Why do voters change their political behavior after negative events such as natural disasters and crime victimization? The extant literature tends to focus on how citizens punish or reward the incumbent based on a model of (mis)attribution of responsibilities. This approach overlooks the fact that affected voters might change their political preferences after the negative shock. Departing from the existing literature, I argue that affected citizens, in addition to evaluating incumbent performance, are also selecting the political leader they believe can most enhance their well-being after the negative event. In particular, I hold that affected voters focus on improving their living conditions, which leads them to pay attention to the policy issues that can help them achieve that goal. As a consequence, victims are more likely to prefer candidates better able to address these new policy preferences. Under adverse conditions, these individuals will vote for political candidates whom they would not select under other circumstances. In each of the three chapters of this dissertation, I provide evidence to support different aspects of this main argument. In the first chapter, I study the political consequences of natural disasters. According to my theory, citizens affected by catastrophes seek to reduce the gap between their living conditions before and after the disaster. This leads them to focus on welfare and social policies – for example, the construction of new housing. Consequently, they are more inclined to vote for parties or persons associated with those measures, typically left-wing candidates. To test this argument, I use a natural experiment created by flash floods that occurred in Chile in 2015, which produced random variation in exposure to the natural disaster. I then measure voters’ political preferences using a conjoint survey experiment, and find that disaster victims are more likely to prefer left-wing candidates. In addition, grounded in two months of fieldwork in the affected area, I provide qualitative evidence that illustrates how disaster victims emphasize the importance of welfare policies that can improve their standard of living. In the second chapter, I show how disaster victims after the 2010 earthquake in Chile select housing and not infrastructure as a top priority after the catastrophe. These results help us better understand why disaster victims are more likely to vote for left-wing politicians: affected citizens are particularly concerned about the reconstruction of their houses, and in consequence, should be more likely to vote for candidates who can be linked with those specific welfare policies. To study how the earthquake modified victims’ political priorities, I rely on survey data before and after this negative event comparing exposed and unexposed counties. In the third chapter, I study how crime victims change their policy preferences. I show that affected citizens are more likely to support strong-handed measures to reduce crime, such as allowing state repression. These results reveal that exposure to crime can change what people think the state should be allowed to do, which can have important political implications. To study the impact of crime on victims’ preferences, I use panel data from Brazil and I implement strategies for reducing sensitivity to hidden biases, such as focusing on individuals who were not crime victims during a previous wave.

In the presence of business groups, the expropriation through related party transactions (RPTs) is common and costly to minority shareholders. At the same time, it is well recognized that RPTs can help firms overcome market shortcomings. Using the setting of India's RPT voting rule, I find that a mandatory and binding shareholder voting mechanism helps filter out expropriation. Minority shareholders actively raise their voice against RPT resolutions, resulting in substantial shareholder dissent. My difference-in-difference analysis reveals that shareholder voting has a significant deterrence effect on RPT volume, especially on financial RPTs. I also find that stock prices react positively to news signaling the passage of the voting rule, and that the association between firm profitability and RPT increases following rule's adoption, suggesting that rule has a positive effect on shareholder value. Lastly, I show that mandatory RPT voting makes Indian firms more attractive to foreign institutional investors.

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This dissertation asks three fundamental questions about representation in American cities. Who serves as mayor? How do voters select mayors? And, do mayors shape policy? Responsible for funding and providing essential services, municipal governments have a huge impact on the public's safety and quality of life. As chief elected officials, mayors are unquestionably important but also understudied political actors. A number of rich and detailed case studies provide valuable insights on individual mayors and their influence, but quantitative cross-city studies have yielded mixed findings on mayors' abilities to affect outcomes. To date, efforts to comprehensively and systematically study mayors have been hampered by a lack of data. To overcome these data limitations, I amassed an original dataset that includes detailed background information on more than 3,200 mayoral candidates, covering nearly 300 U.S. cities over the last 60 years. My data reveal that mayors, like politicians at higher levels of government, are not very representative of their constituents---they are much more likely to be white and male, with prior political experience and white-collar careers. Business owners and executives are especially well represented in American city halls, accounting for about 32% candidates and mayors. This study provides compelling new evidence that mayors can and do influence policy outcomes. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that business executive mayors shape spending priorities, leading to significantly lower levels of spending on redistributive programs and greater investment in infrastructure. Perhaps counterintuitively, electing a business executive mayor appears to have little effect on the overall size of government. However, suggestive evidence indicates that they may increase local revenue, but in the form of fees and charges rather than taxes. My findings suggest that business executives preside over policy changes with implications for the distribution of both costs and benefits of local government. In another component of the dissertation, I employ a conjoint survey experiment to investigate why voters so often elect business executives. The experimental results suggest that a candidate's experience as a business owner or executive is likely to influence voters preferences and evaluations. These findings are consistent with longstanding claims that voters rely on candidate characteristics, such as race, ethnicity, or incumbency, as information shortcuts in the absence of party cues. Notably, the cues they use may vary with party identification. In nonpartisan contests, political experience has an even stronger influence on the preferences of Democratic respondents, while Republicans give more weight to occupation. Overall, my experimental results suggest that electoral institutions may interact with voters' preferences to shape descriptive representation. At the same time, my analyses of new observational data on mayoral candidates document striking deficits of descriptive representation in America's cities and suggest that who serves in office has meaningful policy consequences.

This thesis consists of three stand-alone chapters studying theoretical models concerning a range of issues that take place within the context of political delegation: tax enforcement, political selection, electoral campaigning. First chapter studies the problem of a small electorate of workers who cannot influence tax rates but can influence their local politicians to interfere with tax enforcement. It develops a two-candidate Downsian voting model where voters are productivity-heterogenous workers who supply labour to a local firm that can engage in costly tax evasion while facing an exogenously given payroll tax collected at the firm level. Two purely office motivated local politicians compete in a winner-takes-all election by offering fine reductions to take place if the firm gets caught evading. Two results stand out. First, equilibrium tax evasion is (weakly) increasing in the productivity of the median voter as a result of the latter demanding a weaker enforcement regime through more aggressive fine reductions. Second, if politicians were able to propose and commit on tax rates as well, then the enforcement process would be interference-free and the tax level would coincide with the median voter's optimal level. These two results underline the fact that from voters' perspective, influencing enforcement policy is an imperfect substitute for influencing tax policy in achieving an optimal redistribution scheme due to tax evasion being costly. In other words, a lax enforcement pattern in a given polity can be indicative of a political demand arising as an attempt to attain a redistributive second-best when influencing tax policy is not a possibility. Second chapter turns attention to the role and incentives of media in the context of ex ante political selection, i.e. at the electoral participation level. It constructs a signalling model with pure adverse selection where a candidate whose quality is private information decides on whether to challenge an incumbent whose quality is common knowledge given an electorate composed of voters who are solely interested in electing the best politician. Electoral participation is costly and before the election, a benevolent media outlet which is assumed to be acting in the best interest of voters decides on whether to undertake a costly investigation that may or may not reveal challenger's quality and transmit this information to voters. The focus of the chapter is on studying the selection and incentive effects of changes in media's information technology. The setting creates a strategic interaction between challenger entry and media activity, which gives rise to two main results. First, an improvement in media's information technology, whether due to cost reductions or gains in investigative strength always (weakly) improves ex ante selection by increasing minimum challenger quality in equilibrium. Second, while lower information costs always (weakly) make the media more active, an higher media strength may reduce its journalistic activity, especially if it is already strong. The intuition behind this asymmetry is simple. While both types of improvements increase media's expected net benefits from journalism, a boost to its investigative strength also makes the media more threatening for inferior challengers at a given level of journalistic activity. Combining this with the first result implies that the media can afford being more passive without undermining selection if it is sufficiently strong to begin with. In short, a strong media might lead to a relatively passive media, even though the media is "working as intended". Third chapter is about electoral campaigns. More precisely, it is a theoretical investigation into one possible audience-related cause for diverging campaign structures of different candidates competing for the same office: state of political knowledge in an electorate. Electorate is assumed to consist of a continuum of voters heterogenous along two dimensions: policy preferences and political knowledge. The latter is assumed to partition the set of voters into ignorant and informed segments, with the former consisting of voters who are unable to condition their voting decisions on the policy dimension. Political competition takes place within a probabilistic voting setting with two candidates, but instead of costless policy proposals as in a standard probabilistic voting model, it revolves around campaigning. Electoral campaigning is modelled as a limited resource allocation problem between two activities: policy campaigning and valence campaigning. The former permits candidates to relocate from their initial policy positions (reputations or legacies), which are assumed to be at the opposing segments of the policy space (i.e. left and right). The latter allows them to generate universal support via a partisanship effect and can be interpreted as an investment into non-policy campaign content such as impressionistic advertising, recruitment of writers capable of producing emotionally appealing speeches, etc. The chapter has two central results. First, a candidate's resource allocation to valence campaigning increases with the fraction of ignorant voters, ideological (non-policy) heterogeneity of informed voters and proximity of candidate's initial position to the bliss point of the informed pseudo-swing voter. The last one results from decreasing relative marginal returns for politicians from converging to pseudo- swing voter's ideal position. Second, even if candidates are otherwise symmetric, a monotonic association between policy preferences and political knowledge can induce divergence into campaign structures. For instance, if ignorance and policy preferences are positively correlated (e.g. less educated preferring more public good) then the left candidate would conduct a campaign with a heavier valence focus and vice versa. Underlying this result is again the decreasing relative marginal returns argument: a candidate whose initial position is already close to that of the informed pseudo-swing voter would benefit more from a valence oriented campaign. An implication of this is that a party that is known having a relatively more ignorant voter base can end up conducting a much more policy focused campaign compared to a party that is largely associated with politically aware voters.

Japan has maintained a low profile in its diplomacy since the end of World War II, relying heavily on the United States for its security and prosperity. The cold war structure allowed Japan to maintain its passive foreign policy behavior. By the end of 1980s, West-East confrontations largely ended and global issues such as arms control, environmental problem, human rights, economic development, and ethnic conflicts became the main international concerns. It was expected that in this changed world environment, Japan as an economic power, would take on a more active international role. Yet Japan has not shown any significant political initiative despite of its willingness to contribute to international peace and prosperity. The primary purpose of this thesis is to identify the underlying factors that have kept Japan from being a strong voice and taking initiatives in world affairs. This study presents Japan's official guidelines on global issues as its foreign policy. The guidelines indicate that Japanese foreign policy is too general and broad; it aims at cooperation with everybody. Japan's foreign-policy behavior is represented by its voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly. Inasmuch as it has adopted a U.N.-centered diplomacy, I believe that Japan's voting in the U.N. delineates its foreign-policy behavior. A statistical method of factor analysis I apply in this study delineates Japan's stance and voting cohesion issue by issue. The voting maps reveal Japan's ambivalent stance on most of the issues. Japan's voting pattern often does not follow its idealistic guidelines. The study further inquires into the discrepancy between Japan's foreign policy and its foreign-policy behavior. The main reasons seem to stem from its dependent security relations with the United States, the close economic ties with Asian countries and the oil-producing Middle East states, and historical constraints in relations with Asia. In addition, Japan's ambiguous foreign policy guidelines are themselves a factor which creates the discrepancy. These factors prevent Japan from independently reacting to international incidents. Yet given its financial and technological advances, Japan could play a leading role within the framework of international organizations, especially on global environmental issues.

Compared to most Western democracies, voter turnout in the United States is consistently lower. Individuals from disadvantaged groups such as the poor are also less likely to vote than more affluent citizens. To counteract these trends, American state governments since the 1970s have adopted election reform laws (early voting, no-excuse absentee or mail voting, and Same Day Registration [SDR] voting) to make voting easier for the citizen. Paradoxically, most research on election reform laws has found that these laws have a minimal effect on turnout, and do not reduce disparities between more and less advantaged voting groups. This study argues that past studies have not properly accounted for features of a state’s electoral system – combinations of voting reform laws, election administration, and history of turnout – that structure the impacts of these laws on turnout. The goal of this research is to re-evaluate the performance of these election reform laws by contextualizing the laws in a state’s electoral system. This study makes several unique contributions to the literature on election reform laws. First, convenience voting laws and state election administration are reframed as components of the overall accessibility of a state’s electoral system. Using a policy feedback framework, this reframing recognizes how citizens, political campaigns, and accessible electoral systems shape turnout. The study then evaluates the effects of accessible electoral systems on overall turnout, and turnout among the poor. Additionally, this project analyzes how these laws structure the mobilization strategies of political campaigns. Finally, this research utilizes two large datasets containing millions of respondents from all fifty American states (Catalist and the Cooperative Congressional Election Study) with advanced statistical methods to assess the effects of these laws at the individual level in the 2008-2014 midterm and presidential elections. After controlling for the accessibility of state electoral systems, this research finds that convenience voting laws do increase turnout, encourage participation from the least likely voting groups, motivate campaigns to mobilize voters, and reduce turnout inequality.

What factors motivate members of minority groups to vote based on an ethnic attachment? What motivates candidates and political parties to make appeals to specific ethnic groups? I argue that ethnic voting is more likely to emerge when individual socialization experiences and dissatisfaction increase the salience of ethnic identity, contextual factors serve to politicize this salient identity, and the mobilization potential of the ethnic group is high, making it more likely that an ethnic-based appeal will be successful. I test this theory with a combination of regional-level large-N statistical comparisons, case studies, and individual-level survey data. I primarily examine party voting in the Baltic Republics and Ukraine. In these systems, I contend, ethnic voting may manifest support for traditional ethnic parties but also support for more mainstream but ethnically inclusive parties. These inclusive parties, generally overlooked in the ethnic politics literature, are an important component of ethnic representation and an important addition to research on ethnic voting. While in this work I focus on the Russian minority in the countries of the former Soviet Union, the general theory I develop may be applied to ethnic minorities in other political environments.

La facilitation est un élément central dans une prise de décision de groupe surtout en faisant l'usage des outils de nouvelle technologie. Le facilitateur, pour rendre sa tâche facile, a besoin des solutions de vote pour départager les décideurs afin d'arriver à des conclusions dans une prise de décision. Une procédure de vote consiste à déterminer à partir d’une méthode le vainqueur ou le gagnant d’un vote. Il y a plusieurs procédures de vote dont certaines sont difficiles à expliquer et qui peuvent élire différents candidats/options/alternatives proposées. Le meilleur choix est celui dont son élection est acceptée facilement par le groupe. Le vote dans la théorie du choix social est une discipline largement étudiée dont les principes sont souvent complexes et difficiles à expliquer lors d’une réunion de prise de décision. Les systèmes de recommandation sont de plus en plus populaires dans tous les domaines de science. Ils peuvent aider les utilisateurs qui n’ont pas suffisamment d’expérience ou de compétence nécessaires pour évaluer un nombre élevé de procédures de vote existantes. Un système de recommandation peut alléger le travail du facilitateur dans la recherche d’une procédure vote adéquate en fonction du contexte de prise de décisions. Le sujet de ce travail de recherche s’inscrit dans le champ de l’aide à la décision de groupe. La problématique consiste à contribuer au développement d’un système d’aide à la décision de groupe (Group Decision Support System : GDSS). La solution devra s’intégrer dans la plateforme logicielle actuellement développée à l’IRIT GRUS : GRoUp Support. / Facilitation is a central element in decision-making, especially when using new technology tools. The facilitator, to make his task easy, needs voting solutions to decide between decision-makers in order to reach conclusions in a decision-making process. A voting procedure consists of determining from a method the winner of a vote. There are several voting procedures, some of which are difficult to explain and which may elect different candidate/options/alternatives proposed. The best choice is the one whose election is easily accepted by the group. Voting in social choice theory is a widely studied discipline whose principles are often complex and difficult to explain at a decision-making meeting. Recommendation systems are becoming more and more popular in all fields of science. They can help users who do not have sufficient experience or competence to evaluate large numbers of existing voting procedures. A recommendation system can lighten the facilitator's workload in finding an appropriate voting procedure based on the decision-making context. The objective of this research work is to design such recommendation system. This work is in the field of group decision support. The issue is to contribute to the development of a Group Decision Support System (GDSS). The solution will have to be integrated into the software platform currently being developed at IRITGRUS: GRoUp Support.

Young people in the Western world demonstrate that they have little connection to democratic processes through their increasing absence from the polls at election time. This trend is evidenced in New Zealand where the secondary school curriculum has little content concerning electoral and political processes. Low voter turn-out is particularly prevalent in the triennial local body elections where only a small proportion of all eligible voters participate.This research is based within two North Shore City secondary schools and has two objectives. The first to establish the current understanding of Year 13 students of the local authority, its activities, governance and decision-making processes and the second to assess the effect of this information on the election activity of the participants. Following the provision of this information to the selected classes and after 2004 local authority elections, the same classes completed questionnaires to ascertain whether their participation (voting and non-voting) in the elections was affected by this intervention. A post-election focus group of non-school-based newly eligible voters enabled some qualitative inquiry into rationale and attitudes.The findings indicate a wide degree of ignorance and reinforce the current political situation where young people see no relevance to them of local authority politics. The research highlights the need to engage young people in civic matters and increase their ownership of and involvement in the democratic process.