of Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach to poverty, which discusses the effects of poverty as a deprivation of a person’s abilities to do and be what she has reason to value. This approach identifies what is really at the heart of the problem with poverty: a deprivation of the ability to act in ways that allow the expression of basic freedoms, rather than merely a lack of resources or income. The negative rights approach to grounding an obligation to alleviate global poverty has traditionally been based on a conception of wrongdoing as a deprivation of basic needs. However, I contend that wrongdoing should be seen as a deprivation of fundamental capabilities instead. Using capability deprivations as a baseline for wrongdoing presents us with the theoretical resources required to create a foundation for an ecumenical theory of global justice, and the framework within which to demonstrate that the GEO has an obligation to help alleviate global poverty. / 2020-11-27T00:00:00Z

In his landmark work World Poverty and Human Rights, Thomas Pogge offers a novel approach to understanding the nature and extent of the obligations that citizens of wealthy states owe to their less fortunate counterparts in poor states. Pogge argues that the wealthy have weighty obligations to aid the global poor because the wealthy coercively impose institutions on the poor that leave their human rights, particularly their subsistence rights avoidably unfulfilled. Thus, Pogge claims that the wealthy states' obligations to the poor are ultimately generated by their negative duties, that is, their duties to refrain from harming. In this essay, I argue that Pogge cannot successfully appeal to negative duties in way that would appease his critics because his notion of a negative duty is seriously indeterminate, so much so as to compromise his ability to plausibly appeal to it.

Hunger currently plagues over one billion people around the world, leaving mainly women, children and rural communities in post-colonial developing countries unable to obtain their most basic need for nutrition. The fundamental human right to food is found to be a complex human right involving a combination of both positive and negative duties by states and international institutions in order for its guarantee. Hunger is not only remediable but is highly preventable. Main causal factors of hunger are outlined, with a focus on Thomas Pogge’s claim that coercive international institutions are largely responsible for world poverty. In this way, global institutions are responsible not to cause harm in their economic policies and unfair trade rules in order for individuals to obtain economic access to food and thus remedy their hunger.