The following master's thesis focuses on the development of the position of Russia towards the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe from 1991 till 2016. The relation is examined in four periods: 1991 - 2000, 2000 - 2008, 2008 - 2012 and 2012 - 2016. Based on the theory of neoclassical realism, I analyse the relative material capabilities of Russia as the independent variable, the intervening variables and the relation of Russia as the dependent variable in each of these four periods. The thesis is elaborated as a qualitative case study while the congruence method serves as the main method for comparing the variables.

Neoclassical realism has the ability to advance our understanding of foreign policy responses through the recently designed neoclassical realist model. However as international relations have proven, a theory is not a concrete motionless design. Improvements can be made and the fluidity of theory allows social sciences to adapt and advance. This thesis introduces developments to neoclassical realism by stating that the individual factors and intervening variables hold varying degrees of importance that alter between each foreign policy decision. There is no overarching set of instructions for 'foreign policy', rather an adaptable model that takes into consideration the geopolitical arena, the state and the statesman. The case study chosen for this thesis is the Russian foreign policy response to annex Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. Analysis and comparisons of the variables resulted in three factors standing out as most significant. The most important influence within the systemic stimuli was the nature of the strategic environment and the window of opportunity that arose in Crimea due to Ukrainian political and military instability. The intervening variable leader images proved to be the decisive factor, as the consolidation of power by Vladimir Putin allowed the annexation to be completed...

Considering the South China Sea dispute as a flashpoint of regional stability and power balance within the Southeast Asian region, the first failure in ASEAN history to reach a consensus in 2012 and the deadlock in 2016 on this issue brought up uncertainty towards the ability of ASEAN member states to reach a consensus on the South China Sea issue. This thesis seeks to analyze this issue based on neo-classical realism and the two-level games theory to what extent, if any, do the ASEAN member states’ domestic factors and external relations influence their decision towards the South China Sea dispute. The theoretical framework of neoclassical realism provides three indicators for analysis, which are national interests, domestic politics, and the role and perception of political leaders. The two-level games theory addresses on the preferences and coalitions within states, political institutions, and the role of chief negotiators as the three indicators to determine the win-sets of the ASEAN member states. The conclusions show the different win-sets size of ASEAN member states vary accordingly from a larger win-sets size of an authoritarian state to a smaller win-sets size of a more democratic state.

This study uses a neoclassical framework aiming to explain why different changes in foreign policy towards Cuba has occurred under the Trump-era. The main research question of the study is therefore: To what extent can neo-classical realism explain US policy changes towards Cuba during Trump's 2017-2021 term? The study identified three major changes that occured during the set time period that has been analysed through a neoclassical realist perspective. The material consists of a wide range from government documentation, reports, remarks, newspaper articles, academic work, tweets and more, to get a complete picture as possible. Three intervening variables grounded in neoclassical theory has been set up to analyse and find the material. The analysis concluded that domestic politics can have broad effect on foreign policy, which the neoclassical realism theory can identify.

La décision d’intervenir militairement ou non dans un conflit est certainement l’une des plus importantes qu’un État puisse prendre. Ces décisions sont coûteuses et très prégnantes tant au plan financier, politique que social. La recherche exposée vise à analyser les processus décisionnels canadiens en matière d’intervention militaire lors de la guerre du Golfe, la guerre en Afghanistan ainsi que la guerre en Irak. Le Canada est un cas très intéressant à étudier, car malgré son statut de puissance moyenne, il a pris part à sept conflits armés depuis 1867. Cette recherche tentera donc de déterminer ce qui motive le Canada à investir des ressources financières et humaines dans certains conflits, alors qu’il choisit de ne pas s’impliquer dans d’autres. Certaines théories des relations internationales affirment que la politique de défense des États est guidée par le désir de maximiser leur puissance sur la scène internationale. D’autres théories mettent plutôt l’accent sur les valeurs des États, ou bien sur leur intégration dans des institutions internationales. Ces différentes hypothèses soulèvent l’importance des facteurs internes et externes, mais ne permettent pas de savoir lesquels priment. Ainsi, grâce à un modèle de prise de décision réaliste néoclassique, synthétisant ces deux types de facteurs, il est possible de déterminer lesquels des éléments internes (contraintes de politique interne, perception des dirigeants) ou externes (position relative du Canada dans le système international) prédominent lors de la décision d’entrer ou non en guerre. / The decision to intervene militarily or not in a conflict is certainly one of the most important a government can take. These decisions are extremely significant financially, politically and socially costly. The research presented in this document analyzes decision-making processes in Canada during the Gulf War, the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq. Canada is a very interesting case to study because despite its middle power status, it took part in seven armed conflicts since September 1867. This research will therefore try to identify the reasons for Canada to invest financial and human resources in some conflicts, while it chooses not to get involved in others. Some theories of international relations argue that the defence policy of states is guided by the desire to maximize their power on the international stage. Other theories will instead focus on values or norms internalized by states, or their integration into international institutions. These different assumptions raise the importance of internal and external factors, but do not tell which will prevail. Thus, using a neoclassical realism model of decision making synthesizing these two factors, it will be possible to determine which internal (internal policy constraints, perceptions of managers) or external factors (Canada's relative position in the international system) dominate in the decision to go to war.

Ce mémoire vise la compréhension du mécanisme des choix stratégiques de l’Inde en fonction de la menace perçue de la Chine. Selon une logique réaliste néoclassique, l’étude de l’effet des contraintes systémiques et domestiques présente un paradoxe dans les volontés stratégiques indiennes. L’Inde est soumise à la pression systémique de la montée de la Chine dans un monde post-Guerre froide qui la verrouille dans sa position traditionnellement défensive, alors que sa volonté de projection de la puissance guidée par sa perception, ses idées et sa culture stratégique la porte à adopter une position plus offensive. L’Inde perçoit la menace chinoise de manière dissonante avec l’orientation stratégique chinoi-se. Elle se concentre ainsi sur des signaux et des indices particuliers afin de justifier cette me-nace perçue. C’est pourquoi l’ambiguïté du langage diplomatique de la Chine envers l’Arunachal Pradesh et de sa présence dans l’océan Indien engendre un accroissement de la menace chinoise et une réponse plus agressive conséquemment. La réponse stratégique in-dienne doit s’adapter aux changements de la puissance relative de la Chine. N’ayant pas les capacités relatives suffisantes, l’Inde choisit une stratégie située entre une émulation dans une logique de poursuite aux armements afin de maintenir la parité technologique et un engage-ment afin de désamorcer la rivalité et éviter une réaction chinoise pré-emptive. La culture stratégique de l’Inde traditionnellement défensive se transforme vers une position offensive sous l’effet du nation building du nationalisme hindou. Les préférences stratégiques indiennes agressives s’illustrent principalement dans le choc multidirectionnel des sphères d’influence sino-indiennes en Asie. / This thesis seeks to understand the process of India strategic choice based on the perceived threat of China. According to a neoclassical realism framework, the study of the effect of sys-temic and domestic constraints shows a paradox in India strategic intentions. India is lock in a defensive posture by the systemic pressure of China rise in a post-Cold War era, although its desire to project his power lead by its perception, ideas, and strategic culture shows a progres-sive shift for an offensive posture. India perceives China threat in dissonance with the strategic aims of China. It is focusing on specific signals and indices in order to justify the perceived threat. This is why China’s ambi-guity toward its diplomatic discourse concerning Arunachal Pradesh and its presence in the Indian Ocean creates an increase Chinese threat and therefore a more aggressive response. India’s strategic response must cope with the changes in China’s relative power. Without the necessary relative capacity, India chooses a strategy between emulation defined by a pursuit of armaments logic in order to keep the technologic parity and engagement for the purpose of defusing the rivalry and avoiding a pre-emptive reaction from China. Traditionally defensive India’s strategic culture progressively transforms itself under the influence of the Hindu na-tion building that clash with the nehruvian nationalism. The aggressive Indian strategic pref-erences principally show themselves in the multidirectional clash of India and China spheres of influence in Asia.

於1991年底蘇聯解體後正式獨立的白俄羅斯共和國，其與俄羅斯之間特殊的地緣政治因素、經濟上的依存關係、相近的種族文化與歷史傳統，促使兩國建立相較於獨立國家國協（Содружество Независимых Государств, СНГ/ Commonwealth of Independent States, CIS）更為緊密的政治、經濟、軍事、外交組織，亦即使兩國走向整合的白俄羅斯─俄羅斯聯盟（Союз Беларуси и России/ Union State of Russia and Belarus）。自1996年4月始，時任白俄羅斯總統的盧卡申科（Лукашенко, Александр Григорьевич, Alexander Grigoryevich Lukashenko）與前俄羅斯總統葉爾欽（Ельцин, Борис Николаевич, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin），就俄白聯盟簽署一系列協議，諸如《俄白共同體組織條約》（Договор об образовании Сообщества Беларуси и России）、《俄白聯盟條約》（Договор о Союзе Беларуси и России）、《關於進一步整合宣言》（Декларация о дальнейшем единении России и Беларуси）、《兩國公民權利平等條約》（Договор между Российской Федерацией и Республикой Беларусь о равных правах граждан）、《建立國家聯盟經濟共同體協議》（Соглашение о создании равных условий субъектам хозяйствования государств-союзников）和《建立聯盟國家條約》（Договор о создании Союзного государства）等，朝俄白整合目標邁進的條約。 然俄白聯盟自成立之初至今，負面批評不斷，且除了在軍事同盟上兩國具有較為成功的碩果外，其他領域均無突破性的進展。此外，俄白雙方兩次的油氣之爭與白俄羅斯兩次經濟危機俄羅斯態度不明的事件，使俄白整合蒙上陰影。另一方面，歐盟與北約的東擴，明顯以白俄羅斯、烏克蘭與喬治亞等前蘇聯衛星國為主要拉攏目標，在此國際因素影響下，如何解釋俄白雙方政府仍決定繼續俄白聯盟，是為此論文關注的焦點，並試圖以新古典現實主義的角度，由個案研究的途徑，分析解釋並預測俄白聯盟的發展。 / After the Soviet Union disintegrated, post-communist countries in East-Central Europe were either divided (the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia) or were reunited (the German Democratic Republic with Federal Republic of Germany). Meanwhile, these countries developed different patterns of association. Some of the newly independent states joined the European Union and NATO, while others formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) at the collapse of the USSR. Six of the former Soviet member states established the Collective Security Organization. Five of them established the Eurasian Economic Community. Four of them—Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine—formed the Single Economic Space. Among these nations, Belarus and Russia have built the closet relationship, first with a “Community” and then a “Union” in 1997. Belarus sits between Europe and Russia, but history shows its ambiguous leaning towards the latter. The country had been incorporated in the Russian Empire for two hundred years, and later also in the USSR. Belarus was also the Slavic republic that supported the USSR the most its the referendum on a “renewed union” held in March 1991. Furthermore, the referendum in November 1996 reconfirms the Russia-leaned stand of Belarus, which differs from other former Soviet member states in Middle-East Europe. Despite conflicts between the two countries and the political advancement from the West, Belarus and Russia still tend to compose Belarus-Russia Union on international platforms. This research focuses upon several analytic factors from the viewpoint of Neoclassical Realism, including ethnology, culture, geopolitics, economy, security, political interests, international environment, and leadership factors to examine the relationship between Belarus and Russia.

La décision d’intervenir militairement ou non dans un conflit est certainement l’une des plus importantes qu’un État puisse prendre. Ces décisions sont coûteuses et très prégnantes tant au plan financier, politique que social. La recherche exposée vise à analyser les processus décisionnels canadiens en matière d’intervention militaire lors de la guerre du Golfe, la guerre en Afghanistan ainsi que la guerre en Irak. Le Canada est un cas très intéressant à étudier, car malgré son statut de puissance moyenne, il a pris part à sept conflits armés depuis 1867. Cette recherche tentera donc de déterminer ce qui motive le Canada à investir des ressources financières et humaines dans certains conflits, alors qu’il choisit de ne pas s’impliquer dans d’autres. Certaines théories des relations internationales affirment que la politique de défense des États est guidée par le désir de maximiser leur puissance sur la scène internationale. D’autres théories mettent plutôt l’accent sur les valeurs des États, ou bien sur leur intégration dans des institutions internationales. Ces différentes hypothèses soulèvent l’importance des facteurs internes et externes, mais ne permettent pas de savoir lesquels priment. Ainsi, grâce à un modèle de prise de décision réaliste néoclassique, synthétisant ces deux types de facteurs, il est possible de déterminer lesquels des éléments internes (contraintes de politique interne, perception des dirigeants) ou externes (position relative du Canada dans le système international) prédominent lors de la décision d’entrer ou non en guerre. / The decision to intervene militarily or not in a conflict is certainly one of the most important a government can take. These decisions are extremely significant financially, politically and socially costly. The research presented in this document analyzes decision-making processes in Canada during the Gulf War, the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq. Canada is a very interesting case to study because despite its middle power status, it took part in seven armed conflicts since September 1867. This research will therefore try to identify the reasons for Canada to invest financial and human resources in some conflicts, while it chooses not to get involved in others. Some theories of international relations argue that the defence policy of states is guided by the desire to maximize their power on the international stage. Other theories will instead focus on values or norms internalized by states, or their integration into international institutions. These different assumptions raise the importance of internal and external factors, but do not tell which will prevail. Thus, using a neoclassical realism model of decision making synthesizing these two factors, it will be possible to determine which internal (internal policy constraints, perceptions of managers) or external factors (Canada's relative position in the international system) dominate in the decision to go to war.

Ce mémoire vise la compréhension du mécanisme des choix stratégiques de l’Inde en fonction de la menace perçue de la Chine. Selon une logique réaliste néoclassique, l’étude de l’effet des contraintes systémiques et domestiques présente un paradoxe dans les volontés stratégiques indiennes. L’Inde est soumise à la pression systémique de la montée de la Chine dans un monde post-Guerre froide qui la verrouille dans sa position traditionnellement défensive, alors que sa volonté de projection de la puissance guidée par sa perception, ses idées et sa culture stratégique la porte à adopter une position plus offensive. L’Inde perçoit la menace chinoise de manière dissonante avec l’orientation stratégique chinoi-se. Elle se concentre ainsi sur des signaux et des indices particuliers afin de justifier cette me-nace perçue. C’est pourquoi l’ambiguïté du langage diplomatique de la Chine envers l’Arunachal Pradesh et de sa présence dans l’océan Indien engendre un accroissement de la menace chinoise et une réponse plus agressive conséquemment. La réponse stratégique in-dienne doit s’adapter aux changements de la puissance relative de la Chine. N’ayant pas les capacités relatives suffisantes, l’Inde choisit une stratégie située entre une émulation dans une logique de poursuite aux armements afin de maintenir la parité technologique et un engage-ment afin de désamorcer la rivalité et éviter une réaction chinoise pré-emptive. La culture stratégique de l’Inde traditionnellement défensive se transforme vers une position offensive sous l’effet du nation building du nationalisme hindou. Les préférences stratégiques indiennes agressives s’illustrent principalement dans le choc multidirectionnel des sphères d’influence sino-indiennes en Asie. / This thesis seeks to understand the process of India strategic choice based on the perceived threat of China. According to a neoclassical realism framework, the study of the effect of sys-temic and domestic constraints shows a paradox in India strategic intentions. India is lock in a defensive posture by the systemic pressure of China rise in a post-Cold War era, although its desire to project his power lead by its perception, ideas, and strategic culture shows a progres-sive shift for an offensive posture. India perceives China threat in dissonance with the strategic aims of China. It is focusing on specific signals and indices in order to justify the perceived threat. This is why China’s ambi-guity toward its diplomatic discourse concerning Arunachal Pradesh and its presence in the Indian Ocean creates an increase Chinese threat and therefore a more aggressive response. India’s strategic response must cope with the changes in China’s relative power. Without the necessary relative capacity, India chooses a strategy between emulation defined by a pursuit of armaments logic in order to keep the technologic parity and engagement for the purpose of defusing the rivalry and avoiding a pre-emptive reaction from China. Traditionally defensive India’s strategic culture progressively transforms itself under the influence of the Hindu na-tion building that clash with the nehruvian nationalism. The aggressive Indian strategic pref-erences principally show themselves in the multidirectional clash of India and China spheres of influence in Asia.

This thesis examines the foreign policy evolution of Japan from the time of its modernization during the mid-nineteenth century though the present. It is argued that infringements upon Japanese sovereignty and geopolitical vulnerabilities have conditioned Japanese leaders towards power seeking policy objectives. The core variables of statehood, namely power and sovereignty, and the perception of state elites are traced over this broad time period to provide a historical foundation for framing contemporary analyses of Japanese foreign policy. To facilitate this research, a unique framework that accounts for both the foreign policy preferences of Japanese leaders and the external constraints of the international system is developed. Neoclassical realist understandings of self-help and relative power distributions form the basis of the presented analysis, while constructivism offers crucial insights into ideational factors that influence state elites. Social Identity Theory, a social psychology theory that examines group behavior, is integrated to conceptualize the available policy options. Surveying Japanese foreign policy through this framework clarifies the seemingly irreconcilable shifts in Japan's foreign policy history and clearly delineates between political groups that embody distinct policy strategies and norms. Consequently, the main contribution of this thesis lies in the development of a theoretical framework that is uniquely positioned to identify historical trends in foreign policy. Owing to the numerous shifts in modern Japan's foreign policy history, this research identifies and examines three distinguishable Japanese “states”: Meiji Japan (1868 - 1912), Imperial Japan (1912 - 1945), and postwar Japan (1945 - present).